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Abstract
The Sixties were time of conflict and change in Canada and beyond. Radical social
movements and countercultures challenged the conservatism of the preceding decade,
rejected traditional forms of politics, and demanded an alternative based on the principles
of social justice, individual freedom and an end to oppression on all fronts. Yet in
Canada a unique political movement emerged which embraced these principles but
proposed that New Left social movements – the student and anti-war movements, the
women’s liberation movement and Canadian nationalists – could bring about radical
political change not only through street protests and sit-ins, but also through participation
in electoral politics. The Waffle movement, which formed around the “Manifesto for an
Independent and Socialist Canada” and challenged the leadership of the New Democratic
Party (NDP) from 1969 to 1973, represents a dynamic convergence of many of the social
movements that comprised the New Left in Canada. The Waffle argued that the NDP
should promote socialist measures to combat American economic domination and ensure
Canadian independence while simultaneously engaging with extra-parliamentary
struggles. NDP and trade-union leaders, reluctant to adopt such a radical approach,
expelled the Waffle from the Ontario NDP in 1972. Despite its short life-span, the
Waffle had a considerable influence on Canadian politics and the issues that it raised –
Canadian economic dependency, Quebec’s right to self-determination, women’s equality,
and the decline of the manufacturing sector, among others – continue to resonate to this
day. Furthermore, the Waffle’s impact on Canadian nationalism and its legacy in the
NDP, labour and women’s movements, radical left and academia remain contested. The
Waffle’s successes and failures represent a potentially revealing perspective on Canadian
politics and society during a period of rapid social change, the Sixties. While the existing
historiography has sketched the outlines of the Waffle’s history, the focus overall has
been limited to analyses of internal leadership disputes and the experience of the Ontario
Waffle in particular. Abundant research materials now exist to support a wider and more
intensive examination. Through an analysis of the Waffle, focusing on grassroots
activists as well as the movement’s leadership, this dissertation demonstrates important
connections between the Waffle and other New Left social movements. This
interconnectivity is particularly significant, as it indicates that the Waffle occupied a
unique place in the international New Left, specifically a convergence of social
movements which sought to engage with electoral politics through an existing political
party, the NDP. The dissertation also revises the movement/party dichotomy which has
dominated much of the Waffle/NDP historiography. Finally, my study of the Waffle, a
group active from 1969-75, indicates the flaws of applying a declension narrative to the
Canadian Sixties, instead demonstrating the value of a “long Sixties” approach. As the
clock ticked down on the 1960s, the Canadian New Left neither died nor retreated into
cynicism nor lashed out in violence. Instead, its diverse elements, led by the Waffle,
nurtured the wild dream of redirecting and leading to triumph an established political
party.
Keywords: History, Politics, Social movements, New Democratic Party (NDP), New
Left, Protest, Nationalism, Sixties, Feminism, Women’s Movement, Unions, Labour
Movement, Marxism, Radicalism
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Statement for the Lay Person
The Sixties were time of conflict and change in Canada and beyond. Radical social
movements and countercultures challenged the conservatism of the preceding decade,
rejected traditional forms of politics, and demanded an alternative based on the principles
of social justice, individual freedom and an end to oppression on all fronts. Yet in
Canada a unique political movement emerged which embraced these principles but
proposed that New Left social movements – the student and anti-war movements, the
women’s liberation movement and Canadian nationalists – could bring about radical
political change not only through street protests and sit-ins, but also through participation
in electoral politics. The Waffle movement, which formed around the “Manifesto for an
Independent and Socialist Canada” and challenged the leadership of the New Democratic
Party (NDP) from 1969 to 1973, represents a dynamic convergence of many of the social
movements that comprised the New Left in Canada. The Waffle argued that the NDP
should promote socialist measures to combat American economic domination and ensure
Canadian independence while simultaneously engaging with extra-parliamentary
struggles. NDP and trade-union leaders, reluctant to adopt such a radical approach,
expelled the Waffle from the Ontario NDP in 1972. Despite its short life-span, the
Waffle had a considerable influence on Canadian politics and the issues that it raised –
Canadian economic dependency, Quebec’s right to self-determination, women’s equality,
and the decline of the manufacturing sector, among others – continue to resonate to this
day. Furthermore, the Waffle’s impact on Canadian nationalism and its legacy in the
NDP, labour and women’s movements, radical left and academia remain contested.
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1
Introduction
The Sixties heralded a period of significant social transformation, the effects of
which reverberate to the present day. Yet historians have only begun to explore the
diversity of social movements which demanded sweeping political, social and cultural
change during this critical period of Canadian history. Many of these social movements
comprised the Canadian New Left, and while pursuing distinctive goals they also shared
a political voice in the Waffle movement which formed around the “Manifesto for an
Independent and Socialist Canada.” The Waffle movement, in challenging the leadership
of the New Democratic Party (NDP) from 1969 to 1972, thus represents a dynamic
convergence of many of the social movements comprising the New Left in Canada. The
Waffle argued that the NDP should promote socialist measures to combat American
economic domination and ensure Canadian independence while simultaneously engaging
in “extra-parliamentary” struggles. NDP and trade union leaders, reluctant to adopt such
a radical and militant approach, expelled the Waffle from the Ontario NDP in 1972. By
the mid-1970s the national movement had lost momentum and faded into irrelevancy as a
political force.
In October 1969 the debate over the “Manifesto for an Independent and Socialist
Canada,” commonly known as the Waffle Manifesto, at the national convention of the
NDP in Winnipeg excited delegates and party members and placed the NDP on the front
pages of Canadian newspapers.1 Written by a group of radical intellectuals and presented

1

The group’s odd name came from a comment made at one of the meetings, when a participant suggested
the way out of an impasse in discussion, commenting “If we’re going to waffle, I’d rather waffle to the left
than waffle to the right.” Hugh Winsor, a Globe and Mail reporter and signatory of the Manifesto,
described the comment to Jean Horwath, the Globe’s chief editorial writer, and the paper’s editorial was
titled “The Waffle Manifesto.” James Laxer recalled, “we knew it would be a problem to have a left-wing
group that was seen as too serious, so to have a name that was humorous was just great. We knew right

2
to the convention as a potential party policy, the document boldly proclaimed “our aim as
democratic socialists is to build an independent socialist Canada.”2 Suggesting that the
NDP “must be seen as the parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental
social change,” the authors argued that “American corporate capitalism is the dominant
factor shaping Canadian society… it is an empire characterized by militarism abroad and
racism at home.”3 Criticizing Canadian economic underdevelopment and American
economic domination, the Manifesto called for a socialist response:
Relevant instruments for bringing the Canadian economy under Canadian
ownership and control and for altering the priorities established by corporate
capitalism are at hand. They include extensive public control over investment and
nationalization of the commanding heights of the economy, such as the key
resources industries, finance and credit, and industries strategic to planning our
economy.4
The Manifesto’s authors also argued for workers’ participation in industrial decisionmaking and, in possibly the most controversial section, recognized the existence of two
nations within Canada, English and French, “each with its own language, culture and
aspirations.”5 The Manifesto concluded with a rousing call to action, calling on the NDP
to lead the struggle for an independent and socialist Canada.
The debate over the Waffle Manifesto, which the authors had released publicly
two months earlier, animated the NDP convention and drew national media attention.
But the NDP leadership and much of its membership rejected the document’s “antiAmerican” tone and calls for a radical socialist response. David Lewis, the party’s
deputy leader and, in the view of many, the architect of the modern NDP, led the debate
away that it was a great name.” Quotation in Cameron Smith, Unfinished Journey: The Lewis Family
(Toronto: Summerhill Press, 1989), 579.
2
Appendix B “The Waffle Manifesto.”
3
Ibid.
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
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against the Waffle Manifesto, warning that its “arid nationalism or anti-Americanism”
would place the party in an “ideological straitjacket.”6 Lewis argued that “to bury the
party’s policy on economic independence in words foreign to the Canadian people and
put around it a lot of their issues, is to lose the objective and betray the people of
Canada.”7 Tommy Douglas, the NDP leader, described the Manifesto as “ambiguous and
ambivalent.”8 John Harney, secretary of the Ontario NDP, criticized the section on
Quebec, suggesting it advocated Quebec separatism. Mel Watkins, an economist and one
of the Manifesto’s primary authors, defended the document, describing the American
system as “the military-industrial complex,” and saying “In this century Canada has been
absorbed into the American system, and has become a resource base and consumer
market for the American economic empire.” Watkins called on the NDP to support
socialist measures, including extensive public ownership, in order to roll back “the
dangerous extent to which our economy is owned and controlled by the American
corporate elite.”9 Watkins’s arguments failed to persuade many of the delegates. The
convention rejected adopting the Waffle Manifesto as NDP policy by a vote of 499 to
268.10 Manifesto supporters nevertheless agreed they would continue organizing after the
convention in an ongoing effort to radicalize the NDP. Their efforts, and the conflict
with the party leadership they engendered, would shape the NDP and the broader
Canadian left for the next three years and beyond.

6

Jack Cahill, “Anti-American’ Watkins manifesto rejected by New Democratic Party,” Toronto Star,
October 31, 1969.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Murray Goldblatt and Roger Newman, “NDP delegates reject Watkins manifesto by margin of nearly 2
to 1,” Globe and Mail, October 31, 1969. At its maximum the Waffle mailing list included 2500-3000
names, less than 10% of the NDP’s approximately 50,000 members.
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Although previous scholarship has examined the Waffle in Ontario, Saskatchewan
and New Brunswick, this dissertation broadens our understanding of the movement’s
significance by examining the Waffle from as close to a national perspective as available
sources permit. Existing scholarship treats New Left social movements as distinct
entities without exploring their interconnectedness, much less their relationship with the
NDP. Yet these connections are important. Linked ideologically by a belief in the need
for radical and possibly revolutionary change, many New Left activists developed
political ties across social movements and therefore had to negotiate differences of class,
race, gender, age and sexuality. Furthermore, previous studies of the New Left have
either ignored or dismissed the relationship between radical social movements and
electoral politics. This study, by revealing the convergence of social movement activists
within the Waffle and their willingness to engage with the NDP, a mainstream political
party, shows that the Canadian New Left did not dismiss electoral politics as a means for
achieving radical change.11 Therefore, while my principal focus is on the Waffle, I also
consider the backgrounds, constituencies and historical trajectories of other social
11

A cursory glance over the history of the international New Left suggests that few New Left social
movements sought such extensive engagement with an existing political party as did the Waffle with the
NDP. In the United States, the Democratic Party’s unwillingness to seat the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party’s delegation at the party’s 1964 national convention scuttled the hopes of many young
civil rights activists, and any remaining hopes for the Democrats died with Robert Kennedy’s assassination
and the 1968 Democratic Convention in Chicago, during which police violently clashed with protesters on
the streets and Eugene McCarthy’s anti-war campaign for the presidential nomination ended in defeat.
Although activists continued to work with Democrats at the local level, New Left social movements largely
forsook the Democratic Party as an effective means for radical change. See Maurice Isserman and Michael
Kazin, America Divided: The Civil War of the 1960s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). In
Britain, efforts from 1957-61 by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament to force the Labour Party to adopt
a policy of unilateral disarmament failed, and the social movements turned their attention away from
electoral politics until the 1980s. See Adam Lent, British Social Movements Since 1945: Sex, Colour,
Peace and Power (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 45-6, 168-73). In Germany, although the New Left grew
out of the Social Democratic Party’s (SPD) nuclear disarmament campaigns in the late 1950s, activists
largely worked outside of electoral politics – the SPD discredited by its governing coalition with the
Christian Democrats. See Cyril Levitt, Children of Privilege: Student Revolt in the Sixties (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1984).
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movements including the student movement, the women’s movement, and Canadian left
nationalism.
This dissertation addresses several historiographical gaps and issues. First, it
describes and discusses the Waffle as a national phenomenon, thereby providing a
comprehensive account of what has hitherto been a piecemeal treatment of an important
chapter in the larger history of the NDP. Second, it contributes to the growing body of
academic literature concerned with the periodization of the era of political, social and
cultural radicalism and upheaval commonly known as the “Sixties.” Third, it addresses
how a relatively small socialist and nationalist political movement influenced the
popularity of Canadian economic nationalism and the related shift away from the
country’s longstanding British identity during the “Long Sixties.” Finally, the
dissertation assesses the history of the Waffle by rejecting the flawed “movement/party”
dichotomy that has long been applied to histories of the CCF/NDP. Previous scholars
have interpreted the Waffle primarily within the context of CCF/NDP historiography,
with most authors adopting a movement-versus-party dichotomy to explain the group’s
appeal as well as its ultimate demise. Instead, I analyze the Waffle within its historical
context, highlight its connections with other New Left social movements, and examine its
efforts to influence the NDP from a New Left perspective.
The American historian Van Gosse argues persuasively that scholars have defined
the New Left too narrowly by focusing on the young, white, college-based anti-war
movement and the national American organization, Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS), in particular.12 Gosse defines the New Left more broadly, as a “movement of

12

5.

Van Gosse Rethinking the New Left: An Interpretative History (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005),
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movements,” thereby recognizing the important overlap that occurred among New Left
groups. Adopting a broader definition of the New Left has prompted scholars to question
when the ‘Sixties,’ as shorthand for a unique period of political and cultural upheaval,
truly occurred.13 The growth and activity of the women’s, gay and lesbian rights,
environmental, Black and Red Power movements in the early 1970s suggests a “Long
Sixties” periodization extending to 1975.14 Significantly, this approach challenges a
popular interpretation of the Sixties as a dichotomy by which an idealistic, unified, nonviolent and optimistic New Left of the early “Sixties” is separated from the cynical,
disparate, confrontational, and pessimistic New Left of the late “Sixties.”15 My study
contributes to a revision of the declension narrative that dominates the historiography of
the Sixties. The Waffle’s emergence in 1969, its activism in the NDP until 1972, and its
connections with other social movements active in this period indicate a necessary
reappraisal of the decline of the New Left in the late Sixties and suggests the
appropriateness of a “Long Sixties” periodization extending into the early 1970s.

13

Andrew Hunt, “‘When Did the Sixties Happen?’ Searching for New Directions,” Journal of Social
History 33, 1 (1999): 147-61.
14
I first came across this term in Joan Sangster, “Radical Ruptures: Feminism, Labor and the Left in the
Long Sixties in Canada,” American Review of Canadian Studies 40, no. 1 (2010), 1-21. Sangster uses the
phrase “the Long Sixties” to refer to the period 1965-1975. Other historians have extended the “Long
Sixties” back into the 1950s, an approach which can, as Bryan Palmer suggests, obscure the significant
ruptures that occurred in the 1960s in favour of emphasizing historical continuities. Bryan Palmer, Review
of New World Coming: The Sixties and the Shaping of Global Consciousness, eds. Karen Dubinsky,
Catherine Krull, Susan Lord, Sean Mills and Scott Rutherford, Left History 14, no. 1 (2009), 99.
15
Perhaps the most obvious example of this dichotomy is Todd Gitlin’s The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of
Rage (New York: Bantam Books, 1987), although this dichotomy appears repeatedly even in more nuanced
accounts. Andrea Levy’s article “Progeny and Progress? Reflections on the Legacy of the New Left” in
The New Left: Legacy and Continuity, ed. Dimitrios Roussopoulos (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 2007)
acknowledges the false dichotomy between the “good Sixties” and “bad Sixties” even as she reinforces it.
The contested legacy of the Sixties in the United States, particularly the conservative backlash against the
New Left, may have contributed to the dichotomous treatment. See Peter Collier and David Horowitz,
Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About the ‘60s (New York: Summit Books/Simon & Schuster,
1989) for a particularly incendiary example of the conservative backlash against the New Left and the
“Sixties.”
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The history of the Waffle indicates that one pre-existing interpretation of the
Sixties is long overdue for revision. The dichotomy between the New Left of the early
“Sixties” and the New Left of the late “Sixties,” documented by Todd Gitlin in his book
on the American New Left, Years of Hope, Days of Rage, has been too readily adopted
by students of the Canadian Sixties, including Cyrill Levitt, Myrna Kostash and Doug
Owram. For example, national student organizations such as the Canadian Union of
Students dismantled by 1969, yet large student protests continued at individual
universities into the 1970s. And the range of social movements which comprised the
New Left in Canada extended well beyond national student organizations. Second-wave
feminist, gay liberation, environmentalist, and aboriginal rights movements only began to
emerge and influence Canadian politics and society during the 1970s.16 Similarly, the
heyday of Canadian economic nationalism was the 1970s. An examination of the Waffle,
which emerged in 1969 and remained active until 1975, reveals important connections
between the mid-Sixties New Left, dominated by the student movement, and lateSixties/early-Seventies social movements which have had a lasting impact on Canadian
society. Compared to the plethora of published research on the American Sixties, the
historiography of the Canadian Sixties long remained relatively undeveloped. Three key
books, Myrna Kostash’s Long Way from Home, Cyrill Levitt’s Children of Privilege, and

16

The New Left won important victories in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the supposed period of decline.
For example, the “Stop Spadina, Save Our Community Co-ordinating Committee” was formed in October
1969 and successfully prevented the construction of the Spadina Expressway in Toronto when Premier Bill
Davis cancelled the project in 1971. The declension narrative is so popular among scholars of the Sixties
that it appears even when the chronology directly contradicts such an interpretation. Thus, James Pitsula,
in his fascinating study of student protest on the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan, titles
one chapter “1968: The Year that Everything Changed” despite the fact that the major student protests
discussed in his book occurred over the 1968-69 academic year and further protests continued through
1972. The evidence used to demonstrate that “everything changed” in 1968 is a description of the
Democratic National Convention in Chicago. Pitsula, New World Dawning: The Sixties at Regina Campus
(Regina: Canadian Plains Research Center, 2008).
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Doug Owram’s Born at the Right Time dominated the historiography by default.
Fortunately studies of the Canadian Sixties have proliferated in recent years as a new
generation of scholars grapples with the impact of that profoundly important period of
Canadian history. The resulting historiography reveals vibrant and diverse movements of
cultural and political rebellion operating throughout Canada during the Sixties.
Myrna Kostash, an active participant in the activism and counterculture of the
Sixties in Canada, wrote Long Way from Home, an engaging account of the key events
and organizations between 1964 and 1970.17 Kostash utilizes memoir, biography and
oral history, and presents international developments alongside the Canadian domestic
experience. She argues that the period of 1964-70 was transformative – for her
generation and the country – and urges readers to remember and revive the audacity and
idealism of the political and cultural struggles of the Sixties. She focuses on the Student
Union for Peace Action (SUPA), but also describes a variety of activities embraced by
the Canadian New Left, including aiding American war resisters, leading “student
power” campaigns and promoting women’s liberation. Kostash also incorporates the
counterculture into her narrative of the Sixties in Canada, discussing prevalent archetypes
such as “sex, drugs and rock’n’roll,” as well as communal expressions of the
counterculture in places like Kitsilano and Gastown in Vancouver, Riley Park in Calgary,
Yorkville in Toronto and Mountain and Crescent streets in Montreal.18 While noting the
New Left’s criticisms of the counterculture, Kostash attempts to define the movement as

17

Myrna Kostach, Long Way From Home: The Story of the Sixties Generation in Canada (Toronto: James
Lorimer and Company, 1980).
18
Ibid., 122. Kostash focuses exclusively on hippies in this section, although other groups and identities
were an important part of the counterculture, as Stuart Henderson illuminates in his local study of
Yorkville. See Stuart Henderson, Making the Scene: Yorkville and Hip Toronto in the 1960s (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2011).
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part of a politicized rejection of society, an attempt at “living otherwise,” and part of the
broader youth movement of the Sixties.
Published a few years after Long Way from Home, Doug Owram’s Born at the
Right Time examined the youthful experiences of the Canadian baby boom generation.
His narrative, primarily a social and cultural history, links the immediate post-war period
with the turbulent era of the Sixties. Owram argues that by its sheer size the baby boom
generation was a unique phenomenon which dominated the post-war period.19 He
contends that the baby boomers perceived their generation as unique, a perception
encouraged by the child-centered culture of the 1950s and reinforced by the youthcentered culture and politics of the 1960s. Characterizing the Sixties as “the moment in
history that forever defined the baby boom as a distinct generation,” Owram examines
both political activism and a cultural ‘generation gap’ marked by many boomers’
rejection of traditional 1950s values such as security, domesticity and conformity.20
While few youth actually became hippies or activists, the boomers, according to Owram
shared a “generational sense of identity.”21
Owram’s examination of the sexual revolution reinforces his central argument
that the cultural forces of the 1950s and 1960s represented both continuity and rupture.
Although the cult of domesticity and adherence to strict gender roles dominated 1950s
culture, a new emphasis on sex, as represented by Playboy magazine, attacks on literary
censorship, and Freudian psychological theories about human sexuality clashed in the
1950s with the conservative gender discourse, resulting in profound sexual confusion.
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The 1960s sexual revolution that emerged was therefore as much a product of 1950s
culture as it was a rejection. Owram details changes in concepts of sexual morality, the
effect of the availability of the birth-control pill for unmarried women after 1966, and the
influence of the women’s liberation movement in the late 1960s.
Combining analysis of cultural trends and social organizations, Owram crafted a
detailed synthesis of the social and cultural history of post-war Canada. His emphasis on
the continuities, rather than ruptures, between the 1950s and 1960s is a major
contribution to the historiography. However, because his extensive account of popular
culture relies largely upon international, and primarily American, artists and trends, the
resulting analysis diminishes the uniqueness of the Canadian popular culture experience
despite his focus on Canadian New Left groups when discussing Sixties radicalism.22
Finally, although Owram convincingly redefines the links between the 1950s and 1960s,
he largely adopts the prevailing model of the Sixties as early idealism replaced by
“polarization, repression and decline.”23 This model, although partially accurate,
trivializes the tremendous growth in feminism, gay rights and environmentalism that
occurred in the late Sixties.
Cyril Levitt’s Children of Privilege is a sociological study of the student
movement in Canada, the United States and Germany. Levitt characterizes the student
movement as “a movement of privilege, against privilege, for privilege – at a time in
which the character of privilege itself was changing.”24 He argues that student activists,
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primarily from middle- and upper-class backgrounds, were disappointed by the loss of
status that accompanied the “massification” of university education. Disillusioned by the
promise of status going unfulfilled, the students of the Sixties reacted by revolting – first
on behalf of others, then for themselves as students. As Levitt explains, “their assertion
of privilege took the form of its opposite – the radical-democratic assault upon
privilege.”25 The movement retreated to the campus after 1967 and died, Levitt suggests,
when the students grew up.
Canadian scholars, by transposing an American chronology and narrative of
division and decline after 1968, have diminished the Canadian experience of the 1960s. A
notable exception, Bryan Palmer in Canada’s 1960s, largely abandons this “divided
Sixties” framework and instead focuses a large part of his narrative on Quebec nationalist
and Red Power movements of the late Sixties.26 However, in arguing that after SUPA’s
demise in 1967 “a new New Left emerged,” his explanation that this “new New Left”
only “rode out what remained of the revolutionary wave of the 1960s” reinforces the
declension narrative of the good Sixties/bad Sixties approach. Recent works by Canadian
historians abandon the good Sixties/bad Sixties dichotomy in favour of a “Long Sixties”
historical framework, extending the periodization of the “Sixties” as a time of radical
political and cultural upheaval into the mid-1970s.
In addition to three collections of scholarly articles about the Sixties in Canada,
several recent monographs both challenge and broaden the existing interpretation of the
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era.27 Stuart Henderson’s Making the Scene, a fascinating account of the Toronto
neighborhood of Yorkville and its counterculture from 1960 to 1970, rejects
oversimplified narratives of Yorkville’s eventual demise by presenting a nuanced
discussion of the counterculture. Henderson shows that not just hippies, but also a gay
underground, working-class ‘greasers’ and ‘bikers,’ and New Left and feminist activists
formed the Yorkville “scene.”28 Draft dodgers also were included, as Jessica Squires
reveals in Building Sanctuary, an examination of the Canadian movement to support war
resisters in the 1960s and 1970s.29 Sean Mills’s study of political activism in Sixties
Montreal, The Empire Within, reveals the importance of an international discourse of
decolonization shared and utilized by a variety of Montreal activists and movements for
social and political change and internal anti-colonization struggles.30 Mills contributes a
narrative of political activism beyond the neo-nationalist project of modernization and a
radicalism rooted in the language of decolonization. He thereby highlights, for Canadian
activism and political ideology, the importance of international developments, not only in
the United States, Britain and France but also in the global South.
Although much of the scholarship on activism in the Sixties deals with postsecondary students, the majority of baby boomers ended their schooling after high school
and readily found employment in that period’s prosperous economy. Two excellent
books analyze Canadian worker militancy in the 1960s. Benjamin Isitt uncovers
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connections in British Columbia between the radical labour movements associated with
the New Left and the ‘Old Left,’ by focusing on the political activism of a “militant
minority” of workers.31 Ian Milligan’s Rebel Youth details a wave of revolt amongst
young workers in the mid-1960s and connects worker rebellion with the broader New
Left.32 Milligan also examines the evolving position of student New Left activists toward
the working-class and labour unions, culminating with increasing New Left support for
workers’ struggles in the early 1970s.
All of these authors adopt the framework of the “Long Sixties,” although only
Milligan does so explicitly. Mills concludes his narrative of activism in Quebec with the
massive May Day protests of 1972, Milligan with a 1973 strike involving New Leftists
and workers, and Isitt with the provincial election of Dave Barrett’s NDP government in
1972. Thus, neither the good Sixties/bad Sixties dichotomy nor the chronological model
of decline after 1968 fully explain the Canadian experience as there is ample evidence of
New Left social movements growing in strength during the “late Sixties.” By assessing
the meaning and legacy of the Waffle, a New Left movement seeking to transform an
established political party from 1969 to 1973, this dissertation reinforces the need to
supplant the post-1968 declension narrative of the Sixties with a “Long Sixties”
framework.
It is necessary to situate the Waffle within the historiography of the Canadian
Sixties in another way. By its espousal of a progressive Canadian nationalism linking
independence to socialism, the Waffle played a small but noteworthy role in weakening
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the British identity many Canadians cherished before the Sixties. Popular historians and
academic scholars alike have portrayed the Sixties as a transformative period for the
elusive concept of Canadian identity. Historians addressing the assertion of a new
Canadian identity in the 1960s frequently allude to the parliamentary debate over the
creation of the Canadian flag, or the year-long festivities associated with the celebration
of Canada’s centennial, especially the hugely popular Expo 67 in Montreal. Pierre
Berton, a best-selling and prolific popular historian, covered Expo 67 for Maclean’s
magazine. His book 1967: Canada’s Turning Point combines personal memory and
historical research in a highly engaging narrative. In discussing the Centennial
celebrations, politics, hockey, hippies and an emerging radicalism visible in such causes
as second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and Quebec separatism, Berton emphasizes the
extent to which Canada and Canadian identity were transformed during that year.
Although Berton argues that a “new Canadian attitude” appeared, he was circumspect
about defining such an attitude. He did, however, end the book by quoting Judy
LaMarsh, the Secretary of State for Canada, who provided an unequivocal summation of
the Centennial’s impact: “since 1967 no one has asked what it means to be a Canadian…
the year 1967 changed us all profoundly, and we will never look back.”33
José Igartua in The Other Quiet Revolution utilizes school textbooks, newspaper
editorials, and a narrative of the flag debate to demonstrate the Sixties shift in English
Canada from British patriotism to civic nationalism.34 Philip Massolin adopts a similar
position in his study of the last generation of Anglophile, “anti-modernist” intellectuals to
lament the passing of the British Tory tradition of Canadian national identity from the
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end of the Second World War until 1970.35 Bryan Palmer argues in Canada’s 1960’s that
the decade represented a profound change in Canadian national identity. Although
Canada had largely ceased to be defined by a British connection and character in the
1960s, this former British identity “was replaced only with uncertainty.”36 According to
Palmer, the ruptures of the 1960s brought an end to the old British Canada without
establishing a unified and singular sense of national identity in its place. He identifies
key incidents of the 1960s, including the dollar crisis of 1961-62, the Munsinger affair,
the Ali-Chuvalo boxing match, riotous celebrations of Victoria Day, youthful protest
movements in the workplace and universities, and the rise of women’s liberation and
‘Red Power’ movements to demonstrate vast changes in the social construction and
understanding of class, race, gender, sexuality and national identity during this
transformative decade. C.P. Champion contends that despite superficial appearances,
Canada in fact retained many of the institutions and values symptomatic of its British
heritage.37 Yet, Igartua, Massolin, Palmer and Champion are in agreement that the 1960s
was a transformative period for Canadian national identity. Although my primary focus
is not the slippery concept of an emergent Canadian identity, the Waffle’s espousal of a
progressive Canadian nationalism that linked independence with socialism, and its
connections with New Left social movements that sought to redefine the meaning of
Canadian citizenship, suggest that the group played a role, however minor, in this

35

Philip Massolin, Canadian Intellectuals, The Tory Tradition and the Challenge of Modernity, 1939-1970
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001).
36
Palmer, Canada’s 1960s, 5.
37
C.P. Champion, The Strange Demise of British Canada: The Liberals and Canadian Nationalism, 19641968 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010).

16
transformation. Indeed, other scholars have begun to assess the Waffle’s influence on the
popularity of economic nationalism in Canada in the 1970s.38
The history of the Waffle must also be situated within the expansive
historiography of the CCF and NDP. Unlike many European countries during the
twentieth century, where the left consistently rivaled conservative parties for power, or in
the United States, where social democracy had comparatively little impact, in Canada the
CCF/NDP emerged as the major third party in Canadian politics by the 1940s. The
history of the CCF and NDP has been extensively documented, but few historians have
written comprehensive accounts encompassing the parties at both the federal and
provincial level. Instead, the focus typically has been narrower, zooming in on the
federal party or one of its provincial sections, or a biography of the party’s leading
figures.39
The debate that looms largest over the historiography of the CCF/NDP centres on
the question of whether or not the CCF is best understood as a “party” or a “movement,”
distinctions first made by Walter Young in his 1969 book The Anatomy of a Party: The
National CCF 1932-61.40 Young presents social movements as more ideologically rigid
than political parties, while parties are seen as willing to sacrifice ideological principles
as the price of gaining political power. Social movements are viewed as more
decentralized and democratic than political parties, which are dominated by elites willing
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to impose internal discipline to maintain party unity. Young described the CCF as
shifting over time from a movement into a party, and rebalancing its policies and
practices accordingly. Interestingly, although Young commends the transformation,
scholars who followed him have adopted the movement/party distinction in order to both
criticize the CCF/NDP’s rightward trajectory as well as to praise the party’s supposed
maturation.41
The movement/party thesis has been enticing for scholars of the CCF/NDP.
Struggles over policy, often characterized by left/right ideological divisions, were a
fixture of the CCF since its founding in 1932. The CCF originally brought together a
collection of social movements – its full name included “Farmer, Labour, Socialist” – but
thereafter also developed ties, sometimes tenuous, with other interests, such as the
women’s and peace movements. However, several problems with Young’s approach
have been identified. Alan Whitehorn criticizes the movement/party thesis on a number
of counts, calling it “excessively inbred and increasingly unproductive for future
research.”42 He argues that differences between movements and parties are overstated,
pointing out that political parties can also be ideological, focused on social change, and
less concerned with electoral success than with publicizing their ideas. Furthermore, he
suggests that social movements, some of which are highly structured, require different
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degrees of organization.43 Finally, Whitehorn argues that the movement-to-party model
romanticizes the CCF and ignores the party’s history. He contends that the CCF was a
“political party” from its inception, and points to its imposition of internal discipline as
evidence.44 The larger problem with the movement/party dichotomy lies in the flawed
nature of the categories Young introduced. The Communist Party of Canada (CP), in its
various incarnations, exemplifies this point. The CP, never expecting realistically to win
power through electoral politics, retained its ideological purity while running candidates
with the avowed purpose of using elections to educate the public about the benefits of
communism. By this measure the CP should, according to Young, be classified as a
“movement.” Yet the CP also manifested extraordinary centralization, domination by
elites, and an unparalleled penchant for party discipline, all facets of Young’s definition
of “party.” As such, Young’s schema for differentiating parties from movements is
fundamentally flawed when applied to the history of the CCF/NDP. James Naylor’s
recent work, The Fate of Labour Socialism, asserts the working-class character of the
early CCF and addresses the movement/party thesis. Naylor acknowledges that Young
introduced “somewhat rigid, dichotomous categories” but suggests that Young’s study
recognizes “transitions on the non-Stalinist left” and the “growing demobilization” of the
CCF’s membership in the 1940s and 1950s that his critics ignore.45 Naylor points out
that “much ink has been spilled in tracing the rightward trajectory of the CCF,” and
argues that “whether presented in its original form by Zakuta and Young, or turned on its
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head by Whitehorn, the declension argument of the 1960s failed to address the specific
character of socialism in the 1930s.”46
In addition to accepting the flawed movement/party dichotomy, historians of the
Waffle have often fallen victim to another historiographical trap – a belief in rigid,
unchanging ideological categories, such as “socialist” and “social democrat,” which
discount historical context. Ian McKay, assessing the historiography of the Canadian
left, explains:
The traditional approach invites us to see each one of these names as labels for
separate species that compete with other species in a struggle of the ideologically
fittest to survive in the dog-eat-dog world of political warfare… the governing
assumption is that a Communist was a Communist was a Communist: in 1921,
1935, 1956, or 1989… or you might argue that the ‘democratic left’ was much the
same in 1921, 1932, 1948, and 1968, and always at war with the Communists.
Once in play, these categories become more and more reified: Marxists and social
democrats (and so on) fight on through the ages.47
This “vertical” approach, emphasizing similarities between leftists groups and ideologies
across time favours ideological consistency over historical context. When applied to the
CCF/NDP this “vertical” approach explains the party’s history as a continuing struggle of
socialist versus social democrat, radical versus moderate, or movement versus party. To
pick but one example, Ivan Avakumovic equates the radicals at the 1933 CCF convention
who criticized the Regina Manifesto as being insufficiently socialist, to the Wafflers at
the 1969 NDP convention who criticized the party for veering too far from the Regina
Manifesto’s socialism.48 Similarly, J.T. Morley addresses the Waffle alongside previous
expulsions of Communists and Trotskyists in his chapter on “Party Discipline” and
applies his stretched metaphor of the “party personality” to assert that “like many human
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individuals, the party, as it came to maturity… was still recognizable as the same person
it had always been.”49 McKay urges scholars to instead adopt a “horizontal” approach,
positioning and interpreting groups and ideologies within their proper historical context.50
My study, instead of viewing the Waffle as one manifestation of an ongoing but largely
unchanging ideological struggle within the NDP, subscribes to McKay’s “horizontal”
approach by presenting the Waffle as a product of a unique historical period and uniquely
Canadian manifestation of the New Left.
One further issue mars the historiography of the Waffle. Much of what has been
published about the Waffle was written by either its members or their opponents, and too
often these accounts seek to judge whether the participants were right or wrong in their
actions.51 McKay dismisses this “scorecard approach” to history, arguing “sectarian
exercises in scorecard history will confirm the values of the present day leftist, over and
over and over again… what bothers me most about scorecard history is the hubristic
arrogance of believing that any historian can infallibly bestow or deduct points.”52
The harshest assessment of the Waffle was provided by Desmond Morton, an
advisor to Tommy Douglas and assistant secretary of the NDP in the mid-1960s.
Morton’s NDP: The Dream of Power, published shortly after the Waffle’s challenge to
the party leadership, describes the Waffle Manifesto as “emotionally cathartic for
younger, radical academics” and suggests the group’s primary appeal was as an
“alternative to… the indispensable drudgery of a self-financed political organization.”53
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Dismissing the group’s motivations as primarily egotistical, Morton asked “after four
days of meeting, plotting, mutual congratulation and media attention, what was the point
of stopping?”54 In Morton’s estimation, the Waffle’s leaders, having opted to persist in
challenging the NDP status quo instead of ascending to “positions of prestige and
influence in the party,” were quite simply “losers.”55 Morton chastises the Waffle for
mimicking the rhetoric and demands of the American New Left – notorious in Morton’s
eyes for attacks on “American imperialism” and “appeals for sexual freedom” – by
urging the NDP to adopt radical tactics with potentially damaging implications for the
Canadian left.56 Yet Morton ignores the Waffle’s importance in directing the Canadian
New Left away from issues that dominated the American movement – the Vietnam War
in particular – and focusing attention on Canadian independence and the role of the state
on the road to socialism. In addition, Jill Vickers has demonstrated how the Waffle’s
feminism, driven by increased demands on the welfare state, differed dramatically from
the American women’s liberation movement, which sought to avoid the state by creating
a women’s-centered alternative.57 Contrary to Morton’s portrayal, the Waffle, despite
emerging from the Canadian New Left and presenting a radical critique of American
capitalism and foreign policy, was a uniquely Canadian political movement.
While highly critical of the Waffle, Morton nevertheless subscribes to an
interpretation of the NDP history similar to that of Waffle sympathizer Robert Hackett,
by embracing Walter Young’s “movement-party thesis.” The “problem for the NDP,”
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Morton maintained, “was due to its own ambivalence. It was and behaved like a mass
party of the democratic Left; it also presented itself as a socialist movement.”58 But as a
“mass party” it was preferable, Morton believed, that the NDP consign its “movement”
phase to the proverbial dustbin of history.59
Robert Hackett’s account of the Waffle, titled “Pie in the Sky” and first published
as a special issue of Canadian Dimension in 1980, situates the group within the
movement/party dichotomy. Hackett claims the Waffle “represented the best organized
and most sustained leftist attempt to transform the parent party,” describing its emergence
as a product of the international New Left and burgeoning Canadian nationalism.60 He
argues that the Waffle positively influenced the NDP on a number of policies, including
women’s issues and nationalism, and laments the group’s departure from the party.
Hackett utilizes data from surveys of NDP convention delegates to draw ideological and
demographic distinctions between Wafflers and other New Democrats.61 But, like
Morton, Hackett interprets the Waffle’s exit as signaling an end to the NDP’s
movement/party dichotomy. Ultimately, he concludes, the NDP and indeed all “social
democratic parties in advanced capitalist societies,” could not be a vehicle for a socialist,
anti-imperialist left such as the Waffle.62 He argues that the Waffle, emblematic of the
“movement” orientation but lacking a Marxist analysis, was doomed in its struggle to
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transform the NDP. According to Hackett, social democratic parties, committed to
change through electoral means, are incapable of embracing a socially transformative
ideology. Furthermore, the structure of social democratic parties, including the power of
the party leader, the importance and autonomy of the legislative caucus, and the veto
power of affiliated unions, both as a voting bloc and as financial supporters, makes
fundamental change virtually impossible without a mass mobilization of the working
class.63
Former Wafflers have contributed to the movement’s historiography, most
notably in a series of retrospectives published in the journal Studies in Political Economy
in 1990. The authors vary in their approach, but generally agree that the Waffle
contributed positive ideas to the NDP and Canadian politics. Moreover, they lament its
passing and what they perceive as the NDP’s subsequent moderation.64 Reg Whitaker,
who wrote the introduction to the retrospective series, claims the Waffle’s departure from
the NDP produced an intellectual vacuum. This assessment was reinforced by David
Lewis who, exasperated with his party’s “me-too performance” during the constitutional
debates of the 1980s, commented to Whitaker, “when the Waffle left the party, most of
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the brains left with them.”65 Not surprisingly, many former Wafflers shared this
perspective.
The articles by former Wafflers possibly overstate their group’s overall impact by
crediting it with initiating virtually every nationalist policy the NDP subsequently
adopted. Yet their wide-ranging reflections highlight convincingly the Waffle’s impact
on a multitude of issues ranging from Canadian and Quebec nationalism to international
New Left protest causes such as the women’s and anti-war movements, rather than
dwelling, as many historians of the NDP have done, on where the Waffle fits into the
party’s long history of internal ideological struggle.
Mel Watkins and John Smart suggest that the Waffle contributed to
groundbreaking economic nationalist initiatives implemented in the 1970s, including the
Canada Development Corporation, the Foreign Investment Review Agency, PetroCanada and the “Third Option.”66 Pat Smart notes the Waffle’s forward-looking position
on Quebec, which entailed recognition of “two nations” within Canada and Quebec’s
right to self-determination.67 Rianne Mahon and Gregory Albo focus on the Waffle’s
intellectual contribution to the new Canadian political economy school and its journal
Studies in Political Economy.68 Gilbert Levine argues that the Waffle helped to pave the
way for the “Canadianization” of the labour movement, including the separation of a
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number of Canadian branches of international unions into national entities.69 Varda
Burstyn discusses some of the issues for which women in the Waffle advocated,
including childcare, abortion, equal pay and quotas for women on the NDP’s governing
bodies. Burstyn credits the Waffle not only with pressuring the NDP to recognize
women’s oppression within its own ranks, but also with being “the conduit through which
the radical women’s politics of the late 1960s entered and profoundly moved the NDP,
and indirectly, many members of the unions affiliated to it.”70 John Richards, a Waffler
and former MLA in Saskatchewan, and Larry Pratt argue in Prairie Capitalism that the
Waffle directly influenced the Saskatchewan NDP’s 1971 election platform, but concede
its influence faded once the Waffle withdrew from the party.71 Among former Wafflers,
Dan Heap is unusual in his criticisms of the group. Heap suggests that the Waffle’s
failure was not because of its ideological radicalism within a moderate party, but resulted
from the group’s own elitism. He insists the Waffle exhibited an “elitist tendency,” and
placed too much emphasis on “convention battles over policy statements and party
office.”72
In addition to published discussions of the Waffle, three MA theses focus
primarily on provincial Waffle sections. John Bullen’s MA thesis, which he published in
condensed form in The Canadian Historical Review in 1983, concludes that the Ontario
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Waffle “overestimated the immediate potential for radicalism… and recklessly
disregarded the consequences of its own continued existence within the NDP.”73 He
suggests the Waffle underestimated the extent of the ideological gap separating the
NDP’s moderate leadership from the party’s “radical left wing.”74 Moreover, the Waffle
erred strategically with its singular focus on transforming the NDP, thereby alienating
long-time party and union activists who expected some acknowledgement that the
radicals shared the same goals. Despite its shortcomings, Bullen is convinced the Waffle
influenced both the NDP and Canadian nationalism, and that the NDP has moderated the
party’s image and policies as part if its transformation from the CCF.
Peter Borch’s 2005 MA thesis on the Saskatchewan Waffle identifies significant
differences between the Ontario and Saskatchewan groups, in particular the emphasis
they placed on labour and agriculture respectively. Borch also reveals that the
Saskatchewan Waffle grew out of the Committee for a Socialist Movement (CSM), a
small Regina-based discussion group formed in 1966 he describes as “dominated by
expatriate American Marxist intellectuals… dedicated to furthering socialism in
Saskatchewan.”75 Following the release of the Waffle Manifesto in 1969, CSM members
joined with other student and farm activists in creating the Saskatchewan Waffle in 1970.
Borch also points to the group’s Marxist ideology to explain its conflict with and ultimate
departure from the social democratic NDP.
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The third MA thesis is Patrick Webber’s analysis of the Waffle in New
Brunswick where the group was closely associated with New Left activism at the
University of New Brunswick and was predominantly Trotskyist in orientation.76 The
New Brunswick Waffle was formed by members of the Fredericton Young Socialists, a
branch of the League for Socialist Action (LSA), Canada’s major Trotskyist organization.
Against the advice of LSA leader Ross Dowson, the New Brunswick Waffle successfully
took over the New Brunswick NDP in 1971, only to have the federal party suspend the
provincial section later that year. Thus Webber’s study highlights the presence of
important ideological divisions within the Waffle, in particular between adherents of
Trotskyism and others.
In Chapter One this dissertation provides a brief history of the Canadian left,
specifically the CCF/NDP, from 1932 to the emergence of the Waffle in 1969. Although
covering well-trod ground, this chapter establishes the historical context of the CCF/NDP
within the Canadian left that informed the Waffle’s decision to seek transformative
change to a well-ensconced political party. The chapter also addresses the conflict
between the CCF and the Communist Party, primarily a proxy war in the labour
movement, a conflict that profoundly affected how NDP leaders such as David Lewis
eventually regarded the Waffle.
The second chapter addresses the growth of the New Left in Canada from 1959
until the Waffle’s emergence in 1969. Adopting an expansive definition for the Canadian
New Left, this chapter asserts that historians of the Sixties should examine not only the
anti-war and student movements most commonly associated with the New Left, but also
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the women’s liberation movement, the ‘Red Power’ movement, left-nationalist
movements in Quebec and English Canada, and the wave of militant labour actions
taking place throughout the period. The short-lived but influential Combined
Universities Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND) and the Student Union for
Peace Action (SUPA), as well as the activism of the women’s liberation, student, and
anti-war movements were formative for many future Wafflers.
The third chapter examines the formation and emergence of the Waffle. A group
of NDP and student activists first met in April 1969 to discuss the party’s perceived
failures, in particular its inattention to “the growing dominance of the United States,” and
agreed to outline their beliefs in a manifesto.77 In addition to the activism of the New
Left, the original Wafflers were greatly influenced by the strength of English-Canadian
nationalism in the 1960s, shaped in part by the publication of George Grant’s Lament for
a Nation in 1965 and the Watkins Report on foreign business ownership in 1967.78 The
chapter reviews the evolution of the Waffle Manifesto through successive drafts written
by James Laxer, Mel Watkins and Gerald Caplan, and explores efforts by the early
Wafflers to build support within NDP riding associations, youth clubs, and affiliated
unions. The response they received indicated both enthusiasm for youthful radicalism
and hesitation by others within the party to alter dramatically its direction. Debate over
the Waffle Manifesto at the October 1969 federal NDP convention in Winnipeg thrust the
group into the media spotlight. Despite the Manifesto’s rejection by convention
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delegates, the Wafflers were sufficiently inspired by the support they did receive to
commit to continuing their campaign for party reform.
The fourth chapter addresses the Waffle’s efforts to transform the NDP in the year
following the group’s emergence at the Winnipeg NDP convention. The Waffle
organized provincial sections, mirroring the NDP’s structure, and held both a western
regional conference and a national meeting. It sought, with some measure of success, to
influence party policy at provincial NDP conventions in Saskatchewan, British Columbia,
Ontario and Manitoba in 1970, and contested, albeit unsuccessfully, the leadership of the
Saskatchewan NDP following Woodrow Lloyd’s resignation. Beyond the party Wafflers,
motivated by New Left support for women’s liberation and decolonization movements,
participated in extra-parliamentary protests and encouraged the NDP to follow suit.
Diverging from the chronological narrative of the Waffle and the NDP at national
and provincial levels, Chapter Five is devoted primarily to examining the Waffle at the
grassroots level in Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon. In addition to working within the
NDP, local Waffle activists engaged in extra-parliamentary social movements including
the women’s liberation and anti-Vietnam War protests, as well as supporting striking
workers and the National Farmers’ Union. The chapter also explores Waffle attempts to
engage in a different kind of electoral politics on a local level, emphasizing policy issues
instead of merely winning votes.
Chapter Six examines the Waffle’s participation in the federal NDP leadership
race and the successful provincial election campaign in Saskatchewan during the first half
of 1971. In an effort to raise the group’s prominence and influence, Waffle candidate
James Laxer entered the race to succeed Tommy Douglas as leader of the federal NDP in
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April 1971, finishing a surprising second place behind David Lewis. Wafflers also took
heart from their influence on the Saskatchewan NDP’s election platform ahead of the
1971 provincial election which brought the party to power and elected a pro-Waffle MLA
amongst the NDP caucus.
The seventh chapter analyzes the Waffle’s escalating conflict with the NDP
leadership throughout the latter half of 1971 and early 1972, culminating with Ontario
NDP leader Stephen Lewis’s speech denouncing the Waffle as “a party within a party” in
March 1972. The Waffle in Ontario sought to capitalize on the prominence of Canadian
economic nationalism in 1971 by supporting striking workers at Texpack in Brantford
while backing six pro-Waffle NDP candidates in the provincial election held that fall. In
Manitoba and Saskatchewan, where the NDP had formed governments, the Waffle
struggled with its relationship with the party. But conflicts over the Trotskyist-dominated
New Brunswick Waffle, the Waffle’s role in the Ontario election campaign, and support
amongst dissident caucuses within leading pro-NDP unions exacerbated the divide and
prompted Ontario labour leaders and party moderates to push for the Waffle’s
marginalization in early 1972.
The remainder of 1972, a pivotal year for the Waffle, is the focus of Chapter
Eight. The Ontario Waffle’s ultimately unsuccessful efforts to remain within the NDP in
the first half of 1972 initiated an existential crisis in the group, whose primary focus for
the previous two-and-a-half years had been on transforming the party. When faced with
a choice between disbanding and expulsion, the majority of Ontario Wafflers chose to
leave the NDP and form a new Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada.
Nevertheless, the decision split the Ontario Waffle and a substantial minority remained to
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“stay and fight” in the party and formed a Left Caucus to do so. In the two provinces
where the NDP formed the government, the Manitoba and Saskatchewan Waffle groups
struggled with their frustration at the party’s moderate agenda. The group dwindled in
Manitoba and debated the timing and manner of its inevitable departure from the party in
Saskatchewan.
Chapter Nine examines the year-and-a-half the Waffle spent engaged primarily in
internal debate following the group’s ouster from the Ontario NDP. Absent its primary
purpose – transforming the NDP into a socialist party focused on preserving Canadian
independence – the Waffle struggled to regroup. During the 1972 federal election both
Ontario and Saskatchewan Wafflers mounted a “counter-campaign” criticizing the NDP
yet neither group was prepared to challenge the party electorally. Provincial elections in
British Columbia in 1972 and Manitoba in 1973 illustrated the group’s demise in those
two provinces. Throughout 1972 and 1973 Wafflers debated options for the group’s
future direction amidst a rapidly evolving New Left milieu highlighted by an intellectual
turn towards Marxism and the working-class. By the end of 1973 the Saskatchewan
Waffle had finally broken decisively with the NDP and the Ontario Waffle prepared to
challenge the party electorally.
Chapter Ten analyzes the Waffle’s activities and internal debates during 1974 and
1975 following the group’s decisive break with the NDP. In particular the group’s
embrace of a strict Marxist analysis that emphasized the importance of class divisions
above all else had ramifications for its relationship with the women’s, labour and
farmers’ movements as well as its approach to electoral politics. Furthermore, the
emphasis on Marxism resulted in many Wafflers reevaluating their group’s commitment
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to Canadian nationalism, and produced contentious ideological debates that split the
Ontario and Saskatchewan Waffles into tiny sectarian fragments. By the end of 1975, the
Waffle as a national movement was dead.
The Waffle’s successes and failures offer revealing and hitherto largely
overlooked perspectives on Canadian politics and society during a period of rapid social
change, the Sixties. While the existing historiography sketches the outlines of the
Waffle’s history, it is limited by focusing largely on internal leadership disputes within
the NDP and the experience of the Ontario Waffle in particular. Abundant research
materials now exist to support a wider and more intensive examination of this important
and unique group’s significance in Canadian political history. Specifically, the
dissertation is based upon significant archival collections documenting NDP and Waffle
correspondence, meeting minutes, position papers, leaflets and speeches, as well as
interviews with former Wafflers, New Democrats, and New Left activists. Through an
analysis of the Waffle focusing on grassroots activists in three local studies as well as the
movement’s leadership, this dissertation demonstrates influential connections between
the Waffle and other New Left social movements of the time. In addition, it revises the
movement/party dichotomy which has dominated so much of Waffle/NDP
historiography, while also emphasizing the Waffle’s place in the international New Left,
specifically as a convergence of social movements which sought to engage with electoral
politics through an existing political party, the NDP. Finally, my study of the Waffle, a
group active from 1969-75, indicates the inherent flaws in applying a declensionist
narrative to the Canadian Sixties, demonstrating instead the relevance of the “long
Sixties” approach. For as the clock ticked down on the 1960s, the Canadian New Left
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did not die, retreat into cynicism or lash out in violence. Instead, as the Waffle’s story
demonstrates, young radicals and activists nurtured the ambitious dream of achieving, via
an established political party, the NDP, “fundamental social change… an independent
socialist Canada.”79
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Chapter One
“Our party was born out of protest:” The CCF/NDP, 1932-69
The activists and intellectuals who comprised the Waffle viewed the New
Democratic Party (NDP) as a logical vehicle through which to advance their own New
Left agenda. The NDP, and its predecessor the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
(CCF), between them had almost four decades of experience on the Canadian political
scene, both nationally and provincially, organizing leftist electoral challenges to a
political status quo dominated by the Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as striving
to distance themselves from challengers, Communists in particular, that existed on their
own left. The institutional and electoral history of the CCF and its successor NDP, which
in summary fashion is the subject of this chapter, can be placed within four more or less
distinct periods. Formed in Calgary in 1932, the CCF reached the height of its popularity
in the midst of the Second World War. However, the period of its greatest successes –
including forming the government in Saskatchewan in 1944 and briefly leading the
national polls in 1943 – was relatively short-lived. As the Liberals and Progressive
Conservatives moved to the left, and business organizations funded vicious anti-CCF
campaigns, the party lost its luster. The CCF outside Saskatchewan never regained the
popularity it enjoyed during the Second World War, and saw its electoral record decline
in the heightened tension of the Cold War. By the mid-1950s, party leaders became
convinced there was little future for the CCF and sought to moderate the party’s
commitment to socialism. At the same time, the CCF worked in conjunction with
sympathetic trade union leaders to largely purge Communists from the labour movement
and to establish a new party, the NDP, in 1961. Although the NDP initially struggled to
win more support than the CCF had experienced, by the summer of 1969 it had
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profoundly influenced Canadian politics and society, held significant representation in
legislatures across the country, and appeared to be on the cusp of gaining power in
several provinces.
In each of these periods – the CCF’s formative years (1932-40), its rise (1941-45)
and decline (1946-60), and the NDP’s early history (1961-69) – the prospects and
policies of the parties were determined primarily by the economic and political context of
the time as well as by such internal factors as party leadership, organization, and
membership. This chapter addresses these internal factors as well as examining the
effects of the political economy more broadly on the party’s fortunes.1 The impact of the
Great Depression which devastated the economy and left millions unemployed, sent
farmers’ incomes plummeting, and made one in five Canadians dependent on relief for
survival, profoundly influenced the early days of the CCF. Extensive economic planning,
coordination and oversight by the federal government during the Second World War
combined with a war weary populace’s demands for postwar social security, briefly
enhanced the CCF’s popularity and prospects. But following the war, the party
experienced a drop in popularity as the Cold War encouraged public suspicions of
socialism. Furthermore, postwar prosperity contradicted the CCF’s claims of capitalist
collapse. In the 1960s, crises in the postwar society – decolonization, the civil rights and
anti-Vietnam War movements in the United States, renewed and intensified nationalism
in both Quebec and English Canada – created political opportunities and challenges for
the newly-established NDP.
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The history of the CCF/NDP is significant to the Waffle story because that history
informed and influenced the decisions made by Waffle activists and NDP leaders alike.
For Wafflers, the very existence of a social democratic party with a direct connection to
the labour movement and a history championing left causes contrasted the Canadian New
Left from its American neighbour. Furthermore, the sense that the NDP had moderated
its commitment to socialism and strayed from the CCF’s founding principles lent
substance to the Waffle’s arguments and appealed to some long-time party members.2
On the other hand party and union leaders, who had spent decades struggling to rid the
labour movement of Communist influence, saw the Waffle as a reincarnation of these
left-wing rivals.3 The close ties the party enjoyed with the labour movement had only
recently been established with the NDP’s formation in 1961, and party and union leaders
were determined to preserve this connection.
As will become obvious in this chapter, characterizing the CCF/NDP as a singular
entity presents a challenge.4 Whereas most historians have focused on either the national
party or one of the provincial parties as the basis of analysis, clear distinctions between
the federal and provincial parties are often difficult to discern. The national CCF, beyond
its caucus and small central office, existed essentially as a conglomeration of provincial
sections with overlapping memberships. As a result, any attempts at characterizing the
2
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party’s ideological shifts by a limited focus on a single component of the party risks
oversimplification.5 The CCF/NDP has been since its founding a coalescence of multiple
interests, personalities, ideas, policies, and strategies, operating in all of Canada’s diverse
regions and at all three levels of Canadian politics, thereby defying easy categorization.
Before the CCF’s creation, various left-wing currents surfaced in Canada during a
surge of radical political activity following the First World War. The 1919 Winnipeg
General Strike was the largest and most visible manifestation of increasingly intensive
worker activism that included labour organizing and striking for union recognition.6
Labourist and socialist parties emerged throughout the 1920s, including the Communist
Workers’ Party in 1922. Several Independent Labour Parties (ILP) elected members in
Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Vancouver and Hamilton, while the Socialist Party of
Canada (SPC) and the Social Democratic Party of Canada (after 1920 the Federated
Labour Party) offered unique interpretations of socialism.7 The Trades and Labour
Congress (TLC) formed the Canadian Labour Party (CLP) in a bid to elect union
candidates municipally, provincially and federally, even attempting collaboration with
Communists in the CLP, albeit with difficulty, before largely abandoning the project in
1928.8
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Growing numbers of farmers rejected the established Liberal and Conservative
parties in resounding fashion, electing United Farmers governments in Ontario in 1919,
and in Alberta and Manitoba in 1921. The farmers’ electoral rebellion extended into the
federal election of 1921 when fifty-eight members of the newly-formed Progressive Party
won seats in the House of Commons.9 Although Prime Minister William Lyon
Mackenzie King eventually wooed many Progressives back to the Liberal Party, a
remnant of the Progressive caucus eventually allied with Labour MPs James Shaver
Woodsworth (Winnipeg North Centre), William Irvine (Calgary East), and, A.A. Heaps
(Winnipeg North).10 Holding the balance of power after the 1925 federal election
produced a Liberal minority government, Woodsworth, Heaps and a faction of leftleaning Progressive MPs formed the ‘Ginger Group’ whose achievements included
forcing King to introduce old-age pension legislation in exchange for their support.11
Outside Parliament, coordination and cooperation among farmers, workers and
socialists proved harder to achieve, despite their often shared common intellectual
heritage.12 In Saskatchewan, where farmers had supported the Liberal Party in the 1920s
and the Progressives had never challenged for provincial power, the United Farmers of
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Canada (Saskatchewan Section) [hereafter UFC (SS)] moved steadily to the left, adopting
in 1930 a radical farmers’ program committed to political action based on socialist
ideas.13 Around the same time the Western Labour Parties Conference, first held in
Regina in 1929, connected workers’ and farmers’ organizations.14 In the summer of
1931, a joint conference of the UFC (SS) and the Saskatchewan ILP, led by former
teacher and Regina city councillor M.J. Coldwell, agreed to work together to “establish a
cooperative commonwealth” and support political candidates committed to the same.15
Developments occurred quickly thereafter. In May 1932, members of the ‘Ginger Group’
meeting in William Irvine’s Parliament Hill office agreed to form a national political
party.16 The following month the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) also agreed to
cooperate with like-minded organizations in creating a “cooperative commonwealth,” and
in July the UFC (SS) and the Saskatchewan ILP elected Coldwell as leader of the
Farmer-Labour Group in their province.17 In August the Western Labour Conference,
including the Manitoba and Saskatchewan ILPs, the Socialist Party of Canada, and labour
parties from Alberta, were joined in Calgary by representatives from the UFA, the UFC
(SS) and several left-wing intellectuals from the League for Social Reconstruction
(LSR).18 This meeting’s outcome was the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation
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(Farmer, Labour, Socialist), an amalgam of the various constituent organizations. J.S.
Woodsworth, by then a prominent and respected Labour MP, an ally of farmers, and the
honourary president of the LSR, was elected president of the new political party.19
The CCF at its convention in Regina the following year endorsed as its party
platform the Regina Manifesto. The Manifesto’s meaning and significance has been
much debated ever since. Ian McKay’s description is as accurate as any. He deemed the
Manifesto: “a sandwich; it had a moderate middle between two slices of radicalism.”20 In
calling for the eradication of capitalism, the Manifesto was uncompromising in its
criticism of what it perceived as a failed economic system needing replacement by public
ownership and economic planning. Sweeping in scope, the Manifesto catalogued a long
list of urgent reforms including increased public expenditures on housing, schools, and
parks, tax reform, a labour code to improve working conditions, and free universal health
care.21 Drafted by Frank Underhill, a University of Toronto professor of History and cofounder of the LSR, the Regina Manifesto expanded upon the LSR’s own manifesto,
whose contributors included Eugene Forsey, a lecturer at McGill University, King
Gordon, a professor at the United Theological College in Montreal, and Frank Scott, a
poet and law professor at McGill University. Most notable among the few changes made
19
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to the draft manifesto at the CCF convention was the addition of the rousing closing
sentence – “no CCF government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and
put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the
establishment in Canada of the Cooperative Commonwealth.”22 Although Underhill later
disavowed the Manifesto and criticized the radical additions to it, historian Michiel Horn
points out “the sentence was not fundamentally out of harmony with the rest of the
manifesto or, indeed, with Underhill’s draft.”23
With a nascent party structure in place and stirring manifesto in hand, CCF
supporters next confronted the formidable task of establishing provincial parties from
among the various leftist fragments, as well as organizing for the next federal election.
The CCF’s structure as a federation of affiliated organizations proved both boon and
burden. First off the mark was British Columbia, where the Socialist Party of Canada,
the successor to the ILP (Socialist) of BC, was initially the CCF’s sole affiliate in that
province. The SPC’s membership included radicals such as Ernest Winch, the former
president of the Vancouver and District Labour Council and a committed socialist, and
his son, Harold, as well as the moderate ILP MP Angus MacInnis (Vancouver South).
Members of the Vancouver and Victoria LSR clubs formed the short-lived
Reconstruction Party to join the CCF, while otherwise unaffiliated individuals got on
board by establishing CCF clubs. At the BC party’s founding convention in September
1933 an election platform for contesting the provincial campaign in November was
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endorsed.24 Running candidates in most ridings, the BC CCF won over thirty per cent of
the vote and elected seven members, a commendable first try, but not enough to prevent
the return to power of self-proclaimed reformer “Duff” Patullo’s Liberal government.
In Saskatchewan, M.J. Coldwell led the Farmer-Labour Group established in
1931 by the UFC (SS) and the ILP into the June 1934 provincial election, winning a
respectable twenty-five per cent of the popular vote and five seats after enduring a
campaign marked by intense opposition from the press and the Roman Catholic Church.25
Here too the election result proved disappointing insofar as Coldwell’s team failed to
capitalize sufficiently on farmers’ discontent with the incumbent Conservative
government of James Anderson to prevent James Gardiner’s Liberals from sweeping into
office with a large majority.
A lack of ideological unity among the disparate groups that constituted the CCF
was most apparent in Ontario. A dispute in early 1934 within the Ontario CCF over
whether to support the Communist-linked Canadian Labour Defence League deepened
existing divisions between moderates in the Ontario CCF and members of the radical and
influential Labour Conference, comprised of several small labour and socialist parties.
When the moderate UFO disaffiliated from the CCF, the CCF National Council
intervened by dissolving and then reconstituting the Ontario party, thereby eliminating
the federated structure in favour of straight party memberships for individuals.26 Given
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its recent internal conflict and reorganization, the party was not surprisingly ill- prepared
for its first provincial electoral contest that same summer. With candidates running in
just over one-third of Ontario’s ridings, the CCF drew seven per cent of the popular vote
and elected just one member in the face of the Liberal party’s sweep to power under the
flamboyant leadership of Mitchell Hepburn.
Although the UFA and the Canadian Labour Party in Alberta had experienced
electoral success and held seats in the provincial legislature, when both organizations
affiliated with the CCF they carried significant problems. The UFA had remained in
government since 1921, and the CLP shared municipal power with centrists in Edmonton
and Calgary. But the desire of both groups to retain their autonomy prevented them from
cooperating in essential outreach and organizational activities following their affiliation
within the CCF. Moreover, the unpopularity of Premier Richard Reid’s scandal-ridden
UFA government, as well as the Labour-led municipal government in Edmonton,
contributed to Albertans backing William Aberhart’s nascent Social Credit Party, which
swept into office with a massive majority in the 1935 provincial election.27
The CCF’s first federal election results in the fall of 1935 also proved
disappointing. With candidates contesting only half of the country’s ridings, including
just three east of Ontario, the party was not a serious contender for government. Its
campaign platform, which emphasized the Regina Manifesto, the socialization of banks
and finance, social insurance, new public works, the cessation of farm and home
foreclosures and neutrality in wartime, failed to sway many, who opted instead for
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Mackenzie King’s Liberals despite Conservative Prime Minister R.B. Bennett’s last
minute embrace of a Franklin Delano Roosevelt inspired “New Deal.”28 The following
summer, candidates in the Manitoba provincial election ran under the ILP-CCF banner,
although as the party’s membership expanded, primarily from the growing number of
CCF Clubs, the ILP was undergoing a slow demise as an independent entity.29 Running
few candidates and facing a popular leader in the Liberal-Progressives’ John Bracken, the
party elected only seven MLAs with twelve per cent of the popular vote, primarily in
north and central Winnipeg.30
Despite failing to persuade a majority of Canadians to adopt a socialist solution to
the Depression, those whom the CCF did elect rapidly became advocates of enhanced
public services and civil liberties in Canadian society, and critics of governments for
failing to staunch worsening unemployment and unchecked monopoly capitalism.31 In
Saskatchewan, significant support developed for pursuing an electoral alliance with
Social Credit. For example, the Baptist minister Tommy Douglas had won his federal
seat for the CCF in 1935 with Social Credit support and nomination. However, federal
CCF leaders expressed grave concerns about the potential alliance.32 Regardless, the
Saskatchewan CCF dropped all references to socialism at its 1936 convention, abandoned
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the party’s commitment to land nationalization and continued to seek electoral coalitions
with Social Credit in select ridings.33
The British Columbia CCF also explored new directions. After contesting a
leaderless election campaign in 1933, its seven-member caucus chose Robert Connell, an
Anglican clergyman and member of the Victoria LSR, as house leader. Connell clashed
with Ernest Winch and other party leaders, and rival newspapers the Clarion and the
Commonwealth debated the CCF’s policies and internal struggles.34 The divide came to a
head when Connell repudiated Winch’s “Marxist and revolutionary” positions on the
floor of the provincial legislature.35 When left-wingers moved no-confidence in Connell
at the 1936 BC CCF convention the motion was defeated but the left dominated elections
to the executive that in turn wielded authority over the party caucus. Unwilling to accept
such ideological constraints and facing expulsion, Connell joined three other members of
the CCF caucus in forming the short-lived Social Constructives party.36
The federated structure of the early CCF clearly posed challenges in Ontario,
Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia, where the various organizations
comprising the provincial parties strove to ensure their autonomy and the primacy of their
own ideological positions and leaders. But more positively, the decentralized structure
33
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also presented opportunities for an array of leftists, unionists, farmers, women, and
socialists to engage with the CCF, and accommodated a wide mix of ideological
discourse, ranging from Marxism and populism, to Christian socialism and labourism.
Furthermore, the early CCF had strong links to several social movements of the 1930s,
including the unemployed and pacifist movements, although little connection with a
diminished women’s movement. As circumstances in the labour movement changed in
the 1930s and 1940s and under the influence of David Lewis, the CCF sought closer ties
with trade unions.
The struggles faced by single unemployed men during the Depression, and the
refusal of multiple levels of government to offer them adequate relief, sparked protests
across Canada, including the 1935 On-to-Ottawa trek. The BC CCF, for instance, was
outspoken in defending the unemployed men’s demands for relief, and members
routinely attended, spoke at and led rallies and demonstrations in support.37 In addition
to the economic crisis of the Depression, many CCFers argued that the capitalist system
was responsible for war. Early CCF policy statements, from the Regina Manifesto to the
party’s election platforms, demonstrated their commitment to pacifism, and close links
existed between the CCF and various pacifist and Christian organizations, such as the
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom and the Fellowship of
Reconciliation. Pacifists abounded in the CCF, LSR and Co-operative Commonwealth
Youth Movement (CCYM).38 However, the danger of fascism challenged the party’s
commitment to pacifism, initially when faced with Communist and socialist struggles
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against Franco in Spain from 1936-39, and subsequently from the looming spectre of war
with Germany.39
The CCF’s relationship with the women’s and labour movements was not as
strong in the 1930s. Women formed an “important presence” in the CCF and in some
cases, such as the Women’s Joint Committee in Toronto, organized around distinctively
women’s issues during the Depression. However, their influence within the party was
limited and long-time female party activists were often frustrated by the lack of
leadership opportunities and their relegation to secondary tasks like making coffee and
stuffing envelopes.40 Despite Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees leader A.R.
Mosher’s attendance at the party’s founding meeting, the CCF struggled to attract support
from trade unions and their leaders throughout the 1930s. The rivalry between the Trades
and Labour Congress (TLC) and the All-Canadian Congress of Labour (ACCL), the two
primary English-Canadian union centrals, constrained the party’s ability to win support.
The TLC, suspicious of the party’s ties to the ACCL, kept its distance and repeatedly
rejected appeals to support the CCF, while sympathetic ACCL leaders such as Mosher
distanced themselves from the party in a vain effort to avoid antagonizing the TLC.41
Furthermore, after the dissolution of the Workers’ Unity League in 1936, Communist
organizers and union leaders formed a significant part of the labour movement in Canada,
and enjoyed support even from members who disagreed with their politics.42
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Circumstances in the labour movement changed rapidly during the late 1930s.
Industrial unions organized by the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) began to
expand and CCF and Communist activists alike struggled alongside workers in their often
bitter fights for union recognition and collective bargaining rights.43 Nevertheless, it
came as a surprise to CCF leaders when, after a lengthy struggle in 1938 between
Communists and moderates to represent Cape Breton mineworkers, District 26 of the
United Mine Workers (UMW) sought to affiliate with the CCF. After much debate the
CCF adopted a policy allowing for union affiliation, and established a Nova Scotia
section of the party in 1939.44 David Lewis, arguably the most significant figure in the
history of the CCF/NDP, supported union affiliation to the party.45 Lewis is rightly
acknowledged as the guiding force of the CCF and chief architect of its successor. A
Rhodes Scholar and labour lawyer who developed a healthy respect for the British
Labour Party while at Oxford, Lewis returned to Canada in 1935 to serve as the CCF’s
national secretary.46 Serving in that position until 1950, Lewis strove to build a party
organization with limited resources while imposing discipline and solidarity on the oftdivided party. Furthermore, Lewis worked closely with union leaders, especially in the
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Steelworkers, to expel Communists from the labour movement, take over Communist
dominated unions, and affiliate unions to the CCF.47
The CCF struggled to improve its electoral fortunes. The party’s share of the
popular vote declined in provincial elections in British Columbia, Ontario, Saskatchewan,
and Alberta throughout the 1930s, as well as federally in 1940. In many cases the party
failed even to muster a full slate of candidates.48 The CCF was also divided over
Canada’s decision to enter the Second World War in September 1939, most notably due
to the pacifist convictions of its leader J.S. Woodsworth, while others, including
Saskatchewan CCF leader George Williams and Winnipeg MP A.A. Heaps, advocated
full support for the war effort. An attempt by the CCF’s National Council to calm
tensions in the party with a compromise position endorsing limited participation in the
war resulted in Woodsworth, true to his pacifist principles, tendering his resignation as
party leader.49 When the National Council refused the resignation it was Woodsworth
who led the CCF in the 1940 federal election campaign, although it fell largely on M.J.
Coldwell to explain the party’s position opposing military conscription of manpower and
urging “greater equality of sacrifice,” state planning of the economy, and nationalization
of wartime industries.50 The CCF gains were marginal with eight MPs elected on 8.4 per
cent of the popular vote, while King’s Liberals were returned with a massive majority
winning 179 of the 245 seats.
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If the 1940 federal election demonstrated the CCF’s “capacity for survival,”
events in Manitoba quickly posed a new challenge to the party’s long-term prospects.51
A proposal by Premier Bracken to form a non-partisan coalition government appealed to
many in the Manitoba CCF who were convinced their party could ill afford to oppose the
popular premier in wartime, much less force an election for which they were unprepared.
Although David Lewis and the national CCF executive opposed the coalition proposal,
the Manitoba party accepted Bracken’s offer. Seymour Farmer, the Manitoba CCF party
leader, entered Bracken’s cabinet as Minister of Labour, the only CCF MLA to be given
a seat at the table. The arrangement proved disastrous for the CCF. The coalition
government accepted none of Farmer’s reform proposals, and the CCF eventually
withdrew its support in 1942 after Bracken bolted to federal politics as leader of the
recently renamed Progressive Conservative Party.52 Meanwhile, back in Manitoba, the
CCF would be reduced to three seats in the ensuing 1945 election.
Bracken’s departure signaled a move to the left by both the PCs and the Liberals
as they tapped into growing public support for social security programs.53 CCF fortunes
improved over the course of the war. Massive industrial expansion went hand-in-hand
with widespread government planning and control, lending credence to the CCF’s
arguments in favour of nationalization and economic planning while simultaneously
adding thousands of industrial workers to the party’s base of support.54 The ACCL had
merged with the CIO in 1940 to form the Congress of Canadian Labour (CCL), which
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experienced rapid growth.55 By 1942 its membership had grown to 200,000 from 70,000
in 1940, a potential body of support the CCF hoped to attract with its policies of postwar
planning and social security programs, labour rights, and the conscription of wealth for
the war effort.56 Shamefully, the party also endorsed the wartime internment and
deportation of Japanese-Canadians.57
The first indication of a boost in party support appeared in British Columbia
where the CCF, now led by Harold Winch, won 33.4 per cent of the popular vote in the
October 1941 provincial election and doubled to fourteen its representation in the
legislature. Reduced to a minority, the governing Liberals were forced into a coalition
with the Conservatives, which ensured Duff Patullo’s resignation as premier.58 One week
later in Nova Scotia, Cape Breton elected the first three Maritime CCF MLAs thereby
solidifying the party’s beachhead on the island first established by Clarence Gillis’s
election to the House of Commons in 1940. A federal by-election in February 1942 in
the Toronto working-class riding of York South, long a safe Conservative seat, was
expected to provide a coronation for Conservative leader Arthur Meighen as he sought to
return to the House of Commons after an absence of sixteen years. Instead, a surprise
upset resulted when schoolteacher Joseph Noseworthy of the CCF took the seat in the
absence of a Liberal candidate. The next generation of party leaders was also emerging
at the time as exemplified by United Church minister Stanley Knowles replacing
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Woodsworth in the riding of Winnipeg North Centre, and Ted Joliffe and Tommy
Douglas taking over as leaders of the Ontario and Saskatchewan CCF respectively.
The CCF’s upward trend continued with the August 1943 election in Ontario
where a real breakthrough appeared possible. The party’s support in the popular vote
surged to nearly thirty-two per cent, enough to elect thirty-four members, only four fewer
than the victorious Conservatives. Five days later, four federal by-election losses – two
to the CCF in Manitoba and Saskatchewan, and two in Montreal to the LabourProgressives and the Bloc Populaire – convinced Mackenzie King that his governing
Liberal party might be in trouble, an impression confirmed by a September 1943 Gallup
poll that placed the CCF narrowly ahead of the Liberals, twenty-nine per cent to twentyeight per cent.59 The party’s growing popularity and strongly expressed dissatisfaction
towards the King government’s labour policies inspired the 1943 CCL convention to
endorse the CCF and encourage its union locals to affiliate with the party.
During the summer of 1944 Tommy Douglas led the Saskatchewan CCF to an
astounding election victory, winning over fifty-three per cent of the popular vote and
forty-seven of the legislature’s fifty-two seats. A variety of factors had contributed to the
upset: a forceful campaign promising expanded social services, security of farm
ownership, and improved farm incomes; a strong party organization boasting an
increasingly active membership; and Douglas’s personal appeal.60 Douglas in turn
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acknowledged the fortuitous timing of the election: “we were lucky in Saskatchewan.
We happened to come in in 1944 when the tide was running in.”61
The election of one CCF MLA in the Quebec provincial election of 1944, when
the party ran candidates in fewer than one-third of the constituencies and espoused a
strong federal government, also prompted hopes that perhaps the party was on track to
acquire a truly national presence.62 However, the 1944 provincial election in Alberta,
coming on the heels of popular Social Credit Premier William Aberhart’s death, proved
disappointing to the CCF. Ernest Manning led the Social Credit to re-election,
solidifying its grip on power in Alberta and restricting the CCF to twenty-three per cent
of the popular vote and just two MLAs. It appeared the tide might already have started to
roll out.63
The CCF’s opponents also increasingly took aim at the perceived socialist
upstarts. Prime Minister King sought to undercut CCF appeal by legislating social
benefits such as family allowances and a veterans’ charter, and promising an expanding
list of postwar reconstruction and social security programs. Furthermore, after the
German invasion of the Soviet Union sparked a reversal in the Canadian communist
position on the war effort, from opposition to full-fledged support, both the federal and
Ontario Liberal parties arranged unstated coalitions with the communists in workingclass ridings that undercut CCF support.64 Business organizations, including insurance
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companies and the Canadian Chamber of Commerce, attacked the CCF by aggressively
expounding the benefits of free enterprise and cautioning the public against the perils of
socialism.65 Gladstone Murray, a former journalist and CBC manager, and Burdick
Trestrail, a former advertiser and consultant, received funding from business to attack the
CCF via speeches, advertising, publications and direct mail.66 In conjunction with
criticisms hurled by the press, religious leaders, and several business organizations,
Murray and Trestrail warned that the CCF’s socialism would lead inevitably to
totalitarianism. Shortly before the 1945 provincial election, Ontario CCF leader Ted
Joliffe accused Conservative Premier George Drew of organizing a Gestapo-like “secret
police” unit of the OPP to spy on the party. Drew vehemently denied the accusations,
and received support from the press when he counter-attacked the CCF for making
desperately slanderous allegations.67 The resulting national furor severely damaged the
CCF’s prospects in Ontario where it lost twenty-six seats and watched its popular vote
fall to 22.4 per cent during the June provincial election. The backlash was also felt during
the federal election held one week later.
Despite achieving the highest popular vote (15.5 per cent) and seat count (twentyeight) in its history to this point, the CCF had cause for disappointment with the 1945
federal election results. The party nominated candidates in most ridings outside Quebec
and won a significant share of the popular vote in seat-rich Ontario, but failed to elect a
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single MP in that province.68 Provincial election returns in Manitoba and British
Columbia during October were further confirmation that fierce opposition had stalled the
CCF’s momentum. Despite winning the largest share of the popular vote (33.8 per cent)
in Manitoba, the ability of the governing coalition of Liberal-Progressives and
Conservatives to coordinate the allocation of seats resulted in the CCF electing only nine
MLAs out of the legislature’s fifty-five. The decision of two MLAs to run as
“Independent CCF” candidates after facing discipline for advocating closer cooperation
with Communists provoked a controversy that deeply divided the provincial party and
marred its campaign.69 Similarly in the British Columbia contest the Liberal and
Conservative electoral coalition contributed to the CCF losing four seats despite
capturing over thirty-seven per cent of the popular vote.
The years 1946 to 1960 were marked by a long decline for the CCF. In the Cold
War environment, promoters of public ownership and socialism were easily suspected of
being atheistic communist sympathizers. Adding insult to injury, CCF predictions of
economic crisis and capitalist collapse were undercut by the relative prosperity Canada
was enjoying in the immediate postwar years. At the same time the party reduced its
earlier commitments to public ownership and focused instead on economic planning and
social welfare measures, yet efforts at presenting a more moderate image failed to attract
widespread support. Developments in the labour movement, however, particularly the
exclusion of communist unionists and the creation of the Canadian Labour Congress
(CLC) in 1956, promised new opportunities for CCF leaders determined to forge a closer
connection between the party and the unions.
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Admittedly, the news for the CCF in the immediate postwar years was not all bad.
In the Ontario provincial election of June 1948 financial support from the CCL’s Political
Action Committee substantially augmented the CCF’s advertising budget. The improved
results – a rebound in its popular vote to twenty-seven per cent, the party’s return to
Official Opposition status with twenty-one seats, and the personal defeat of Conservative
Premier George Drew by CCFer William Temple – demonstrated to the CCF and its
union supporters the potential benefits of closer cooperation with organized labour.70
Seventeen days later, Tommy Douglas’s CCF was returned in Saskatchewan with a
reduced majority of thirty-one seats and 47.5 per cent of the popular vote. However,
undermining these positive signs was a continued slippage in the CCF’s popular vote
generally, often resulting in significant numbers of lost seats, as occurred in the 1949
federal election when over half its caucus fell leaving a rump of only thirteen MPs.
Provincial elections in Manitoba in 1949 and Ontario in 1951 mirrored this decline; in
Ontario, for instance, the party lost all but two of its seats.71 Saskatchewan remained the
party’s bright spot. There in 1952 the CCF increased its seat count to forty-two, won
fifty-four per cent of the popular vote, and earned a third term as a result of popular
reforms and a formidable organization.
The Cold War also sharpened divisions, between Communists and CCFers within
the labour movement, and moderates and radicals within the party. The CCL established
a Political Action Committee to act as the political instrument of the labour movement,
and pro-CCF unionists sought to ensure support for the party despite internal opposition,
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especially from Communists.72 At times embracing Cold War rhetoric and working in
tandem with employers and the state, CCF leaders attempted to eliminate Communists
from influential positions within the Canadian labour movement. The expulsion of the
Canadian Seamen’s Union from the TLC in 1949 initiated a series of purges that, by
1955, had eradicated Communist influence within the Congress.73 Similar battles
occurred in the industrial unions that comprised the CCL. Two examples will suffice
here. The CCF considered Communist interference the greatest challenge to winning
seats in automobile manufacturing centres such as Windsor.74 CCF leaders, resentful of
Communist influence over Canadian UAW director George Burt, worked with the newly
elected UAW president Walter Reuther to dislodge Communists from the union. By
1951 their efforts paid off as a diminished Communist presence forced Burt to embrace
the pro-CCF stance of the CCL leadership in order to remain in power.75 Similarly,
CCFers in British Columbia worked to undermine Communists within that province’s
labour movement wherever possible. During the ‘Red Wars’ of 1948, their efforts bore
fruit, first by winning control of the Vancouver Labour Council (affiliated to the CCL),
next by suspending the International Union of Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers (MineMill) from the CCL in response to intemperate and critical comments by Communist
activists about the union’s leadership, and finally by taking advantage of the absence of
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Mine-Mill delegates to win control of the BC Federation of Labour (BCFL).76 The
struggles peaked in the battle over BC’s woodworkers. Amidst attacks from CCF
unionists, the mainstream press, and the international executive of the International
Woodworkers of America (IWA), the Communist Labour Progressive Party (LPP)
decided to break away from the IWA. In the ensuing legal battles, the courts, the Labour
Board, and the employers all favoured the IWA. The inability of LPP leadership to
garner member support for the break would cost the Communist party one of its largest
union bases.77 Indeed, the IWA, much like the UAW, became one of the CCF’s strongest
supporters in the labour movement.
Struggles existed within the CCF as well. In Ontario, the explicit emphasis on
party organization upset members who felt the party should focus on education.
Dissatisfied members formed a ‘Ginger Group’ in 1952 with the slogan “Keep Left.”78
Shortly after, a conflict ensued over the finances and autonomy of the Woodsworth
Foundation, a progressive think-tank headed by Frank Underhill. Although members of
the ‘Ginger Group’ were also active in the Woodsworth Foundation, they disagreed with
Underhill’s view of the party’s direction. Underhill, who had been the primary author of
the Regina Manifesto, argued that the CCF must update its platform from the 1930s, and
strongly warned against a party dominated by union leaders.79 Historian Dan Azoulay
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astutely recognizes that conflicts within the Ontario CCF at the time originated in the
paranoid atmosphere of the Cold War. Members of the ‘Ginger Group’ and Woodsworth
Foundation alike were sufficiently fearful of being associated with totalitarianism that
they exaggerated any tendencies of the CCF toward centralization, bureaucratization, and
the elimination of dissent.80
An atmosphere of fear engendered by the Cold War also loomed large over the
BC CCF in the 1940s and 1950s. Foreign policy debates frequently divided ‘left’ and
‘right’ factions of the provincial party, with moderates led by Angus and Grace MacInnis
working with national CCF leaders such as David Lewis to curb the influence of radicals
such as Ernest and Harold Winch, Rodney Young, Bert Herridge, Colin Cameron and
Dorothy Steeves.81 Angry over this turn to the right, lefists in the BC CCF formed a
Socialist Caucus, soon renamed the Socialist Fellowship, to fight the moderates’ growing
influence. The Socialist Fellowship was short-lived, and dissolved under pressures
exerted both from without and within.82 Although Harold Winch remained the CCF
leader, Steeves was removed from her position with the CCF News in 1951.83 The
party’s ‘right’ faction thus asserted itself in executive elections and, to a lesser extent, in
the party’s policy platform. Despite entering the 1952 provincial election campaign
divided, the BC CCF emerged with the most votes of any party (thirty-four per cent of
the popular vote) and eighteen seats, decimating the governing Liberal-Conservative
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coalition which had been created to keep the CCF from power. Under the short-lived
preferential ballot system used in BC, many voters placed Social Credit as their second
choice, allowing the Socreds to elect nineteen members without a leader. Former
Conservative MLA W.A.C. Bennett assumed the Social Credit leadership, and with the
assurance of support from Labour MLA Tom Uphill was offered the opportunity to form
a government.84 When Bennett engineered his government’s defeat in 1953, hopeful he
could achieve a majority in the subsequent election, Harold Winch first requested and
was denied by the lieutenant governor the opportunity to form a government.85 Winch
subsequently resigned after being heavily criticized by his own caucus. Arnold Webster,
his successor, was more moderate, but when he led the ill-prepared party into the 1953
election the result was a Social Credit majority and the loss of four CCF MLAs.
The Manitoba CCF also chose a new leader, United Church minister Lloyd
Stinson, in preparation for the 1953 election that followed dissolution of the LiberalProgressive and Conservative governing coalition. The CCF assembled only twenty-five
candidates to run in the election, and returned five MLAs with 16.5 per cent of the
popular vote as the Liberal-Progressives were swept back into power.86 Although the
CCF’s popular vote declined in the August 1953 federal election, concentrated support in
working-class areas of BC, north Winnipeg, Cape Breton and in part of Saskatchewan
yielded twenty-three seats and further convinced the Ontario CCF of the importance of
party organization and the new poll-by-poll committee system of identifying supporters.87
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In November, the architect of that system, former national treasurer Donald C.
Macdonald, was elected leader of the Ontario party.
Ongoing developments in the labour movement continued to impact the CCF.
The widespread acceptance of collective bargaining and automatic dues check-off
contributed to lessening spontaneous protests and “wildcat strikes,” while enhancing the
power of unions and their leadership in negotiating labour relations.88 Combined with
purges of Communist activists and their unions from the mainstream labour movement,
the changed labour relations climate (often referred to as “the postwar compromise”)
allowed senior union leaders to alter significantly the political direction of the Canadian
labour movement.89 Beginning in 1953, CCL and TLC leaders explored the possibility of
a merger. Following the election of the left-wing former president of the Montreal
Trades and Labour Council Claude Jodoin as TLC president, the two organizations
merged in 1956 as the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). Unlike his earlier efforts to
secure CCL support for the CCF, David Lewis, in concert with Jodoin, counseled
patience and made no attempt to ensure the new union centre would immediately back
the CCF.90 Instead, Lewis initiated discussions with CLC leaders about the possibility of
creating an entirely new party in the near future.
Meeting in Winnipeg in 1956 for the party’s federal convention, CCF leaders
sought to update the party’s image and policies. The resulting Winnipeg Declaration,
written primarily by David Lewis and national secretary Lorne Ingle, moderated the
CCF’s statement of principles. In deference to Cold War anxieties, the Winnipeg
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Declaration contained few condemnations of capitalism and proposed only a limited
program of public ownership alongside extensive economic planning and social welfare
reforms.91 The Declaration’s “guarded” language emphasized the modifier “democratic”
whenever referring to the party’s socialism.92
Despite falling to 45.3 per cent of the popular vote and thirty-six seats, Tommy
Douglas and the Saskatchewan CCF won a fourth consecutive majority in the summer
1956 election. Elsewhere the party still appeared to be in decline. In the Alberta
election of 1955, Social Credit retained its grip on power while the CCF’s eight per cent
of the popular vote translated into just two seats and the personal defeat of its leader,
Elmer Roper.93 That same year in Ontario, the CCF’s new leader Donald Macdonald
managed to win back York South, but with only 16.5 per cent voter support the party won
two seats in Oshawa and Hamilton and lost its lone northern Ontario seat.94 For Robert
Strachan, the BC CCF’s new leader, the 1956 election in that province proved equally
disheartening. W.A.C. Bennett and Social Credit enjoyed an increased majority while the
CCF’s share of the popular vote (28.3 per cent) was its lowest yet in that province.
Federally the party added two MPs to its caucus in the 1957 election, but was decimated
by Conservative John Diefenbaker’s historic electoral sweep of the country in 1958.
When the dust had settled, the CCF was reduced to three northern Ontario ridings, Hazen
Argue’s seat in Saskatchewan, and four working-class strongholds in BC. The debacle
convinced CCF leaders the time had come for a new party and a fresh start.
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One month after the federal election, the CLC in convention adopted a resolution
calling for the establishment of a new “broadly based political movement.” CCF and
CLC leaders soon thereafter created the National Committee for the New Party (NCNP).
Stanley Knowles, who had lost his Winnipeg North Centre seat in the 1958 rout, was
elected CLC vice-president to work with Lewis in developing a new political party.95
Farm organizations, unlike in 1932, were uninterested in affiliating with the new party.96
In addition to the CCF’s existing labour constituency, the NCNP sought to attract
“professional people and liberally minded persons” through the creation of New Party
clubs, of which there were 300 by 1961.97 Many CCFers expressed suspicion that an
influx of union activists and liberal professionals might dilute the commitment to
socialism and, in the case of labour specifically, use its considerable financial clout and
large membership to dominate the party.
Oddly, given the federal CCF’s reliance on its constituent provincial sections, the
provincial parties were little consulted in the discussion and planning for the new party.98
Some of those parties, most notably in Manitoba, Ontario, Saskatchewan and BC, had
managed to overcome the CCF’s general struggle with dwindling support and diminutive
caucuses to exert an important influence on Canadian political life and society. In
Manitoba, for example, where the CCF held the balance of power after the 1958
provincial election, it backed Duff Roblin’s minority Progressive Conservative
government in implementing extensive reforms including hospital insurance and a
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centralized public school system. The Saskatchewan CCF fought the 1960 provincial
election over the proposed introduction of Medicare, a provincially-funded, universal
medical care plan, and won a slightly increased majority despite facing heated opposition
from the College of Physicians and Surgeons. Medicare’s successful introduction in
Saskatchewan two years later was an important first step in the eventual creation of a
nationwide publicly-funded health insurance plan. In the British Columbia election of
1960, Robert Strachan and the CCF vigorously promoted nationalization of the
province’s hydro-electric industry, enduring Premier W.A.C. Bennett’s taunts about
socialism in the process, only to have Bennett implement the idea once his government
was returned to office.99 The CCF’s policy influence in spite of disappointing election
results prompted some within its ranks to question the need for a new party, and many
expressed their discontent by supporting MP Douglas Fischer’s unsuccessful attempt to
challenge David Lewis for the CCF presidency in 1958.100
The act of creating the new party involved retaining many aspects of the old CCF,
although one noteworthy difference was enhanced financial support from organized
labour.101 Dan Azoulay has shown how in Ontario the new party was “new” in image
only, and instead of recruiting supporters into New Party clubs, organizers focused on
bringing them into existing CCF riding associations. Indeed, the organization of the new
party often remained reliant upon existing CCF riding associations rather than the New
Party clubs and donations from labour continued to originate with the same sympathetic
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union leaders who had supported the CCF.102 Nevertheless, early on there were grounds
for encouragement when Walter Pitman, a school teacher, won the 1960 federal byelection as the New Party candidate in Peterborough, a city where the CCF previously
had been shut out.103 Also positive was the decision by Tommy Douglas, the CCF’s most
successful politician to date, to run for the new party’s leadership. Despite David
Lewis’s efforts to ensure Douglas was acclaimed to the position, Hazen Argue, the CCF
house leader and only Saskatchewan MP to survive the Diefenbaker sweep of 1958, also
threw his hat into the ring. Argue was suspicious of the motives for creating the New
Party and of the increased influence that labour was likely to exercise within it. He was
backed by his caucus mates Douglas Fisher, Frank Howard and Arnold Peters, as well as
left-wingers in the CCF angered by the party’s apparent rightward drift.104
Over two thousand delegates attended the New Party’s July 1961 founding
convention in Ottawa. Much about the New Party’s program, with its emphasis on
economic planning and regulation, progressive taxation, and an expanded welfare state in
the form of health insurance, pensions and free education, was carried over from the old
CCF.105 Douglas easily defeated Argue’s challenge for the leadership by 1391 votes to
380. Much closer was the decision over the party’s name, with New Democratic Party
(NDP) eventually winning out over, among other suggestions, the Social Democratic
Party.106 The excitement generated by the first federal convention was not emulated in
the provinces. Founding conventions for the provincial NDP in British Columbia,
Manitoba and Ontario only highlighted the “lack of substantive change in membership
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and leadership.”107 Also disheartening was Argue’s decision, six months after losing the
leadership, to cross the floor and join the Liberals, claiming that labour’s domination of
the NDP rendered it untenable.
The new party’s first electoral test was not long in coming. Diefenbaker’s PCs
sought re-election in 1962 following a tumultuous first term in office marked by cabinet
divisions over nuclear weapons and a feud with Bank of Canada governor James Coyne.
The NDP’s platform emphasized increased and portable pensions, a federally-funded but
provincially-run universal medicare program, and a royal commission on bilingualism
and biculturalism.108 Despite renewed interest in Quebec, the NDP mustered only forty
candidates for that province’s seventy-five ridings. Elsewhere in the country it
assembled almost a full slate of candidates.109 Spending more money on the 1962
campaign than the CCF had ever managed to amass, the NDP was still vastly outspent by
both the Liberals and PCs. In the final week of the campaign the NDP staged several
massive rallies featuring Tommy Douglas in a bid to draw greater media coverage.110
But the election returns for the NDP – nineteen seats and 13.6 per cent of the popular
vote – while an improvement over the CCF’s in 1958, were disappointing nonetheless.
Although its support remained focused largely in the same areas that previously
supported the CCF, the NDP was shut out of Saskatchewan despite winning twenty-two
per cent of the vote in that province, and Tommy Douglas lost in his bid to return to the
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House of Commons after an absence of eighteen years.111 Particularly galling, Argue
won re-election for the Liberals.
The national NDP’s embarrassing failure to win a single seat in Saskatchewan –
the birthplace of the Regina Manifesto, home to three CCF/NDP leaders, and location of
the first social democratic government in North America – was not corrected when
Canadians returned to the polls in 1963 amidst a heated debate over the stationing of
American nuclear missiles in Canada. The NDP augmented its previous election
platform by emphasizing an internationalist foreign policy and strong anti-nuclear stance.
Douglas, who had been returned in a by-election in British Columbia’s BurnabyCoquitlam riding, attempted to convince voters that the Liberals’ pro-nuclear position
was equivalent to championing continentalism and an American-dominated economy.
But Douglas struggled to be heard over the clamour of Diefenbaker railing against
American imperialism in a losing battle against Lester Pearson’s Liberals. The NDP lost
three seats and remained in fourth place in the House of Commons. In the aftermath of
the 1963 election, delegates to the party’s second national convention in Regina endorsed
a statement confirming the NDP’s commitment to “democratic socialist” principles and
agreed that Quebec’s ‘special status’ within Confederation needed to be formally
recognized.112
Provincial elections in the early 1960s produced further disappointments for the
NDP. A decline in its popular vote in elections in Ontario and British Columbia during
1963 was an unnecessary reminder of the challenges involved in tackling well-ensconced
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provincial regimes. Despite gaining two seats in Ontario, the NDP’s share of the popular
vote slipped marginally to 15.5 per cent, while in British Columbia a steeper decline in its
popular vote to 27.8 per cent produced fourteen seats. A severer blow occurred a year
later in Saskatchewan where voters replaced the twenty-year-old CCF government with
Ross Thatcher’s Liberals.113 After the bitterness of the doctors’ strike, the CCF finished
fewer than 700 votes behind the Liberals in the provincial election, but won only twentyfive seats to the Liberals’ thirty-two. “The NDP,” historian Desmond Morton lamented,
“was at its nadir”.114
Morton and some other historians of the NDP have interpreted the by-election in
the Toronto riding of Riverdale in September 1964 as a “turning point” for the party.115
David Lewis’s 25-year-old son Stephen masterminded for the party a volunteer-based
door-to-door canvassing and ‘get-out-their-own-vote’ strategy. After contributing to
NDPer James Renwick’s victory in Riverdale, the strategy became a model for the
party’s future campaigns.116 Two additional by-election victories in late 1964 – federally
in Waterloo and provincially in Hanley, Saskatchewan – raised hopes that further gains
would materialize in the upcoming federal election. Meanwhile, in 1965 at its third
national convention, the party at the urging of Robert Cliche, the leader of the Quebec
NDP, adopted a position endorsing joint federal-provincial consultations and pledged to
work for French-language rights in English Canada.117
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In the 1965 federal election that followed, the NDP achieved a record twelve per
cent of the popular vote in Quebec, but was unable to elect a single member. Charles
Taylor, the party’s leading intellectual, lost to Pierre Elliott Trudeau, who along with Jean
Marchand and Gerard Pelletier had recently accepted Pearson’s overtures to join his
Liberal government. The NDP platform focused on the creation of a national medicare
system, promised an immense array of social programs, an increase to old age security,
and improved federal provincial cooperation and economic planning.118 Winning an
improved 17.9 per cent of the popular vote, up from 13.6 per cent in 1963, the party only
increased its seat count by four, up to twenty-one, comprised of nine each in British
Columbia and Ontario and three in Manitoba. At least the continued minority
government status of Pearson’s Liberals seemed to guarantee that the NDP would
continue to wield influence over it for a while longer. Indeed, Pearson’s two minority
governments (1963 to 1965 and 1965 to 1968) often relied on NDP support, resulting in
several major reforms the CCF/NDP had advocated for years, including a new Canadian
flag, a public pension plan, and federally-funded public medicare.119
A series of provincial elections in 1966-67 seriously tested the NDP’s resources.
Improved results and close races in Manitoba, British Columbia, Saskatchewan and
Ontario were gratifying, but in each province the party experienced a turnover in
leadership following the election. The departure of Russell Paulley, Robert Strachan,
Woodrow Lloyd and Donald C. Macdonald, each of whom had led a provincial CCF
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party before the advent of the New Party, suggested a significant generational and image
change was underway.
The popularity of Duff Roblin’s PCs was waning in Manitoba, and although they
were reelected in 1966 with a reduced majority and the Liberals returned as Official
Opposition, the increase in NDP popular vote (23 per cent) and seat count (eleven) were
grounds for optimism.120 In British Columbia the NDP’s provincial secretary described
the 1966 provincial election results there as “quite satisfactory,” given the party had
gained two seats and won over thirty-three per cent of the popular vote even as Social
Credit under W.A.C. Bennett returned to a sixth term in office with a comfortable
majority.121 In Saskatchewan the NDP made its debut under Woodrow Lloyd. Emerging
only 5200 votes behind Ross Thatcher’s incumbent Liberals, the NDP’s seat total was
twenty-four to the Liberals’ thirty-five. Six days later, on October 17, 1967, Ontario
voters awarded the NDP its best result yet in that province, with 26 per cent of the
popular vote and twenty seats, including wins in Toronto, Hamilton, Oshawa,
Scarborough and northern Ontario, as well as in Brantford, Windsor and Peterborough,
where there had not traditionally been a strong history of CCF support.
Despite some increases in party strength since 1965 at both the provincial and
federal levels, pressure was building from NDP members and activists to recruit a new
generation of leaders. In the aftermath of the British Columbia election, for example,
union affiliations with the party proliferated after newly-elected MLA Thomas Berger,
with the support of BCFL secretary Pat O’Neil, announced he would challenge Robert
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Strachan’s leadership at the 1967 provincial convention.122 Strachan eventually fended
off Berger’s challenge by a vote of 277 to 178 among convention delegates.123 A desire
for generational change was also evident at the national level.124 At the party’s fourth
national convention held in Toronto during the summer of 1967, a group of ‘Young
Turks,’ including future provincial party leaders Stephen Lewis and Grant Notley, former
federal secretary Terry Grier, provincial secretaries John Harney and Clive Lytle, and
provincial legislators Sidney Green and Jim Renwick, focused on defeating the federal
executive’s choice for party president, former Saskatchewan cabinet minister J.H.
Brockelbank. Stephen Lewis considered challenging for the presidency but was
dissuaded after a conversation with his father and reported to his fellow ‘Young Turks’
that “blood would run in the streets” were he to personally challenge Brockelbank.125
Nevertheless, their opposition prevailed and Jim Renwick won the presidency “by dint of
feverish canvassing.”126 Also noteworthy, effective lobbying by Robert Cliche, Laurier
LaPierre, and Charles Taylor prompted the party to adopt a policy recognizing ‘special
status’ for Quebec, including the potential for separate social programs along the lines of
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the Quebec Pension Plan.127 Furthermore, in the late 1960s the NDP was the only
Canadian party closely associated with opposition to the Vietnam War.128 Tommy
Douglas condemned Canadian complicity in the “bloody and barbaric” war in Vietnam in
a February 1967 speech to the House of Commons.129 New Democrats were regular
speakers at antiwar rallies and NDP riding associations and youth groups were occasional
participants in organizing protest demonstrations.130
Although the NDP had briefly led the PCs in a March 1967 Gallup Poll, the
Tories rebounded in public opinion nationally when the selection of Nova Scotia premier
Robert Stanfield as PC party leader later that year helped to ease memories of woes
associated with Diefenbaker’s tempestuous leadership. One year later Pierre Elliot
Trudeau succeeded Pearson as the Liberal leader. Long identified with the left in
Quebec, Trudeau posed a threat to the NDP in particular, both from his reputation as a
progressive and socially liberal reformer, and as a staunch opponent of Quebec
nationalism.
Even before Trudeau’s elevation to the Liberal leadership, Stephen Lewis, who
had recently been elected provincially in the Ontario riding of Scarborough, met with
Tommy Douglas in Vancouver to urge his resignation from the helm of the NDP.
Lewis’s request, which he claimed was supported by the Ontario caucus, and was in
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response to Douglas’s earlier willingness to step aside for a new generation to take over,
was nevertheless badly received.131 An obvious and ambitious candidate to succeed
Douglas was Stephen’s father, David, the federal house leader, but he was only four years
younger than Douglas. Moreover, Douglas was looking forward to leading the NDP into
an election against Stanfield and Trudeau, relatively inexperienced leaders at the federal
level.
There was much that was new about the 1968 election; in addition to the arrival of
Stanfield and Trudeau, the campaign included the first televised leaders’ debate.132 In the
afterglow of the highly successful Centennial celebrations held the year before,
nationalism was a prominent campaign theme. Economic nationalism, in particular, had
been at the forefront of political debate since Walter Gordon’s brief stint as Liberal
Minister of Finance from 1963 to 1965, and the publication of the Watkins Report of
February 1968 into foreign ownership had sharpened concerns.133 Douglas and the NDP
attacked Trudeau and the Liberals for promoting a dependent continentalism, and
campaigned instead on a platform of affordable housing, the establishment of a prices
review board to reduce the cost of living, a guaranteed annual income and tax reform, and
for an end to the American bombing of North Vietnam.134
By keeping the details of Trudeau’s promise of a ‘Just Society’ deliberately
vague, the Liberal campaign focused attention on the charismatic leader himself .135 On
one issue, however, the lines were clear – Trudeau’s opposition to Quebec nationalism
131
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and his criticisms of Quebec’s attempts to gain for itself a heightened international status
stood in stark contrast to the positions of both the PCs and the NDP.136 On the eve of the
election, Trudeau’s widely reported resilience and personal courage in the face of a
nationalist riot on St. Jean-Baptiste Day in Montreal endeared him further to many
English Canadians. The result was a Liberal majority with 154 seats and 45.4 per cent of
the popular vote compared to seventy-two seats and 31.4% of the popular vote for
Stanfield’s PCs. Although the Liberal victory was not unexpected given the
unprecedented outpouring of Trudeaumania, the result was a disappointment nevertheless
for the NDP. It had nominated a record 263 candidates but elected just twenty-two MPs
with 16.9 per cent of the popular vote. In Quebec the NDP had run such high-profile
standard bearers as Charles Taylor and Laurier LaPierre, yet instead of achieving a
breakthrough due to the party’s adopting a ‘deux nations’ approach to federalism, its
support in that province slumped to 7.5 per cent of the popular vote.137 The election in
Oshawa of Ed Broadbent, a young political science professor, and its resurgence in
Saskatchewan, where it won thirty-five per cent of the vote and elected six members
including Canada’s youngest MP, Lorne Nystrom, only partially compensated for NDP
losses incurred in northern Ontario, Toronto and Hamilton. With the loss of Douglas’s
redistributed Burnaby-Seymour seat, attention refocused on the leadership question. This
time, Douglas, now sixty-three years of age and approaching icon status in the party,
made clear his intention to resign at the 1969 convention.138 The death of long-time
leftist Colin Cameron only a month after the election, however, opened a relatively safe
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seat on Vancouver Island, and Douglas, at the urging of the party executive, stayed on as
leader and re-entered the House of Commons after winning the February 1969 byelection.139
Leadership challenges in Ontario and Manitoba during the fall of 1968
highlighted differences in image, more so than ideology or policy. Jim Renwick in
Ontario, although only four years Donald Macdonald’s junior, represented a fresh face.
First elected in 1964 and named federal NDP president at the party’s 1967 convention,
Renwick surprised Macdonald by announcing that he planned to challenge his leadership
at the November ONDP convention in Kitchener.140 Although many agreed the party
should have performed better in the provincial election of 1967, Macdonald’s longstanding connections with many party activists complicated Renwick’s struggle to win
delegates. In the event, Macdonald prevailed by a vote of 859 to 370.141 That same
month Grant Notley took over the leadership of the Alberta NDP from Neil Reimer, who
resigned after the party won sixteen per cent of the vote but no seats in the 1967
provincial election.
In Manitoba, Sidney Green challenged Russell Paulley’s leadership of the
province’s NDP, not over policy differences but because he believed a contest would be
healthy for the party.142 However, many party members interpreted Green’s challenge as
a left-wing insurgence. Paulley indicated he planned to resign soon, but his preferred
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successor was the popular MP Ed Schreyer.143 Paulley retained his leadership at the
Manitoba party’s November 1968 convention by a vote of 213 to 168 and eventually
resigned the following year. Thereupon, the majority of the caucus encouraged Schreyer
to run in the June 1969 leadership race which he won handily.144 In British Columbia,
after Robert Strachan resigned the leadership in early 1969, Thomas Berger defeated
MLAs Dave Barrett and Bob Williams and New Left activist John Conway to head that
province’s NDP.145
When the activists and politicians who ultimately formed the Waffle began
meeting in the spring of 1969, the CCF and NDP had significantly influenced Canadian
politics and society over the previous thirty-seven years. Despite experiencing electoral
disappointments and misplaced optimism repeatedly at both the federal and provincial
levels, the CCF/NDP had nevertheless achieved strong representation in many provinces,
especially Saskatchewan, and demonstrated the potential to take power in others,
specifically Manitoba and British Columbia. The party could point to solid regional
bases of support in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Nova Scotia and parts of
Ontario, and commentators across the political spectrum characterized leading party
figures as committed, intelligent and principled parliamentarians.146 At the same time the
NDP faced many challenges in the late 1960s, including alternating hostility and
inattention from the press, a dearth of financial resources, entrenched Liberal and
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Conservative supporters in many regions of the country, and a first-past-the-post electoral
system which often worked to its disadvantage.
Each period of the CCF’s history – its early years from 1932 to 1940, its rise from
1941 to 1945, and its decline from 1946 to 1960 – had been primarily influenced by the
political and economic context in which the party operated, especially the “matrix
events” of the Great Depression, World War II, and the Cold War.147 The context of the
1961 to 1969 period, including various crises in the postwar system such as
decolonization, the civil rights and anti-war movements in the United States, and
intensified nationalism in both Quebec and English Canada, created both challenges and
opportunities for the NDP. One of the greatest challenges was the emergence of a series
of social movements that, taken together, represented an entirely different approach to
political action and social change. As will be seen in the following chapter, a ‘New Left’
comprised primarily of young ‘baby boomers’ active in extra-parliamentary social
movements such as the student and anti-war movements rejected the politics of an ‘Old
Left’ which many in Canada associated with the NDP and its allies in the trade union
leadership.

147

McKay, Rebels, Reds, Radicals, 95.

78
Chapter Two
“We had a sense of the world afire with revolution:” The New Left in Canada,
1959-69
The Waffle was closely tied to the New Left’s emergence in Canada during the
1960s. Indeed it was within a variety of New Left movements that many future Waffle
activists first met and were attracted to ideas of radical political reform. James Laxer and
Krista Maeots, for example, each began their activism in the Student Union for Peace
Action (SUPA) and the Canadian University Press (CUP), two key organizations of the
Canadian New Left. Another prominent Waffler, the liberal economist Mel Watkins,
through his involvement in such New Left manifestations as the American civil rights
and Canadian anti-war and draft resistance movements, developed an enhanced sense of
Canadian nationalism and questioned the benefits of continental economic integration.
Other future Wafflers cut their activist teeth in the labour movement, especially within
massive locals of the automotive and steel industries radicalized by an influx of young
workers and a wave of wildcat strikes. And young members of the New Democratic
Party such as Giles Endicott, John Smart and Gerald Caplan, all of whom would become
Waffle supporters, were drawn to the New Left’s youthful, aggressive and exciting
politics next to which the NDP appeared old, timid and dull by comparison.
The concept of the New Left, which was international in scope, is inseparably
linked to the rebellious political, social, and cultural ferment of the “Sixties.” The term
“New Left” was first used self-referentially by activists in the British anti-nuclear
movement of the late 1950s, many of whom, in the stark Cold War atmosphere, were
determined to distance themselves not only from capitalism, but from their former
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communist sympathies as well.1 By May 1968, Parisian student insurgents manning the
barricades and scrawling poetic graffiti (“be realistic, demand the impossible;” “it is
forbidden to forbid;” “run comrade, the old world is behind you”) on city buildings while
battling police in the streets, had become, along with clamorous protests from a crosssection of American society opposed to United States involvement in the Vietnam War,
the indelible image of the international New Left.
This chapter, in surveying the New Left’s origins and activities in Canada, and
thereby establishing the important ideological and institutional backdrop in which the
Waffle is situated, adopts Van Gosse’s broad definition of the New Left discussed earlier.
As will be shown, the Canadian New Left, in addition to encompassing the anti-Vietnam
War movements and university campus-based organizations such as the SUPA, also
included the women’s liberation, ‘Red Power,’ left-nationalist, and militant labour
movements that took place throughout the “Long Sixties.”2 Those rejecting the Old Left,
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represented in Canada by the NDP and union leaders, brought a new approach to politics,
as described by Peter Warrian, a Canadian New Left activist, in 1968:
We are committed to democratic and humanistic values. Consequently, we are
opposed to authoritarian forms of social organization that repress selfdetermination and self-development and we aim at democratization of education
and, necessarily, the democratization of our society.3
The Canadian New Left, in addition to being influenced by British and American
New Left social movements, originated in three historical developments in the aftermath
of the Second World War: the baby boom; the Cold War; and the decolonization
movements that emerged in Africa and Asia throughout the 1950s and 1960s. A fourth
influence, unique to Canada, was the early 1960s Quiet Revolution in Quebec.
The baby boom of approximately 1946 to 1962 massively altered Canadian
society. Between 1946 and 1955 alone, 3.9 million babies were born as the birth rate per
thousand of the population rose from 24.3 in 1945 to 28.9 in 1947, and remained above
twenty-four until 1963.4 Historian Doug Owram has demonstrated how the baby boom
generation dominated the post-war era.5 He details, for instance, the explosion in statefinanced educational investments, including buildings and instructors, required by the
baby boomers as they progressed through elementary, secondary and post-secondary
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institutions in unprecedented numbers.6 Despite the increasing numbers of youth
attending university by the 1960s, a majority of the boomers did not advance beyond
secondary school, opting instead to enter the paid workforce in a relatively buoyant
economy with its expanding job market.7 Raised in the child-centered environment of the
1950s that merged into a youth-centered culture and politics of the 1960s that was quick
to reject hitherto normative values of domesticity and security, the boomers, Owram
asserts, perceived their generation as unique. Their replacing of the previous generation’s
values of domesticity and security with a radical counterculture and politics highlighted a
broadening ‘generation gap.’
The virulent anticommunism of the Cold War only enhanced the political
conservatism of the 1950s, soon to be challenged by outbreaks of liberalized sexual
expression and adolescent rebellion. Fears of nuclear annihilation motivated students to
form the first New Left organization in Canada, the Canadian Universities Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament (CUCND). The slow and painful end to European colonialism
following the Second World War also profoundly affected the development of the
Canadian New Left. As historian Sean Mills has demonstrated, the influence of Third
World decolonization movements, including revolutions in Cuba and Algeria, and the
accompanying views of anti-colonial theorists deeply influenced activists’ analysis of
their own oppression in Montreal and Quebec throughout the 1960s. His conclusions
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could easily be applied to English Canada as well.8 Finally, the Quiet Revolution in
Quebec that followed the death of long-time conservative Union Nationale Premier
Maurice Duplessis in 1959 and the election of Jean Lesage’s reformist and modernizing
Liberal government the following year fundamentally altered provincial society during a
period of rapid social and economic development marked by an expanded welfare state, a
redefined Quebec nationalism, and an expanded and increasingly secularized educational
system that signaled the waning power of the Roman Catholic Church.
The international New Left’s influence on the Canadian movement must also be
acknowledged. From the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the late 1950s to
the student protests in Paris, Prague, Tokyo and Mexico City in the late 1960s, Canadian
activists engaged with and were inspired by the struggles of New Left movements around
the world. The proximity of the United States meant that the civil rights and anti-war
movements in that country held particular importance for Canadian New Leftists, with
the American radical newspapers The Guardian and Ramparts conveying to Canadian
readers the immediacy of New Left activism south of the border.
Although the Canadian New Left contained important links to the Old Left, its
ideology and tactics represented a significant rupture with its predecessor organizations.9
In particular, Canada’s social democratic party, the NDP, came under attack from New
Leftists dismayed by the perceived limitations of parliamentarianism and of postwar
social democracy. Stanley Gray, a prominent New Left activist, criticized the NDP’s
“top-down” approach to social change for “failing to create a popular movement for a
8
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democratic and socialist Canada” and not harnessing the energy of youth protest
movements.10 “An exclusive concentration on electoral politics,” Gray argued, and
“attempts to introduce social change from the top” were incapable of revolutionizing
Canadian society.11 Even more telling, Gray doubted the NDP even harbored a
commitment to “fundamental social change.”12 James Harding, another prominent New
Left activist but future critic of the Waffle concurred, writing in Canadian Dimension
that “the present rationale of the NDP stands in contrast to the position of the new left” as
“our present political institutions are not capable of ensuring that our degree of
democracy will survive or participation in decisions occur.”13 Seeking revolutionary
social change, participatory democracy and humanism alongside equality, the New Left
looked askance at the NDP and other representatives of the Old Left, in particular labour
unions and the largely discredited Communist Party.
In Canada, students at Montreal organized the first New Left group in response to
Prime Minister Diefenbaker’s 1959 decision to position American Bomarc nuclear
missiles at sites near Thunder Bay, Ontario and La Macaza, Quebec.14 Dmitri
Roussopoulos, a graduate student from Montreal who had been profoundly influenced by
the British Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) while studying at the London
School of Economics, proposed and launched the CUCND with students from McGill
and Sir George Williams universities. In tandem with students from the Université de
Montréal, the group held a demonstration in Ottawa on Christmas Day 1959, during
10

Stanley Gray, “New Left, Old Left,” Canadian Dimension, November-December 1965: 11-13.
Ibid., 12.
12
Ibid.
13
James Harding “The NDP, The Regina Manifesto and the New Left,” Canadian Dimension (NovemberDecember 1966), 19.
14
Michael Maurice Dufresne, “‘Let’s Not Be Cremated Equal:’ The Combined Universities Campaign for
Nuclear Disarmament, 1959-1967,” in The Sixties in Canada: A Turbulent and Creative Decade: 9-64.
11

84
which eighty participants delivered petitions to the federal government opposing
Canada’s decision to host the Bomarcs and laid a symbolic memorial wreath at the
National War Memorial.15 This was, Roussopoulos explains, “the first such action by
young people in the postwar period.”16
CUCND chapters, in the face of hostility and accusations of harboring
Communist sympathies from other students and the press, began springing up at
universities across Canada. A priority of the CUCND was to distinguish itself from the
Canadian Peace Congress (CPC), the much-maligned face of the Communist-dominated
peace movement of the 1940s and 1950s. In fact, the Toronto chapter of the CUCND
expelled a campus Communist leader from the group for refusing to denounce Soviet
nuclear tests.17 Yet this first New Left organization also retained important ties to the
Old Left. For example, when the CUCND engaged with the National Committee for the
Control of Radiation Hazards (NCCRH), a body which disseminated educational
information on the dangers of nuclear radiation exposure, it successfully pressured the
committee into adopting a position opposing the placement of nuclear weapons on
Canadian soil and even to changing its name to the Canadian Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament (CCND).18 Furthermore, as Doug Owram describes, many student activists
began in the Student Christian Movement (SCM), another manifestation of the ‘Old
Left,’ while Myrna Kostash has linked many CUCND activists to membership in the
NDP youth.19 Despite the acknowledged influence of the British CND, the CUCND
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initially focused its attention on opposition to nuclear weapons and unlike its British
counterpart did not undertake a broader critique of the existing social and political
systems.20 Neither was the CUCND the only peace group actively opposing nuclear
weapons. The Voice of Women, founded in 1960 as part of the immense grassroots
response to journalist Lotta Dempsey’s columns in the Toronto Star opposing nuclear
weapons, also lobbied the federal government.21 Nevertheless, as Kostash explains, “for
the post-war generation at this point, the ‘movement’ was CUCND.”22 The Montrealbased newspaper Our Generation Against Nuclear War, founded in 1961 by Dimitri
Roussopoulos, became an important source of information and debate for the nascent
New Left.23
The CUCND continued its own public agitations against nuclear weapons
throughout 1960, staging a one hundred-student picket at the Bomarc construction site in
North Bay in May, and a Christmas Day demonstration in Ottawa that attracted a crowd
of 450 from seventeen universities across Canada.24 The following year the CUCND in
conjunction with the CCND held a Thanksgiving weekend vigil in Ottawa and presented
Diefenbaker with a 140,000-person petition opposing the Bomarcs, actions that
contributed to the prime minister’s decision to renege on his previous nuclear
20
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commitment, deeply dividing his cabinet in the process.25 After failing to defeat
Diefenbaker’s Progressive Conservatives in the 1962 federal election, Liberal leader
Lester Pearson reversed his party’s stance and vowed to accept the Bomarc missiles if
elected. When the April 1963 election produced a Pearson Liberal minority government
committed to nuclear weapons, CUCND reconsidered its own tactics.
At a September 1963 meeting in Regina, speakers including Art Pape and James
Harding, who would go on to chair CUCND and SUPA respectively, urged the CUCND
to expand its mandate and to learn from other social movements, such as the civil rights
movement, to link economic exploitation with war. At the CUCND’s federal conference
in Montreal that December, the membership broke with the CCND over the latter’s
refusal to endorse a proposal urging Canada’s withdrawal from all military alliances,
including NATO.26 The CUCND’s Christmas Day 1963 march to the War Memorial in
Ottawa was its last prior to adopting new strategies for opposing nuclear weapons and
promoting broader social change.27
In January 1964, Bomarc nuclear missiles were installed at bases near North Bay
and La Macaza. That summer, CUCND activists began projects in both communities that
revealed a newfound approach to organizing locally, including utilizing the tactic of civil
disobedience, reflecting the influence of the civil rights movement in the United States.
Twelve students, including one staffer from the American Students for a Democratic
Society (SDS), lived in North Bay for the summer in an effort to persuade the community
to oppose nuclear weapons. The students, confronted with considerable local support in
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favour of the missile base and its anticipated economic benefits, instead focused on
identifying alternative modes of community development, all the while warning of the
dangers of nuclear fallout.28 Unable to offer the residents of North Bay a tangible
alternative to the Bomarc base, the organizers’ efforts came to naught. At La Macaza as
well, CUCND activists, in conjunction with union supporters and members of Quebec
Socialist Youth, adopted non-violent direct action tactics to register their opposition to
the nuclear weapons.29 In June 1964, activists combined a week-long vigil outside the
Quebec base with attempts to engage in discussions with the local community.
Seventeen activists, coached by a Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) veteran, blocked
the access road into the base for two hours during which police repeatedly dragged the
protesters into an adjacent ditch. This demonstration of civil disobedience was the first
large-scale use of non-violent direct action amongst the Canadian New Left, and was
followed by an even larger demonstration that September.30
Energized by these efforts and by examples of activism by students in the United
States and elsewhere, 150 students from eighteen Canadian universities met in Regina
over the 1964-65 Christmas break. Following the SDS example of making decisions by
consensus, the group agreed to disband the CUCND and create in its place the Student
Union for Peace Action.31 Although SUPA’s statement of purpose re-emphasized
opposition to nuclear weapons and war, the document also included an analysis of the
role of universities and students in society, emphasizing participatory democracy and
28
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non-violent protest as the legitimate means for effecting fundamental social and political
change.32
SUPA’s first major action in March 1965 signalled how far the group had
advanced beyond a singular focus on opposition to nuclear weapons as well as the
importance of international connections among New Left movements across borders. In
response to the violent dispersal by police a few days earlier of the civil rights marchers
Martin Luther King Jr. led from Selma to Birmingham, Alabama, SUPA and SCM
activists, alongside veterans of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC) and CORE, organized protests outside the United States consulate in Toronto.33
Sixty-five people, mostly students from the University of Toronto, prevented the
consulate from opening and, in an act of civil disobedience purposefully reminiscent of
the civil rights movement, went limp as police arrested them and supporters sang “We
Shall Overcome.”34 The performance was captured in a photograph printed in the Globe
and Mail, thereby vastly enhancing the new group’s visibility and attuning its members to
the power of the media.35 Canadian activists, seeing a role for themselves in the struggle
for civil rights, established the Canadian Friends of SNCC and held a conference in May
1965 featuring SNCC speakers.36 SUPA activists, by now closely connected with the
SDS, at the same time helped organize a protest against Adlai Stevenson, the American
Ambassador to the United Nations, who was scheduled to receive an honourary degree at
the University of Toronto. Stevenson, a defender of American involvement in the
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Vietnam War, was met by three hundred protesters when he arrived at Convocation
Hall.37
Following the American consulate protests, editorial opinions in both the Globe
and Mail and the Toronto Star questioned why Canadian students were focusing on
American rather than domestic issues. Home-grown problems were very much the
impetus for five summer projects SUPA undertook across Canada during 1965. SDS,
which previously had staged Economic Research and Action Projects (ERAP) on a model
of community organizing popularized by Saul Alinsky, clearly influenced SUPA’s plans
to situate student organizers among the working poor in Kingston, on First Nations
reservations in Saskatchewan, and in pacifist Doukhobor settlements in British
Columbia.38 Nor were previous issues forgotten – students continued to protest against
nuclear weapons in La Macaza and Toronto SUPA members researched examples of
Canadian support for the Vietnam War. However, the students quickly learned the
challenges of community organizing. Faced with the realization that revolution was not
imminent and suspicion from those who would remain in the marginalized communities
long after the students returned to class, SUPA activists recognized the limitations of the
1965 summer projects. Amongst First Nations in Saskatchewan, the students spent much
of their time working to earn the trust of a suspicious community, and their attempts at
political organizing faced stiff opposition from the federal government.39 In the
Kootenay region of British Columbia, the SUPA workers discovered to their dismay that
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young Doukhobors were as materialistic as their own peers back home.40 In Halifax, a
single African-Canadian SUPA organizer sought to organize the black community, but
when left largely to his own devices failed to experience much success.41 Only in
Kingston, where the students successfully lobbied for minor changes such as road and
park safety measures and forced a public meeting with a negligent landlord could they
claim a modicum of success in community organizing.42 The one sobering lesson to be
taken away from all five of the summer projects was that the poor were not inherently
radical agents of an incipient revolution.43
Although Joan Newman and Myrna Wood continued their organizing efforts in
Kingston by forming the Association for Tenants’ Action, Kingston (ATAK), SUPA did
not reprise the summer projects in the future.44 Instead, responding to the escalation of
American military intervention in Vietnam in the mid-1960s became the larger focus.
The anti-war movement which in Canada began in 1964, was linked from its beginning to
the international anti-war movement. Furthermore, as Christopher Powell has
documented, the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action and its youth branch, the Young
Socialists (LSA/YS), along with the Communist Party of Canada (CP) played important
organizational roles in fostering the anti-war movement.45 Describing the 1965
International Days of Protest in Toronto Powell notes, “the participation of SUPA,
Trotskyists, Communists, the NDY and others indicated a rare unity of old and new
left.”46 Although the anti-war movement drew the largest crowds in major cities like
40
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Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver, anti-war demonstrations attracted protesters across the
country and was not limited to university students.
Organizers of the spring 1965 protest against Adlai Stevenson at the University of
Toronto had included both SUPA activists and NDP youth, but professors Chandler
Davis and Natalie Zemon Davis, immigrants from the United States, had been the
principal instigators. Economics professor Mel Watkins, whose ideological orientation
had begun to move leftward, also attended the protest. These three faculty members,
along with economist Abraham Rotstein and historians Peter Russell and Kenneth
McNaughton, organized an ‘International Teach-In on Vietnam’ for October 1965.47
Framed as an educational event rather than a protest, the undertaking received
institutional support and the blessing of the university’s president. Broadcast over three
days on radio in New York as well as across Canada via the CBC, the event may have
felt “top-heavy” to seasoned student activists, but it was, according to Myrna Kostash, a
“coup” and a “phenomenon” for those beginning to question the war and Canada’s role in
supporting the United States in waging it.48
Groups opposed to the Vietnam War, such as Winnipeg’s Vietnam Action
Committee and Saskatoon’s Committee to End the War in Vietnam, began appearing
across the country. In the aftermath of the Teach-In, SUPA activists Heather Dean and
future Waffler Danny Drache began assisting American war resisters in Toronto with
securing housing, legal advice and employment.49 SUPA produced a pamphlet, ‘Escape
to Freedom,’ aimed at Americans worried about the draft and distributed by SDS in the
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United States.50 By 1966 SUPA had set aside space in its crowded Spadina Avenue
office for its Anti-Draft Programme – soon renamed the Toronto Anti-Draft Programme
(TADP) – and hired war resister Mark Satin to run it.51 Around the same time, the editor
of the radical magazine Sanity formed the Montreal Council to Aid War Resisters, and
activists on the other side of the country organized the Vancouver Committee to Aid
American War Resisters. These three groups would stay in frequent contact by early
1967.52 Also that year, the TADP began publishing the Manual for Draft Age
Immigrants to Canada, printing 35,000 copies of the pamphlet in the first three editions
alone for distribution throughout the United States.53 American refugees established their
own American Deserters Committees in both Toronto and in British Columbia.54 A small
expatriate community lived on Baldwin and Huron streets in Toronto and for the most
part integrated within local student, activist and bohemian communities.55 The magazine
AMEX, whose target audience was war resisters, urged them to integrate into Canadian
life and most did, although some were accused by the Canadian academic and future
Waffler Robin Mathews of extending American imperialism to Canada by retaining an
exclusive focus on the politics of the United States.56 Regardless of such criticisms,
many Canadian activists viewed assisting American war resisters as a tangible means of
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actively opposing the Vietnam War, a cause with international resonance for the New
Left.57
By the mid-1960s, student off-campus activism in the Canadian anti-war
movement and SUPA’s attempts at community organizing in marginalized communities
were augmented by more students focusing their attention on reforming the university
itself. Many among the new wave of “boomers” flooding university campuses
increasingly regarded themselves as a distinct group tasked as agents of social change.58
A variety of often overlapping organizations, including the Canadian Union of Students
(CUS), local student councils, Students for a Democratic University (SDU), and campus
newspapers, strove to transform the university into their idea of a democratic, accessible
and socially engaged institution.
Until 1965 the CUS had acted primarily as a service organization and eschewed
political action. However, between 1964 and 1966 all Quebec-based francophone student
groups left the CUS to join the Union générale des étudiants du Québec (UGEQ) which
had been established in 1960. The exodus was initiated by two influences: a heightened
sense of Quebec nationalism, and ‘student syndicalism,’ the belief that students, by virtue
of being the upcoming generation of workers not yet embedded in the capitalist system,
had a unique and vital role to play in bringing about revolutionary social change.59 In
response the participants at the 1965 annual CUS conference recognized UGEQ as a
“sister union” and adopted policies endorsing financial accessibility to higher education
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and student power in university governance.60 At the following year’s annual conference,
student activists adopted a full-fledged “student syndicalism” policy that positioned CUS
as a New Left organization in tune with the activism of the times.61 Despite routinely
facing backlash from conservative students who sought to disassociate their schools from
the CUS, the organization would prove integral to the New Left throughout the late
1960s, distributing activist literature from SUPA’s Research, Information and
Publications Project after that group’s demise, and radicalizing numerous student leaders
who attended CUS seminars and conferences.62
In addition to anti-war and civil rights demonstrations, by 1967 “student power”
in university governance had become the “overriding goal in campus struggles.”63 As
historian Roberta Lexier demonstrated, student activists at Canadian universities imbued
with democratic ideals mobilized in large numbers to fight for “direct student
representation on university governing structures,” such as university senates, boards, and
departmental committees.64 Self-identifying as a distinct group with a collective identity
on campus, many students questioned the university’s role in society, and in particular its
support for the hierarchical and technocratic world student activists rejected.65 The most
prevalent “student power” organization on campuses was the Students for a Democratic
University (SDU), although SDU groups actually shared little beyond the name and
irreverent style.66 Radicalized student councils also led numerous “student power”
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campaigns. Although not widely adopted at other universities, departmental and course
unions were created to advocate for students’ rights at the University of Toronto and
Simon Fraser University.67 Student newspapers such as the Varsity, the Carillon, and the
Ubyssey also emerged as forums for campus activism. Often the only media outlet
reporting on student protests and demands, campus newspapers provided lively and often
explicitly New Left perspectives.68 Equally important was the Canadian University Press
(CUP) which not only shared and disseminated news and opinions across university
campuses but also held annual gatherings at which many students were radicalized.69
Numerous Wafflers, including James Laxer, Krista Maeots, John Conway, Don Kossick
and Don Mitchell, launched their activist careers at student newspapers.
It should not be overlooked that a large majority of young Canadians in the 1960s
did not attend post-secondary institutions, and thus had no part in campus civil rights
demonstrations, anti-war rallies and “student power” protests. Despite the tremendous
growth in enrolments at Canadian universities and colleges during the decade, only one in
six high school graduates pursued post-secondary education in 1965. With
unemployment less than four per cent that year, clearly the majority entered directly into
the workforce after graduation.70 Yet young workers also were not immune to the spirit
of protest and unrest as the wave of illegal wildcat strikes that swept the country in 1965
and 1966 attests. Exact numbers are difficult to determine, but historians estimate
between twenty and fifty per cent of the 1100 strikes that occurred over those two years
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were wildcats, many of them initiated by younger workers.71 By rejecting their union
leaders and participating in these informal “quickie strikes,” workers challenged the
“postwar compromise” for workplace stability that had been reached among the Old Left
union leadership, management, and the state.
This “postwar compromise,” initially defined by the ‘Rand Formula,’ was
subsequently enshrined in legislation that provided unions with the security of formalized
collective bargaining and automatic dues check-off.72 However, the compromise
reserved for management the right to make major decisions involving production and
technology, while unions were limited to negotiating wages and benefits. Furthermore,
strikes were permitted only between contracts, while shop-floor issues – staffing,
overtime, discipline, and technological change – were addressed through a formal
grievance process between union representatives and management.73 By the mid-1960s,
frustration over the formalized, bureaucratic, and often plodding means for negotiating
contracts and resolving shop-floor issues frequently erupted as walkouts and illegal
strikes. As historian Bryan Palmer has described, informal and spontaneous wildcat
strikes were “the perfect vehicle for the expression of youthful labour rebellion.”74
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Young workers, who were flooding into the general labour force at the time, were
undoubtedly central to the mid-1960s wildcat wave.75 Moreover, the youngest lowseniority workers were often clustered together in less desirable jobs or locations.76
Perhaps most importantly, young workers often shared with other youths of the 1960s a
similar cultural outlook. Historian Ian Milligan has identified a mass culture of the time
that, although interpreted somewhat differently by working-class and middle-class youth,
nevertheless resulted in a “shared youth consciousness.”77 Emphasizing personal
liberties, individual expression, and anti-authoritarianism, this common youth culture was
primed to protest on the factory shopfloor and campus courtyard alike during the 1960s.
Older workers obviously led and participated in wildcat strikes as well, but “the new
militancy” clearly “signaled a rejection of the ‘old left’ unionism of the previous
decades.”78
Although the majority of wildcat strikes in 1965-66 were confined to a single
union local, two nation-wide strikes notably defied this pattern. Members of the
Canadian Brotherhood of Railway, Transport and General Workers (CBRT) throughout
southwestern Ontario walked off the job illegally in June 1965 to protest management’s
imposition of disciplinary demerit points, and again in August 1966 over the slow pace of
negotiations with Canadian National Railway (CN).79 In both cases, the wildcat strike
spread from an initial walkout across disparate locations. The 1965 illegal strike by
postal workers was relatively well-organized by comparison, and paved the way for the
formation of the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (CUPW) and extension of collective
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bargaining rights to public servants.80 Most of the wildcat wave, however, occurred at
individual union locals in spontaneous expressions of anger and frustration. For example,
workers represented by UAW Local 444 conducted fifty-five brief wildcat strikes at
Chrysler’s Windsor plant in 1966 alone.81 Buzz Hargrove, a shop steward at the Chrysler
plant while still in his twenties, recalled the rebellious atmosphere:
The Chrysler plant was overrun with young hotheads full of their own ideas and
not willing to take orders from authority figures – company or union. We were
rebellious and took advantage of our collective power and the protection the union
offered us. Between 1965 and 1968 we had more wildcat strikes in our section –
the cushion room – than at any other time in the plant’s history.82
Seemingly trivial issues could spark a walkout, particularly in workplaces with a history
of severely strained labour-management relations. Such was the case at the remote
Levack Mine outside of Sudbury in July 1966, where young Newfoundlanders employed
by the International Nickel Company of Canada (Inco) were disciplined for eating
sandwiches while on break. At the time, contract negotiations between the United
Steelworkers of America (USWA) local and Inco were languishing in conciliation and
only a small spark was required to ignite spontaneous protests. The wildcat strike at
Levack quickly spread to all of Inco’s operations, sidelining nearly 16,000 workers
despite their union leadership’s pleas that they return to work. Union officials clearly lost
control of their membership for several days, particularly when gunshots were fired by
strikers at helicopters transporting managers over the picket lines.83 After returning to
work the union members rejected a proposed contract just three weeks later prompting
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yet another brief wildcat which ended only after a collective agreement was negotiated
that doubled the earlier wage offer.84
Also in 1966, workers represented by USWA Local 1005 at the Steel Company of
Canada (Stelco) in Hamilton, frustrated over the slow pace of their contract negotiations,
exploded in anger when a foreman taunted them saying “you guys haven’t got the guts to
walk out.”85 The mass walkout by nearly 11,000 workers that ensued ground Stelco’s
operation to a halt. But without clearly defined leadership or a list of demands the strike
consisted of “just picket lines and angry young men” who rejected their local president’s
entreaties to return to work.86 Three hundred police officers eventually broke through the
picket lines charging some workers with unlawful assembly, while other strikers burned
cars and staged a sit-down on the street blocking traffic. A mass meeting, conducted
while the strikers’ wives held the line, voted to return to work. Ultimately the local won
a generous collective agreement, but the strike was the precursor to the membership
ousting the local leadership the following year, further demonstrating how a culture of
rebellion against the established authority of management and union leadership alike was
taking hold.87 Just as the student protest movements provided a breeding ground for
future Wafflers, so too did the wildcat wave create fertile territory for young workers to
become politicized and radicalized. USWA Locals 1005 in Hamilton and 6500 in
Sudbury later became important centres of Waffle support alongside large UAW locals in
southern Ontario such as 444 in Windsor, 222 in Oshawa and 27 in London.
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Meanwhile, SUPA activists debated whether they might have acted prematurely
in disregarding the working-class as potential agents for revolutionary change. At
SUPA’s September 1965 conference in Saint Calixte, Quebec, activists debated the
efficacy of the organization’s five community projects in Kingston and elsewhere the
previous summer, while the aforementioned Stanley Gray, at that point a graduate student
at Oxford University, urged more attention be focused on working-class struggles.88
Dimitri Roussopoulos criticized the group for its “lack of intellectual vigour” in
examining “neocapitalism in Canada,” while James Harding described SUPA as “an
ethical movement in search of an analysis.”89 Roussopoulos later concluded that “turning
our backs on the campuses had a crippling effect,” and Myrna Kostash sees the Saint
Calixte conference as “the beginning of the end” for SUPA.90 Although SUPA’s primary
activity during the final two years of its existence was its Research, Information and
Publications Project, including publication of the SUPA Newsletter, the group continued
with its public activism by organizing anti-war rallies in Ottawa and Toronto. In
addition, some student members returned to Saskatchewan First Nations reservations in
the winter of 1965-66 before ultimately admitting that SUPA’s projects there “did little to
affect change in the Indian and Métis communities.”91
The Saint Calixte conference introduced an additional challenge for SUPA
activists. Inspired by the success of the American Peace Corps, Lester Pearson’s Liberal
government had established in April 1965 the Company of Young Canadians (CYC), a
88
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somewhat vaguely defined government initiative that was intended to mobilize Canadian
youth enthusiastic for social change.92 SUPA activists, including Art Pape, the former
CUCND chair, and David DePoe, who saw an opportunity to fund the Toronto Youth
Project with “free” government money, moved quickly to embrace the CYC.93 Largely
controlled by young activists imported from student protest movements in its chaotic
early years, the CYC commissioned a report on SUPA’s community organizing projects
and paid for much of the Saint Calixte conference, leading to criticism from
Roussopoulos and others that the Canadian student movement was in danger of being coopted by the state.94 Nevertheless, several SUPA activists were recruited by Pape to join
the CYC, including Alan Clarke as Executive Director, Stewart Goodings as Associate
Director of the Organizing Committee, and Doug Ward, the first New Left president of
the CUS.95 According to historians of the CYC Carrie Dickenson and William Campbell,
many student activists were “genuinely excited” at the possibility of government
promoting New Left values of “participatory democracy and empowerment as opposed to
colonialism, oppression and marginalization.”96 Unfortunately, CYC volunteers sent to
some of Canada’s most impoverished and marginalized Canadian communities soon
encountered the same sorts of challenges and disappointments stemming from
community organizing that SUPA activists had previously discovered. Even more
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troubling for the organization, when the participation by CYC workers David DePoe and
Lynn Curtis in a January 1967 anti-war protest at the U.S. consulate in Toronto attracted
harsh media attention, the relative autonomy hitherto enjoyed by CYC activists began to
diminish. Increasingly, politicians and the press alike focused on CYC worker radicalism
and “bad behavior.” The revelation of CYC connections to separatist sympathizers in
Quebec was the proverbial final straw which resulted in government appointees, rather
than the student activists, assuming tight control of the organization. Shorn of its
autonomy, energy and sense of purpose, the CYC gradually withered until the final
elimination of its funding in 1975 killed the experiment.
The lure of CYC salaried positions and funded projects also took a toll on SUPA.
Recriminations, doubts and debates over SUPA’s ongoing purpose tainted its December
1965 conference in Saskatoon.97 Rising tensions among SUPA’s central office in
Toronto, its more radical western Canadian chapters, and Montreal activists centered
around Our Generation exacerbated the divisions.98 The following year’s conference in
Waterloo resumed the debate over the organization’s future directions; in particular the
question of where SUPA should focus its energies – on students, youth, the workingclass, minorities, or the marginalized – remained unresolved.99 The conference tasked
seven men, including James Laxer, with drafting a SUPA manifesto, which was
presented at the September 1967 conference held in Goderich, Ontario.100 Aimed at an
“integration of Marx and new left theory” the document identified a “new working class”
borne out of “society’s contradictions” which would replace the economically stable and
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culturally conservative traditional working class as the agent for revolutionary change.101
Unlike the “couple of hundred” who had attended the Saint Calixte conference two years
earlier, only forty students attended the Goderich meeting, and they failed to reach
agreement on the manifesto, or much else. SUPA dissolved shortly afterwards. Twelve
of its former members formed the short-lived New Left Committee, but it too folded after
publishing only a couple of issues of the New Left Committee Bulletin.102
As Ian Milligan notes, SUPA’s choice of seven men and no women to compose
its manifesto “speaks volumes” about the organization’s often misogynistic
atmosphere.103 As readers of Sara Evans’s foundational work Personal Politics: The
Roots of Women’s Liberation in the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left will
recognize, the emergence of the Canadian women’s liberation movement from within the
New Left closely mirrors the American experience. As the four female activists who
authored “Brothers, Sisters, Lovers… Listen…” for the 1967 SUPA conference in
Goderich attested, the organization segregated women into just two roles – “the workers
and the wives.”104 As such, they argued the “myth of participatory democracy is just that,
if one looks at the participation of women in SUPA.”105 The realization that they were
“oppressed as women within an organization that was attacking oppression” prompted
the four to declare “we are going to be the typers of letters and distributors of leaflets
(hewers of wood and drawers of water) no longer.”106 Political scientist Naomi Black
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points to the use of this famous Canadian imagery to suggest differences between the
emergence of the Canadian and American women’s liberation movements. Most
significantly, Canadian women did not exit the New Left with the same level of anger as
their counterparts in the United States often did.107 Indeed, many who became involved
with women’s liberation groups in Canada continued their activism in various New Left
organizations, at least initially.
Toronto Women’s Liberation, which began meeting in the winter of 1967-68,
prepared and presented to the House of Commons a brief on abortion.108 Other activities
included protesting a “winter bikini contest” that denigrated women, and demanding daycare services at the University of Toronto.109 In June 1968, women active in the New
Left at Simon Fraser University formed a women’s liberation group which soon became
the Vancouver Women’s Caucus that included non-campus women as well.110 With
abortion rights becoming a central focus of the early movement, in Montreal women’s
liberation activists published a Birth Control Handbook.111 The women’s liberation
movement considered itself distinct from liberal feminist groups, including the voluntary
and professional women’s organizations that formed the Committee on Equality for
Women and pushed for a Royal Commission on the Status of Women. However,
following the 1970 publication of the Royal Commission’s report in 1970 and the
subsequent creation of the National Action Committee on the Status of Women, greater

107

A famous example of the angry split with the New Left is Robin Morgan’s article “Goodbye to All
That,” reprinted in her book The Word of a Woman: Feminist Dispatches, 1968-1992 (New York: Norton,
1992).
108
“Introduction,” in Women Unite!, 9.
109
Naomi Black, “The Canadian Women’s Movement: The Second Wave,” in Changing Patterns, 162.
110
“Introduction,” Women Unite!, 9.
111
Mills, The Empire Within, 119-137.

105
overlap between the more radical women’s liberationists and liberal feminists
occurred.112
Even as SUPA disintegrated, mass protest continued unabated across Canada.
Anti-war demonstrations continued to draw large crowds, including 1800 participants at a
rally in Montreal in 1967. Dow Chemical, the manufacturer of napalm, was targeted by
anti-war activists during on-campus job recruitment sessions at universities in Toronto,
Waterloo, British Columbia and Manitoba, among others.113 Until they were forcibly
evicted by police, SDU members at McGill occupied the administration building to
protest perceived attacks on the campus newspaper’s autonomy, while at the University
of Alberta the SDU protested tuition increases in the spring of 1968 and set up countereducation groups in Edmonton and at the University of Calgary.114
Protests occurred at Simon Fraser University (SFU) almost from the school’s
opening in 1965. An “instant university” that had been constructed atop Burnaby
Mountain in Vancouver in just two years, SFU’s nascent departmental and faculty
structure, its overrepresentation of junior untenured faculty members close in age and
outlook to many graduate students, and its promotion of a different kind of education that
attracted a student body more inclined to radical activism than was found on most
Canadian university campuses, proved to be a volatile mix.115 In March 1967 police
arrested five graduate students for staging a protest in support of a high school student
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suspended for satirizing his poetry teacher.116 When the university dismissed the five as
teaching assistants, several days of protest rallies and the threat of a student strike ensued
until all were reinstated.117 Shortly thereafter, activists established a SDU group on the
SFU campus.
Following the spring and summer of 1968, when massive student protests
internationally shared media attention with the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr.
and Robert Kennedy, and reaction to the Democratic National Convention in Chicago
engulfed the city in riot, Canadian student protests exploded in the fall and winter of
1968-69.118 An October anti-war rally in Winnipeg drew five hundred people, “by far the
most successful demonstration yet held in Manitoba,” and over 1000 students protested
over access to student loans at the Regina Campus of the University of Saskatchewan.119
At SFU students occupied the administration building to protest “the administration’s
discrimination against junior college students” in admissions procedures, and the SDU
campaigned to rename SFU ‘Louis Riel University’ instead of commemorating what one
future Waffler called “a member of the vanguard of pirates, thieves and carpetbaggers
which dispossessed and usurped the native Indians of Canada from their rightful
heritage.”120 The Toronto Student Movement, an independent New Left group at the
University of Toronto, joined striking workers at the Peterborough Examiner on the
picket line, another example of the student movement’s broadening horizons. “Student
power” continued to be a central issue, however, at the University of Ottawa when
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demands for student representation on university governing bodies prompted a strike
amongst social science students.121
Seemingly innocuous issues occasionally developed into major protests during the
1968-69 academic year. At the University of New Brunswick (UNB), physics professor
and future Waffler Norman Strax objected to his university’s decision to introduce
student identification cards for the fall semester as an “erosion of civil liberties and
democracy.” Student activist members of the Canadian Struggle for a Democratic
Society (CSDS) followed up by inundating the library circulation desk with hundreds of
books and refusing to produce identification cards. When UNB suspended Strax, several
students registered their support for the professor by occupying his office, an action
dubbed ‘Liberation 130’ in reference to Strax’s room number. Despite a court injunction
removing Strax from campus, regular confrontations between student activists and
opponents seeking to end the office occupation occasionally turned violent. Police ended
the stand-off after forty-four days and thwarted a second ‘Liberation 130’ attempt in
January 1969. UNB’s student council was divided over the occupation, but a Canadian
Association of University Teachers (CAUT) censure of the university in March 1969
prompted a student council-sponsored protest attended by over 1000 students at which a
makeshift coffin was burned to symbolize the passing of the “old order” of the
university’s Board of Governors.122
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A similarly minor issue – the December 1968 publication of a ‘Happy New
Year’s’ image of the Vietnamese communist revolutionary Ho Chi Minh emerging from
an abstract womb printed in the University of Saskatchewan’s Regina campus student
newspaper The Carillon – raised the ire of the school’s principal and Board of Governors
who responded by suspending collection of student activity fees and thereby cutting off
the paper’s funding. Some 1600 students held a mass demonstration on the Regina
campus in January 1969 to protest the clamp-down and 100,000 copies of a special issue
of The Carillon were distributed across the province with the assistance of the National
Farmers’ Union (NFU) and the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL). Bowing to the
pressure, the Board of Governors reinstated the newspaper’s funding two months later.123
Nor was this the first occasion in which The Carillon’s left-wing editorial policy had
been attacked. In 1965 future Waffler John Conway had been forced to resign as editor
after he placed a picture of a frosh parade next to images of the Vietnam War. Conway
was replaced as editor by another future Waffler, Don Mitchell, who was succeeded by
yet another future Waffler, Don Kossick.124
Long-standing social and political tensions and the existence of a diverse and
vibrant radical community in Montreal made the atmosphere in that city particularly
fraught during 1968-69. Quebec’s Union Nationale government opened the first twelve
Collèges d'enseignement général et professionnel (CEGEPs) in 1967, only to announce
just one year later that 20,000 CEGEP students would not be able to find a place at
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university in the fall of 1969 due to insufficient capacity. CEGEPs across the province
effectively stopped functioning during two weeks of student occupations and protests
following the announcement.125 Students protesting the inadequacy of French-language
education in Montreal during the fall of 1968 directed their anger at McGill University.
A protest march of 5,000 to 10,000 students on campus in October was followed two
months later by a student occupation of McGill’s computer centre, which only ended
when the radicals were evicted by police. In February 1969 the university fired Stanley
Gray, by then a political science professor and author of a recent and widely reprinted
article “McGill and the Rape of Quebec,” a move activists perceived as politically
motivated that prompted further protests. In an unprecedented move at the end of March,
between 10,000 and 15,000 protesters sought to occupy McGill, an action requiring over
2500 police officers to prevent. Opération McGill, its visibility and support enhanced by
the ongoing political debate in the province over the Union Nationale government’s
language rights Bill 63, continued into the fall of 1969 with some demonstrations
drawing crowds of over 20,000 supporters.126 Meanwhile, at Sir George Williams
University, the failure to resolve year-old accusations of racism in the biology department
prompted students to occupy both the campus computer centre and faculty club in
January 1969. Two weeks into the occupation of the computer centre, police stormed the
student-erected barricades. In the ensuing violent confrontation the facility was
destroyed. In response, the outraged mainstream media harshly criticized the students for
their militancy.127
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Student activists, inspired by their counterparts in the international New Left, had
thus ensured that the 1968-69 academic year on Canadian campuses was contentious. In
addition to encouraging student protests, international developments in the New Left also
influenced Canadian women’s liberationists. CUS meetings provided opportunities for
female students from across Canada to connect with one another. An SFU activist
described one CUS seminar as “fantastic, women met daily and turned on almost all girls
from campuses… women were the only ones to break down the terrible regionalism that
dominated the conference, the only ones to really exchange experiences and theories.”128
By 1969 women in Halifax, Montreal, Ottawa, Kingston, Toronto, Hamilton, Guelph,
Sarnia, Winnipeg, Regina, Saskatoon, Edmonton and Vancouver could all access a local
women’s liberation movement.129 But when a group of Ontario women attended a
Women’s Liberation conference in Chicago in 1969 they were exposed to serious
divisions among American activists, some of whom insisted on linking women’s
liberation to Marxism and others who defined themselves solely as “consciousness
raisers.”130 Consequently, a split subsequently developed within the Toronto Women’s
Liberation Movement when several women who “rejected the view of a social and
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political revolution as a precondition for the liberation of women” left to form the New
Feminists.131
Canadian New Leftists who turned toward Marxism in the late 1960s could be
forgiven for feeling overwhelmed as they contemplated the plethora of ideological
interpretations proffered by a range of sectarian Marxist organizations operating in
Canada at the time. Two parties with a long history in the Canadian left, the Communist
Party (CP) and the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA), competed for adherents
with three Maoist groups that emerged in the late 1960s. As Christopher Powell has
demonstrated, both the CP and the LSA played an important role in the Canadian antiwar movement.132 Although significantly diminished from when its membership peaked
in the 1930s, the CP continued to exert influence over several unions, including the
United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (UE), in the 1960s. However the CP,
tainted by Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s 1956 revelations of Stalinist purges and the
Soviet suppression of uprisings in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968
struggled to obtain much support in the Canadian New Left.133
Not all Canadian Marxists embraced the Soviets. Hardial Bains, an IndoCanadian microbiology student at the University of British Columbia, opposed Soviet
communism’s perceived “revisionism” after Khrushchev succeeded Stalin, endorsed
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China’s position in the Sino-Soviet split, and advocated Maoism.134 Bains’s new
organization, the Canadian Student Movement, appealed to New Leftists through its
unquestioning support of China and opposition to American imperialism. The group
renamed itself the Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) in 1970 and competed,
sometimes violently, with other sectarian Marxist groups.135 In the late 1960s and early
1970s “Maoism… absolutely permeated the New Left,” not only in Canada but
throughout the Western European and American movements as well.136 For New Leftists
in search of a revolutionary Marxist analysis updated to reflect the conditions of a
postwar, decolonizing world, Maoism held significant appeal. The most prominent
adherents of Maoism in the United States, the Progressive Labor (PL) party, ferociously
defended its belief in the working class as the only potential agent of revolution. Not
surprisingly, its dismissiveness towards students and racialized minority protesters
infuriated critics and divided the SDS national organization. The PL’s disciplined and
hierarchical organization enabled it to control a sizeable minority of delegates to the 1969
SDS convention in Chicago, where the divide between the PL and its opponents over
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SDS support for the Black Panthers, Brown Berets and Young Lords fatally split the
student organization.137
The Canadian Party of Labour (CPL), formed in the late 1960s, associated with
the American PL and adopted its analysis that “all nationalism is reactionary.”138 The
CPL, like the PL, sought to establish Worker-Student Alliances at universities and
criticized New Left movements when they failed to adhere to the CPL’s line.139 In
contrast, the Canadian Liberation Movement (CLM) interpreted Maoism to highlight
nationalist, anti-imperialist struggle and sought to elevate Canadian independence as the
primary goal of the Canadian New Left. Gary Perly, his wife Caroline Walker, and
Norman Endicott were the central figures in the militantly nationalist CLM.140 The
group’s public profile was enhanced in the early 1970s through its publishing house, New
Canada Press, and its association with Milton Acorn, a well-known poet and resident of
Toronto’s seedy Waverly Hotel.141
Unlike Maosim, Trotskyism’s much deeper roots in the Canadian left dated back
to the 1920s. One variant, the League for Socialist Action (LSA), was spearheaded by
Ross Dowson and founded shortly before the NDP in 1961. The LSA practiced
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“entryism,” an international strategy premised on infiltrating a country’s major workingclass party, in this case the NDP, and urging the party to adopt a more radical and
socialist platform in order to win new recruits to Trotskyism. The LSA viewed itself as a
Leninist “vanguard” party prepared to lead the much anticipated workers’ revolution. It
published a newspaper, the Workers Vanguard, but failed to exert much influence within
the NDP, not least because its members regularly were expelled from the party.142 By
contrast, the LSA’s youth wing, the Young Socialists (YS), did achieve an important
presence in the student New Left by the late 1960s, and played an important role in the
Canadian anti-war movement.143 Although Trotskyist groups were expelled from antiwar coalitions in Toronto and Vancouver in 1966, two years later the LSA/YS dominated
the Vietnam Mobilization Committee, the leading anti-war organization in Toronto.144
Other New Left social movements began to gather momentum internationally in
1969, while their Canadian equivalents were only in their infancy, if active at all. The
civil rights and Black Power movements profoundly influenced the emergence of ‘Red
Power’ movements in both Canada and the United States, leading to engagement with
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New Left activists in the years to come.145 Although homophile organizations existed in
Canada during the 1960s, they were based on the educational and behind-the-scenes
lobbying approach of the American Mattachine Society. In the aftermath of the June 1969
Stonewall riot in New York, gay liberation groups began to emerge, first in the United
States and then in Canada by the early 1970s.146 Unlike the gay liberation movement, the
inspiration for Canada’s 1960s environmental movement lay close to home. Historian
Ryan O’Connor traces the movement’s origins to the airing of the television documentary
The Air of Death on CBC in October 1967.147 Although O’Connor does not characterize
Pollution Probe, an early Ontario environmental group, as a New Left organization,
despite New Leftists and Wafflers such as Varda Burstyn being amongst its founders, the
British Columbia movement Greenpeace grew directly from the anti-war and countercultural milieu of late 1960s Vancouver.148 However, in 1969, both groups’ days of
public activism lay ahead of them.
The New Left operated in a context of an international culture of social and
political rebellion against established authority. In Canada, New Leftists rejected
established political, social and cultural traditions, structures and institutions, including
the NDP and union leadership. A wide-ranging series of movements constituted the New
Left in Canada, including CUCND/SUPA, the anti-war movement, the “student power”
movement, wildcat striking workers, women’s liberationists and, after 1969, many others.
Despite their disparate contexts and goals, the characteristics of the New Left in Canada –
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the youthfulness of the participants, their acceptance of a democratic ethos, their antiauthoritarianism, and their willingness to embrace unconventional tactics and strategies –
were present in each of these movements. At the same time, the diversity of aims and
constituencies among these movements presented a difficult challenge to anyone seeking
to channel the New Left in a particular direction. In the midst of this sometimes
cacophonous mélange of voices, the authors of the Waffle Manifesto, among whom were
experienced New Left activists, embarked on a brazen campaign to transform Canada’s
major ‘Old Left’ political party, the NDP.

117
Chapter Three
“A little subversive gathering:” The Waffle Manifesto, 1969
By early 1969, James Laxer, a leading New Left activist, graduate student, and
former president of the Canadian University Press, had become disillusioned with the
student movement in Canada for uncritically replicating its American counterpart. At
much the same time the economist Mel Watkins, who in 1968 was writing a prominent
report on foreign ownership commissioned by the federal government, concluded that
Canadian independence could only be achieved through socialism. Meanwhile, Gerald
Caplan, a young professor and NDP activist, added his voice to this growing chorus of
lament by expressing frustration with the NDP for its timidity over “the growing
dominance of the United States” in Canada.1 This chapter explores how Laxer, Watkins,
Caplan and a small group of New Left and NDP activists came together in the spring of
1969 to draft a statement – the Waffle Manifesto – in which they outlined their belief in
an independent, socialist Canada, and devised a strategy to co-opt an increasingly leftleaning NDP as the electoral vehicle by which their goals would be advocated and
hopefully realized. Even prior to meeting in 1969 the original Wafflers had been
influenced by the rising tide of nationalism in English Canada during the 1960s. Before
turning attention to the “little subversive gathering” that gave birth to the Waffle, this
chapter addresses the political events which contributed to the nationalist wave that the
young authors of the Waffle Manifesto sought to catch by tapping into the concerns
shared by many Canadian leftists. Furthermore, as will be shown by examining the
Manifesto’s evolution through three drafts written by Laxer, Watkins, and Caplan, and
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their efforts at reaching out to NDP riding associations, youth clubs and affiliated unions,
the Waffle moderated the rhetoric of the Manifesto in a strategic attempt to broaden its
appeal to New Democrats ahead of their party’s federal convention held in Winnipeg in
October 1969. At the convention the Waffle generated intense publicity, thrusting the
group into the media spotlight. Despite the Manifesto’s defeat, the strength of their
support inspired the Waffle to commit to ongoing organizing within the NDP.
Laxer’s scathing 1969 critique argued “the Canadian New Left derived much of
its style and ideology from the United States and American-centered issues filled its
political agenda.” As a result, “it has been unable to formulate a political strategy
relevant to Canadian society.”2 Laxer accused the Canadian New Left of uncritically
adopting the analysis of the American movement which, he contended, ignored uniquely
Canadian circumstances. Laxer criticized the New Left’s “suspicion of institutional
structures” and lack of concern for “the survival of Canadian national institutions, in that
they represent the best means to thwart American dominance.”3 By focusing on
American issues such as the Vietnam War and civil rights, Canadian New Left activists
typically ignored and showed little appreciation for the history of workers’ and farmers’
movements in Canada, as well as the role of the CCF/NDP. Most importantly for Laxer,
the Canadian New Left failed to recognize the dire threat that American economic
domination posed to Canadian independence.
Laxer’s focus on Canadian independence and his expressed desire to disentangle
Canada from a United States fraught with war and racial divisions was representative of
the “new nationalism” expressed in English Canada during the late 1960s and early
2
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1970s. The “new nationalists” encompassed a wide range of spokespersons and
ideological perspectives. In addition to the Waffle’s New Left-influenced socialism,
prominent voices included Walter Gordon, Peter Newman, and Abraham Rotstein, whose
Committee for an Independent Canada championed a moderate economic nationalism,
and the academic Robin Mathews, who espoused a particularly vigorous form of cultural
nationalism.4 Two points about the “new nationalism” are especially pertinent. First,
some observers, such as the Wafflers, harbored deep concerns about both American
economic and cultural domination of Canada. Other “new nationalists” had a narrower
focus. Walter Gordon, for instance, showed little interest in cultural protections. Yet
Robin Mathews focused relentlessly on issues of Canadian hiring and content at cultural
institutions and universities.5 Secondly, criticism of the American model of liberal
capitalism in Canada had hitherto been primarily the preserve of conservatives who
valued the British connection and were suspicious of the individualism, consumerism and
liberalism of the United States, whereas links between Canadian and American leftists
were often very strong.6 The “new nationalists” of the late 1960s and early 1970s, by
comparison, tended to critique American liberal capitalism from a left-wing perspective,
albeit with considerable variation.7

4

Anthony Westell, “New Nationalists May Push Trudeau to the Left,” Toronto Star, November 29, 1969.
See Stephen Azzi, Walter Gordon and the Rise of Canadian Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 1999) and Jeffrey Cormier, The Canadianization Movement: Emergence, Survival and
Success (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004) for discussions of the “new nationalism” and two of
its leading practitioners.
5
Cormier, The Canadianization Movement, 6-7.
6
Damien-Claude Bélanger, Prejudice and Pride: Canadian Intellectuals Confront the United States, 1891
to 1945 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 21. J.L. Granatstein explained, “anti-Americanism
was almost always employed as a tool by Canadian political and economic elites bent on preserving or
enhancing their power.” J.L. Granatstein, Yankee Go Home?: Canadians and anti-Americanism (Toronto:
HarperCollins, 1996).
7
Historian Paul Litt suggests that “contemporary American issues like the civil rights movement, the
nuclear arms race, pollution, ghetto riots, and Vietnam showed Canada to be the morally superior North

120
These “new nationalist” critiques frequently were responses to developments in
Canadian-American relations already several decades in the making. The move towards
closer military and economic integration between the two countries accelerated
dramatically during World War II and continued into the postwar period.8 On the
cultural front, the final report of the Royal Commission on National Development in the
Arts, Letters and Sciences, released in 1951, warned against the “dangers of dependence
upon American culture in the postwar world.” Popularly known as the Massey
Commission after its chair, Vincent Massey, the commission proposed governmentsponsored strategies for strengthening Canadian culture.9 By the mid-1950s concerns
about increasing American control of the Canadian economy were a topic of public
debate. Walter Gordon was foremost among the critics. As the wealthy scion of the
prestigious accounting firm Clarkson Gordon and personal friend of Secretary of State for
External Affairs Lester Pearson, Gordon had the government’s ear.10 Consequently,
when Walter Harris, the minister of finance, established the Royal Commission on
Canada’s Economic Prospects in 1955, he appointed Gordon as chair. Although not
originally a priority, the issue of foreign investment soon was a highlight of its public
hearings.11 The Dominion Bureau of Statistics’ data demonstrating markedly increased
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levels of American investment in Canada amplified the concern, and a July 1956 poll
indicated increasing numbers of Canadians fretting over the prospect of even higher
levels in the future.12 The Commission’s Preliminary Report issued in January 1957
mildly criticized the increase in foreign investment and recommended tax incentives to
motivate enhanced Canadian investment and employment, a solution largely panned by
economists at the time.13
Other events of the 1950s exacerbated Canadians’ concerns over American
interference in their affairs. Many Canadians, never completely comfortable with
ruthless US Senator Joseph McCarthy’s virulent anti-communism, became further
concerned about American interference when Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman
committed suicide in Egypt in 1957 after being publicly accused of Communist
sympathies by the US Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security.14 John Diefenbaker,
the leader of the Progressive Conservative party, attempted to capitalize on the tragedy
while on the campaign trail later that year by criticizing the Pearson government for
mishandling Norman’s situation, and in turn insisting that Canadian independence must
be defended against American interference.15 Diefenbaker’s rhetoric describing his
“New Frontier Policy” was designed to inspire a sense of Canadian nationalism.16 His
tactics succeeded. The Progressive Conservatives took power, first as a minority
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government from 1957-58 and then with a massive majority from 1958-62.17 As
historians Robert Bothwell, Ian Drummond and John English explain, “Diefenbaker was
honestly attached to the British connection and genuinely distressed about the ever-closer
integration between the Canadian and American economies.”18 After attending the
meeting of Commonwealth leaders in London in 1957, Diefenbaker announced his
intention to divert fifteen percent of Canadian spending on imports from the United
States to Great Britain.19 While the trade diversion proposal, not surprisingly, went
nowhere, concerns over the perceived threat that powerful American multinational
corporations and growing Canadian-American economic integration posed to Canadian
independence grew louder throughout the second half of the 1950s.20
Canada’s close ties to the American-dominated NATO and NORAD military
alliances also raised concerns among some Canadians, including a significant portion of
the CCF, over the resulting loss of national autonomy. In particular, Diefenbaker’s
obfuscation over whether Canada should accept nuclear warheads on Bomarc missiles
stationed in Ontario and Quebec as part of its NORAD commitment divided his cabinet
and the country.21 The issue festered through the 1962 election that reduced the
Progressive Conservatives to a minority government, prompted the resignation of
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Defence Minister Douglas Harkness in protest, and dominated the federal election of
1963 when NDP leader Tommy Douglas associated Lester Pearson’s pro-nuclear weapon
stance with American domination of the Canadian economy.22 Although Pierre Berton
declared in Maclean’s that “if this election proves anything it proves that antiAmericanism is finished as a political issue. We have cast our lot with the continent for
better or worse and the people know it,” the election of Pearson’s Liberals to a minority
government merely shifted nationalists’ focus to Canada’s economic, rather than military,
integration with the United States.23 Certainly, the Liberals’ success at the polls in 1963
provided Pearson’s friend Walter Gordon with an opportunity to put his economic
nationalist beliefs into practice.
In the aftermath of the disastrous 1958 election, Gordon along with the party’s
national campaign director Keith Davey and Pearson advisor Tom Kent had reshaped the
Liberal organization and polices into a modern, progressive force.24 Although Gordon
never succeeded in getting his opposition to foreign investment and American control of
the Canadian economy formally adopted by the Liberal Party, his views were wellknown, having been published in his 1961 book Troubled Canada.25 However, as
Minister of Finance in the new government, Gordon had the clout to overcome wary civil
servants and present in June 1963 as part of Pearson’s “sixty days of decision” a budget
that reflected at least some of his concerns over American investment in Canada.26
Gordon’s budget imposed a “takeover tax” of thirty percent on foreign takeovers of
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Canadian companies, along with changes to the withholding tax that favoured companies
even partially owned by Canadians.27 The stock market’s negative reaction to the
changes forced Gordon to withdraw the proposed takeover tax just six days after
announcing it in the budget. He also offered his resignation to Pearson, who refused it,
but the 1963 budget imbroglio irreparably weakened Gordon’s standing in cabinet. He
did not pursue further policies to limit foreign investment during his remaining two years
in the finance portfolio.28
Whereas Pearson and the Liberal government remained generally cool to
economic nationalism, Canadian symbolism loomed large in political debates throughout
much of the following year. On the Victoria Day weekend in 1964, Pearson announced,
to a chorus of boos at the Royal Canadian Legion Hall in Winnipeg, his intention to
introduce a new Canadian flag.29 When opening debate on the subject in the House of
Commons, Pearson expressed hope the new flag would “strengthen national unity and
national pride.” But the Progressive Conservatives, with an apoplectic Diefenbaker at
their helm, would have none of it. They mounted an intense public opposition to the
proposed flag – derided as “Pearson’s pennant” – and filibustered debate while
Diefenbaker demanded a national plebiscite.30 With the filibuster grinding government
business to a virtual halt, and Conservative professions of affection for British institutions
and symbols sounding increasingly critical of French-Canadians specifically, Pearson
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invoked closure. The motion to approve the new Canadian flag passed the House of
Commons in December 1964.31
Pearson’s determination to provide the country with a distinctively Canadian flag
was motivated in part by concerns over recently growing strains on the national fabric, in
Quebec especially. That province’s rapid political and economic modernization under
the Liberal government of Jean Lesage had also precipitated a dramatic surge in radical
Quebec nationalism during the 1960s. The separatist Rassemblement pour
l'Indépendance Nationale (RIN) was formed in 1960 to advocate for Quebec’s
independence, the Front de Libération du Québec (FLQ) exploded its first bomb in March
1963, and René Lévesque, the Minister of Natural Resources in Lesage’s government,
proclaimed Quebeckers were “maîtres chez nous” when rationalizing expansion of the
publicly-owned Hydro-Québec in the early 1960s.32 The question of Quebec’s place in
Canada would continue to dominate Canadian political discourse for the next three
decades.
Along with the new flag, Pearson’s government sought to foster national unity
and pride with a boisterous celebration of Canada’s centenary in 1967. Montreal’s
success hosting a widely popular world’s fair, Expo 67, did much to enhance Canadians’
pride in, and optimism for, their country that, in 1967 at least, felt one hundred years
young. Indeed, as the journalist Margaret Wente observed fifty years after the fact,
31
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young Canadians felt as if their generation came of age at the same time as their
country.33 Historians Bothwell, Drummond and English described Canadian nationalism
in 1967 as “gentle,” and Pierre Berton later rhapsodized how “Expo taught us to go first
class, and we reveled in the pride that inspired.”34 Yet, according to Stephen Clarkson,
accompanying this sense of “prevailing optimism” was a “fear that the United States
might drag the world into nuclear holocaust with the Soviet Union – unless a social
revolution did not first erupt there.”35
All the while, Canadian opposition to America’s escalating military conflict in
Vietnam grew. As was shown in the previous chapter, the Canadian New Left was an
energetic participant in the emerging international anti-war movement.36 Emulating the
spontaneous “teach-ins” breaking out at American universities, anti-war faculty at the
University of Toronto organized an administration-sponsored “International Teach-In on
Vietnam” in October 1965. One of the speakers, and an unusual darling of the Canadian
New Left, was 47-year-old McMaster University philosophy professor George Grant.
Earlier in 1965 Grant had published Lament for a Nation: The Defeat of Canadian
Nationalism, a pessimistic indictment of the Liberal Party’s acceptance of the country’s
growing integration with the United States, and a eulogy for the British tradition in
Canada and its recently defeated champion, John Diefenbaker.37 Among Grant’s laments
was the Pearson government succumbing to pressure from the United States to accept
33
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nuclear warheads on Canadian soil. Lament for a Nation, in addition to establishing
Grant as a “Canadian intellectual celebrity,” resulted somewhat ironically in this
conservative and religious philosopher being embraced by the Canadian New Left.38
Much of Grant’s critique of American society – the homogenizing impact of its
technology, consumerism and materialism – and its unparalleled threat to a uniquely
Canadian culture, identity, and independent nationhood, resonated strongly with New
Left activists.
As became evident at the Toronto “teach-in,” Grant not only opposed the war in
Vietnam. He also criticized Canadian industrial and diplomatic interests for their
complicity with the American war effort, and connected the lack of an independent
foreign policy to the decline in Canadian sovereignty. For Mel Watkins, then a thirtyfour-year-old economist at the University of Toronto, “the whole experience of the teachin was very radicalizing.”39 Watkins had been a student of Harold Innis in the 1950s and
completed his graduate studies at MIT before assuming an academic appointment in the
University of Toronto’s Political Economy department. A self-described “well-trained
technocrat and an American left democrat” upon his return to Canada, Watkins grew
“disillusioned” by American involvement in Vietnam.40 Innis’s influence remained
strong, and Watkins’s 1963 article “A Staple Theory of Economic Growth” updated the
senior scholar’s earlier groundbreaking explanation of Canada’s economic development
as a series of “staple” resources for export.41 Although initially skeptical about the
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possibility of Canadian nationalism, Watkins had become concerned by 1966 about the
“political costs” associated with American investment despite its “economically
advantageous” effects.42 Thus, when Walter Gordon approached another University of
Toronto economist, Abraham Rotstein, to chair a Task Force on the Structure of
Canadian Industry, Rotstein suggested Watkins instead.43 Watkins accepted. Gordon
had resigned as Minister of Finance following the 1965 election but then re-entered
Pearson’s cabinet as minister-without-portfolio on condition a cabinet committee on
foreign investment be established. Watkins’s task force was to conduct the committee’s
research. In the meantime Gordon had also published his second book, A Choice for
Canada: Independence or Colonial Status. A critique of foreign investment in Canada,
the book sold 12,000 copies in its first six months, a Canadian bestseller.44 Watkins
recalled reviewing the book “favourably on the whole, which put me in a distinct
minority among Canadian economists.”45
The report of the Task Force, titled “Foreign Ownership and the Structure of
Canadian Industry,” caused a stir upon its release in February 1968, despite its
accompanying caveat that the report had not yet been endorsed by the government.46 In
fact, the report’s recommendations were far from radical, reflecting the task force’s
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membership.47 The document accepted that the Canadian economy needed foreign
investment, and argued that there was little difference in the performance of Americanowned and Canadian-owned firms.48 The task force recommended multilateral tariff
reduction and the creation of a Canadian Development Corporation to provide investment
capital to domestic companies. The issue of extraterritoriality – the application of
American laws to companies operating in Canada and in particular the US embargo
against Cuba – rankled all of the task force’s members and they recommended
establishing a government agency to monitor foreign-owned firms and passing legislation
to prevent foreign laws from being applied to foreign-owned firms operating in Canada.
Media responses to the report generally reflected previously established editorial opinions
about Walter Gordon and foreign investment – the Toronto Telegram and Winnipeg Free
Press for instance, were critical, while the Toronto Star’s coverage was detailed and
laudatory.49 Historian Stephen Azzi notes in his biography of Gordon that “the most
interesting aspect of the media’s coverage of the report was the context,” as stories about
the task force were placed alongside articles and photographs of the ongoing war in
Vietnam and violent police responses to peaceful civil rights protesters in the United
States.50
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Although the Watkins Report received significant public attention, many
intellectuals and New Democrats were already aware of corporate America’s expanding
ownership of the Canadian economy. Concerns over foreign ownership of the economy
and Canada’s increasing continental integration had been a staple of NDP policy since
the party’s founding, and its election platforms in 1963 and 1968 had harshly criticized
the federal Liberal government’s tacit support of continentalism. Nevertheless, political
scientist Gad Horowitz expressed surprise at the results of a 1966 survey of politicians,
academics and reporters on the future of the NDP, published in the left-wing magazine
Canadian Dimension, which indicated that a majority of respondents expected the party
to become the voice of Canadian independence.51 Founded by Cy Gonick, a future
Waffler and Manitoba NDP MLA, Canadian Dimension was a regular forum for critics
of the Vietnam War and of Canada’s continuing absorption by American cultural,
economic, and foreign policy influences.52 McGill University philosopher Charles
Taylor, the NDP’s leading public intellectual, published articles in the magazine on
“Alternatives to Continentalism” and “Nationalism and Independence.”53 The NDP also
Liberal Party, keeping his “Just Society” and “More Power for Everyone” slogans deliberately ambiguous.
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held policy seminars in 1966 and 1967 at which Taylor, Mel Watkins and Kari Levitt
presented policy papers on challenges to Canadian independence.54 Although Levitt’s
classic indictment of continental integration, Silent Surrender, was not published until
after the Waffle Manifesto was written, her work began as a study of foreign ownership
prepared for the NDP at the behest of Charles Taylor, and the Manifesto’s authors were
certainly familiar with and influenced by her conclusions.55
During the 1968 federal election campaign, Douglas and the NDP endorsed the
Watkins Report and criticized the incumbent Liberals for Canada’s unchecked drift
toward continentalism that had occurred on their watch.56 The NDP even invited
Watkins to join with Douglas’s campaign tour, but he declined on the grounds that he had
assured Gordon that he would be available to promote the task force report for one year
following its publication.57 Watkins did acknowledge, however, that the entire process of
writing and defending the report “pushed me towards socialism. It seemed clear to me
that only through substantial nationalization could Canadians regain control of their
economy.” Still, he remained uncertain about the NDP’s brand of democracy, describing
it as “the Old Left position of considering hierarchical power structures inevitable.”58
Watkins identified instead with “a New Left version of socialism” which emphasized
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democratic decision-making by citizens in their workplaces, universities and
neighbourhoods.59
In April 1969, after Watkins had spent the year as promised promoting his report,
he was invited by Gerald Caplan, a professor at the Ontario Institute for Studies in
Education, to attend a weekend meeting at his home in Toronto. Also on the guest list
were, as Caplan explained, other like-minded friends and acquaintances “who feel that
we’re significantly left of the NDP but not happy to simply embrace all of the jargon and
tactics of the New Left.”60 Watkins and Caplan were joined by Ed Broadbent, James
Laxer, Krista Maeots, Doug and Carol Myers, John and Patricia Smart, and Giles
Endicott in what would become the inaugural meeting of the Waffle. Among Caplan’s
invitees, only Stephen Lewis, the MPP for Scarborough West, failed to respond to
Caplan’s invitation. Caplan and Lewis were close friends, but Lewis’s nonattendance
reportedly did not surprise the others.61
It had been Stephen Lewis who, in the late 1950s, introduced and converted
Caplan, then an undergraduate student at the University of Toronto, to socialism.
Together they had co-managed in the spring of 1962 David Lewis’s successful election
campaign in the riding of York South.62 Caplan went on to graduate school in England
and then Rhodesia, where he was arrested and deported in 1965 for supporting black
student protests against Ian Smith’s white nationalist government.63 Giles Endicott also
met Caplan and Stephen Lewis while an undergraduate at the University of Toronto and
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served with them and John Smart in a CCF student cabinet.64 Along with Caplan and Ed
Broadbent, Endicott later joined a group of Canadians living in London, England, in the
early 1960s in founding a New Party club.65 By 1969, Endicott was back in Canada as
research director with the United Packinghouse Workers-Amalgamated Meat Cutters
union, a member of the NDP’s federal council, and party activist in the downtown
Toronto riding of St. David. Endicott had participated in the ‘Young Turks’ revolt
against the party establishment at the federal NDP’s 1967 convention, for which he was
criticized and threatened by his union for breaching the principle of labour “caucus
solidarity.”66 Although Cy Gonick dismissed the ‘Young Turks’ revolt as “a family
quarrel which saw the presidential candidate of the middle-aged generation, James
Renwick, defeat the candidate of the over-sixties generation, J.H. Brockelbank,” Endicott
walked away from the unpleasant experience convinced that the NDP sorely needed to
modernize and move further left.67 Endicott ran unsuccessfully as the NDP candidate in
St. David in the 1963 and 1967 provincial elections.68
Endicott had remained friends with Ed Broadbent, who taught political science at
York University until NDP and UAW activists recruited him to seek the federal party’s
nomination in his hometown of Oshawa. In one of the NDP’s few gains in the 1968
election, the thirty-two-year-old Broadbent defeated long-time Progressive Conservative
MP Michael Starr by a margin of just fifteen votes. Upon joining the NDP caucus in
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Ottawa Broadbent initially devoted much of his energy advocating for industrial
democracy, a concept then popular with elements of the American New Left that sought
greater levels of worker participation and influence in the workplace. Broadbent fully
expected the NDP to embrace the concept, but his idealism took a blow over the steadfast
opposition of the union movement, including the UAW, to the idea.69 A similar naivety
was on display when Broadbent attempted to arrange for Caplan and Laxer, neither of
whom had been formally invited, to present to the federal NDP caucus their views on the
party, Canadian independence, and socialism.70 The decision by caucus not to break
procedure and hear them out caused Broadbent much embarrassment.
James Laxer, who had been active in the student movement as an undergraduate
at the University of Toronto, was head of Canadian University Press (CUP) in 1965 when
it added to its mission statement a commitment to “act as an agent of social change.”71
Along with Dimitri Roussopoulos, Art Pape and Doug Ward, Laxer was a leader of
SUPA’s Vietnam Action Committee when it organized the March 1966 sit-in on
Parliament Hill that resulted in sixty-one arrests.72 By that point, Laxer was at Queen’s
University where, along with fellow graduate student and SUPA activist Krista Maeots,
he worked at revitalizing the campus NDP club. There was “considerable overlap” in
membership between the Kingston SUPA and the Queen’s University NDP, but by 196667 “the NDP had taken over SUPA’s role as the major political organization on
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campus.”73 Although Laxer was the “key figure” in the campus NDP, he continued his
involvement in SUPA until its demise.74 Maeots edited the Queen’s Journal in 1967, and
under her direction the campus newspaper began featuring broader social and political
coverage.75 However, as Laxer grew disenchanted with the Canadian New Left’s focus
on American issues and its ignorance of the history of socialist struggle in Canada, his
focus shifted away from the student movement and towards the NDP.76
While at Queen’s Laxer participated in student-run seminars on Canada’s history
and politics where he encountered kindred spirits among graduate students and junior
faculty primarily from the Department of History, including George Rawlyk, Krista
Maeots, George and Rosemary Warskett, John and Patricia Smart, and Lorne and
Caroline Brown. Laxer, who at the time was writing a Masters thesis on the Quebec
nationalist politician Henri Bourassa, became increasingly convinced that a leftist
program combining socialism and economic nationalism “would attract French-Canadian
nationalists back to federal politics.”77 Patricia Smart recalls having long conversations
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with Laxer about Quebec nationalism and Canadian independence.78 Her husband, John
Smart, also a Queen’s graduate student in history, had been active in the CCF/NDP as an
undergraduate at the University of Toronto with Stephen Lewis, Caplan and Endicott. He
later worked on David Lewis’s 1962 federal election campaign, managed Stephen
Lewis’s 1963 provincial election campaign and after moving to Kingston managed John
Meister’s 1965 federal and 1967 provincial election campaigns before becoming
president of the local riding association by 1969.79
Laxer’s small coterie of Queen’s students transformed the Kingston NDP. At the
suggestion of Joan Newman, a SUPA activist who had continued her organizing efforts
among the city’s poor and working-class youth after SUPA ended its summer community
project in September 1965, the local riding association supported the creation of an
information centre in Kingston’s poor North End. The Community Information Service
that opened in January 1968 with NDP support proved so popular that within months
Newman and others established the Association for Tenants’ Action, Kingston
(ATAK).80 Although the NDP and ATAK were not formally linked the connection
nevertheless expanded the Kingston NDP’s commitment to grassroots community
organizing because many people were active in both the riding association and the
tenants’ organization.81 Involvement in community organizing appeared to pay
immediate electoral dividends when two of the three ATAK candidates were elected
aldermen and the NDP vote in the city’s north end increased in the 1968 federal
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election.82 Laxer regarded Joan Newman’s election to city council in particular as
representing “the beginnings of a new coalition of poor tenants, labour and students.”83
Such fruitful ties between the New Left and Kingston NDP working together to address
local social problems further motivated Laxer, Maeots and the Smarts to join Watkins,
Broadbent, Endicott and the Myers at Gerald Caplan’s house in late April 1969 for what
the host dubbed “a little subversive gathering.”84
Over the course of the weekend the group discussed the state of the NDP and the
left in Canada, while formulating ideas for inclusion in a draft statement that Laxer would
compose.85 They also agreed that new recruits to the group should be members of the
NDP.86 At the second meeting held one month later at John and Patricia Smart’s home in
Kingston, they were joined by Lorne and Caroline Brown, who had been active in the
Saskatchewan NDP before moving to Kingston where Lorne was a graduate student.
Also new were Don Taylor, an assistant research director for the Steelworkers, Hugh
Winsor, a reporter for the Globe and Mail, Gordon Flowers, the federal NDP Youth
secretary, Hans Brown, a staffer in the federal NDP leader’s office, and several others,
mainly from Toronto and Kingston.87 The enlarged group assigned Watkins the task of
incorporating ideas from their second meeting into Laxer’s draft. After a third meeting
held in Toronto two weeks later, Caplan made the final edits to the document.
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Much of the substance of Laxer’s draft would be included in the final Waffle
Manifesto, and reflected many of the concerns he had previously expressed in articles
appearing in Canadian Dimension. The draft highlighted two key issues: domination of
the Canadian economy by a morally bankrupt United States tainted by chronic racial
inequality and its war in Vietnam, and the potential for a heightened emphasis on
Canadian economic nationalism to attract Quebec nationalists into a pan-Canadian
socialist coalition.88 The first draft also argued that capitalism caused regional
inequalities within Canada, and included a nod to the importance of “the struggle for
worker participation in industrial decision making.” No mention was made of the NDP
specifically until the final paragraph.89 Laxer later recalled that “we had the spirit of the
New Left. The Manifesto was an expression of the youthful radicalism of the era, but it
was Watkins who made it a brilliant document. Watkins was my idol.”90
Watkins’s draft considerably improved Laxer’s. Watkins added stirring
introductory and concluding paragraphs, reworked some of Laxer’s awkward phrasing,
and included three paragraphs on industrial democracy – a major preoccupation of
Broadbent’s – that highlighted the need to redistribute managerial power to workers and
concluded that the labour movement was crucial to the struggle for Canadian
independence and socialism.91 The draft acknowledged that “concern is sometimes
expressed in Canada about the role of international unions and there are some who call
88
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for national unions” before rejecting such an approach for fear of “weakening unionism
and the condition of the working man.”92 As Watkins later explained:
Although we were nationalists, we did not want to take a stand denouncing
international unions, despite urgings from some of our friends on the Left. We
felt that taking that stand would have been political suicide. For one, it would
have made it impossible for us to stay in the NDP. Also it would have put our
supporters who are militant members of international unions, in an intolerable
position.93
The references to international unions were eventually removed, and the final version of
the Manifesto remained silent on the issue. According to Endicott, the discussion over
international unions inspired the group’s odd name:
We agreed that the case was very different from that of multinational
corporations, since the corporations have real power to initiate and control
economic development whereas the unions do not. But in the course of this
discussion it was argued that if we were going to waffle, it would be better to
waffle to the left than waffle to the right.94
After the Globe and Mail used the term in a September 1969 editorial “The Waffle
Manifesto,” the group quickly adopted the “Waffle” name publicly.95 Even prior to the
editorial, Endicott had signed his letters “the Waffle King,” and declined some requests
for copies of the Manifesto with the regretful admission “we are now out of waffles.”96
Although Laxer recalled that “we might not have had it without the editorial… We knew
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it would be a problem to have a left-wing group that was seen as too serious, so to have a
name that was humorous was just great. We knew right away that it was a great name.”97
The group also waffled on the strength of their statement’s wording on the thorny
issue of Quebec’s right to self-determination.98 Explicitly stating support for Quebec’s
right to determine its own fate, including separating from the rest of Canada, went further
than existing NDP constitutional policy that endorsed a “deux nations” approach to
federalism including “special status” for Quebec. When the executive committee of
Endicott, John Smart, Caplan, Laxer, Watkins and Don Taylor met in June to finalize the
Manifesto, they did not alter the document significantly aside from striking the sentence
“Quebec’s right to self-determination is not in question” from a paragraph that began “a
united Canada is of critical importance in pursuing a successful socialist strategy.”99
Despite the controversy it soon created within the party, the Waffle Manifesto did
not represent a complete radical rupture with NDP policies and ideology in the late
1960s. As Ontario NDP provincial secretary John Harney explained to Waffler Steven
Langdon, “there is almost nothing in there that I have not endorsed already as a member
of the NDP… if anything, I think that the ‘manifesto’ is not radical enough, and in

97

Smith, Unfinished Journey, 579.
These two issues – international versus national unions, and Quebec’s right to self-determination – would
prove to be what caused the most division and acrimony between Waffle supporters and the NDP
leadership. Interestingly, both of the original authors recall the Manifesto containing elements that were
not, in fact, included. Laxer explains that the Manifesto’s “assertion that Quebec had the right to ‘selfdetermination’” went beyond the NDP’s policy, but the group actually chose to eliminate the sentence of
the Manifesto which included that assertion. Watkins recalled that “It was really advanced in its
perceptions of issues – not only nationalism but Quebec’s right to self-determination, feminism, the
environment and support for independent Canadian unions.” However, the Manifesto is also silent on the
issues of feminism, the environment, and independent Canadian unions. Given the centrality of these
issues to the Waffle’s future conflict with the NDP leadership, it is perhaps unsurprising that they feature in
many Wafflers’ recollections of the Manifesto. James Laxer, In Search of a New Left, 151; Watkins
quotation in Steed, Ed Broadbent, 147.
99
Third Draft, June 12, 1969. Box 2009-047/001 (09), File 9 Waffle - Manifesto, Giles Endicott fonds,
YUA; Giles Endicott, “Timeline,” Box 2009-047/001, File 6 Waffle - History, 1969-1972 (1 of 2), Giles
Endicott fonds, YUA.
98

141
several points seems to be taking a step backward from positions which the party has
already taken.”100 Certainly the Manifesto’s proponents had waffled on the contentious
issues of international unions and Quebec’s right to self-determination. However, the
Waffle Manifesto distinguished itself from the mainstream Canadian left, as represented
by the leadership of the NDP and the affiliated labour movement, by its aggressive tone
and its origins in the New Left, both as articulated by its authors and as evidenced by its
approach to the issues of capitalism and Canadian independence.
The Canadian nationalism central to the Manifesto – it pronounced that “the most
urgent issue for Canadians is the very survival of Canada” – was a product of the New
Left’s avid opposition to American “racism at home and militarism abroad.”101 The civil
rights and anti-war movements in the United States were pivotal for a generation of
young people who mobilized to expose the hypocrisy they perceived at the heart of Cold
War America. The Canadian New Left in turn demanded Canada chart a course distinct
from the racism and militarism plaguing American society. Capitalism, too, was
condemned for threatening Canada’s independence. The Manifesto linked the American
“empire” and “military-industrial complex” to a dominant corporate capitalism it
castigated for producing Canada’s regional economic disparities. Notably, the Manifesto
did not attack capitalism for impoverishing Canadians or alienating workers. Moreover,
it is vague in its discussion of socialism, indicating only that it will be achieved “by
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national planning of investment and by the public ownership of the means of production
in the interests of the Canadian people as a whole.”102
A New Left emphasis on democracy was central to the Waffle Manifesto’s
assertion that neither independence nor socialism “are meaningful without true
participatory democracy.” A section on industrial democracy argued that “the NDP must
provide leadership in the struggle to extend workingmen’s influence into every area of
industrial decision-making.” Despite its stance that the NDP must ally with New Left
social movements as “the parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental
social change,” the Manifesto was not an expression of a post-materialist, “new social
movement” approach sometimes associated with the New Left.103 Issues such as
women’s and gay liberation, racial discrimination, and environmental protection, while
not mentioned specifically in the Manifesto, would nevertheless become important to the
Waffle.
In preparation for the October 1969 federal NDP convention in Winnipeg, the
Wafflers devised concrete plans for rallying support of the Manifesto and their goal of
moving the party’s policies further left. They put Endicott in charge of “overall
organization of our efforts,” appointed Caplan “internal secretary,” and tasked John
Smart with coordinating a slate of resolutions for submission to the convention on such
“agreed topics” as industrial democracy, Quebec, foreign ownership, extra-parliamentary
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social movements, party structure, and the Americanization of universities, and also for
ensuring they were submitted to the convention.104
Broadbent, meanwhile, began expressing doubts about the direction the group was
headed. After he showed the Manifesto to the NDP’s research director, Marc Eliesen,
who was decidedly unimpressed, the two of them rewrote it.105 Although Endicott wrote
to Caplan to suggest that several sections of the Broadbent/Eliesen draft could be
incorporated into the Manifesto, others were equally unhappy with the revisions.106
Laxer, for example, complained “you’ve taken all the juice out of it… the guts are
gone.”107 Broadbent, whose focus was still the issue of industrial democracy, quietly
withdrew from the group. Others among the original Wafflers were determined that the
Manifesto remain a radical statement. In an interview twenty years later, Saskatchewan
Waffler John Warnock explained:
I was talking with Lorne Brown the other day about the drafting of the Waffle
Manifesto, spring of 1969, and he said that people don’t realize that his position,
which was then supported by Mel Watkins, is that the Waffle Manifesto should be
strong enough to the left so that the NDP could not accept it, and this would force
the creation of a left-wing caucus within the NDP, so Caplan and Broadbent and
Endicott tried to water it down, but they wanted the Waffle Manifesto to be strong
enough that it could not be co-opted by the NDP leadership and would create an
organization.108
However, Laxer’s recollections suggest that Brown’s determination was not universally
shared among the original Wafflers, and he explained:
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The furthest thing from my mind was the idea of destroying the NDP… when we
drafted the Waffle Manifesto, I was full of virtue and belief that we were doing
some thing that was good… I didn’t think that there was anything conflictual, or
that David Lewis would hate this, or that trade union leaders would almost give
themselves coronaries chasing twenty-six-year-olds from one side of a convention
hall to another to stop us…109
Mel Watkins recalled:
None of us who wrote the Waffle Manifesto, and certainly not myself, ever sat
down and said: “Let’s radicalize the NDP.” It was much more of a spontaneous
thing of a half dozen or so people realizing they were in the Party and fed up with
it. We never set out to do what we ended up doing. In the best sense, I think,
you’re doing something real if you touch a nerve and everybody jumps.110
The Waffle’s executive committee next decided to draw more publicity for the
Manifesto in advance of the convention by seeking endorsements from prominent New
Democrats “whose names will be recognizable and attractive.”111 Copies were sent to
potential supporters with a note explaining the desire to “swing the NDP convention a bit
to the left.”112 Among those Endicott contacted were MPs Alf Gleave, Grace MacInnis
and Max Saltsman, newly-elected Manitoba MLA and editor of Canadian Dimension Cy
Gonick, Nova Scotia NDP leader Jeremy Akerman, former BC NDP leadership candidate
and New Left activist John Conway, UAW-Canada Director Dennis McDermott (who
formerly worked with SUPA activists as an organizer in Kingston), left-wing Simon
Fraser University political scientist Martin Robin, and two American-born professors in
Saskatchewan, Joe Roberts and John Warnock.113
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Many of the recipients were already aware of the Manifesto. Broadbent had
presented it at a meeting of the federal caucus, and he was informed “that such papers
should not be circulated without having their source attached.” Both MacInnis and
Gleave thought the document “interesting,” but declined to endorse it.114 The response
beyond the federal caucus was considerably more positive. Cy Gonick, Joe Roberts, John
Warnock and Jeremy Akerman all indicated their enthusiastic support, but not without
suggesting some revisions were in order. Gonick in particular explained that he had
spoken at length with Watkins and Laxer about the document and indicated that “the
contents are okay but it starts off badly.”115 Concerned that the Manifesto “casts us as
outsiders,” Gonick offered a new preamble he had written that he thought better situated
concerns about American economic and cultural domination of Canada within the
broader history of the CCF/NDP.116 Endicott replied positively to Gonick’s preamble,
but regretted it was too late to make further changes to the document as it had already
been distributed widely among potential supporters.117 Stephen Lewis recalled that he
“came fairly close to signing” the Manifesto because “I felt I had a similar view of the
left.” However, he explained “I think I was scared off by David [Lewis]. I think it was a
severe parental admonition – he scared me off – and it was ironic that I didn’t rebel by
signing.”118
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Once a list of notable supporters whose names could be affixed to the Manifesto
was compiled, the executive committee planned to distribute the document to riding
associations during the month of August in a preemptive bid to ensure that it received due
consideration at the October convention. The Wafflers were worried that the structure of
the convention, which provided for resolutions to be debated by panels rather than the
entire assembly, would preclude the Manifesto from being debated and voted on by all
delegates. However, if sufficient riding associations indicated support for the Manifesto,
Wafflers hoped that party officials could be persuaded to allow a convention-wide debate
on the topic. While John Smart continued his work of coordinating a series of leftleaning resolutions for submission to the convention, Wafflers sent copies of the
Manifesto to provincial NDP newspapers and Canadian Dimension for publication in
September and encouraged supportive party members to seek election as delegates to the
October gathering.119
Some Manifesto supporters proved so enthusiastic they jumped the queue and
circulated it at NDP meetings in advance of the Wafflers’ intended distribution date.
John Conway handed out copies at the Saskatchewan NDP convention in Saskatoon in
early July, where “it was given further attention by Ed Broadbent who declared his
disagreement with it.”120 Delegates to the Young New Democrats convention in Ottawa
also distributed the Manifesto prematurely, resulting in its mid-July publication in the
Workers Vanguard, the newspaper of the Trotskyist League for Socialist Action (LSA).
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The newspaper’s editor apologized for the misstep, but perhaps he need not have.121 The
Manifesto was not further circulated over the balance of the summer, prompting
Endicott’s comment to political scientist Joe Roberts, “we are grateful that the paper has
not yet hit the regular press – apparently nobody reads the Workers Vanguard.”122
In Saskatchewan the Waffle encountered an existing network of intellectuals and
students predisposed to supporting an expression of New Left-tinged socialism within the
NDP. Intellectuals and activists critical of American imperialism had founded the
Committee for a Socialist Movement (CSM) in 1967. Primarily a Saskatoon- and
Regina-based discussion group, the CSM was the initiative of two expatriate American
academics, Joe Roberts and Ed Mahood, along with Bill Gilbey and Roy Atkinson, who
were union and farm activists respectively.123 A fifth participant was Jack Shapiro,
whose friendship with Woodrow Lloyd’s executive assistant, Jack Kinzel, prompted an
informal dialogue with the Saskatchewan NDP leader as well. Lloyd believed internal
ideological debates were vital for a healthy social democratic party. His public criticisms
of unrestrained capitalism’s damaging effects on the marginalized of Saskatchewan
convinced those in the CSM that they were exerting at least some influence on the NDP
leader.124 The group also connected with student New Left activists, including Don
Mitchell, Richard Thompson and Don Kossick.125 In the summer of 1969, following an
unsuccessful foray into Saskatoon’s municipal election and internal disagreements over
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the group’s future direction, the CSM’s members were “re-energized” by the timely
appearance of the Waffle Manifesto.126
That same summer in neighbouring Manitoba the outlook was propitious for New
Democrats. Shortly after Ed Schreyer, a popular thirty-three-year-old MP, won the race
to succeed Russell Paulley as leader of the Manitoba NDP, the province was in the midst
of a provincial election campaign. Schreyer’s “rural touch” appealed to many voters, and
his party also enjoyed additional media coverage early in the campaign as a result of its
recently televised leadership convention.127 With the Liberals under the leadership of
R.R. Bend occupying much the same territory on the right of the political spectrum as the
governing Progressive Conservatives, the NDP enticed progressives and reformers with a
platform promising lower medicare premiums, public automobile insurance, an increased
minimum wage, a lowered voting age, the appointment of a provincial ombudsperson,
and a review of Manitoba’s hydro-electric industry.128 Aided by a “voting coalition of
the ethnic minorities, the traditional outsiders in Manitoba society and politics,” and a
more representative redistribution of electoral districts, the NDP won the June 25th
election with twenty-eight of the province’s fifty-seven seats and formed a majority
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government when Liberal MLA Larry Desjardins joined the NDP caucus as a “Liberal
Democrat.”129
The NDP in British Columbia, led by thirty-six-year-old Thomas Berger, likewise
appeared poised for victory when Social Credit premier W.A.C. Bennett dissolved the
legislative assembly in July 1969 and called a provincial election. Bennett had
antagonized workers and unions by limiting collective bargaining and legal strikes in the
province, and the NDP raised money from national unions headquartered in English
Canada and hired organizers to target vulnerable Social Credit-held seats.130 Bennett
stoked fears of socialism by seizing on the NDP’s commitment to nationalizing the
British Columbia Telephone Company.131 A modest gain in its popular vote did not
prevent the NDP from losing four seats, including Berger’s, and Social Credit from
increasing its majority in the August election. Berger resigned soon afterwards leaving
his former leadership rival David Barrett, the MLA for Coquitlam and signatory to the
Waffle Manifesto, as party leader.
Much like in Saskatchewan, in British Columbia an existing array of left-wing
party members and activists were attracted to the radical tone of the Waffle Manifesto.
But unlike in Saskatchewan, an organized network of socialist academics and students
comparable to the CSM did not exist. In British Columbia the Waffle attracted grassroots
members of the provincial NDP’s long-standing and influential left wing alongside
Barrett and his supporters in caucus. Perhaps frustrated by Berger’s moderate views and

129

Ibid., 125.
Isitt, Militant Minority, 182-3. British Columbia public servants voted to transform their employee
association into a union after the chair of the Mediation Commission declared there would be no collective
bargaining for civil servants. The appeal to unions outside BC allowed the NDP to raise money from
labour in spite of Bennett’s de facto ban on political donations.
131
Ibid., 183-4.
130

150
unsuccessful leadership of the provincial party, five Vancouver-based NDP MLAs signed
the Waffle Manifesto.132 So too did Wally Ross, NDP provincial secretary, Norm Levi, a
former MLA and party president, and Paddy Neale, the left-wing secretary-treasurer of
the Vancouver and District Labour Council. Barrett recalled several years later that he
had viewed the Manifesto as a good starting point for a discussion about the NDP’s next
steps, but he did not support the entire statement outright.133
After a summer spent attempting to garner support for their cause among NDP
riding associations, Wafflers officially unveiled their Manifesto at a press conference in
Ottawa on September 4, 1969. Six of the signatories were present, with Watkins, who
was the best known among the group from his previous public defense of the Watkins
Report, acting as spokesperson. Journalists in attendance were blunt in their criticisms.
Charles Lynch, reporting for the Southam News Service, dismissed as “fatuous”
Watkins’s views on the “American Empire,” and jeered the Waffle “wouldn’t even be
able to elect a dog-catcher anywhere in Canada on a platform like that.”134 Douglas
Fisher, a Toronto Telegram columnist and former CCF and NDP MP, dubbed the
Manifesto “a jumble of discarded slogans of the 1930s, a nostalgia of guild socialism and
above all a frenzy of anti-Americanism.” He predicted that not even twenty of the
approximately one thousand delegates to the NDP convention would be interested in
discussing the Manifesto in any detail.135
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Ontario NDP leader Donald MacDonald was similarly critical. In an interview
the day after the press conference, he described the Manifesto as “a disappointing
document containing old and weary rhetoric and ideas.”136 Later in the month,
Manitoba’s Ed Schreyer expressed concern about the Manifesto’s “strident antiAmericanism,” and intimated he would work behind the scenes to reject the document at
the upcoming Winnipeg convention.137 Most of the critical responses directed to
Endicott focused on problems of worker participation in management, and warned that
the Manifesto’s support for industrial democracy threatened to antagonize the labour
movement.138 At least one unionist smelled a plot, and demanded to know whether the
party leadership had been informed of the Waffle group’s “secret meetings.” He assured
them that “it was not the lack of a good old-fashioned doctrinaire socialist program that
lost us that [BC] election.”139 In general, however, the Manifesto’s founders were
pleasantly surprised and encouraged by the interest and positive response their initiative
had generated.
Watkins recalled that “when we called meetings to discuss it [the Manifesto],
50-60 party members would show up regularly. We were also getting letters and phone
calls from NDP’ers across the country.”140 At an Ontario Young New Democrats
seminar at the University of Toronto, 150 delegates debated and endorsed the Manifesto.
Prominent Wafflers recommended to the gathering a combination of social movement
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activism and electoral politics. Caplan’s complaint was whereas “most of the student
movement in Canada doesn’t talk to anyone but itself… socialism means dialogue,”
while Laxer cautioned that “the NDP has become dangerously fossilized as a left-wing
institution.” Steven Langdon, the former president of the University of Toronto Student
Administrative Council, advised that “the NDP in power in parliament, by itself, cannot
make the fundamental changes for a socialist society.”141 Eventually, twenty-one riding
associations endorsed the Manifesto, but usually only after heated debate.142
By now widely known as the Waffle, thanks to the Globe and Mail’s editorial, the
group began printing a rudimentary Waffle Weekly news bulletin in the lead-up to the
convention.143 A victim of their own success in generating interest, the Wafflers
struggled to manage all the requests for information. Endicott reported “various selfmade promotional committees” popping up in support of the Manifesto, and a month
before the convention additional copies of the document were unavailable. Meanwhile,
queries directed to the overburdened Wafflers often went unanswered for several
weeks.144 Some members of the media began to recognize, as the Winnipeg convention
drew nearer, that the Manifesto and its oddly-named champions might well be a force to
be reckoned with.145
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On the down side, the Waffle Manifesto achieved little traction with either the
labour movement or the federal NDP leadership.146 Don Taylor, the Steelworkers’
assistant research director and original member of the Waffle executive committee,
resigned from the group before the convention. Taylor explained he no longer wished to
defend “the workers’ participation section with which I never really agreed and from
some superfluous anti-Americanism; none of which is really essential to the manifesto”
but which triggered “almost automatic distrust” among his colleagues in the labour
movement.147 The philosopher Charles Taylor, who had signed and subsequently
repudiated the Waffle Manifesto, collaborated with NDP deputy leader David Lewis in
producing a statement ‘For a United and Independent Canada,’ that both acknowledged
the Manifesto’s popularity within the party and attempted a repudiation of its more
radical elements. In response to widely shared concerns about expanding foreign
ownership, the Taylor/Lewis document called for the creation of a Canada Development
Corporation and held up public ownership as one important, but not exclusive, means of
limiting and regulating foreign ownership of the Canadian economy.148 Endicott alerted
other Wafflers to the existence of a “competing statement” that union officials such as
Modren Lazarus of the OFL and Lorne Ingle of the Steelworkers distributed to labour
leaders prior to the convention.149 Labelled the Marshmallow Manifesto by convention
delegates for its moderate tone, the Taylor/Lewis statement criticized anti-Americanism
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as a “barren and negative” concept and was adopted by the party’s federal council.150
Prior to the convention some NDP executive members attempted to block the Waffle
Manifesto from even reaching the convention floor, but David Lewis insisted that the
party both debate and vote on it.151 Eventually it was decided that both manifestos would
be debated simultaneously on the final night of the convention.
The media interest generated by the Waffle, the ideological and generational
differences between Waffle supporters and long-time New Democrats, and the
convention’s plenary structure combined to create an often frantic atmosphere. Several
days of policy panels open to all delegates found Waffle supporters and party moderates
alike rushing from one panel session to another in an effort to win crucial votes.
Desmond Morton described it as “a nightmare for party regulars” as “rival clutches of
delegates were sent panting through the corridors of Winnipeg’s Civic Auditorium.”152
James Laxer recalled a similar scenario of “young, long-haired and often bearded Waffle
supporters… racing from one workshop session to another, being pursued by older, and
often paunchy, trade union delegates.”153 The Waffle arranged for its own space at the
convention which proved fortuitous since its meetings regularly drew 300 to 400
delegates, although the Waffle was not intended to operate as a “binding caucus” whose
members would vote in concert, in contrast to the expectation of solidarity among union
delegates on party policy issues.154
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Douglas Fisher’s prediction proved wildly inaccurate. Debate over the Waffle’s
policy resolutions dominated the convention, and revealed some delegates were prepared
to support some of its policy positions without endorsing the Manifesto in its entirety.
For instance, a Waffle resolution advocating Canada’s withdrawal from NATO, NORAD
and other joint military agreements with the United States passed a policy panel despite
opposition by the NDP’s foreign affairs critic. Indeed, John Harney, the Ontario NDP
provincial secretary, and Lorne Nystrom, a Saskatchewan MP, supported the withdrawal
resolution, suggesting that the Waffle’s opposition to American militarism was shared by
some young party moderates.155
The Waffle also successfully influenced the policy panel on education when the
Ottawa South New Democratic Youth (NDY) submitted a proposal to replace the
Resolutions Committee’s education policy with one more radical that passed by a close
vote of ninety to eighty-eight. Wafflers Krista Maoets and Daniel Drache spoke in
favour of the NDY resolution which proposed giving students a greater role in university
governance, abolishing tuition fees, paying salaries to students, and requiring universities
to hire a majority of Canadian professors.156
The Waffle was less successful in the policy panel dealing with Quebec. The
Kingston NDP sponsored a resolution, supported by the Waffle, that committed the party
to recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination, defined Canada as two nations, and
criticized bilingualism as a futile endeavour. Charles Taylor confronted the Waffle head
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on, and advocated retention of the party’s current policy that promoted bilingualism but
was silent on the question of Quebec’s right to self-determination. Taylor proposed a
formal special status for Quebec, arguing “I don’t think it is wise for this convention to
tell us what to do in Quebec.”157 Taylor’s moderate resolution passed by a vote of 123 to
seventy-seven.158
Wafflers were instrumental in devising a compromise resolution on foreign
ownership passed by the policy workshop. Watkins moved the resolution, which stated
that “multi-national corporations, mostly American based, are the dominant institutions
of Canadian life,” and claimed that Canada “has virtually been reduced to a resource base
and consumer market within the American empire.”159 It went on to advocate
government restrictions on foreign takeovers of Canadian-owned firms, and a general
prohibition on foreign ownership in certain unspecified sectors of the economy. The
resolution also proposed creating a Canada development corporation as an instrument of
state economic planning and means of increasing Canadian economic independence, a
government export trade agency, and requiring higher standards of financial data
disclosure by corporations. David Dodge, secretary-treasurer of the CLC, argued
unsuccessfully in support of the NDP federal council’s recommendation that the motion
advocate foreign investment controls without criticizing the United States directly.160
Dodge decried the compromise resolution as “dangerous nonsense” and criticized its antiAmerican language, but delegates at the plenary session of the convention two days later
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nevertheless passed it with minor modification, replacing the phrase “American empire”
with “American economy.”161
The Waffle could also share credit for the convention’s acceptance of a resolution
calling for Canada’s withdrawal from NATO and NORAD. Some other Waffle causes,
however, were defeated. Its radical education policy, which had been adopted by the
conference’s education policy panel, was referred at the plenary to the federal council for
redrafting.162 Also defeated was the Waffle resolution calling for recognition of
Quebec’s right to self-determination, with the party choosing instead to stick with its
position on Quebec’s ‘special status’ adopted at the 1967 convention.163
Amendments to the party’s constitution were also debated. A proposal to end
affiliated memberships for trade unions was soundly defeated, and convention delegates
instead opted to increase the spots allocated to affiliated union representatives on the
party’s federal council. Also rejected were two proposals to increase the number of
federal council spots designated specifically for women. The first, sponsored by the
women’s caucus, advocated increasing the allotment from five to twenty-five. When the
motion was defeated, deputy leader David Lewis moved an amendment to increase
women’s representation to fifteen seats. It also failed to achieve the support of two-thirds
of voting delegates necessary for passage, much to the frustration of feminists and Waffle
supporters.164
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The convention’s keynote speakers sounded markedly different notes over the
party’s direction moving forward. Tommy Douglas opposed the Waffle Manifesto, but
his speech conveyed at least some sympathy for the issues it championed:
We must achieve economic independence so that the decision-making power will
be restored to the people of Canada… I believe that the challenge of the ‘70s calls
for greater public intervention in the economy, social planning, direction of
investment to meet social needs and where necessary, public ownership of those
sectors of our economy which are essential for economic planning… However,
we must do more than advocate programs. We must involve ourselves in the
daily struggles of those who fight against social injustice. The NDP must become
the voice of the voiceless and the champions of those who are the victims of
injustice and exploitation. Most important of all, the NDP must be the political
vehicle by which the people of this country can bring about social change by
democratic means.165
Manitoba Premier Ed Schreyer, by contrast, spoke of the importance of achieving
political power in order to implement a progressive agenda. In a thinly-veiled critique of
the Waffle’s radical policies and rhetoric, Schreyer ignored the issue of foreign
investment and described his own government’s legislative agenda, including its plans for
public auto insurance, before emphasizing “the kind of progress which I have been able
to report to you this evening has been possible because we are in power… We are not
fulfilling our responsibilities as a political party or as committed social democrats if we
place the problem of gaining political power as being beneath our consideration.”166
The seventy-five minute televised debate between supporters of the Waffle and
Marshmallow Manifestos, proved a highlight of the convention. David Lewis started off,
urging delegates to reject the Waffle Manifesto’s anti-Americanism. Mel Watkins
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responded, rejecting accusations of anti-Americanism by explaining how “a growing
number of Americans reject American militarism and the exploitation of the third world
by its multi-national corporations.” Referring to the rapidly changing politics of the
1960s, Watkins implored the NDP to “relate itself as a Party to these new undercurrents
of radicalism… It must become the parliamentary wing of a broad social movement.”
Several more speakers, including Dennis McDermott and Ed Broadbent, accused the
Waffle Manifesto of anti-Americanism, with McDermott reminding delegates “we belong
to a political party not a pseudo-intellectual debating society.” Despite earlier comments
he made to Steven Langdon, John Harney criticized the Manifesto for implying that
Quebec separatism was desirable. Three MLAs spoke in its favour. Cy Gonick
suggested the NDP had become “too soft… too timid… more concerned with
respectability than with social action,” while Gordon Dowding (Burnaby-Edmonds) and
Walter Smishek (Regina North East) beseeched the convention to support the Manifesto
as a clear affirmation of their commitment to independence and socialism. Party leaders
added to Lewis’s opposition. Allan Blakeney, the federal NDP’s incoming president, and
federal leader Tommy Douglas both rejected the Waffle Manifesto for its lack of
specificity compared to the Marshmallow Manifesto’s clear policies on introducing a
Canadian Development Corporation, corporate financial disclosure rules, and a takeover
tax. Douglas indicated “both documents recognize that we can only attain independence
through democratic socialism, and that we will never get complete democratic socialism
until we have succeeded in winning economic independence,” but questioned the
meaning of the Waffle’s commitment to “public ownership of the means of
production.”167 After lengthy and boisterous debate, delegates defeated the Waffle
167
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Manifesto by a vote of 499 to 268, and passed the Marshmallow Manifesto by a wide
margin in an unrecorded vote.168 Despite the setback, Wafflers were energized by their
success in garnering significant support for several of their policy proposals throughout
the convention, as well as over the substantial media attention they had attracted.
Furthermore, the Waffle experienced some success in elections for the party
executive and council. Watkins was elected one of the seven vice-presidents on the
executive, and Waffle sympathizers won eight of the twenty available council spots.169
The Waffle did not challenge Allan Blakeney’s acclamation as NDP president.
Delighted with the enthusiasm the Manifesto and their radical policy positions
had generated, after the convention the Wafflers committed to continue organizing as a
distinct group within the NDP.170 Before travelling to Winnipeg, as Endicott had
acknowledged, “we cannot expect to change the whole party at one convention… it really
matters more what the delegates go away thinking than what they go away having
endorsed.”171 Despite the Manifesto’s failure to win support among a majority of the
convention delegates, the Wafflers “were ecstatic about their success in drawing national
attention to their cause.”172 Although still a minority faction within the NDP, the Waffle
had nevertheless made strides towards achieving its objective of providing for
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representatives of radical social movements a sympathetic forum and effective impetus
for political action within an established national political party.
The Waffle Manifesto and its supporters shook up the 1969 NDP convention.
The image of an incursion by radical young activists into the staid and sober NDP was
enhanced by media reports, well-versed in the Sixties tropes of the generation gap, that
emphasized the Wafflers’ youth and unusual appearance. One Toronto Star reporter
described the “long-haired and bearded” leftists while another columnist explained
“many of them have long curly hair, with sideburns and mustaches. They do not favor
ties and wear jeans as if they were a uniform for the guerrilla army.”173 NDP leaders
rejected any suggestion that the Waffle represented one-third of party members, despite
the results of the Manifesto vote, and argued that “students and other radicals” were
overrepresented at the convention.174 Yet this element of the Canadian New Left was
unusual in its embrace of the ‘new nationalism’ that had emerged in English-Canada
during the preceding decade as well as anti-imperialist decolonization movements
internationally. The authors of the Waffle Manifesto, with backgrounds in both the New
Left and the NDP, had become concerned that the party was ignoring the single most
pressing issue of the time – American domination of the Canadian economy. Convinced
that only extensive public ownership could reverse this trend, they sought to convince the
NDP to turn leftward and espouse a similar message. Coming together in the spring of
1969, they had crafted a Manifesto that resonated with a significant minority of New
Democrats and attracted excited media attention to the party’s 1969 convention. After
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the Waffle Manifesto’s defeat Tommy Douglas thanked the young radicals for helping to
revitalize the party and suggested he was “delighted” they were part of the NDP.
Douglas praised the debate the Manifesto had spurred, commenting “the time to worry is
when a convention turns into a mutual admiration society.”175 The New Left’s arrival in
the party via the Waffle ensured that would not be the NDP’s immediate fate.
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Chapter Four
“The Waffle has made the NDP exciting:” Activism and Influence, 1970
Following the October 1969 federal NDP convention in Winnipeg, the Waffle
sought to continue working within the party to promote socialism and Canadian
independence from American economic domination. Without question, its activism at
Winnipeg had jolted the NDP. Donald MacDonald, the leader of the Ontario NDP,
acknowledged the Waffle’s role in producing “the most exciting and satisfying”
convention of his career, but simultaneously warned against adopting policies that
“would totally isolate us from the community at large.”1 Despite minor conflicts arising
between the Waffle and the party’s leadership, and criticisms from some party moderates
that as the group organized further it threatened to create a “party within a party,” the
Waffle became an important influence within the NDP in the year following its
emergence. Mel Watkins declared after his election as one of the party’s vice-presidents
that he intended to act as a spokesperson for the Waffle and would not be “co-opted.”2
Acknowledging the ongoing radical activism amongst students, women, and workers,
Watkins hinted at the Waffle’s potential strategic role on the left of the party, saying “we
want to demonstrate that the NDP can relate to such groups.”3 Indeed, throughout 1970
the Waffle would pursue its goals both from inside the NDP and through extraparliamentary activism including participating in the Abortion Caravan and rallies
opposing the federal government’s use of the War Measures Act. Within the party the
Waffle influenced with some measure of success policy conventions in Saskatchewan,
1
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British Columbia, Ontario and Manitoba, as well as supported a Saskatchewan NDP
leadership candidate who ran an “issues-based campaign.”
Cy Gonick, the MLA and editor of the influential Canadian Dimension, proposed
during the final Waffle caucus of the Winnipeg convention that they continue their
organizational efforts by establishing provincial committees across the country. Gonick
took the lead in Winnipeg, organizing during the 1969-70 winter holidays a group who
met regularly at the Dimension bookstore.4 The Manitoba Young New Democrats
(YND) at their January 1970 convention passed a manifesto calling for an independent
and socialist Canada and support for party participation in the women’s liberation, antiVietnam War, and student movements.5 In Saskatchewan, a Waffle group formed in
December 1969 at a meeting in Moose Jaw called by John Conway, Joe Roberts and Don
Mitchell attended by thirty people. The following month the Committee for a Socialist
Movement (CSM) agreed to fold its activities into the Saskatchewan Waffle.6 In
preparation for its public launch at a conference in March, the group developed a
statement for the Saskatchewan NDP convention expected in the fall of 1970, and
participated in several of the party’s regional policy seminars.7 In Toronto, a chapter of
the Waffle was launched in an early December meeting attended by 150 people. Even in
Newfoundland, where the party had few supporters, NDP activists established a small
Waffle group.8
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The Waffle caucus, having decided at the 1969 federal NDP convention to hire
Jackie Larkin as a full-time organizer to plan both a western regional conference and a
national conference in 1970, began soliciting monthly donations to support its initiatives.
Not all Waffle supporters were pleased with these decisions. Wally Ross, the B.C.
NDP’s provincial secretary and a signatory to the Manifesto, declared that although he
continued to support the group’s “aims and objectives,” he opposed development of a
distinct Waffle organization as “no political party can long afford to contain within it
another.”9 Giles Endicott responded to Ross by explaining that the monies collected were
solely for funding the conferences and no memberships were being sold. Endicott shared
Ross’s concerns that the establishment of a “real bureaucratic apparatus” by the Waffle
risked creating a “party within a party.”10 In fact, both Endicott and Gerald Caplan
would soon leave the Waffle, for roles organizing Stephen Lewis’s leadership bid for the
Ontario NDP.
Some disputes raised during the October 1969 convention carried over into the
party’s federal council when it met in Toronto three months later. Despite creating a
Participation of Women Committee to “assist and encourage women’s participation in all
forms of political activity,” convention delegates had twice defeated proposals to increase
women’s representation on the federal council.11 Nevertheless, during the October
convention the party’s Women’s Committee had elected five of its members to represent
it on the federal council. Yet when the council met in January the five were denied
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delegate status.12 Carol Fogel, the chair of the Women’s Committee, suggested that the
youthfulness and activist backgrounds of the five women were contributing factors to the
party’s refusal to grant them seats on the council. Fogel commented, “I think if we had
elected four nice middle-aged women, they wouldn’t have protested.”13 Fogel also
claimed the party had misconstrued the five women as Waffle supporters as only three of
them voted in favour of the Waffle Manifesto.14 Eileen Dailly, the British Columbia
MLA who chaired the Women’s Committee meeting at Winnipeg, attempted to clarify
that the point of the election was only to recommend, not appoint, the five as members of
the federal council. Allan Blakeney, the party’s newly acclaimed president, attributed the
dispute to confusion over the respective roles of the two women’s committees.15
Regardless, the refusal to seat the women’s delegates, combined with other defeats of
Waffle policy proposals at Winnipeg on issues such as education and Quebec, caused
some Wafflers to question the NDP’s commitment to radical societal reform.
Mel Watkins ruffled more feathers by writing in the Globe and Mail that his
appointment to the party’s policy review committee did not indicate the Waffle’s demise
in favour of “instant consensus.”16 Rather, Watkins offered assurances that “the Waffle
is very much alive and well” and there remained “disagreements within the party on a
number of fundamental issues” still to be resolved.17 NDP federal secretary Cliff
Scotton, in a private reply to Watkins, attempted to assuage his concerns with an
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assurance that the policy review committee would certainly stimulate debate within the
party, but suggested its disputes should not be aired in the media.18
The emergence of provincial Waffle groups in Saskatchewan, Ontario and
Manitoba after the 1969 federal convention illustrated the Waffle’s growing influence as
it challenged the NDP status quo. The official launch of the Saskatchewan Waffle at an
Easter weekend conference in Saskatoon in March 1970 was overshadowed by the
provincial NDP leader Woodrow Lloyd’s sudden resignation. Lloyd had led the
provincial party ever since Tommy Douglas left the premiership to pursue the federal
NDP leadership in 1961. Despite negotiating a successful end to the 1962 Doctors Strike
and overseeing the implementation of universal health care in the province, Lloyd lost the
1964 election to Ross Thatcher and the Liberal Party. He recruited new and younger
candidates to contest the 1967 election campaign, but after the NDP again lost to
Thatcher’s Liberals some began questioning his leadership.19 Lloyd gave moderates in
the Saskatchewan NDP, including a number of the young MLAs he had recruited, further
cause for doubt when he voted for the Waffle Manifesto at the October 1969 federal NDP
convention.20
Approximately half of the Saskatchewan delegation had supported the Manifesto
at Winnipeg, including MLA Walter Smishek and Carol Gudmundson, vice-president of
18
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the Saskatchewan NDP.21 Gudmundson had been elected to the provincial party
executive only a few months earlier along with a number of other leftists, including
Lloyd’s friend Bev Currie, a farmer from Swift Current sympathetic to the Waffle and the
National Farmers Union (NFU).22 Currie raised the ire of NDP moderates when, in a
discussion paper at the Winnipeg convention and an article in the provincial party’s
newspaper the Commonwealth, he endorsed the concept of a land bank, a measure by
which the government purchased land to lease back to farmers on a voluntary basis as a
means of alleviating the decline in family farms resulting from the corporate
consolidation of farmland.23 The policy of “use-lease” had been a controversial issue for
the CCF during the 1930s when the Great Depression ravaged the province’s agrarian
economy, and was eventually eliminated from the party’s program in 1936. Now
Currie’s proposal revived fears that any move to purchase farmland at its “assessed”
value would ultimately result in forced expropriations of properties at much less than
their actual value.24 Under pressure from MLAs Gordon Snyder and Ted Bowerman, the
provincial party caucus asked Lloyd to call a joint meeting of the executive and caucus to
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discuss Currie’s actions.25 Although the meeting, held on March 26, 1970, began with
criticisms of Currie, former MLA and current executive committee member Robert
Walker redirected the focus to questioning Lloyd’s leadership and his lack of electoral
success. However, the timing of his criticisms – shortly after Lloyd’s support for the
Waffle Manifesto and immediately following the formation of an organized Waffle group
in Saskatchewan which included Lloyd’s allies – suggests that Lloyd’s critics were
motivated as much by ideological differences with their leader as by the party’s
disappointing recent election results. One group of MLAs piled on with criticisms of
their own, while Lloyd’s friends and allies – including MLAs Walter Smishek and Bob
Davies and executive members Jack Shapiro and Frank Coburn – attempted, largely
unsuccessfully, to defend Lloyd by returning attention to Currie’s action as party
president.26 Shaken by his critics’ attacks and the lack of a vocal defense from his
supporters, Lloyd promptly offered his resignation and left the room.27 When urged by
the executive to reconsider his decision, Lloyd waited three days before confirming that
he would indeed be resigning as party leader in the Legislative Assembly the following
day.28
When details of the stormy caucus-executive meeting leaked out, the Waffle
interpreted the incident as an unfortunate victory for the Saskatchewan NDP’s right
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wing.29 In a reflective speech on leadership, party and province Lloyd made to the NDP
provincial council a couple of weeks later, he professed to being incapable of generating
the “mass emotional appeal” necessary for winning votes in a contemporary political
environment. Lloyd also extolled the virtues of encouraging debate and accommodating
a diversity of opinions within the NDP:
We as a party have never been (certainly have never wanted to be so far as I am
concerned) a tightly disciplined organization. That is both a strength and a
weakness… We have always been tolerant with ideas. This must continue, but
even this can be a strength or a weakness. Some of those ideas or inclinations
inevitably worry and may even frighten some. Whether such tolerance is strength
or weakness depends on the respect and sensitivity for the positions and opinions
of those with a right to worry or be frightened by that which they fear is a barrier
rather than a bridge.30
For his part, Robert Walker denied that he had sought to prompt Lloyd’s resignation,
claiming instead that Lloyd had previously indicated an intention of resigning before the
next provincial election.31 The caucus also responded to the accusation, levelled on the
CBC, that it had forced Lloyd’s hand. In an open letter caucus members contended that
political style rather than policy differences were behind their criticisms of Lloyd’s
leadership.32
The recently formed Saskatchewan Waffle believed otherwise. Interpreting
caucus pressure for Lloyd’s resignation as a right-wing reaction to the emergence of a
coordinated leftist bloc within the provincial party, the Saskatchewan Waffle prepared a

29

“The Lloyd Story,” Waffle News, May 1970, File 446-18, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC; J.J. Jons, “Lloyd
axed for Waffling,” Canadian Dimension, April-May 1970, 7-8; Douglas Fisher, “Sask. Crisis a test for
Wafflers,” Toronto Telegram, April 6, 1970.
30
Woodrow Lloyd, “The Image of Leadership: Leader’s Report to Provincial Council, 12 April 1970,” in
The Measure of the Man: Selected Speeches of Woodrow Stanley Lloyd, ed. C.B. Koester (Saskatoon:
Western Producer Prairie Books, 1976), 129.
31
Commonwealth, June 10, 1970, File I.5 Clippings 1969-70, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
Walker’s motives in particular came under suspicion as he was leadership aspirant Roy Romanow’s partner
in their law firm.
32
“NDP Caucus Statement,” April 1, 1970, File 446-14, Waffle-NDP fonds, LAC.

171
statement for the group titled For a Socialist Saskatchewan in an Independent Socialist
Canada. The document, which shared the original Waffle Manifesto’s concerns about
the increasing Americanization of Canada, also contained a brief history of socialism in
Saskatchewan that emphasized economic planning as the key to reversing regional
underdevelopment. It also included an extensive agricultural policy, which the Manifesto
had not mentioned at all, that promoted guaranteed farm incomes, a halt to corporate
farming, the creation of a land bank, limits on farm size, and a rationalized food industry
in which processing and marketing were conducted in the same region as production.33
The Saskatchewan Waffle’s statement also addressed women’s liberation,
environmentalism and the plight of native peoples, all topics absent from the original
Waffle Manifesto.34
An Ontario section of the Waffle was also formed at the end of March. It elected
a steering committee with representatives from several localities in the province and
adopted For a Socialist Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada, a statement that
echoed the Waffle Manifesto’s emphasis on the dangers of American domination of the
Canadian economy and Ontario’s reduction to a “branch plant society.”35 The Ontario
Waffle statement criticized the provincial government’s support of foreign corporate
takeovers and subsidies, and shared the original Manifesto’s prescription of centralized
planning and public ownership of “key sectors of the economy.”36 For a Socialist
Ontario also incorporated the Manifesto’s emphasis on extra-parliamentary social
33
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movements of workers, farmers, students, tenants, women, and minority groups as key
components to achieving social transformation, and called on the NDP to act as “the
vitalizing centre that gives these social forces a common perspective, a sense of solidarity
and an organization for united action.”37 Unlike the Waffle Manifesto, the Ontario
document warned of the “reckless exploitation of the natural environment,” and linked its
ecological concerns to the consequences of entering into energy resources deals with the
United States. The Ontario statement also included a section, heavily influenced by
Robin Mathews, on the Americanization of Ontario’s “branch plant system of higher
education.”38 On labour matters it called for the “full autonomy” of Canadian sections of
international unions, and encouraged mergers among domestic unions.39 Whereas the
Manifesto did not address feminism, the Ontario statement called on the NDP to “provide
its full support to the struggle for the liberation of women” including for independent
feminist groups.40 The Ontario document retained the Manifesto’s commitment to giving
“control in decision-making to workers and the community,” but the absence of the
phrase “industrial democracy” reflected Broadbent’s departure from the Waffle.41
Finally, in the event of Donald MacDonald’s resignation as provincial NDP leader, the
Ontario Waffle agreed it would only field a leadership candidate if no other candidate
agreed to “publicly endorse and actively support” the manifesto.42
In addition to organizing provincial sections within the NDP, Wafflers attempted
to practice the Manifesto’s commitment to extra-parliamentary activism. The Winnipeg
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Waffle sponsored two conferences in the spring of 1970: the first, on the theme
“Manitoba: Colony Within a Colony,” drew 200 attendees, while the second, an
exploration of extra-parliamentary activism, included invitees from the women’s
liberation movement, the Métis Federation, the NFU, the Welfare Rights Union, and the
Manitoba Association of Students.43 The Toronto Waffle, in conjunction with the
University of Toronto NDP club, organized a two-day public forum in March 1970
dubbed “Teach-In: The Americanization of Canada.” The event attracted approximately
eight hundred participants who heard featured speakers Walter Gordon, Cy Gonick,
Robin Mathews, NDP MP Andrew Brewin, and Michel Chartrand, president of the
Montreal council of the Confederation of National Trade Unions (CNTU).44 Grace
Hartman, secretary-treasurer of the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE),
utilizing a report prepared by the union’s research director and Waffler Gil Levine,
informed the crowd that $35 million of Canadian workers’ union dues were sent annually
to the head offices of international unions in the United States, for which little benefit
was received in return.45
Although the Waffle Manifesto failed to address the issue of women’s liberation,
many female Wafflers were actively involved in Canada’s burgeoning women’s
liberation movement. As has been seen, the debate over women’s representation on the
federal NDP council was among the most contentious at the 1969 Winnipeg convention.
Waffler D.J. O’Donnell, a member of the Vancouver Women’s Caucus, later reflected on
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the disappointment caused by the convention majority twice defeating proposals to
increase women’s representation on the council. She argued that women “need special
representation on party bodies to both speak to women's issues and to criticize male
chauvinism within the party, just as labour requires special representation to speak to
working-class issues and to ensure the party maintains its commitment to the workingclass.”46 Citing the Waffle Manifesto’s insistence that the NDP act as “the parliamentary
wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental social change,” O’Donnell cautioned that
unless the NDP took a strong stand in support of women’s liberation, it risked becoming
as “irrelevant” to that vital cause as it was to the anti-Vietnam war movement.47
O’Donnell and other Vancouver Wafflers pursued women’s liberation struggles
beyond party politics. In the spring of 1970 they staged what became a historic crosscountry protest against Canada’s abortion laws. Despite the federal Liberal government’s
partial legalization of abortion in 1969, abortion remained in the Criminal Code of
Canada and the law was interpreted inconsistently among hospitals and doctors.48 The
Vancouver Women’s Caucus (VWC), which emerged in 1968 out of the Students for a
Democratic University movement at Simon Fraser University, was one of the earliest
women’s liberation groups formed. In protest against the continued criminalization of
most abortions and the difficulties of accessing the procedure legally throughout the
country, the VWC organized an ‘Abortion Caravan’ to travel across Canada.49 Dawn
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Carrell, a Vancouver Waffler and one of the Abortion Caravan’s two key organizers, first
crossed the country ahead of the Caravan to mobilize support.50 Jackie Larkin, whom the
Waffle hired to plan its 1970 conferences, was released by the group to work on the
Caravan instead. She described a “cross-country connection of socialists, students,
women and anti-war activists” who provided the “framework” for the protest.51 The
caravan of automobiles, carrying a coffin filled with coat hangers “in memorial to the
thousands of women who die each year from illegal abortion,” departed Vancouver on
April 29, 1970, stopping in nine cities before arriving in Ottawa on Mother’s Day
weekend.52 Another Waffler, Sally Mahood, was the Caravan’s contact in Regina, and
Toronto Wafflers, under the guise of the women’s liberation group of the NDP, worked
with the Voice of Women, the Trotskyist Young Socialists (YS), and the radical New
Feminists to organize a welcoming rally for the Abortion Caravan. Five hundred people,
including pregnant women and children, attended the resulting Free Abortion on Demand
protest in downtown Toronto.53
Once in Ottawa, the caravaners requested an audience with Pierre Trudeau and
invited any interested MPs to meet with them. Only three NDP MPs (Grace MacInnis,
David Lewis and Lorne Nystrom) and one Progressive Conservative backbencher (Gerald
Baldwin) accepted the invitation. Trudeau declined, as did John Munro, the minister of
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health, and John Turner, the minister of justice, to whom the VWC’s brief was addressed.
Refusing to be ignored, the several hundred protesters who had gathered on Parliament
Hill marched to the prime minister’s residence to leave the coffin of coat hangers.54 One
Waffler, Dawn Carrell, expressed the sentiments of many in the crowd: “we’re tired of
this buck passing and we won’t stand for it any longer – the poor and working women
bear the brunt of the current law; we cannot stand by and watch our sisters die.”55
The following day thirty-six women, including Ottawa Waffler Jackie Larkin,
gained access to the public gallery of the House of Commons, chained themselves to
chairs, and disrupted proceedings with chants of “free abortion on demand” and “we want
control of our bodies.”56 Their protest caused Commons Speaker Lucien Lamoureux to
adjourn the House while guards cleared the galleries.57 Waffler Krista Maeots described
the protests associated with the Abortion Caravan as the “first significant national
expression of a movement which had been active and growing for some time.”58 Maeots
explained that women’s liberationists were concerned with a variety of issues, but
abortion “served as no other issue to link university and working women, the
economically comfortable and the poor, young and middle-aged in an urgent, personal
struggle to achieve a definable goal.”59
The Waffle in Ontario and British Columbia also took action to support various
worker-related causes. Waffler Sharon Yandle described the B.C. Waffle as forming
“around the dual issues of extraparliamentary activity and foreign ownership of the
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Canadian economy” and its April 1970 meeting in Vancouver was attended by one
hundred people, leading a visiting Cy Gonick to consider their prospects “very
promising.”60 It organized a public demonstration against BC Hydro rate increases that
attracted two hundred people, held a seminar featuring Mel Watkins, and published a
newsletter.61 Wafflers in Vancouver also supported striking tugboat workers during a
month-and-a-half-long strike in May and June 1970.62 Court injunctions which
prohibited picketing at the MacMillan Bloedel’s mills and resulted in jailed union leaders
and seized union assets when defied, further motivated the Vancouver Waffle.63 Yandle
described the group’s activities as “involving the NDP in the day-to-day struggle for
democratic socialism in the community, the workplace, the school and the living place.”64
In late March 1970, at the union local’s invitation, the Toronto Waffle offered
assistance to the 600 workers then fighting closure of the Dunlop Tire plant on Queen
Street East in Toronto. Wafflers attended union meetings, helped the local create and
distribute a newspaper, and aided in circulating a petition throughout the adjacent
community.65 They also helped organize a demonstration at Queen’s Park where,
following addresses by Watkins, James Renwick, the local NDP MPP for Riverdale,
Waffler Steven Langdon, the former president of the University of Toronto Students
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Administrative Council, and Phil Japp, the president of Local 132 of the United Rubber
Workers of America, scuffles broke out between protesters and police.66
However, the Waffle and the NDP differed on how best to support the Dunlop
workers. Despite Renwick’s efforts in the Legislature to require Dunlop to keep the plant
open for three months to allow for a study of its economic feasibility, he eventually
concluded the plant could not be saved and advised the union to take legal action to
secure the best severance pay deal possible.67 Despite the NDP’s Community Action
Committee declaring themselves “generally satisfied” with the party’s participation in the
campaign to save the plant, Mel Watkins recalled that the Waffle “would like to have
thrown our support behind the more militant workers of the plant who were
contemplating direct industrial action, such as sit-ins or work-ins.”68 In his critique of
both the union leadership and Renwick, Waffler Steve Penner argued that “the potential
militancy of the Dunlop workers and the rank and file of Toronto’s labour movement was
never really tested.”69 NDP member Michael Prue defended Japp and Renwick from
Penner’s criticisms and argued that Penner’s “doctrinaire truth… was not that of the
workers.”70 For their part, the Wafflers’ efforts on behalf of the Dunlop workers were
viewed favourably by union activists. As Watkins saw it, “labour people were beginning
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to lose some of their suspicions of us as impractical intellectuals and long-hairs when we
actually did some of this practical work.”71
A Waffle influence within the labour movement was also apparent at the
Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) convention in Edmonton in May 1970. A ‘Reform
Caucus’ of younger union activists presented a five-point program urging the CLC “to
establish a team of organizers who could be assigned on short notice to help
underprivileged groups – slum dwellers, native people, working poor and the
unemployed.”72 The program also called for the creation of a CLC youth department to
counter younger workers’ tendency to feel alienated from unions, the adoption of a policy
supporting equal rights and opportunities for women, the creation of aid and information
centres for the poor and unemployed, and the use of multi-union teams to organize the
unorganized.73 In addition, the Reform Caucus demanded that Canadian sections of
international unions be allowed to operate independently by having domestic offices,
policy conferences, staffs, funds specifically earmarked for Canadian projects, and
complete autonomy over their political involvement.74 Much of what the Reform Caucus
proposed did not come to fruition. Although Waffler Gil Levine later admitted only a
few among the “odd lot” who comprised the Reform Caucus “had any direct connection
to the Waffle” beside himself, commentators described the caucus as the “counterpart
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within the union movement of the Waffle,” and members acknowledged the influence of
the Waffle on its program.75
Historian Steve Hewitt has documented the extensive surveillance and
investigation of New Left social movements in the 1960s and 1970s by the RCMP,
including the Waffle. The RCMP Security Service monitored the Waffle’s activities
“believing that subversives were using it as a means to infiltrate the NDP” and
investigated both Waffle and NDY meetings.76 A brief submitted by the RCMP Security
Service to Solicitor General Jean-Pierre Goyer in March 1971 accurately summarized the
Waffle’s intentions:
The prime aim of the Waffle Group within the NDP is the establishment of an
independent socialist Canada to be achieved through the existing structure of the
New Democratic Party. The Waffle Group hope to change the NDP from within
and radicalize the NDP socialist policies. Considering the Waffle group as a
whole, it is felt that they will be a viable political force within the NDP.77
Although a police informant attending the 1970 ‘Americanization of Canada Teach-In’ at
the University of Toronto focused on the attendees’ factionalism and suggested “several
more teach-ins of this type would really scatter any semblance of cohesion left within the
‘New Left’” another disagreed and warned that the Waffle had the potential to polarize
debate over Canadian independence.78 The RCMP Security Service targeted Waffle
groups at eight universities as well as the NDY at the University of Regina and the
University of Saskatchewan but only the Waffle at the University of Toronto was
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considered a “significant threat.”79 The Waffle was investigated alongside other radical
left groups active at the time, including the YS, CLM, SDS, CPC (M-L), Black Students
Unions and the CP.
Its involvement in extra-parliamentary struggles for women’s liberation and
worker’s rights, and against Americanization and foreign ownership, did not distract the
Waffle from focusing on transforming the NDP from within. In riding associations and
especially at provincial party conventions in B.C., Saskatchewan, Ontario and Manitoba,
Wafflers sought to alter party policy and thereby shift the NDP decisively leftward.
Although ultimately falling far short of its goals, the Waffle during the summer and fall
of 1970 did wield influence on a variety of issues, including agriculture in Saskatchewan,
and in Ontario and British Columbia women’s equality and nationalization of resource
industries.80
In May 1970, just over a year after its initial meeting at Gerald Caplan’s house in
Toronto, the Waffle described itself as a “national coalition of socialists within the NDP”
with a mailing list of 1300 people across nine provinces.81 A Western Regional
Conference held in Banff in late April failed to attract many delegates from B.C. or
Saskatchewan and none from Manitoba. Despite “productive” discussions in a series of
workshops, the conference only produced a “substantial statement” on agricultural policy,
leading Lorne Brown to conclude that “good written statements… amplifying existing
policy are not possible to produce in a two-day seminar – at least not without
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considerable preparation beforehand.”82 Laxer spoke at the conference, emphasizing the
need for a national campaign opposing a possible energy resources agreement with the
United States. Despite the low turnout in Banff, the Waffle persisted with plans to hold a
national conference later that year in August.83
In the meantime, the Saskatchewan Waffle’s efforts to move the provincial NDP
further left in the aftermath of Woodrow Lloyd’s resignation was facing tough resistance
from party moderates. The Waffle’s takeover of the Regina South riding association in
early April 1970 aroused concern, but its efforts to deny a sitting MLA the NDP
nomination for Moose Jaw South raised genuine alarm.84 When Bill Davies, the NDP
incumbent in Moose Jaw South announced his retirement, Gordon Snyder, the NDP
MLA for Moose Jaw North seized the opportunity to seek for himself the nomination in
Davies’s former riding, which was considered to be the safer seat of the two. But then
John Conway, a sociologist, New Left activist, and former candidate for the BC NDP
leadership announced his intention to contest the Moose Jaw South nomination. Conway
promptly staked out his ideological turf, criticizing American domination of the Canadian
economy, the corporate consolidation of agricultural land, and its resulting threat to rural
life, arguing “we must point to a bolder future of a society that puts people’s needs before
the profits of a few.”85 After the party’s provincial secretary, Don Faris, intervened to
delay the nomination meeting from January to April in order to assist Snyder, Conway
and his Waffle supporters campaigned hard, canvassing party members and holding a
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Moose Jaw teach-in on the topic of the Americanization of Canada that featured Mel
Watkins, Fred Gudmundson, Cy Gonick and Conway.86 Snyder, who had the added
advantage of being nominated by the popular Davies, eventually won the contest, which
only deepened the animosity between Saskatchewan Wafflers and NDP moderates.87
One month later, Robert Walker, the executive committee member who led the
attack on Woodrow Lloyd’s leadership, wrote to party president Bev Currie and all
provincial council members, riding presidents, and secretaries, to accuse Currie and “a
majority of the executive” of identifying with “an extremist minority group” that placed
the Waffle’s interests ahead of the NDP. Walker attacked the Waffle’s land bank policy
as “compulsory socialization of farmers’ land,” expressed anger over “the two women on
the executive” who vowed to defeat “reactionary” NDP MLAs, and accused Currie of
using party funds to subsidize Waffle activities in contravention of provincial council
directives.88 Currie dismissed Walker’s charges as misleading “inaccuracies” and denied
that a grant to the Saskatchewan Young New Democrats (SYND) constituted a misuse of
party funds.89
The Saskatchewan NDP leadership convention to name Lloyd’s successor was
scheduled for early July 1970. Allan Blakeney, the party’s deputy leader and MLA for
Regina Centre, as well as the favourite to win, announced his candidacy in mid-April.
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Roy Romanow, the MLA for Saskatoon-Riversdale, made it a race a few weeks later.
Blakeney emphasized his proven competency in government and the need for party unity
to win back voters who had switched over to the Liberals in recent elections. Romanow
touted his ability to communicate effectively with voters in a modern era in which
television was the predominant medium of politics.90 Neither candidate presented a
comprehensive policy platform.
The Saskatchewan Waffle held two meetings in early May, one of which included
leaders of the Saskatchewan NFU, to determine their strategy for the leadership race.
Since none of the Waffle’s “serious possibilities – Bev Currie, Roy Atkinson, Fred
Gudmundson” was willing to run, the group adopted the unusual strategy of encouraging
two different candidacies.91 At the urging of the NFU, Waffler Don Mitchell, a NFU
organizer and student activist, threw his hat into the ring in part to support Waffle efforts
to defeat Romanow by denying him “the ‘youth’ vote.”92 The Waffle also intended to
support a labour candidate in an effort to “split the labour vote in the cities,” but their
preferred choice, MLA Walter Smishek, declined to run, and the group was not
associated with another candidate, the respected labour lawyer George Taylor.93 Don
Mitchell was not explicitly a Waffle candidate, although he drew his campaign team and
policy positions from the Saskatchewan Waffle.94 Campaigning under the slogan “issues
not images,” Mitchell criticized his opponents’ lack of substantive policies and the
“bankruptcy of image politics,” claiming “we cannot stand by playing polite politics
90
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while farms and town are abandoned, unemployment soars, and our people are forced to
leave Saskatchewan in mass exodus.”95
At his first press conference Mitchell advocated “an agricultural policy which
would keep farmers and eliminate profiteers.”96 Although Mitchell pitched a detailed and
comprehensive platform, agriculture featured most prominently in it, including a land
bank proposal, the nationalization of farm machinery and food processing industries, a
plan for provincial government procurement of agricultural products, and more
government investment in agricultural research.97 His links to the National Farmers
Union were an important element of his campaign. As Don Kossick, a former student
activist and NFU organizer explained, “we used the Farmers Union as a cover to organize
for Mitchell… we were using that to offset Taylor… he was organizing the labour vote
and the way we were balancing every labour vote that Taylor had was with every NFU
local we could penetrate. We spent our time organizing.”98
After Mitchell entered the race, Blakeney finally began to espouse his position on
agriculture, labour, health, taxation and education policies. Romanow too was more
forthcoming, articulating an eighteen-point agricultural platform that included loans to
young farmers and warnings about the dangers of foreign ownership.99 Yet, the Waffle’s
influence on the leadership campaign extended beyond prompting Blakeney and
Romanow to develop more detailed policy positions. By the start of the leadership
convention in Regina, all three leading candidates expressed support for the idea of a land
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bank. Mitchell claimed such a policy would reduce “the burden of land debt that
excludes young farmers from starting out,” and Blakeney, in agreeing to a land bank, also
emphasized Saskatchewan’s disputes with Ottawa over agricultural price and market
guarantees. Even Romanow, the most centrist among the candidates, supported a land
bank, criticizing corporate and absentee ownership of farmland but cautioning such a
policy must include an option-to-purchase clause and explicit refutation of
expropriation.100 The Saskatchewan Waffle, which attracted an average of 130 delegates
to its convention meetings, urged centre-left delegates to vote for Mitchell on the first
ballot but heard from many who, fearing a Romanow victory, were committed to
Blakeney instead. Others, particularly union delegates and those identified with “the old
left” were reported to be endorsing Taylor.101
With the importance of the rural vote in the upcoming provincial election a
foremost concern, the Saskatchewan NDP also used the leadership convention as an
opportunity to debate a new agricultural policy. Its “Position Paper on Agriculture and
Rural Life” strongly resembled aspects of the Waffle’s agricultural policy, including
proposals for a land bank, limits on farm size, and a publicly-owned farm machinery
industry.102 The position paper maintained,
We require a farm policy that increases the farm population, not one that depletes
it. We require a policy that opens the door to young farmers, not one that slams it
in their faces. We require a land policy that provides the basis for a new and
invigorated rural community, not one that undermines it. We require a policy that
supports the family farm, not one that destroys it.103
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Aspects of the position paper proved controversial, and a committee review of it
produced several revisions, including a clarification that “the NDP does not contemplate
any program of compulsory acquisition of farm lands.”104 To that end, the convention
revised the ‘Position Paper on Agriculture and Rural Life’ by replacing the limit on farm
size with restrictions on the foreign ownership of farmland, rejecting the idea of a
publicly-owned farm machinery industry, and strongly restating the NDP’s support for
the family farm.105 As the Leader-Post explained, “while the original paper was in no
way considered a product of the Waffle caucus… some parts of it came closer to Waffle
policies on farm land ownership than past party policy, and the changes approved by the
convention were considered a defeat for the left-leaning faction.”106 Certainly Waffle
supporters disapproved of the changes and in particular the continued emphasis on
private over public ownership. Fred Gudmusson of the NFU argued “many feel it is not
always desirable for a farmer to own all or part of his land… by renting, the farmer can
beat the banks and the mortgage companies. If we reject the farmers, they will reject the
party, and they should.”107
In his speech to the convention, Mitchell reminded delegates “our party was born
out of protest! It was created by the people of Saskatchewan to express anger and fight
for social justice!”108 He urged the party to “not be afraid” of policy debates or the
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party’s youth, messages that secured for Mitchell a respectable twenty-two per cent of
first-round ballots cast.109
Saskatchewan NDP Leadership Election – July 4, 1970
First Ballot
Second Ballot
Third Ballot
Roy Romanow
300 Roy Romanow
320 Allan Blakeney
Allan Blakeney
286 Allan Blakeney
311 Roy Romanow
Don Mitchell
187 Don Mitchell
219
George Taylor
78
Totals
851
850

407
349
755

Many of Taylor’s delegates supported Mitchell on the second ballot, and Mitchell’s
supporters in turn voted for Blakeney over Romanow by a three-to-one margin on the
final ballot. Waffle support was therefore key to Blakeney’s victory, and they were
relieved over Romanow’s defeat, but ninety-six Wafflers including Mitchell declined to
vote on the third ballot in response to Bev Currie’s failed bid for re-election as party
president.110 In fact, the leftist candidates lost every election for party office, and the
Saskatchewan Waffle suggested that even Blakeney was upset that “the far right swept
the executive.”111 Still, the Wafflers departed the convention enthusiastic over what had
been accomplished. Their support had been crucial to Blakeney’s win, the party’s
updated agricultural policy bore their imprint, and Blakeney had appointed Mitchell as a
legislative advisor and encouraged him to seek an NDP nomination in the next
election.112 In a press conference immediately following the convention the new leader
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admitted that “perhaps the party will move moderately more leftward than it has in the
past.”113
The left wing had fared much better in elections for party offices at the B.C. NDP
convention held earlier that summer in Chilliwack. The BC Waffle estimated that 150 of
the 500 delegates to the convention were its supporters. Waffle resolutions to nationalize
chronic industrial polluters, and to advance women’s equality by committing to supports
for child daycare, abortion clinics, and free abortion on demand, were all adopted by the
convention.114 The BC Waffle also distributed a “Statement of Principles” echoing the
Waffle Manifesto’s warnings about the inequalities inherent in capitalism and American
corporate domination of the Canadian economy, as well as its call for party members to
engage with their communities at a grassroots level and not only during election
campaigns. Unlike the Manifesto, the BC Waffle “Statement” specifically emphasized
the primacy of the working class in realizing “fundamental social change,” and insisted
“the NDP must clearly be seen as the only mass party rooted in the working class.”115
The Waffle ran a full slate of fourteen candidates for the party executive, electing three –
Paddy Neale, the secretary-treasurer of the Vancouver and District Labour Council,
Dawn Carell and Harold Winrob.116 The BC NDP went into the convention divided
between supporters of Tom Berger and Dave Barrett, who had been acting leader in the
Legislature since Berger’s resignation the previous year. Yet Barrett, who also supported
Neale for party vice-president, was acclaimed as party leader, and the BC Waffle
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reported that “the Barrett forces (which comprise the left and centre of the party)
basically smashed the party’s right wing at the convention.”117
Despite the Waffle’s high profile at the recent Saskatchewan and BC NDP
conventions, and its efforts to subsidize costs for delegates travelling longer distances to
attend, its national conference held in Toronto in early August did not attract many
representatives from Western Canada. For the nearly 200 delegates who did attend,
workshops on themes such as anti-imperialist strategies, energy and resources, regional
underdevelopment, media and universities, women’s liberation, labour and the left-wing
within social democratic parties occupied much of the conference which was designed to
be as much educational as strategic in focus. There were also panels on organizing the
unemployed, farmers, tenants, minorities, students and youth in recognition of the
Waffle’s commitment to extra-parliamentary activism.118 Steve Penner criticized the
educational focus and complained “we are so preoccupied with intellectual debate that
the very debate is taking place in a vacuum where questions of strategy… are hardly
considered. We lack a sense of praxis – the creative give and take between revolutionary
ideology and radical action.”119 A debate over the Ontario Waffle’s relationship with
organized labour occupied the conference for an entire evening, causing Saskatchewan
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Waffle delegates to complain that Ontario’s issues were dominating proceedings.120
Another debate erupted over an unsuccessful proposal for the Waffle to hire three people
to undertake a national campaign to organize the unemployed.121 Cy Gonick explained
the challenges the Waffle faced attempting to navigate between “visions of apocalyptic
revolutionary transformation” and “the trap of evolutionary reformism.” Although the
Waffle “must view capitalism as a system and must elaborate an alternative system in its
stead,” Gonick cautioned against relying on revolutionary rhetoric alone, arguing “just to
state and restate the overall goal is to have no strategy at all.”122
The primary strategic decision confronting the Waffle involved the impending
federal NDP leadership race. At the conference it was decided to form a ten-person
campaign committee tasked with promoting the Waffle’s vision for the party among other
NDP members before settling on a leadership candidate to endorse. Cy Gonick, Mel
Watkins and James Laxer were each touted as possible contenders. Watkins, who had
health concerns, was prepared to exclude himself, although he and Gonick endorsed the
campaign committee plan as an opportunity to prioritize “issues” over the “cult of
personality.”123 In addition to Gonick, Watkins, and Laxer, the conference selected Gil
Levine, John Conway, Jackie Larkin, Kelly Crichton and Sheila Kuziak for the campaign
committee, and left two spots open to be filled later by the Saskatchewan Waffle.124
Regardless of who ultimately would be selected to lead the party, Laxer was
adamant that the NDP must engage in an ambitious campaign opposing the “energy
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sellout” of Canada’s resources to the United States. In response, the Waffle in September
1970 sponsored demonstrations across the country protesting the “sellout” of Canadian
natural gas to the Americans.125 The Canadian government announced an increase in
natural gas exports to the US at the same time as the United States, after months of
bilateral energy negotiations, hiked its quota on Canadian oil imports.126 Tommy
Douglas criticized the Trudeau Liberal government’s decision, predicting it would raise
the price of gas in Canada. Laxer prophesized an even more disastrous result, describing
the federal government as “incompetent” and suggesting the sale was the first step toward
a continental energy deal endangering Canadian sovereignty.127
In addition to the provincial Waffle groups in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Alberta and British Columbia, there were sympathetic New Democrats and activists in
Nova Scotia, Newfoundland and Quebec who corresponded with prominent Wafflers
without forming their own provincial organizations. In New Brunswick, by contrast, a
provincial Waffle section was launched in September 1970 despite having had only
limited contact with the authors of the Waffle Manifesto. Earlier in 1970 a handful of
Trotskyists in Fredericton had contacted the LSA and formed the Fredericton Young
Socialists (FYS). Upon discovering there was no NDP to infiltrate in Fredericton, the
FYS members approached former NDP candidate Pat Callahan and together they began
reorganizing a riding association in the local riding of York-Sunbury. The provincial
NDP was without a leader at that point and had run only three candidates in the previous
provincial election, all of whom lost their deposits. The nascent New Brunswick Waffle
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was therefore well positioned to revitalize the NDP’s organization, electing Callahan as
party president and several other Wafflers to executive positions at a provincial NDP
convention. Despite adopting a number of Waffle policies, such as the creation of a mass
public transit system, public ownership of natural resource industries and committing the
party to supporting women’s liberation, the delegates voted against adopting the Waffle
Manifesto by a vote of twenty-four to eighteen and elected non-Waffler J. Albert
Richardson as party leader. In the New Brunswick election one month later, the NDP
nominated candidates in thirty-one of the province’s fifty-eight ridings, but secured only
2.8% of the popular vote.128
The Ontario NDP’s longtime leader Donald MacDonald had previously fended
off a leadership challenge by Jim Renwick in 1968, but by early 1970 Stephen Lewis was
mobilizing for his own bid to unseat MacDonald. Lewis contended that after seventeen
years headed by MacDonald the party needed a “fresh face.” He built alliances within
the provincial caucus, and served as the NDP’s labour critic in an attempt to attract union
supporters.129 When senior union leaders and members of the party’s executive failed to
dissuade Lewis from following through with his campaign, MacDonald simplified
matters somewhat by resigning. As Desmond Morton described the alignment of factions
behind Lewis, “senior union leaders had discovered, somewhat to their chagrin, that he
had quietly lined up many of the second-level leaders in their organizations as well as
Dennis McDermott, the aggressive new leader of the United Autoworkers in Canada.”130
With his friend and former Waffler Gerald Caplan managing the campaign, Lewis
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announced his candidacy on July 3, 1970, counting fourteen of the twenty-one members
of the ONDP caucus amongst his supporters.131 Six weeks later, Walter Pitman, MPP for
Peterborough since 1967 and now the voice of party members disgruntled over Lewis’s
ambitions, announced his own candidacy for the top job.132
With little to differentiate between the two candidates in terms of policy, Pitman
contended that his softer and more moderate image would appeal to voters. Lewis, by
comparison, portrayed himself as a fighter committed to advancing the party’s
principles.133 Described in the press as waging “a contest between the centre and right
wings of the party,” neither candidate advocated sweeping nationalization, for which they
were received with muted enthusiasm at a Waffle meeting in Toronto.134 Granted, unlike
the restrained Pitman, Lewis’s impassioned rhetoric at times came close to emulating the
Waffle’s strident nationalism, if not its emphasis on public ownership.135 Indeed, Lewis
claimed to have moved further to the left ideologically of late, explaining “there are too
many parties clouding up the centre. The place in the political spectrum is for us to take
a radical posture on issues” rather than the NDP’s recent “anxious, self-conscious search
for respectability and security in a Canadian body politic. It was a false quest and we
have paid the price.”136
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Based on its own survey data, the Ontario Waffle concluded that with only
thirteen percent of convention delegates prepared to vote for a Waffler it was futile for
the group to attempt a credible leadership campaign.137 Yet they also agreed that “it is, of
course, obvious to most of us that Stephen Lewis will not lead the party in a socialist
direction either in program or in the practice of the party.”138 As a result, the Waffle
concentrated instead on attempting to shape party policy and getting some of their group
elected to executive and council positions, including Krista Maeots for ONDP president
and John Smart for secretary.139
The day before the convention’s official start, Waffle supporters on the provincial
council attempted to replace a resolution critical of a recently announced sale of Canada’s
natural gas to the United States with a policy of widespread nationalization, but were
defeated handily.140 The Waffle proved more successful the following day. By the
overwhelming ratio of twenty to one, the convention adopted a Waffle resolution to
nationalize Ontario’s energy resource industries, such as Imperial Oil’s refineries. The
resolution also committed the NDP to a “massive public campaign” against a possible
continental energy agreement between Canada and the United States. A delighted Laxer
described the resolution as a “clear indication” that Ontario New Democrats supported
nationalization, and he told reporters that its passage “takes it [NDP policy] a significant
step further.”141 The Globe and Mail noted that none of the party’s leadership spoke
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during the debate, leaving it to the ONDP’s research director Marion Bryden to present
the opposing viewpoint.142 Although both Stephen Lewis and Pitman expressed support
for the resolution, both had reservations about the precise extent of the nationalization
being proposed.143 At the initiative of Bruce Kidd, a Waffler, the convention passed a
second resolution endorsing the imposition of stiff penalties, including “forfeiture of
ownership,” for polluting industries. The Waffle’s housing policy, which called for
greater involvement by the Ontario Housing Corporation, financial aid for co-operative
housing, and expanded rights for tenant unions, was also approved. Throughout the
entirety of the convention, the ONDP women’s caucus, which included Wafflers Krista
Maeots, Kelly Crichton, and Jackie Larkin, lobbied tirelessly for a series of resolutions of
particular concern to women.144 On the final day, following an abbreviated debate, the
convention endorsed the Waffle’s lengthy resolution on women’s liberation which
included prohibitions on gender-based discrimination in hiring and in the workplace, a
government-funded houseworkers’ allowance, improved access to child-care,
amendments to the nation’s divorce law, and support for abortion on demand.145 The
women’s caucus was stymied, however, in its attempt to pass a constitutional amendment
that would have stipulated one-third of the provincial NDP executive must be comprised
of women, and elected by women.146
The Waffle’s candidates for party executive positions also met with some success.
Although Krista Maeots lost the presidency to Gordon Vichert by a vote of 818 to 416,
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and John Smart was defeated by Gordon Brigden with a similar margin in the election for
party secretary, four Wafflers were elected executive members-at-large and Laxer earned
a spot on the federal council.147 Yet despite making significant gains pushing its agenda
and candidates during the conference, the Ontario Waffle’s statement For a Socialist
Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada was defeated by a secret ballot vote of 744
to 628.
Numerically, organized labour wielded greater influence over the convention than
did the Waffle. Union members accounted for 830 of the 1868 delegates in attendance,
the majority of them Autoworkers or Steelworkers.148 While Walter Pitman continued to
emphasize his moderate image and electability amongst conservative Ontarians, it was
Lewis who attracted the largest bloc of union delegates, with twice as many present as
had attended the previous provincial convention.149 When the votes were counted, Lewis
easily prevailed over Pitman 1,188 to 642.
As had been the case at the federal, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan
conventions, the Waffle had good reason to be pleased with its performance at Toronto.
A number of policy resolutions, most significantly those dealing with energy resources,
housing, and women’s liberation had been approved, and the group had even made
inroads among union delegates. Cy Gonick, for example, recalled counting at least fifty
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labour delegates among the 250 attendees at a meeting of the Waffle caucus during the
convention.150 Also encouraging was the fact both leadership contenders had embraced a
pro-nationalist message in their campaigns, albeit with strong reservations about public
ownership. All in all, the party appeared poised to highlight economic nationalism in the
next provincial election. The Globe and Mail was unimpressed; in an editorial it decried
the ONDP’s support for nationalization, and dismissively defined its new leader Lewis as
“an attractive young man shackled to the wranglers and wafflers.”151
Certainly the Waffle’s influence and successes to this point should not be
overstated. Desmond Morton and Gonick suggested that the party establishment’s
distraction over the leadership race had enabled the Waffle to fill a policy vacuum at the
convention, and neither of the leadership candidates had openly championed
controversial policies identified with the Waffle. Indeed, following the convention party
leaders publicly downplayed the Waffle’s impact shaping NDP policy. Lewis, during his
first press conference as leader, explained “what the party has done is taken a very strong
vote for independence. Now we will have to see how that applies in the province of
Ontario.”152 Jim Renwick, the former deputy leader, suggested that the Waffle resolution
on energy resources represented merely a “general statement” which provided caucus
with a “framework” for future consideration.153 Another party leader, albeit unnamed,
claimed the Waffle had been absorbed: “That’s the ballgame… They’ve been sucked into
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the mainstream of the party.” Mel Watkins countered that “the party establishment is not
co-opting us, it’s jumping on our bandwagon.”154
Following the convention, Lewis reached out to party establishment figures he
might have alienated during the leadership race, including appointing Pitman as his
deputy leader. Lewis largely dropped whatever radical rhetoric he had employed during
the campaign, and began addressing business clubs to reassure them that the prospect of
an NDP government was nothing to fear.155 Lewis also recruited Desmond Morton who,
in one of many attacks on the Waffle, deemed its ideology “a particularly archaic, sterile
and academic brand of socialism.”156 Tasked by Lewis to “clean up the radical policy
mess left at the convention,” Morton eventually produced a 73-page campaign platform
“that only used the word ‘socialist’ once.”157 Gonick’s post-convention evaluation
pointed to the sorts of difficulties likely to confront both the Waffle and the party in the
days ahead: “The NDP was boring and dull before the Waffle. The Waffle has made the
NDP exciting. How it will retain the delicate balance of simultaneous autonomy from
and involvement in the party remains to be seen.”158
Disturbing news from Quebec had overshadowed the Ontario NDP convention
and Stephen Lewis’s election as party leader. On October 5, 1970 members of the
violent separatist Front de libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped first the British trade
commissioner, James Cross, and five days later Quebec’s Minister of Labour and
Immigration, Pierre Laporte. On October 15, in an atmosphere of crisis and uncertainty,
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the federal cabinet invoked the War Measures Act, which never before had been used in
peacetime, to grant police extraordinary powers of search, seizure and imprisonment.
Eventually over five hundred individuals were detained, some as suspected terrorists or
their sympathizers, as well as Parti Québécois supporters.159 All but four members of the
NDP’s federal caucus opposed implementation of the War Measures Act, thereby
backing their leader Tommy Douglas who condemned it as “overkill on a gargantuan
scale… we are not prepared to use the preservation of law and order as a smokescreen to
destroy the liberties and the freedom of the people of Canada.”160 According to Morton,
many Canadians in turn “vilified the NDP as an alliance of cowards, traitors and secret
separatists.”161 The Waffle demonstrated its support of the federal caucus’s stance by
organizing several large public meetings at which the Trudeau government’s use of the
War Measures Act was challenged. The Ontario NDP executive declined officially to cosponsor one such event, although MPs David Lewis and Ed Broadbent each spoke at a
demonstration in Toronto that drew several thousand people.162
Manitoba’s Ed Schreyer, leader of Canada’s only provincial NDP government at
the time, broke with the federal NDP and offered his measured support for the War
Measures Act during the October Crisis. The issue continued to hang over delegates to
the Manitoba NDP convention in November 1970, where otherwise the speeches and
policy debates focused largely on provincial issues. The Manitoba Waffle, when
159
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organizing for the convention, recognized the potential dilemma it faced of being true to
its radical roots on the left of the party, yet reluctant to criticize Manitoba’s first social
democratic government. As Don Mitchell observed in the Waffle News, “with a
precariously situated government party, it is difficult to get many left thinking people to
identify with the [W]affle. Understandable, and it is probably important the [W]affle
group in no public way create the impression of a split in the Manitoba NDP.”163 As it
happened, the Waffle suffered a series of policy defeats at the convention involving
labour rights, economic and northern development, and a constitutional amendment
designed to bind MLAs to uphold party policies.164 Waffler Alvin Finkel complained
that cabinet ministers frequently intervened in convention debates to urge delegates not to
“tie the hands” of government with specific and radical policy instructions, a practice that
threated to reduce the gathering to “an exercise in cheerleading for the government
team.”165 Nevertheless, the Waffle attracted 120 of the convention’s 600 delegates to its
public meeting, and filled four of the ten elected executive positions including Una
Decter as party vice-president.166 Furthermore, delegates loudly applauded Douglas’s
fierce defense of the federal caucus’s opposition to the War Measures Act, yet remained
largely silent when Premier Schreyer repeated his qualified support for the Act.167
Although unhappy that the NDP leadership exercised such firm control, Wafflers were

163

Don Mitchell, “The Waffle as Mass Movement,” Waffle News, September 1970. File 446-18, WaffleNDP fonds, LAC.
164
Frances Russell, “Manitoba NDP retains its moderate socialist image,” Globe and Mail, November 2,
1970.
165
Alvin Finkel, “An Analysis of the Manitoba NDP Convention,” 1970, File 446-15, Waffle-NDP fonds,
LAC.
166
“Convention Elects Bell NDP Chief,” Winnipeg Free Press, November 2, 1970.
167
“41 Resolutions Dealt With by NDP,” Winnipeg Free Press, November 2, 1970.

202
optimistic that a lack of policy debate or meaningful consultation among party members
would ultimately direct more people into the Waffle.168
One year after the federal NDP convention debate that shot the group into
prominence, the Waffle had established itself as a significant minority within the NDP.
The Waffle boasted a presence virtually everywhere that the NDP did, demonstrating its
capacity to influence the party’s policy and leadership elections at the provincial level.
The Waffle had also acted on its commitment to engage with extra-parliamentary social
movement activism through strike support, abortion law protests, and public
demonstrations against the War Measures Act, at times dragging the NDP along with it.
Within the party, the Waffle had a strong presence in the miniscule NDP sections in
Atlantic Canada, although Wafflers in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
tended to be too busy organizing the largely moribund NDP to cause significant conflict
with the party leadership.169 In Ontario, the largest Waffle group had influenced the
provincial party’s policies and ensured that Stephen Lewis was elected leader over the
more moderate Walter Pitman. The Manitoba Waffle, despite its weakness at the
convention, continued to organize and featured a spokesperson in MLA Cy Gonick
capable of publicizing their criticisms of Premier Schreyer and the NDP government. In
Saskatchewan the Waffle’s leadership candidate had achieved a respectable 25 per cent
of the vote in the provincial party’s leadership contest, had helped elect Allan Blakeney
instead of Roy Romanow, and had significantly influenced the party’s policy on
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agriculture. The BC Waffle, while not as organized as the Ontario or Saskatchewan
groups, had also influenced the provincial party’s policies at convention, content to work
with a leader and caucus that appeared sympathetic to their cause. After one year of
organized activity, the Waffle’s efforts to transform the NDP had borne some fruit. But
the Waffle’s plans to run a leadership candidate to succeed Tommy Douglas as leader of
the federal NDP would bring the group into direct conflict with established party and
union leaders and set the stage for open struggle within the party.
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Chapter Five
Waffling in Winnipeg, London, and Saskatoon
This chapter diverges from the chronological narrative of the Waffle and the NDP
at national and provincial levels to examine the activists and activities of local Waffle
chapters in three diverse localities.1 The history of the Waffle is not only one of intraparty conflict, nor was the group’s impact limited to the resurgent Canadian nationalism
of the 1970s. Instead, as has been discussed earlier, the Waffle’s struggle within the NDP
both developed out of the existing work of New Left activists and inspired Wafflers to
engage in local, extra-parliamentary struggles. Examining the grassroots of the Waffle in
Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon demonstrates that Waffle activists, in addition to
working within the NDP to advocate for socialism and Canadian independence, engaged
in extra-parliamentary social movements within their local communities. These
movements included second-wave feminism, anti-Vietnam War protests, aid for draft
resisters, and support for striking workers, as well as participation in municipal politics.
Furthermore, election campaigns undertaken by local Waffle chapters, including
municipally in Winnipeg in 1971, federally in Middlesex-Lambton-London in 1974, and
provincially in Saskatoon-Centre in 1975, demonstrate their efforts to engage in a
different sort of electoral politics, emphasizing policy issues instead of merely winning
votes.
The three Waffle chapters were chosen primarily on the basis of available archival
materials and oral histories. Together they provide an opportunity for comparisons.
Winnipeg was the centre of both the provincial NDP and Waffle in Manitoba and had a
1
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long history of left-wing radicalism tempered by the election of a moderate NDP
government in 1969. London was neither a hotbed of NDP support nor the home of
Ontario’s Waffle leadership, but it contained the third-largest local chapter in the
province drawing supporters from the UAW as well as the University of Western Ontario
(UWO). Saskatoon was not the centre of the provincial Waffle leadership – that title
belonged to the Regina chapter – but it was the largest provincial chapter and took on
enhanced significance for the group after John Richards’s election as an NDP-Waffle
MLA for the riding of Saskatoon-University in 1971.
Over the winter holidays in 1969-70, an initial gathering of “about thirty” people
established a Waffle group in Winnipeg following the Manifesto’s well-publicized defeat
at the federal NDP convention just a few months before.2 With an expanding student
population, a tradition of left radicalism and the presence of a sympathetic MLA schooled
in the New Left, in many ways Winnipeg was an ideal city for the Waffle to organize
support. Winnipeg’s status as the “gateway to the west” had declined as the city grew
and transformed in the decades following the Second World War. In becoming a major
urban centre for the surrounding hinterland, metropolitan Winnipeg increasingly
dominated the province’s economy, especially in finance, insurance, trade, services,
construction, transportation, communications, and utilities, while accounting for nearly
two-thirds of the province’s employment.3 While the city experienced a slight population
decline in the 1960s, the rapid expansion of the surrounding suburban communities
increased metropolitan Winnipeg’s population by over 30,000 to 540,000 during the five
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years prior to 1971.4 Skyrocketing demand for postsecondary education led to the
creation of the University of Winnipeg, newly separated from the University of
Manitoba, in 1967.5 The city historically attracted a diverse population, but whereas
working-class north Winnipeg had a well-deserved reputation for radicalism, having
previously elected both CCF/NDP and Communist representatives at the municipal,
provincial, and federal levels, south Winnipeg was considered equally conservative.6 The
city’s municipal politics had been dominated by a pro-business, anti-socialist coalition
since 1919, but the Manitoba NDP’s provincial election victory in 1969 depended on
strong urban support, with seventeen of the party’s twenty-eight MLAs coming from
Winnipeg.
After focusing on the New Democratic Youth (NDY), Winnipeg Wafflers
prepared position papers on Manitoba’s economic development and labour issues in a bid
to influence the provincial NDP convention in the autumn of 1970. Throughout that year
a group met regularly at the Dimension bookshop run by Cy Gonick, the NDP MLA for
the Winnipeg riding of Crescentwood, to discuss issues such as foreign ownership, the
Americanization of universities, and independent Canadian unions.7 In the fall of 1970,
two young Wafflers, Arthur Schafer and Michael Mendelson, began hosting regular
political education meetings. The provincial group elected a steering committee, chaired
by Sheila Kuziak and comprised almost exclusively of Wafflers from Winnipeg.8 Indeed,
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all but seventeen of the 182 names on the Manitoba Waffle’s mailing list in late 1971
hailed from Winnipeg. The Winnipeg Waffle group managed to elect to the federal NDP
leadership convention in support of Waffle candidate James Laxer “a number of
delegates largely representing the New Democratic Youth and the federal constituency of
Winnipeg South.”9 In the summer of 1971 the group restructured, began publishing a
newsletter for the Manitoba Waffle, offered support to striking construction workers and
started organizing for Winnipeg’s municipal elections in October.
The Winnipeg Waffle would focus much of its efforts on local issues.10 The
creation of the amalgamated metropolis of Winnipeg “unicity” and its first municipal
elections in the fall of 1971 engendered much local public debate including among
members of the Winnipeg Waffle. Furthermore, the NDP ran a slate of candidates on a
unified municipal party platform. The Winnipeg Waffle, concerned that “unless the left
within the party draws up a concrete set of proposals for the NDP’s policy convention,
there can be little doubt that the party will run on a platform indistinguishable from the
platform of real estate groups,” organized an Urban Policy Conference in June 1971.11 At
the conference the Winnipeg Waffle developed policies on housing, taxation,
transportation and citizen involvement in the newly amalgamated city, and made plans to
support the nomination of Waffle sympathizers and left-wingers as NDP candidates in the
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upcoming municipal election.12 At the NDP’s Municipal Policy Convention in August
1971, the Winnipeg Waffle was, by its own account, “relatively successful in winning
support for its policies.”13 The NDP’s municipal platform clearly reflected Waffle
policies including proposals to nationalize the Greater Winnipeg Gas Company, and
create a Winnipeg public housing corporation, a mass-transit system, and more
progressive taxation. Although Waffle sympathizer and incumbent Metro councillor
Andrew Robertson lost to fellow councillor Art Coulter the vote to become party
electoral chair by 125 to 90, Robertson was elected to a three-person leadership
committee for the municipal NDP, and a Waffle resolution binding NDP councillors to
the party’s policy platform was passed.14 Nevertheless, only three Waffle-supported
candidates won their nomination as NDP candidates, and none were elected in the
October general election.15 The NDP elected only seven councillors, while the rightwing Independent Citizens’ Election Committee elected thirty-seven. On a more positive
note, one Waffle-supported candidate and four other New Democrats were elected to the
Winnipeg school board, constituting a left-wing majority.16 In a reflection on the NDP’s
poor showing in the city’s north end, Waffler Alvin Finkel acknowledged the advantage
enjoyed by incumbents and the strong support for Communist councilor Joe Zuken, but
complained the “NDP has to date completely failed to make people think of municipal
elections as important” and urged candidates to “run issue-oriented campaigns” instead of
seeking election based on the party brand. Waffler Paul Barber emphasized the city’s
12
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“class cleavages” in his analysis of the campaign and pointed to Waffler Carol Fogel’s
strong support in an “area of older, small, working class homes” in comparison with her
poor showing in wealthier parts of south Winnipeg. Barber warned that unless the NDP
challenged the “capitalist value structure” and altered Canadians’ “political
consciousness” it should expect little success at the ballot box.17
Following the municipal election the Winnipeg Waffle produced four pamphlets
outlining its policy positions, distributed them at the Manitoba NDP convention in
November and held a “well-attended public meeting” featuring Saskatchewan Waffle
MLA John Richards. After several educational meetings in March and April 1972, the
group’s activity slowed as its members became disillusioned with the NDP government.
At the same time, several Winnipeg Wafflers began to publish an alternative newspaper
titled Prairie Dog Press which continued until August 1973.18
As was the case in Winnipeg, the Waffle in London drew a large portion of its
members from the local university community. Unlike in Winnipeg, however, it also had
a base in the labour movement, specifically the large UAW Local 27. London in the late
1960s and early 1970s was in many ways true to its image as a conservative, white,
Anglo-Saxon Protestant city. With a population of 200,000 London was home to
insurance and trust companies, as well as John Robarts, Ontario’s Progressive
Conservative Premier from 1961 to 1971. But significant change was afoot as the city
underwent a decade of suburban expansion and industrial growth. UWO was growing
too, with the addition of eight new academic buildings and three student residences
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during the 1960s, while Fanshawe College of Applied Arts and Technology opened in
1967.19 Immigration from south Asia, Africa and the Caribbean changed the face of
London in this period, as diverse communities expanded across the city.20 Furthermore,
London fostered a dynamic art scene in the 1960s where nationally renowned artists
worked, taught, and fostered a vibrant creative atmosphere.21 Although the Liberals and
Conservatives had long dominated London’s politics, this too began to change in the
1960s. Anglican archdeacon Kenneth Bolton won a 1969 by-election for the NDP in
Middlesex South, a riding containing part of London, while in 1972 Jane Bigelow
became the first female and New Democrat to become the city’s mayor.22 The Ontario
Young New Democrats (OYND) reported having two clubs in London in 1970, including
a campus club at UWO. The OYND indicated “many of the NDP and NDY in London
seem to be from a first or second generation European family, probably because the
WASP power structure has tended to exclude them.”23
The key figures in the London Waffle were Mary and Al Campbell. Mary
Campbell, who worked at the UWO library, was active in a variety of social justice
groups, including the Committee to End Canada’s Complicity in Viet Nam, the Voice of
Women, and the Women’s Auxiliary for Auto Workers. She was also involved in early
attempts to unionize staff at the university.24 Hilary Bates Neary, who worked with Mary
Campbell, describes her as “an organizer… She knew exactly why she held certain
19
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political attitudes and beliefs. I’m not saying she was a rabid proselytizer, but she never
lost an opportunity to remind people why things were the way they were and how they
could change.”25 Bates Neary and Margaret Simpson, a social work professor at
Fanshawe College, remember Mary Campbell welcoming and helping American draft
evaders in addition to her other activism. Both Mary Campbell and her husband Al, an
employee at Eaton Automotive and former president of UAW Local 27, were active in
the NDP riding association and supported Waffle positions, albeit with limited success, at
local party meetings.
The London Waffle’s 1972 mailing list of 128 people is not truly indicative of
local support for the group as it included both Wafflers and its opponents.26 Several New
Democrats on the list ran for party offices in opposition to the Waffle, such as Charles
and Jane Bigelow, or denied any involvement with the Waffle. Another London Waffler,
Paddy Musson, a graduate student, suggests that “Mary Campbell would see all of those
people as people she could talk into supporting something she was interested in.”27 After
the Ontario Waffle decided to form the Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada
(MISC) at the August 1972 conference at Delaware, a decision that split the twelveperson London delegation, the number of Waffle supporters declined.28 Still, between
November 1972 and September 1974 the London Waffle’s membership ranged between
twenty-nine and forty-three, making it the largest local chapter outside of Toronto and
Ottawa. Many London Wafflers continued to support the NDP after MISC’s formation.
One of the delegates to the Delaware conference remembers that he “wanted to remain in
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the party… because I thought it [MISC] would be a dissipation of our energies – we
couldn’t afford to do that.”29 He remained a NDP member and volunteered for election
campaigns throughout the 1970s.30 Paddy Musson also remained involved with the NDP,
including running as a candidate in the 1979 and 1980 federal elections.31 In contrast,
UWO professor Henry Roper’s frustration with the ONDP’s treatment of the Waffle led
him to resolve not to work for the NDP after 1972.32
As well as Campbell’s colleagues at the university library, the London Waffle
mailing list included the names of professors and graduate students at UWO. Craig
Simpson, a history professor, had moved to London after attending university in the
United States, where he and his spouse Margaret Simpson were radicalized by the antiVietnam War and student movements. Craig Simpson remembers “we’d come from a
highly politicized environment, where by that time I think it’s fair to say that we were
ready for some action.”33 Another faculty member, Henry Roper, had been politically
involved prior to joining the Waffle, both as a canvasser for the British Labour Party in
1964 while studying at Cambridge University, and as campaign manager for an NDP
candidate in Halifax in 1968.34 Roper suggests that he was sympathetic to the Waffle’s
nationalism and influenced by the Vietnam War, concerns over Canada becoming a
“branch plant economy,” the writings of George Grant, and the perception that Canadian
universities were hiring too many American professors. The mailing list also included
members of London’s burgeoning arts community alongside the professors, students, and
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Al Campbell’s co-workers at the Eaton Automotive plant. Among several London artists
involved with the Waffle, Greg Curnoe was the best known.35 Curnoe had gained
national notoriety in 1968 when his 110-foot mural at Montreal’s Dorval airport was
taken down after just four days for its “anti-American” content.36 Hugh McIntyre,
another London artist and Waffler, co-founded the improvisational Nihilist Spasm Band
with Curnoe and others during the late 1960s.
The London Waffle’s primary activity outside the NDP was in providing support
for workers, for example by opposing the closure of the American-owned Eaton
Automotive factory and joining striking workers at Brantford’s Texpack plant. London
Wafflers also helped organize the Ontario Waffle’s Delaware conference during the
summer of 1972 when, after contentious debate, the group split and the majority left the
NDP to form the Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada. Mary Campbell was
one of three MISC candidates to run in the 1974 federal election, but received only a
fraction of the NDP’s vote in the riding of Middlesex-Lambton-London.37 The London
Waffle characterized the campaign as an opportunity to educate people about the
Waffle’s positions on independence and socialism. Campbell had decided to run in
Middlesex-Lambton-London instead of London West since it was “Waffle policy not to
run against left-wing NDP candidates,” or in London East, where the NDP candidate Ray
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Funk was believed to have a strong chance of winning.38 Furthermore, the London group
had been surprised by the Ontario Waffle election strategy committee’s decision to field a
candidate in London and were ill-prepared for a full-fledged campaign. In an attempt to
engage electors in more substantial discussions than usually occur during campaign doorto-door canvassing, they opted to canvass one-third of the riding twice. The first visit, a
“light canvass,” was limited to leafleting, whereas during the second sweep they sought
to engage people in longer discussions about socialism and the Waffle’s policies.39
Unfortunately, they failed to convince voters the Waffle’s long-term socialist program
was substantially different from other parties’ short-term election promises. The London
Wafflers also regretted not preparing a pamphlet focusing on women’s issues despite
running a female candidate.40
The London Waffle’s primary extra-parliamentary activity was to support local
left-wing labour causes. Al Campbell, president of the large UAW Local 27 and longtime editor of its newsletter had formerly been a Communist Party (CP) member and
electoral candidate.41 Although Campbell had left the CP in 1956, he was still regarded
as a leftist within the UAW by the union leadership.42 When London’s Eaton
Automotive plant, where many members of the left wing of UAW Local 27 worked,
closed in 1971, Campbell found himself out of a job and the UAW.43 The London
Waffle’s prompt response was to organize a meeting to decry plant closures by
American-owned companies and to picket the Eaton Automotive plant alongside activists
38

Ibid.
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Jason Russell, “The Union Local in post-Second World War Canada: A Case Study of UAW/CAW
Local 27 from 1950 to 1990,” (PhD diss., York University, Toronto, 2010), 77-8.
42
Ibid., 80.
43
Ibid., 44.
39

215
of the Militant Co-Op group.44 In light of the plant’s impending closure, Campbell, a
Laxer supporter and delegate at the federal NDP’s April 1971 convention in Ottawa, led
his fellow New Democrats in a spontaneous protest on Parliament Hill against the Liberal
government’s economic strategy.45
London Wafflers also participated in the September 1971 Texpack strike in
Brantford. The strike set a small independent Canadian union representing a primarily
female workforce against a large American-based multinational corporation.46 While
wages and benefits were in dispute, Kent Rowley and Madeleine Parent, the leaders of
the Canadian Textile and Chemical Union (CTCU), considered the phasing out of
manufacturing operations at Brantford a fundamental issue. The Texpack strike
encapsulated several significant issues for the Waffle, including Canadian economic
underdevelopment, foreign ownership, exploitation of female workers, and the influence
of conservative international unions. Craig Simpson recalls:
The issue involved the strikebreakers, who were coming up in their buses, and he
[Rowley] broke the containment of the police and ran off in front and tried to
position himself – like the man in Tiananmen square with the tank – and the lead
bus had to stop. And he was whacked a couple of times by the cops and hauled
out of the way. And that infuriated many of us, and the cops formed a cordon
protecting the area for the buses to go into the plant.47
As the crowd of demonstrators surged forward, police ordered them to disperse as a court
injunction had limited to seven the number of pickets permitted at the plant. Several
Wafflers became involved in heated arguments with the police, including Simpson who
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had to be restrained by his friends. London Wafflers Henry Roper, Al Campbell and
James Napier were arrested along with eleven others, including Mel Watkins, Steve
Penner, Robert Laxer and Daniel Drache.48 Roper recalls being separated from the others
in jail for several hours before undergoing police questioning and eventually being
charged with obstructing a police officer in the course of duty.49 After the arrests, the
remaining Wafflers drove to the courthouse to wait for their friends to be released on bail.
The obstruction charges against the London Wafflers were later dropped, and Roper
suggested “they weren’t interested in me, I wasn’t high-profile” like some of the other
Wafflers arrested.50 Although the strike was not resolved until October, the Waffle’s
participation in the Texpack demonstration drew attention to the company’s use of
replacement workers and the Waffle’s criticisms of foreign ownership.
The Saskatoon Waffle, like the groups in Winnipeg and London, drew much of its
support from young people. Saskatoon experienced significant population growth
throughout the 1960s that led to the construction of a new freeway, bridge, and residential
neighbourhoods, especially on the east side of the city. The removal of the rail yards
from downtown resulted in the construction of a shopping mall, YMCA building, and the
Centennial Auditorium.51 The construction of office buildings and residential high-rises
“was rapidly changing the look and feel of Saskatoon’s downtown.”52 Like Winnipeg
and London, post-secondary education institutions responded to the influx of baby
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boomers in Saskatoon. The University of Saskatchewan expanded in numbers of
students and buildings, and the Saskatchewan Technical Institute opened in 1959.53
Members of the Saskatoon Waffle were drawn to the group through their
backgrounds in student and anti-war activism. John Conway, Don Mitchell and Don
Kossick served as editors of the Carillon, the often controversial student newspaper of
the Regina campus of the University of Saskatchewan in the mid-1960s. Conway
described his experience as an undergraduate during the Sixties as an “awakening” and
recalled being fired as editor for placing a picture of a frosh parade directly adjacent a
photograph of Vietnamese people suffering and dying from American bombs.54
Likewise, Don Kossick recalled students being radicalized over issues such as opposition
to the Vietnam War, racism against native peoples, student power and university
autonomy. He explained “I tended to come to the Waffle more through the organizing
work in the student’s movement and the farming union.”55 Don Mitchell pointed out that
opposition to the Vietnam War was "really where I got that commitment because I came
out of a conservative family, I was a student conservative in Saskatoon, I mean large-C, I
was a member of the Young Progressive Conservatives,” and it was “only gradually,
through these issues on campus, that I got drawn into broader politics.”56 Mitchell, like
Kossick, organized for the National Farmers Union alongside numerous other Wafflers,
including Conway, John Warnock, Lorne Brown, Gerry Sperling, Doug Daniels and Pat
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Gallagher.57 Kossick explained that “we were looking for a politics that was beyond the
formalized NDP. And while we were looking at that we also recognized that we were
also sitting in opposition, trying to get rid of the Thatcher government.”58
John Richards, a twenty-six-year-old graduate student who had studied as an
undergraduate at the University of Saskatchewan prior to moving to St. Louis, planned to
return to the province and seek the nomination as an NDP candidate in Saskatoon for the
1971 election. Richards was preoccupied with the escalating anti-Vietnam War
movement at Washington University for much of the spring of 1970. Protests led by the
Washington University Liberation Front (WULF) culminated in a mass demonstration
outside the campus Reserve Officers’ Training Corps (ROTC) building which ended after
a protestor threw a cherry bomb firecracker that set the building on fire. As one of the
demonstration organizers, Richards was charged with unlawful assembly.59 Soon
thereafter John Warnock gave Richards, who had previously researched the development
of Saskatchewan’s potash industry and kept abreast of the province’s politics, some
Waffle literature and encouraged him to seek the NDP nomination in SaskatoonUniversity when he returned to Canada later in 1970.60 Warnock explained “we are
going to stress the necessity of a young candidate, to win the university vote. The new
dormitories will place about 800 new voters in that riding. We think we can get the
wafflers out – the right has not been showing up for meetings in Saskatoon.”61 Richards
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accepted the invitation, claiming his decision to trade extra-parliamentary protest for the
nomination of a major political party could be explained in part by differences between
American and Canadian politics:
In America, there is no parliamentary politics worthy of the name. The only kind
of popular politics involves people in the streets, demonstrating, both violently
and non-violently; against the war, against racism, and against a great number of
other things which are wrong with America. Thus, from afar I began to
appreciate more, one of the few things which does separate Saskatchewan, and
Canada in general, from the States; that there still remains, hopefully, enough of
democratic socialist politics within the New Democratic Party that one can avoid
the kind of politics that’s got to be fought in the States. A politics which is much
more violent, much more dangerous and altogether frightening… One shouldn’t
forget, however, that one of the things which defines Waffle is that it is, in some
sense, consciously distinguishing itself from ordinary New Left politics. Whereas
ordinary New Left politics has as its axiom that Parliamentary Politics ‘Stinks’;
the Waffle has as its axiom that we must make a last desperate effort to win over
the NDP.62
The Saskatoon Waffle operated informally until 1972 when the provincial group
adopted a constitution that provided for formally organized local chapters. The
Saskatoon Waffle adopted a “revised strategy” to redirect its efforts toward “building an
active socialist political base within the community through direct action” and “moving
away from an exclusive concern with radical organizing within the NDP.”63 They
established committees on university reform, resources, co-ops, community clinics,
communications, and a trailer park in the Sutherland neighbourhood.64 The university
reform committee organized a seminar in February 1973 titled “The University: Who
Benefits?” attended by sixty people which provided the impetus for Saskatoon Waffler
Ed Mahood to draft a policy paper on education for the provincial group. The
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committees focused on community health clinics and the threatened Sutherland trailer
park resolved to meet with activists and offer assistance. Individual members contacted
the Unemployed Citizens Welfare Improvement Council in Saskatoon and developed a
welfare rights policy for the provincial Waffle.65 According to the chair, the Saskatoon
group also “played a leading role in the Sask Oil Campaign” for the establishment of a
publicly-owned oil company by preparing and distributing pamphlets, bumper stickers,
buttons and posters, holding a one-day seminar on campus, and gathering signatures for a
petition.66
The Saskatoon group also established a citizens’ committee which mobilized a
“progressive coalition” including the Métis Society, legal aid clinics, native women, and
the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union (RWDSU) to support three left-wing
candidates running independently of the NDP in the October 1973 municipal elections –
the Wafflers Nora Thibodeau, Mary Arpin and Vicki Wilson. The committee reported
that the “coalition formed enthusiastically without any serious dissension over being in
the field against a secret NDP-labour slate.”67 Fifty volunteers canvassed the city for the
three Wafflers and prepared a four-page tabloid with help from The Sheaf, the student
newspaper at the University of Saskatchewan. The committee was pleased with its
efforts, explaining “the vote ran between 3 and 12 percent and some promising contacts
were made.”68
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In the summer of 1972, before organizing as a formal chapter, the Waffle
registered 124 supporters in Saskatoon.69 The following year Rob Dumont, the local
chairperson, reported that the Saskatoon Waffle had seventy members and an additional
125 people on its contact list.70 He praised Waffle MLA John Richards as a
“pamphleteer, orator, mediator, researcher, organizer, agitator and always a socialist,” but
the activities of the Saskatoon Waffle were sustained by a dedicated group of activists
including Dumont, Duncan Bury, Gerry Kowalenko, June Santjes, John Piper, Jill
Sargent and Don Kerr.71 Dumont acknowledged that “liaison and communication with
the women’s movement has been very bad” and recommended that the next chair be an
active feminist and a “rigid policy of parity on all committees be reaffirmed by the
Saskatoon local.” Furthermore, Dumont regretted that work amongst Saskatoon unions
had been “minimal,” for which he blamed the “uncertainty” of the provincial Waffle’s
position on the labour movement and the “underrepresentation of working people in the
Saskatoon local.”72 Although no longer chairperson, Dumont remained actively involved
in the group’s next major undertaking – John Richards’s re-election campaign – which
preoccupied the Saskatoon Waffle for the ensuing year-and-a-half.
The “Independent Socialist” campaign committee established by the Saskatoon
Waffle decided early on that its primary aim was to “successfully raise socialist issues of
substance,” and maintained that although “it would be nice to win – not least because
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Richards needs a job” electoral success remained a “secondary goal.”73 Running in the
newly-created riding of Saskatoon-Centre, Richards sought to increase his profile by
canvassing, holding public meetings, and criticizing the NDP government from the left in
the media. Nearly fifty canvassers assisted the Richards campaign despite realizing that
Paul Mostoway, the NDP candidate, was “folksy and poses a real threat.”74 Researching
and writing policy for the Richards campaign was a group effort. The campaign
committee produced tabloid-style information pieces titled Citizens’ Advocate which
addressed issues such as public ownership of provincial energy resources, housing in
Saskatoon, and the “colonial state” of northern Saskatchewan, as well as pamphlets on
senior citizens, women, health care and resources. In keeping with the campaign’s goal
of raising socialist issues, pamphlets such as the one titled “Bread and Butter Issues”
sought to educate its recipients about the global politics of food production, trade
agreements and overconsumption using poetic verse and featuring a suggested reading
list including the books Small is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered by E.F.
Schumacher and Diet for a Small Planet by Frances Lappe.75
At the campaign launch Richards argued that “residents of this constituency
suffer more than their share of the injustices of our present society” and emphasized six
policy areas. He advocated for public ownership of urban land to prevent speculation,
and promoted low-cost public housing and the preservation of heritage properties in older
neighbourhoods. He proposed community health centres as an alternative to private
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medical practices, and a provincial prescription drug program. Richards’s platform also
included mandating that a majority of university faculty positions be held by Canadians,
and measures to alleviate unemployment and poverty among Saskatchewan’s native
peoples.76 Despite presenting a detailed slate of policies and recruiting a dedicated group
of supporters, Richards’s educative approach to the campaign did not result in his reelection.77
The provincial Waffle’s decision not to support Richards’s 1975 re-election bid
had devastating ramifications for its Saskatoon chapter. After an extended debate during
1974, which is discussed in Chapter Ten, over the purpose and value of participating in
electoral politics left the issue unresolved, Richards opted to run as an independent
candidate with the support of the Saskatoon Waffle. The provincial Waffle ultimately
declined to back a campaign for the re-election of a “social democrat,” albeit one to the
left of the governing NDP. Most Saskatoon Wafflers joined Richards’s “Independent
Socialist” campaign committee leaving the local chapter of the Waffle in “shambles.”78
John Warnock suggests that “resentment” over the Waffle’s treatment of Richards
accounted for the group’s decline in that city, explaining
From ’69 to the spring of ’74 I was in Saskatoon and during the period when they
were in the NDP we had enormous... well probably enormous representation in
our meetings and in our phoning lists and everything else. I mean we had a very
large group in Saskatoon… it’s really surprising to see that as big a group as we
had in Saskatoon kind of just disappeared completely.79
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After 1975, in the absence of a large contingent from Saskatoon, the provincial Waffle
was increasingly dominated by a Regina-based group. After ten members of the
International Socialists (IS) resigned from the organization in August 1975 “there was
practically no representation from Saskatoon.”80
The political foci of the Waffle chapters in Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon
varied, but each one attracted activists from the burgeoning women’s liberation
movement. The Waffle’s advocacy of government-funded wages for housework
reflected the ongoing theoretical debates amongst early Canadian women’s
liberationists.81 Authors Adamson, Briskin and McPhail explain that “the debate on
wages for housework was an important theoretical and strategic turning point for many
socialist women,” who realized that women’s liberation could be approached from a
Marxist-influenced analysis.82 Women’s liberationists in the Waffle were among the
organizers of the 1970 Abortion Caravan which travelled across the country to protest the
continued criminalization of many abortions and the difficulty in accessing legal
abortions in many parts of the country. As was discussed in Chapter Four, Wafflers
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welcomed the Caravan as it arrived in several cities along its route.83 The Abortion
Caravan held a press conference at the University of Winnipeg where a member of the
Vancouver Women’s Caucus promoted their abortion information service, explaining
“within five years women will come to women’s liberation groups instead of
psychiatrists… they will realize they’re not mentally ill in seeking an abortion.”84
Winnipeg Wafflers and women’s liberationists were also active in the Abortion Action
Committee of Winnipeg. They responded to Manitoba NDP cabinet minister Joe
Borowski’s high-profile opposition to abortion by supporting the health clinics that
referred women to resources for legal, out-of-province abortions. The Wafflers
demanded that Borowski and other anti-abortion MLAs be driven out of the NDP.85
Students at the University of Manitoba founded Winnipeg Women’s Liberation in
1969-70 as a “development of the consciousness-raising sessions begun in the living
room of Millie Lamb, a feminist and high school teacher.” Unlike the Manitoba Status of
Women group, Winnipeg Women’s Liberation worked within a socialist framework and
established a newsletter in 1973 as “a way for those of us involved on the left wing of the
women’s movement to communicate with each other.”86 Ellen Kruger and Linda Taylor
recalled that “there was very little written theory in the feminist world, and we worked
out our policies and positions on issues through animated discussions and consensus
decision-making. There were some women with years of political experience in the NDP,
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particularly the Waffle.”87 Winnipeg Women’s Liberation established a Woman’s Place
as a drop-in centre and meeting space in 1973 before separating in the late 1970s into
sub-groups such as the Socialist Women’s Collective, the Winnipeg Lesbian Society,
Women for Non-Sexist Education, and Mothers for Change. Wafflers Margaret Simpson
and Paddy Musson were active in London’s women’s movement throughout the 1970s
and helped to establish the Women’s Resource Centre and the Women’s Credit Union in
that city.88
Saskatoon Women’s Liberation has been described as the “first self-conscious
socialist-feminist organization in Canada.”89 Members of the CSM, predecessor to the
Waffle in Saskatchewan, formed Saskatoon Women’s Liberation in 1969 and decided
men would be allowed to attend only public meetings of the new organization. The
following summer Saskatoon Women’s Liberation established a Birth Control
Information phone-in centre and in the fall hosted the first national women’s liberation
conference. The group also organized a conference on campus which led to courses in
Women’s Studies, and established a Women’s Centre which served as a base for further
feminist organizing where Waffle policy statements could be found amongst the
“mountains of lit.”90 Waffler Mollie McQuarrie was a feminist activist, and Lynda
Holland, Rosemarie Rupps and Maylynn Woo, all members of the Saskatoon Waffle,
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served on the editorial committee for the Saskatoon Women’s Liberation Newsletter.91
An article in the newsletter reported that women activists in Saskatoon were supporting
both John Richards’s “Independent Socialist” re-election bid and the campaign of Ann
Boulton, “an avowed and unabashed feminist,” to become the NDP MLA for SaskatoonSutherland.92
Furthermore, Wafflers such as Pat Gallagher and Sheila Kuziak, who both became
active in trade unions, were crucial figures in Saskatchewan Working Women (SWW), a
feminist group in the provincial labour movement in the late 1970s and early 1980s. John
Warnock suggested that SWW was “virtually a direct offspring of the Waffle” and
Kuziak concurred that “women in the Waffle demanded a strategy… there was a strong
sense that trade union women did not have a voice in their unions. They weren’t really
organized as women.”93 Lorraine Beardsworth explained that although SWW was
organized by Wafflers, “we did not want to set it up as a front for the Waffle, supposedly,
at the time we formed it we were talking about a mass women’s organization… asking
the women who were associated with the Waffle, to help them organize something
different where they could talk about women’s issues as well as union issues.”94 She
elaborated that “SWW may not have ever turned into the mass movement that we wanted
it to turn into but it was another training ground and it was the place that we Waffle
women needed to go to as well, in order to learn the skills we needed that we weren’t
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learning in the Waffle.”95
Certainly women’s liberationists such as Jackie Larkin, Varda Burstyn, Krista
Maeots, and Kelly Crichton took on high-profile roles in the Waffle. Female Wafflers in
Winnipeg recalled the effect of seeing other women assuming leadership roles in the
group. One anonymous Waffler commented that “the activity of other women in the
Waffle… had an impact developing my confidence, overcoming feelings of shyness and
intimidation.”96 Two Waffle-backed candidates in the 1971 Winnipeg municipal
elections, Carol Fogel for council and Gloria Mendelson for school board trustee, were
encouraged by their experience in the women’s liberation movement to become political
candidates. As one female Winnipeg Waffler explained, “the women’s liberation
movement says go, do, fight, it gives an impetus and a motivation to activity.”97
The relationship between women’s liberationists and the Waffle was nevertheless
strained on occasion. One woman in the Winnipeg Waffle commented that,
during Waffle educationals there was a kind of intellectual one-upmanship. I often
had strong arguments with the men about this. The whole consciousness raising
experience and democratic thing, the sense of the quality of experience and
environment, isn’t part of male culture, and therefore you can’t bring that into
political life.98
Another Winnipeg Waffle woman suggested that the “women’s liberation movement has
forced men in the Waffle to look at themselves to see if they are male chauvinists.”99
Male Wafflers, when asked about the effect of the women’s liberation movement,
described their appreciation of the necessity for changing both their personal
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relationships and conduct and their political structures and priorities.100 Yet not all
female Wafflers were convinced of the immediacy or extent of their male counterparts’
enlightenment. Martha Tracey indicated that although most appeared genuinely
committed to women’s liberation, “putting it into effect” could be difficult.101 Ken
Collier suggested:
The experience that women and Native people had in [the Waffle] was far
different from what men had in it. Many of the women who were not on the
executive but who came to the Waffle things mentioned that 'boy, it’s sure uphill
for women to get right into that, to take part’… I guess one of the major criticisms
that I heard from women was that a lot of things the Waffle did they thought were
not very practical for them.102
Similarly, the experience of women’s liberationists in the London Waffle led the
women to deepen their commitment to feminist activism. Paddy Musson remembered
being asked to leave the Delaware conference after confronting a male Waffle leader:
He came in and made this broad statement in terms of this issue, and as an
energized university student who was interested in social change, I thought his
analysis had serious flaws in it. I dared to tell him and I was told to be quiet and I
told him that I owned this meeting as much as he did and that the whole principle
of the Waffle was to move away from the domination of the party centre control
and… here he was practicing the same techniques that had been practiced by the
party centrally and that was the point at which I left.103
Neither Paddy Musson nor Margaret Simpson remembered the Waffle as a feminist
movement. Simpson recalled feeling like “an onlooker” at the Delaware conference, and
neither she nor Musson detected signs of either feminist concerns or female leadership.
Simpson remembered feeling like “I was just some young kid trailing along on the
coattails of the professors who understood about socialism, the political movement and
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the CCF.”104 Her main commitment, however, was to feminism. In comparing the fun
and excitement of her involvement with feminist groups and actions in the 1970s to the
Waffle experience, Paddy Musson concluded “The Waffle was not fun. Those were not
fun men… they were earnest, all of them.”105 Thus, the Waffle attracted women’s
liberationists and the experience of women within the Waffle in Winnipeg, London and
Saskatoon both strengthened their commitment to feminism and inspired them to greater
political involvement.
Most of the Waffle leadership’s energy was devoted to clashing with the NDP and
determining the policies and tactics of the provincial Waffle groups. This chapter’s study
of local Waffle groups in Winnipeg, London and Saskatoon adds another dimension to
the narrative of intra-party conflict that is highlighted throughout this dissertation.
Young activists, influenced especially by the student and anti-Vietnam War movements,
joined the Waffle in an attempt to extend the ethos of the New Left to Canada’s
established social democratic party, the NDP. The Waffle’s explicit declaration that the
party should be the “parliamentary wing of a movement dedicated to fundamental social
change” reflected the New Left’s faith in the power of social movements and frustration
with traditional forms of electoral politics. James Laxer explained that the authors of the
Waffle Manifesto sought to “move this stream of very powerful youth politics into
Canadian social democracy,” and the experience of Wafflers in Winnipeg, London and
Saskatoon suggests this goal was at least partially realized.106 Moreover, many of the
activists in these three local chapters were significantly impacted by their experiences in
the Waffle. Their hands-on activism such as supporting striking workers on a picket line,
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distributing radical publications, or participating in the burgeoning feminist movement
enhanced many Wafflers’ commitment to a lifelong struggle for social justice. When
Wafflers engaged in electoral politics in Winnipeg, London, and Saskatoon, they
attempted an alternative vision of politics based on education and “the development of a
socialist consciousness” instead of merely prioritizing the winning of votes. The pursuit
of a different kind of politics by local Waffle chapters was indicative of its place in the
broader Canadian New Left and its unique position in the international phenomenon of
youth activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
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Chapter Six
“I’ll swallow them only if they are digestible:” Inside the NDP, 1971
This chapter examines the Waffle’s participation in the federal NDP leadership
race and the successful provincial election campaign in Saskatchewan during the first half
of 1971. During this period, the Waffle attempted to utilize the campaign to succeed
Tommy Douglas as leader of the NDP to improve its profile and influence within the
party. James Laxer’s surprising second-place finish to David Lewis indicated that the
Waffle commanded substantial, albeit minority, support within the party. The federal
contest and subsequent election victory in Saskatchewan suggested that despite its
internal defeats the Waffle exerted a small influence over NDP policy and that conflict
between the Waffle and party leadership, while serious, was not irreconcilable. However,
a growing backlash by NDP moderates and labour leaders against the Waffle’s radicalism
only enhanced the existing polarization within the party.
After leading the federal NDP through four elections since its inception in 1961,
Tommy Douglas, having lost his own seat in the 1968 federal election, indicated his plans
to resign. But when the death of NDP MP Colin Cameron only a month after the election
opened up a relatively safe seat on Vancouver Island, the party executive persuaded
Douglas to continue as leader. Douglas agreed, and after winning the resulting byelection in Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands in early 1969, he announced that he would
remain at the helm until 1971.1 The NDP stalwart David Lewis was regarded as
Douglas’s heir apparent, even after indicating he would not be seeking the leadership
since he believed the next leader should be from the younger generation.2
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Ed Broadbent was the first to enter the leadership race to replace Douglas.
Announcing his candidacy at an Ottawa press conference in June 1970, Broadbent was
endorsed by four of his fellow MPs and promised a campaign that highlighted issues of
full employment, the control of foreign investment, and industrial democracy.3 The press
focused on the thirty-four-year-old Broadbent’s youthfulness and his obvious
intellectualism, claiming he appeared “ideologically closer” to the Waffle than were any
of the other likely leadership candidates.4 Broadbent did not approve of the affiliation.
“I think I am of the left” within the NDP, he said, but he denied associating with the
Waffle and criticized the reference in its Manifesto to American “imperialism abroad and
racism at home.”5 Broadbent concentrated his campaign on discrediting Pierre Trudeau
and the Liberal government, even releasing a book titled The Liberal Rip-Off in which he
castigated the prime minister for failing to address poverty in Canada, and claimed
“Trudeau has done less for the average or poor Canadian than any prime minister since
the Second World War.”6
John Harney was next to enter the race, in late November 1970. Although he
neither held a seat in Parliament nor enjoyed the backing of any federal MPs, the Globe
and Mail deemed the “bilingual, articulate and contemporary” thirty-nine-year-old
Harney a potentially appealing candidate.7 A humanities professor at York University,
Harney served as the Ontario NDP’s provincial secretary from 1967-69, and ran
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unsuccessfully, in four federal elections under the NDP banner.8 He promised that as
leader he would move the NDP further left, and prioritize adding urban and rural poor to
the core of workers, intellectuals, and members of the progressive middle class who
already supported the party. Harney had voted against the Waffle Manifesto at the
Winnipeg convention, but nevertheless supported both Quebec’s right to selfdetermination and the Ontario NDP’s recently adopted policy of nationalizing resource
industries.9
David Lewis joined the race one week after Harney. Lewis was an architect of
the NDP and long coveted the leadership. Electorally he had struggled to win and retain
a House of Commons seat until he recaptured York South in Ontario for the NDP in 1965
and held onto it in the face of the Liberal surge of 1968. Lewis achieved significant
public prominence in 1970 as a leading opponent of the War Measures Act and its
successor legislation, the Public Order Act. His principled defense of Canadians’ rights
and freedoms – expressed “eloquently, gracefully, and convincingly” according to one
commentator – was lauded by many New Democrats.10 Backed by nine other MPs,
Lewis announced his long-expected candidacy for the party leadership in early December
in Ottawa, describing himself as “a very angry, very militant democratic socialist.”11
That said, Lewis made clear that as leader he would pursue a moderate policy approach
8
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for the NDP and not attempt to woo the Waffle with radical policy commitments. He
claimed “I’ll swallow them only if they are digestible.”12
The Waffle began preparing for the leadership race during its national conference
in August 1970 by forming a ten-person campaign committee. The committee planned to
promote Waffle policies to NDP members and decide on a leadership candidate after
holding a series of meetings with Wafflers across the country.13 By early November it
was clear that ill health would prevent Mel Watkins, the Waffle’s most prominent
spokesperson, from seeking the leadership. After the Quebec-based television
personality Laurier Lapierre also declined to run, the Waffle’s choices were whittled
down to Cy Gonick and James Laxer.14 John Warnock, who was then teaching at York
University, suggested to his Saskatchewan Waffle colleagues “I think Jim is the most
articulate spokesman the Waffle has now,” but encouraged Gonick to enter the contest for
“tactical reasons.”15 Warnock thought Gonick, an elected politician from Manitoba who
was also older than Laxer, might be considered by some to be the more credible
candidate among the two, and also able to draw support from western Canada.16
However Gonick’s frustration with Manitoba’s NDP government and determination to
build up the left in his home province dissuaded him from seeking the national party
leadership. Laxer thereby became the Waffle’s candidate of choice, declaring his
candidacy in Toronto at the end of November before rushing back to Kingston to be
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present for the birth of his and Krista Maeots’s first child, Michael.17 He promised to
emphasize economic nationalism and the necessity of striking a new deal for Quebec
within Confederation, while attacking Pierre Trudeau’s invocation of the War Measures
Act as a ploy “to suppress his political opposition in Quebec.”18 The Waffle committed
to a collectively-run campaign, and Laxer recalls “I was as much the representative of the
Waffle movement’s ideas as an actual candidate for the leadership of the party,”
suggesting that the Waffle aimed primarily to influence party policy.19
Frank Howard, the final candidate to enter the race in January 1971, was a veteran
MP for Skeena, British Columbia, and something of a maverick in the federal NDP
caucus for splitting with the majority in supporting Trudeau’s imposition of the War
Measures Act. In addition to advocating for prisoners and opposing Canada’s archaic
divorce laws, he had achieved some notoriety in 1967 after a former friend’s attempt to
blackmail him resulted in Howard’s admitting that as a young man he had spent time in
jail for armed robbery. In his leadership campaign, Howard contrasted his rough
background as a miner, ironmolder, and logger to the university professors in the race,
and criticized the Waffle’s “academic and professional theories” of nationalization of
resource industries as “out of touch with the realities of politics and with common
sense.”20 Going further still, Howard warned that widespread nationalization “would
destroy Canada completely and thoroughly – just as any endorsement of these Waffle
proposals will destroy the NDP.”21 By the time Lewis, Broadbent, Harney, Laxer and
17
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Howard began a tour of Canadian cities to hold a series of twenty public debates, clear
policy divisions had emerged among the five leadership candidates.22
The Waffle’s position on Quebec polarized the NDP leadership race more than
any other issue. In January 1971, Laxer publicized five resolutions on Quebec that the
Waffle proposed for debate at the upcoming NDP convention, including commitments to
support Quebec’s right to self-determination and building “a people’s alliance” between
English Canadian and Quebec socialists.23 The Waffle’s position on Quebec received
coverage in both the English and French-language press, and provoked David Lewis into
accusing the group of factionalism and harming the NDP’s credibility by proposing an
alliance with the separatist Parti Québécois (PQ).24 Moreover, he rejected the Waffle’s
emphasis on nationalization as anachronistic socialist fundamentalism.25 Laxer shot
back, rejecting Lewis’s charge of a Waffle-PQ alliance, disavowing the suggestion that
the Waffle endorsed separatism, and complaining that “Frank Howard and David Lewis
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have spent too much time criticizing the Waffle group and too little time putting forward
their own positive proposals.”26
NDP leaders were sensitive to suggestions that the party was sympathetic to
Quebec separatism. Pierre Trudeau had charged during the 1968 election that the NDP’s
embrace of the deux nations concept and ‘special status’ for Quebec appealed to
separatists, claiming that “René Lévesque’s movement is supporting [Quebec NDP
leader] Robert Cliche because they feel Robert Cliche’s position is as far towards
separatism as any federal party can go.”27 Furthermore, the federal NDP caucus’s
opposition to the use of the War Measures Act did not endear the party to many English
Canadians.28 As a result, although the Waffle did not openly advocate for Quebec
independence, their endorsement of Quebec’s right to determine its own future went
further than other English-Canadian politicians and appeared to some a quasi-separatist
policy. Wafflers, especially Laxer, were highly attuned to political developments in
Quebec. Both the Waffle and many nascent Quebec separatists were a product of New
Left social movements which derived much of their inspiration and rhetoric from anticolonial independence movements in Asia and Africa.29 In late 1970 the Waffle did
approach the PQ to “enter into discussions with socialists in Quebec.”30 Cy Gonick
reported on his communications with André Laroque, a caucus assistant for the PQ, who
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suggested establishing regular meetings between the Waffle and the “left in the PQ.”31
However, the group decided “to postpone any meetings with Quebecois” until after the
Quebec NDP convention, and contact was not resumed in its aftermath.32
Three weeks after the Laxer-Lewis dispute, some 200 delegates gathered in
Montreal at the Quebec NDP convention, planned as an “open” meeting to attract
progressive supporters into the hitherto moribund provincial party. Delegates overrode
objections by David Lewis and several English-speaking members and approved a
resolution recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination. They also passed resolutions
highlighting the provincial party’s autonomy, including a decision not to run NDP
candidates in future provincial elections, and a promise to collaborate with the federal
NDP only when doing so “does not come into conflict with” the Quebec NDP’s
principles.33 The convention replaced the party’s retired president Roland Morin with
Raymond Laliberté, a Quebec nationalist and former president of the Corporation des
enseignants du Québec (CEQ) who had been among that union’s leadership during its
controversial 1969 strike. Although Laliberté ruled out forming an alliance with the PQ,
many long-time English-speaking party members remained suspicious.34
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That same weekend in Kitchener, Stephen Lewis launched his first public attack
on Waffle policies during a meeting of the Ontario NDP provincial council. Lewis’s
speech described the Ontario NDP as a “truly serious political party on the threshold of a
dramatic advance,” and suggested many New Democrats had been “diverted from the
essential chore of reasonable policies reasonably conveyed” by concentrating too heavily
on basic organizational tasks, allowing party policy to be dominated by the radical left.
Without mentioning the Waffle directly, Lewis took issue with two of its most prominent
policies: support for Quebec’s right to self-determination, and large-scale
nationalization.35 Lewis explained that part of the motivation behind his speech was to
express concern that the NDP’s opponents were benefitting from the Waffle’s vocal
promotion of policies unpopular with many English Canadians, concluding “it’s the kind
of issue that Bob Nixon has already played by linking the party to Quebec separatism.”36
Lewis himself endorsed a flexible federalism and insisted the right to self-determination
already existed, but argued it was “perverse” and “presumptuous” to continually focus on
Quebec’s right to self-determination as the Waffle was doing. Lewis reminded the
council of Desmond Morton’s contention that the NDP had “nothing to gain save our
permanent and well-deserved oblivion” by adopting such a platform.37 Despite the
prominence he gave in the speech to warnings about foreign ownership of the Canadian
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economy, Lewis objected strenuously to “advocating a peculiarly sterile and sectarian
view of nationalization as the answer” to foreign domination.38
Waffler Gordon Cleveland responded to Lewis’s attacks by suggesting a
confrontation between the Waffle and the Ontario NDP leadership was “inevitable.”39
Laxer hinted that Stephen Lewis’s criticisms were on behalf of his father’s leadership bid,
commenting “I think they should only attack one at a time so I can be there to defend
myself,” and insisted Stephen Lewis had misrepresented the Waffle’s position on
Quebec.40 Meanwhile, both Harney and Broadbent adopted positions on Quebec similar
to the Waffle’s by recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination. Broadbent promised
a renewed federalism, and Harney decried the presence of separatists within the Waffle,
but both were at odds with David Lewis who believed acknowledging Quebec’s right to
self-determination only encouraged provincial separatists.41
The Waffle’s strategy for the leadership campaign was to promote Laxer as a
“socialist alternative” and emphasize the Waffle’s major policy divergences from Lewis
and other NDP moderates, including their difference over Quebec’s autonomy. In
announcing Laxer’s acclamation as their candidate, the Waffle national steering
committee solicited resolutions from its various provincial groups on an array of topics
including labour, energy resources, economic development, the petrochemical industry,
pollution, women’s liberation, foreign ownership, education, poverty and
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unemployment.42 The Saskatchewan Waffle, for example, developed the group’s
agricultural policy including commitments to a land bank and the nationalization of the
farm implement industry.43
In preparation for the convention, the Waffle steering committee distributed to
riding associations, affiliated union locals, and youth clubs a thirty-page booklet of
resolutions that represented its “most expensive piece of campaign literature” to support
Laxer’s leadership bid.44 Although Harold Steves (Vancouver), Ken Novakowski
(Edmonton) and Bruce Archibald (Halifax) joined the ten members on the campaign
committee elected at the Waffle’s national conference the previous summer, most of the
organizational work was performed by a small coordinating committee based in Kingston
and Toronto.45 Krista Maeots prepared a tabloid-style leaflet introducing Laxer and the
Waffle to convention delegates which emphasized the importance of “public ownership
of large corporations in key sectors of the economy,” and presented a strong feminist
position in the section on “Women and Socialism.”46
Laxer’s campaign was supported by youth sections of the NDP as well as
provincial Waffle groups, the latter providing an existing organizational and fundraising
network.47 Wafflers in Saskatchewan, Ontario, Manitoba and New Brunswick all
reported success in recruiting and electing pro-Laxer delegates to attend the April 1971
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convention in Ottawa.48 In addition, the Waffle nominated Saskatchewan activist Carol
Gudmunson for party president in an effort to win support from uncommitted female and
western Canadian delegates for the group and, in turn, Laxer.49 The Waffle’s success at
organizing in riding associations, often where little NDP support previously existed,
caused party moderates to worry that the group might appear larger and more influential
than was the case.50 Harney supporter Desmond Morton later criticized what he viewed
as a Waffle strategy of attempting to secure delegates and policy endorsements at thinlyattended riding association meetings by staging long and tedious debates that exhausted
and drove away less committed party members. Morton recalled his own response to
Waffle tactics was to co-found with Ontario NDP research director Marion Bryden the
group NDP Now:
It rapidly became the concern of a group of moderates, based on the party’s
federal council, who decided that in the Ottawa convention the Waffle would not
win by default… Launched a few months before the convention, the NDP Now
group, like the Waffle in 1969, was no more than a cadre of like-minded people in
search of wider support.51
Much of NDP Now’s support came from the unusually large bloc of union delegates at
the convention.52 The CLC had established a steering committee of key union leaders to
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coordinate labour’s role at the convention, and in particular to oppose Waffle policy
positions.53 Lynn Williams, an USWA official, acted as liaison between the CLC
steering committee and NDP Now.54 Unlike the 1970 Ontario NDP convention when
Dennis McDermott and the UAW were prominent supporters of Stephen Lewis, in 1971
Autoworker delegates were divided over whom among the leadership aspirants to
endorse. Therefore the Steelworkers took the lead in organizing opposition to the
Waffle.55 Speaking at a USWA conference in Hamilton, Morton attacked the Waffle and
alleged it contributed nothing to the NDP “that is not archaic, opportunistic or irrelevant”
and added that “indulging youth, as the NDP regularly does, may be emotionally
satisfying but it is politically stupid if it turns off hard-working, sensible people with
mortgages.”56 For its part, the Waffle’s steering committee acknowledged NDP Now’s
success in electing anti-Waffle delegates at riding association meetings across Toronto
ahead of the convention.57
Despite the efforts of NDP Now and the other four leadership campaigns, the
Waffle steering committee operated on the premise that many delegates would arrive at
the convention still undecided about their choice for leader. The committee ensured that
Wafflers were spread among the various Ottawa hotels hosting provincial delegations in
order to canvass and record delegate information, including their first and second choices
for leader, and their positions on issues such as Quebec’s self-determination and natural
resource development. With this detailed data in hand, Wafflers could more effectively
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appeal to delegates in the later rounds of voting.58 The Waffle steering committee
estimated at the beginning of the convention that 426 delegates, or twenty-three to
twenty-five percent of the total, would support Laxer on the first ballot, putting him in
second place behind David Lewis.59 It expected most of the youth and Quebec delegates
and one-third of the Saskatchewan and British Columbia delegations were committed to
Laxer. Yet anticipated support from Ontario lagged. Despite the emergence of Waffle
groups in Windsor, London, Hamilton, St. Catharines and Welland that backed Laxer,
and hopes for strong second-ballot support from northern Ontario, it was clear that NDP
Now had limited the Waffle’s ability to attract Toronto-area delegates.60
In addition to promoting anti-Waffle candidates at riding association delegate
selection meetings, Morton produced a pamphlet criticizing the “Americanization of the
Canadian left” and calling on delegates to reject Waffle positions.61 Ontario NDP
president Gordon Brigden assisted Morton’s efforts by securing prominent endorsements
for the pamphlet. Brigden wrote to Manitoba cabinet minister Howard Pawley, for
example, explaining that “a number of NDPers are concerned that we have positive
policies for the forthcoming federal convention rather than go to the convention and swat
down ideas we don’t like.”62 Marc Eliesen, the federal party’s research director and NDP
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Now member, wrote to Lewis in an effort to ensure the convention schedule favoured
their supporters:
I suggest we attempt to seek Federal Council approval for the position that votes
on resolution matters be taken at certain times during or at the end of the day.
Because of the hardcore dedication of the Waffle group, it is imperative that the
anti-Waffle forces be there at all times when votes are taken on important policy
matters. A large number of labour delegates do not participate in these policy
matters and are therefore very difficult to round up for the final votes.63
NDP Now successfully challenged the Waffle for positions on the party’s crucial
Resolutions Committee, which selected, drafted, and prioritized from among the
hundreds of submissions by riding associations, affiliated unions and youth groups the
resolutions for debate at the convention. With Wafflers making up only a quarter of the
Resolutions Committee membership, Morton and his allies ensured resolutions that made
it to the convention floor reflected moderate policies.64 As a result, during debates on the
convention floor the Waffle was forced to refer resolutions back to the committee with
specific instructions to re-draft the policy.65 This approach signaled to NDP Now and
their union allies that all motions to refer must be defeated.66 Indeed, some delegates
received written instructions from USWA official Bob Mackenzie to “push through –
defeat those marked Waffle.”67 But not all union delegates opposed the Waffle. Harry
Greenwood, the secretary of USWA Local 1005, stated before the convention that some
unionists supported the Waffle, and warned that labour leaders should not automatically
expect all union delegates to fall into line behind them. On the other hand, Greenwood
noted that not all Waffle unionists necessarily supported Laxer for leader; four of the
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eleven delegates from Local 1005 for instance, backed Laxer, but Greenwood favoured
Broadbent.68
Divergent and strongly-held opposing ideological visions for the NDP resulted in
a highly polarized convention. Liz Valleau, a Toronto NDP activist and former
neighbour of Broadbent’s, recalled “I can’t describe how horrible that convention was…
There was intense bitterness among the candidates, dirty dealings, backstabbing and a
sort of psychological violence to it.”69 She added “the back-stabbing got to me. I hated
the way the Lewis faction treated the Waffle. I felt the party wasn’t open to new ideas,
and I’ve never felt the same about the NDP since.”70 Terry Grier, a former federal NDP
secretary, faced the ire of Wafflers at the convention and remembered being
hissed and booed by hordes of young people who hadn’t been anywhere in sight
two years earlier and weren’t in sight two years later. I wasn’t elderly then – I
was only thirty-five – and I was really turned off by them. I had joined the party
at their age and I had stuck with it, working to build it. I was getting ready to run
in ’72 and was worried that relationships with my own constituents would be
poisoned by their shenanigans.71
An early indication of the convention’s polarization was the debate on gender
parity for the party’s federal council. On the first day of the convention, Krista Maeots
presented a resolution requiring twelve of the twenty-four federal council positions
elected at the convention be held by women. Maeots argued “discrimination does exist in
the politics of this country and in the politics of this party,” a view that would be
reinforced for women’s liberationists over the coming days.72 The debate on Maeots’s
resolution, chaired by former Ontario MLA and longtime USWA and NDP official
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Eamon Park, was cut off before the time allotted had expired, bringing cries of “Seig
heil” from frustrated feminists. Although Harney spoke in favour of gender parity, the
remaining four speakers opposed the resolution. Mary Eady, the party treasurer, insisted
the resolution represented “an unwise step backward by replacing discrimination with
tokenism.”73 After the convention, Varda Burstyn described the result: “the parity
resolution was not merely defeated or rejected – it was railroaded.”74 On the final day of
the convention, the Resolutions Committee introduced its policy statement on women’s
issues, which called for legislation to eliminate discrimination in employment
opportunities, provide for equal pay and paid maternity leave, and eliminating abortion
from the Criminal Code.75 The document’s conservatism appalled women’s liberationists
who decried it as totally inadequate. Waffler Kelly Crichton attacked it as an insult to
women that would leave the NDP far behind the Liberals on support for women’s
equality.76 An attempt to refer the document back to committee for revision including a
commitment to hold a national conference of NDP women was defeated.77
Policy defeats were not the only source of frustration for women’s liberationists at
the convention. Many delegates were visibly uninterested during the debate on women’s
issues; union delegates and male Wafflers alike read newspapers and chatted amongst
themselves throughout.78 Varda Burstyn recalled being heckled and insulted as she
waited in line for a microphone, being told “go back to the kitchen where you belong,”
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“you have to get married to join the union,” and “what you really need is a good fuck.”79
The referral motion on the women’s resolution was defeated to the tune of “Solidarity
Forever” sung by satisfied union delegates. Despite the party prominently advertising its
daycare provisions for the children of delegates, the facilities were only open from 2:00
to 5:00 p.m.. Women’s liberationists were disgusted by an advertisement for a topless
nightclub in the convention brochure. Yvonne Trower summarized the feelings of many
when she lamented, “this party is prepared to see women, not as policy makers, but as
playmates.”80
The Waffle fared little better in the debate over foreign policy held on the second
day of the convention. The catchall resolution produced by the Resolutions Committee
called for revisions to Canada’s approach to foreign aid and trade, including increasing
Canada’s foreign aid to one percent of the gross national product, less than the two
percent called for at the 1969 Convention.81 Rejecting Wafflers’ criticisms that the
resolution was too weak, Don Montgomery, Toronto-area director for the USWA,
compared them to “a bunch of clerics debating how many angels could stand on the head
of a pin.”82 Michael Cross, a commentator sympathetic to the Waffle, argued
“imperialism was ignored, aid for national liberation movements in Africa was ducked,
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Canadian defence polices and alliances were not discussed.” Waffler Jackie Larkin
dismissed it as “a liberal resolution.”83
After two days of continuous policy defeats, the Waffle geared up for the critical
third day of the convention in anticipation of the elections of party officers and the
debates to determine the NDP’s stance on natural resources and Quebec. But
disappointment followed on all fronts. Despite its related success at the Ontario NDP
convention only a few months earlier, the Waffle was rebuffed in its attempt to refer the
proposed policy on natural resources back to committee for consideration of its position
on widespread nationalization.84 Instead, the convention passed a resolution calling for
increased public control over Canada’s resource industries via several methods, including
public ownership and joint participation with private corporations.85 Broadbent argued
this was a retreat from existing party policy and attempted to introduce an amendment to
the resolution calling for nationalization of all aspects of the oil and gas industries, but
the vote was taken before he was recognized by the chair.86 Laxer, who had avoided
involvement in the early policy debates, spoke in favour of the Waffle position, but his
speech was criticized by Art Kube, a CLC director and former Steelworker, who “drew
angry shouts and applause with an attack on the academics in the Waffle faction.”
According to Wilfrid List, a reporter covering the convention for the Globe and Mail,
Kube was furious, claiming “I’m sick and tired of those people in Kingston, led by Laxer.
83
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It’s time we had people who did some work rather than professors who write
resolutions… No one has refused to join the NDP because we’re not radical enough.”87
The Waffle’s referral motion was defeated, and the resolution passed by a three-to-one
margin.
After an unsuccessful attempt at crafting a compromise policy on Quebec, the
Resolutions Committee presented a resolution expressing a clear commitment to
federalism, with the only concession to Quebec nationalism being acknowledgement that
Canada should not be kept together by force.88 Both the Waffle and the Quebec delegates
attempted to refer the resolution back to the committee with instruction to include the
policy recognizing Quebec’s right to self-determination adopted at the provincial NDP
meeting in Montreal two months earlier. Raymond Laliberté, Jim Laxer, Mel Watkins,
Robert Cliche and Laurier LaPierre all spoke in favour of referral and
“autodetermination,” while the other leadership hopefuls David Lewis, Harney, and
Howard all spoke against.89 Desmond Morton argued that supporting self-determination
would ruin the NDP’s electoral ambitions in English Canada. Murray Cotterill, director
of public relations for the USWA, denounced “bloody academic labels” and warned
Quebec independence would divide bargaining teams, cripple workers’ negotiating
power, and harm organized labour.90 Broadbent’s attempt at a compromise by
strengthening the resolution’s wording in support of Quebec’s right to self-determination
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while retaining the party’s commitment to federalism, was rejected by both sides. The
convention voted 953 to 423 to reject the referral motion and endorse the strictly
federalist policy. After the convention, David Lewis suggested that the resolution left the
party’s policy on Quebec in the hands of the federal council, and emphasized his own
support for a federalist solution.91
The Globe and Mail neatly summarized the alignment of forces that had
successfully opposed the Waffle at the convention: “labor supplied the muscle in these
crucial votes but the ideas were developed by the NDP Now group.”92 Union delegates
had indeed literally “supplied the muscle” on occasion. After the Waffle motion to refer
the resource resolution back to committee was defeated in a vote by show of hands,
Waffler Gilles Teasdale lunged for a microphone to demand a recorded vote. As the
Globe and Mail reported the incident:
He was thrown back from the podium by three trade union delegates acting as
convention ushers. When Mr. Teasdale again attempted to climb onto the
podium, the ushers pushed him back and a fight almost resulted.93
When Steve Penner, chair of the Ontario Waffle, tried to reach a microphone to suggest a
standing vote, he too was rebuffed by union delegates when Terry Meagher, the
secretary-treasurer of the OFL, noted Penner was not wearing a delegate badge. Near
bedlam ensued as Waffle and trade union delegates “cursed and pushed at each other,”
Mel Watkins screaming that Meagher was “a fascist” and unionists retorting that Watkins
was a “commie.” Stephen Lewis intervened, telling the union delegates to “cool it,”
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while Watkins urged the Wafflers to calm down and Penner to leave the podium.94 The
Wafflers were justifiably upset over the actions of some union delegates to the
convention. According to Cy Gonick and Jack Warnock, “union muscle intimidation was
let loose throughout the convention floor.” They described the scene:
A Manitoba cabinet minister who, in the final ballot, was refusing to wear a Lewis
button was surrounded by representatives of the Manitoba steelworkers and told,
“You vote for Laxer and we’ll fix you.” He didn’t buckle, and that little exchange
cost David a few more votes. A union man who put on a Laxer button was
grabbed by three others, pressed against a wall and threatened if he didn‘t remove
the button. One of us was grabbed and threatened by a union delegate for
cheering one of the Waffle’s few procedural victories.95
The Waffle had also resolved to challenge the “administration slate” of candidates
for party offices by nominating its own members for various positions.96 However, as
with its policy setbacks, the group experienced several defeats with the result that fewer
Waffle supporters were elected to important party posts in 1971 than had been two years
earlier. Former Ontario NDP leader Donald MacDonald defeated Waffler Carol
Gudmundson for the party presidency by 885 votes to 565; Mary Eady was re-elected
party treasurer over Waffler Sheila Kuziak by 897 votes to 497; and Roland Morin was
re-elected associate president over Waffle-backed Marc Boulard by 807 votes to 680.97
Carol Gudmundson was the only Waffler to be elected to one of the NDP’s seven vicepresident positions when Mel Watkins lost his bid for re-election. Gonick and Watkins
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were the only two Wafflers elected to the twenty member-at-large spots on the federal
council. In the convention’s highly polarized atmosphere, Sidney Green, a Manitoba
cabinet minister, was left off the party establishment’s slate for re-election as a vicepresident. Although Green was not a Waffle supporter per se, he attributed his rebuff by
“the establishment group” to the fact they “were not satisfied with me, because I did not
share their obsession” with the Waffle.98 Despite the electoral defeats, the Wafflers were
buoyed by the results. Many of their candidates had received over 400 votes, a promising
harbinger it was believed for Laxer in the election for party leader to be held the next day.
Laxer’s speech to the convention emphasized how the Waffle’s vision for Canada
and the NDP differed from his rivals. Key defining tenets were “public ownership is
central to any notion of building an independent Canada,” and the need to transform the
NDP so its influence extended beyond Parliament Hill and periodic election campaigns.
Laxer reminded delegates of the Waffle’s link to the broader New Left when he criticized
“an educational system that is nothing more than a glorified babysitting service for
society and nothing more than a training ground for the corporations in this country,” and
held up the women’s liberation movement and the youth movement against
authoritarianism as essential vehicles of social transformation. He reminded New
Democrats that adopting radical policies without a basis in people’s movements was not
sufficient to avoid “the trap of coming to office but the people not coming to power”.99
While David Lewis was widely favoured to win the party leadership, an equally
important question was how much support Laxer and the Waffle would draw. An article
in the left-wing publication The Last Post suggested some Lewis supporters planned to
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back Harney on the first ballot in an effort to deny Laxer second place. But as one party
official explained, “it’s very tough to rig a ballot… you might subtract too many votes
from Lewis or not give Harney enough. So it’s going to be very very tough.”100 Publicly
Lewis supporters predicted their man would have forty percent of the vote after the first
ballot with Laxer in second place at twenty percent, but then Lewis would triumph on the
second ballot by drawing the remaining anti-Waffle delegates into his camp.101
Lewis did indeed lead from the first ballot, but he saw his support grow
agonizingly slowly over the next two ballots. Laxer finished second, ahead of Harney,
and Broadbent came in fourth, although with less support than anticipated. Howard
received more votes than expected, but finished last on the ballot and was required to
withdraw from the race. When Broadbent again finished fourth on the second ballot and
was eliminated, his supporters mostly split between Laxer and Harney on the third ballot,
which Lewis continued to lead. With Broadbent out of the running, Waffle supporters
led by Watkins pushed into the Broadbent section of the convention hall offering
delegates Laxer buttons. As Wafflers Cy Gonick and John Warnock later recalled, “as
soon as Broadbent dropped, they literally rushed to take up Laxer buttons, and for the
first time in the past six months they felt politically comfortable.”102
When Harney was removed from the third ballot, MPs and Lewis supporters Max
Saltsman and Andrew Brewin pressured him to declare for their candidate. Badgered by
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CBC reporters eager for a story, Harney sat silently and refused to commit.103 Terry
Grier, Desmond Morton, John Brewin and Donald MacDonald, all key Harney supporters
and determined to defeat Laxer, donned Lewis buttons and encouraged others to do
likewise. Lewis finally prevailed over Laxer on the fourth ballot, by a vote of 1046 to
612.104 While his supporters chanted “Power to the people,” Laxer moved the obligatory
motion that Lewis’s election be declared unanimous and exhorted the party to “get
together in the 1972 election.”105 Desmond Morton, writing of the event two years later,
described the leadership vote as “a shabby triumph for a veteran who deserved better
from his party.”106 Gerald Caplan described the Lewis victory celebration at the Château
Laurier hotel as “one of the worst celebrations I’ve ever been at. It was like a wake…
I’ve never been to a place at which the winner felt so much like a victim.”107
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more aggressive and more radical” suggests sympathy for the Waffle’s position. However, in the next
breath Douglas explained “if it becomes divisive, if it sets up a party within a party… then it becomes a
source of friction rather than a source of strength” and warned that “the group inside the party which is
trying to move the party forward may tend to shut its eyes to political realities… without any regard to (a)
whether the things they are suggesting are practicable and (b) whether these things they are suggesting are
acceptable to the electorate, who, in the final analysis, we must win over.” Douglas’s closeness to Hans
Brown, a Waffler and his executive assistant, in combination with Douglas’s own ideological inclinations,
appears a likelier explanation for his relative sympathy for the Waffle position, at least compared to other
members of the NDP leadership. Bill Knight, a Saskatchewan NDP MP, suggested that Douglas was “every
bit as tenacious in his opposition to the Waffle as Lewis… if he’d stayed on, he would have put the sword
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Federal NDP Leadership Election – April 24, 1971
First Ballot
Second Ballot
Third Ballot
Lewis
661 Lewis
715 Lewis
Laxer
378 Laxer
407 Laxer
Harney
299 Harney
347 Harney
Broadbent
236 Broadbent
223
Howard
124
Total
1,698 Total
1,692 Total

742
508
431

Fourth Ballot
Lewis
1046
Laxer
612

1,681 Total

1,658

Leading Wafflers, despite the group’s various policy and leadership defeats,
nevertheless expressed satisfaction over the convention’s outcome in general. Laxer
considered his second-place showing for the party leadership to be a great victory,
making it “impossible for the left ever again to be ignored by the NDP.”108 Mel Watkins
described the race for party leader as one of the greatest days of his life, and proclaimed
the Waffle was ensconced within the NDP while continuing to function as a distinct
movement.109 Laxer and Watkins both interpreted the increasingly polarized NDP on
display at the Ottawa convention as evidence of growth in support for the Waffle since
1969 when it was still a largely unknown entity to many in the party. Lewis, in his
leadership acceptance speech to the convention, commented “I look forward to working
with Jim Laxer and his friends. There is no difference of purpose in this party.”110 But
during the press conference that followed he was unequivocal and uncompromising in his
stance on the Waffle, describing it as an “organization of its own” and pledging he would
focus on NDP policy, not the Waffle. When asked for his reaction if the Waffle
continued organizing the workers and the oppressed, Lewis replied “Well, if they do
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organize the workers and the oppressed I would be a great deal happier. So far they’ve
organized the students and the oppressing.”111
At the same time as the Waffle was capturing national media attention for shaking
up the federal NDP at its convention and beyond, Wafflers were playing critical roles
during 1971 in the Saskatchewan and Ontario provincial elections and the New
Brunswick NDP convention. Saskatchewan Wafflers comprised the second largest group
within the movement overall, and the election there represented an opportunity for
incorporating Waffle ideas into an NDP campaign for winning back a province where the
CCF/NDP had a strong presence historically, but currently had a Liberal government.
Saskatchewan Premier Ross Thatcher appeared confident when he announced a
provincial election for late May 1971.112 Believing rebounding grain sales and the
promise of a federal grain stabilization program subsidy for farmers would offset the
unpopularity of the federal Liberals’ Operation LIFT (Lower Inventories For Tomorrow),
Thatcher was also buoyed by apparent divisions amongst his political opponents.113 An
attempted merger between the Social Credit and Progressive Conservative parties that
ended in acrimony had undermined an effective challenge to the Liberals from the right,
and news reports that the Waffle had split with the NDP in early 1971, although
erroneous, initially reassured Thatcher that the left too was in disarray.114 Nevertheless,
signs of voter disenchantment with Thatcher’s government existed. In addition to
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plunging grain sales troubling Saskatchewan farmers in 1969 and 1970, the Thatcher
government had battled with students over university autonomy, introduced unpopular
user fees for hospitals and medical care programs, and consolidated schools against local
opposition. Furthermore, the Liberal government was known to have blatantly
gerrymandered electoral districts to its own advantage.115
The Liberal campaign, with its two-fold focus promising legislation prohibiting
strikes and a commitment to economic development and diversification by opening more
mines and mills backfired. The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour responded to the
anti-strike pledge by extensively supporting the NDP campaign. And the announcement
of more pulp mills, which many assumed would be American owned, angered opponents
of foreign ownership and industrial pollution.116 In the span of four years the Thatcher
government had antagonized students, farmers, teachers and the labour movement. As
Waffler Don Kossick recalled, “there was a really important coalition politics that was
developing in the late 60s and helped the NDP get elected in ’71.”117
To counter the Liberals, the NDP platform a New Deal for People promised free
collective bargaining, a Land Bank Commission and land-lease program to protect family
farms, a commitment to challenge unhelpful federal government agricultural policies, and
implementation of a fairer tax system. The NDP also took aim at the Liberals’ record of
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promoting economic development by subsidizing American investors. It promised to
cancel construction of the Meadow Lake pulp mill project Thatcher announced early in
the campaign, and to “stop sellouts to foreign promoters… develop resources for the
benefit of all and… protect our environment from pollution.”118
The Waffle’s influence was clearly evident in the Saskatchewan NDP’s electoral
platform. As an editorial in the Regina Leader-Post noted, the NDP platform “has a lot
of Waffle in it.”119 In addition to criticizing the extent of foreign ownership of the major
provincial resource industries and the unfavourable – to the public – terms on which new
mines and mills relied, the platform promised an NDP government would “consider [the]
feasibility of bringing the potash industry under public ownership,” which was a major
Waffle demand.120 David McGrane, a political scientist, has pointed out that the platform
contained ideas also found in the Saskatchewan Waffle Manifesto, including a
commitment to eliminating “all sexual discrimination.” A New Deal for People pledged
to enact a new Human Rights Code that prohibited sexual discrimination in hiring and the
workplace and ensured pregnancy leave entitlements.121
Both the Saskatchewan Waffle Manifesto and the New Deal for People also
promoted creation of a government-run land bank to lease land to farmers unable to buy
their own.122 The NDP had adopted a modified version of the land bank at its 1970
convention, and gone to great lengths to demonstrate its support for private property and
118
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the family farm. Regardless, its more conservatively-oriented critics such as David
Steuart, the Liberal Minister of Finance, attacked the NDP program as communistic, and
likened the Waffle to the humourless “Red Guard.”123 Perhaps fearing such criticisms,
Allan Blakeney ensured his party’s provincial council included an option-to-purchase
clause in the land bank plank of its election platform.124 A New Deal for People
explained that the Land Bank Commission would “purchase land offered voluntarily on
the market at competitive prices and lease this land, guaranteeing tenure, on the basis of
need, with option to buy, with the objective of promoting the maximum number of family
farms in Saskatchewan.”125 The Regina Leader-Post predicted “the farm vote is expected
to tell the story” as both parties wooed Saskatchewan’s farmers. Blakeney presented his
NDP and its proposals for a land bank and curbs on foreign ownership as the “saviours of
the family farm.”126 Ross Thatcher countered that “our program is just the opposite” of
the land bank proposal. “We have sold more than one million acres of Crown land back
to the farmers and we will continue to do so.”127 Thatcher’s Liberals remained highly
critical of Waffle influence over NDP policies throughout the campaign, contrasting the
benefits of free enterprise with the dangers of socialism.128
The Waffle made a conscious effort to minimize its conflicts with the party
leadership in the weeks leading up to the provincial election. Antagonisms between
radicals and moderates in Moose Jaw, where MP John Skoberg openly sympathized with
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the Waffle, threatened to spill over into the rest of the province.129 In the aftermath of the
bitter nomination battle won by Gordon Snyder over Waffler John Conway to succeed
William Davies in the riding of Moose Jaw South in April 1970, Conway and other
Wafflers took over Moose Jaw’s leftist municipal group, the Civic Reform Association,
prompting the city’s two-term mayor L.H. “Scoop” Lewry, a former CCF MP, along with
four other moderate candidates to leave the group.130 Running as an independent in
Moose Jaw’s December 1970 municipal election, Lewry was defeated by former
Conservative MP J. Ernest Pascoe.131 Blakeney explained to Waffler John Richards that
The situation in Moose Jaw is very, very prickly. A couple of weeks ago I spent a
long evening with Snyder, Davies and Skoberg trying to pour oil on troubled
waters. As a result a letter went out to the membership in Moose Jaw signed by
all three which was (I hope) a delicate call for unity. As you may know some of
the Snyder group (if I may use that term) are feeling less than cordial to John
Skoberg and less than cordial to Don Mitchell and John Conway.132
Blakeney admitted he was “concerned about Waffle” and “hesitated to make any public
statements on Waffle since that is clearly to rise to Thatcher’s bait.” He did promise to
be conciliatory in the press and emphasized the importance of party unity heading into
the provincial election.133 For its part, as Richards explained to Blakeney, the Waffle
“wisely decided to adopt a ‘low profile’ until the election is over.”134
Privately, however, the NDP leadership was concerned that internal divisions
might hinder the party’s electoral fortunes. Clifford Scotton, the federal party’s
secretary, predicted the NDP eking out a bare majority winning thirty-two of the
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legislature’s sixty seats.135 Ontario NDP provincial secretary Gordon Brigden reiterated
the party’s concerns about Liberal gerrymandering while also recognizing that “the party
is split, thanks to the Waffle and Thatcher is exploiting this” alongside anti-union
rhetoric.136 For some Ontario party leaders already concerned about the Waffle the
Saskatchewan group appeared to loom larger than life. USWA staffer, party organizer
and Waffle opponent Bob Mackenzie wrote to Brigden to complain about being sent to
the riding of Elrose for the election, which he claimed was the “centre of Saskatchewan
Waffle” in addition to being large, rural and featuring a poorly organized campaign
marred further by suspicions of the party’s Provincial Office.137 Mackenzie added that
the Provincial Office was in complete chaos and suggested that they need to “get rid of
some of the unreasonable and unsupported optimism.” He concluded “I would not dare
report all this to Sefton.”138 As it turned out, NDP candidate and Eston machinery dealer
Hayden Owens, who demonstrated no discernible interest in the Waffle, defeated the
Liberal incumbent in Elrose.
The Saskatchewan Waffle was active in the election campaign, especially in
supporting two candidates, Walter Smishek and John Richards. Smishek, the NDP MLA
for Regina North East, earned his reputation as a leftist in 1961 when, as the provincial
government structured Saskatchewan’s medicare system, he strongly opposed the
introduction of premiums and patient deterrent fees, and argued that doctors should be
salaried rather than allowed to work on a fee-for-service basis. Smishek had spoken
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favourably of the Waffle Manifesto during the party’s 1969 convention. The Waffle also
actively supported the campaign of Richards, a twenty-six-year-old professor of political
economy at the University of Saskatchewan who was contesting the riding of SaskatoonUniversity. Active in the campus NDP as an undergraduate, Richards went on to do
graduate work in economics at the University of Cambridge in England and Washington
University in St. Louis, Missouri. When planning his return to Saskatchewan, Richards
decided to seek an NDP nomination and wrote to party activists in the province
requesting their support. At that point still unaware of the Waffle, Richards expressed his
belief that Canadians “must try to diminish greatly our dependence – economic, political,
and social – on America,” and he blamed American ownership, at least in part, “for the
present chaotic conditions in potash communities.”139
After he won the NDP nomination in September 1970 and publicly identified
himself with the Waffle, Richards unwittingly became the focus of controversy and
student protests on the University of Saskatchewan campus when his one-year teaching
contract with the Department of Economics and Political Science was not renewed in
1971. Two weeks of student occupations of the university’s arts building turned
Richards’s case into a cause célèbre, with the student union council, the Saskatchewan
Waffle and the Saskatchewan NDP Youth all endorsing the protesters.140 Richards’s
supporters suggested that his Waffle sympathies and NDP candidacy were behind the
non-renewal decision, but Leo Kristjanson, who was the department head and also a New
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Democrat, denied the claims.141 The real reason was opposition from economists in the
department who disapproved of Richards’s political economy course.142
It is possible the controversy contributed to Richards’s election victory, or
perhaps he simply was propelled along as the NDP swept into power under Blakeney’s
leadership, capturing forty-five of sixty seats, including thirty-two of the province’s
forty-three rural ridings, and fifty-five per cent of the popular vote. Despite his PC
opponent Peter Russell’s criticisms of Richards’s inappropriate language and Waffle
“extremism,” the NDP triumphed in the newly created Saskatoon-University riding by a
margin of over 1000 votes.143 Commentators at the time attributed the massive and
surprising swing to the NDP across Saskatchewan to the unpopularity of the federal
Liberals’ agricultural policies, dissatisfaction over the Thatcher Liberals’ two tumultuous
terms in government, distrust of foreign investment, concerns over industrial pollution,
and the NDP’s modernized and active canvassing operation.144 Although historians of
the NDP have largely ignored the appeal of the Saskatchewan NDP’s platform when
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explaining the 1971 election victory, Thatcher’s biographer Dale Eisler described New
Deal for People as a “masterstroke.”145
While Saskatchewan Wafflers granted that the unpopularity of both Thatcher’s
government and the federal Liberals significantly influenced the election results, they
also emphasized the contributions of extra-parliamentary “constituent groups.”
According to Waffler John Gallagher, the NFU, the SFL, the Saskatchewan Teachers
Federation (STF), and various environmental groups all vociferously opposed Thatcher’s
Liberals thereby enabling the NDP to benefit “from a sentiment it did not generate.”146
Don Mitchell, formerly a Waffle leadership candidate, agreed that the organized
opposition of labour, farmers and teachers was significant to the NDP’s success, but also
suggested “the left revival in the NDP made the party more credible.”147 Saskatchewan
Wafflers were pleased that Walter Smishek was appointed minister of health in
Blakeney’s cabinet and John Richards named his legislative secretary. Still, the Waffle
harboured uncertainties about the new government. Specifically, John Gallagher noted
“some serious ideological differences” remained between left and right wings of the
caucus, and predicted only moderate reforms would be implemented under the Blakeney
NDP.148
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Nearly two years after its formation the Waffle’s relationship with the NDP had
been strained but not broken. The federal NDP leadership race exposed significant policy
divisions between the Waffle and moderate New Democrats over Quebec’s right to selfdetermination, women’s liberation and gender parity on the party executive and council,
and widespread nationalization of resource industries. The creation of an organized
opposition to the Waffle in the form of the NDP Now group, with its union allies, both
curtailed the Waffle’s policy influence and further polarized the party between radicals
and moderates. Yet Laxer’s surprising second-place finish to David Lewis and the
strength of his final ballot support indicated that the Waffle’s message appealed to a
significant minority of party members. Furthermore, the Waffle’s presence did not deter
voters in Saskatchewan from electing the NDP in that province to a majority government
in the 1971 election. Despite struggles with party moderates over nominations and
policy, the Waffle influenced the Saskatchewan NDP platform and had one of its
members elected as a MLA. Overall, circumstances appeared propitious in mid-1971 for
the Waffle to continue exerting pressure from the NDP’s left wing.

268
Chapter Seven
“I don’t like to see people get their fingers burned unnecessarily:” Polarization,
1971-72
The Wafflers’ optimism was soon challenged. This chapter examines the
Waffle’s escalating conflict with the NDP leadership throughout the latter half of 1971
and into 1972, culminating in Stephen Lewis’s Oshawa speech denouncing the group as a
“party within a party,” thereby setting the stage for its expulsion from the Ontario NDP.
Canadian economic nationalism was high on the political agenda in 1971, and provincial
Waffle groups sought to capitalize on the political climate by pushing the NDP to adopt
policies reflecting the Waffle’s focus on independence and socialism. The group’s
distinctive strategy to conduct parallel electoral and extra-parliamentary activism was
never clearer than during the late summer and fall of 1971. Wafflers in Ontario
supported the Texpack strikers while simultaneously fighting a landmark provincial
election. In Manitoba and Saskatchewan, they struggled to define their relationship with
NDP governments, while federally the NDP agonized over its own relationship with the
Waffle. But conflicts with the party leadership – over the Trotskyist-dominated New
Brunswick Waffle, the Waffle’s role in provincial elections in Saskatchewan and Ontario,
and Waffle supporters within NDP-affiliated unions – intensified to the point where
union leaders and party moderates were pushing by 1972 to marginalize the Wafflers.
Canadians fearful of American domination of their nation’s economy were given
further cause for concern during the summer and autumn of 1971. President Richard
Nixon announced his New Economic Policy (NEP) in a speech on August 15, 1971,
marking a significant shift in American economic and trade policy. Often referred to as
the “Nixon Shock,” it has been described as an “epochal event in the history of Canada-
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United States relations” as the Americans made clear Canada would not be exempted
from protectionist measures.1 Of particular concern to Canadians were the ten percent
temporary import surcharge, the NEP’s ten percent tax credit for American-made
machinery and equipment, and the Domestic International Sales Corporation (DISC) that
allowed American companies to defer paying taxes on at least half of their profits earned
from exports. Authored by John Connally, the Nixon administration’s combative
Secretary of the Treasury, the combined impact of these measures was intended to bolster
American manufacturing in the face of increasing competition from Western Europe and
Japan. But Canada too was in the crosshairs, thereby signaling to many the end to the
‘special relationship’ Canadians had enjoyed with the U.S. to that point.2 Particularly
worrisome were documents revealing American objections to the Auto Pact’s
safeguarding of Canadian economic interests.3 The announcement of America’s
unilateral termination of the Auto Pact had only been removed from Nixon’s speech at
the last minute.4 The Nixon Shock led even the reliably pro-business Globe and Mail to
editorialize “we have lately learned, and are still learning, that Canada’s economic and
political dependence on the United States is not as easy, secure or undemanding as
Canadian complacency has tended to assume in the past.”5 Although the United States
ultimately backed down on changes to the Auto Pact and soon suspended the ten percent
import surcharge against Canada, the aggressively protectionist stance adopted by Nixon
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and Connally seriously shook many Canadians’ faith in American economic
benevolence.
A leaked federal cabinet report in late 1971 confirming large-scale foreign
ownership of the Canadian economy further eroded that confidence. At the request of
Prime Minister Trudeau, Minister without Portfolio Herb Gray had created a working
group to study levels of foreign direct investment in Canada. The Gray Report, submitted
to cabinet in May 1971 and not intended for public consumption, recommended a
“screening agency” for direct foreign investment be implemented in particular areas of
the economy. After a version of the report was leaked by a government official and
published in Canadian Forum in November 1971, the Trudeau government released the
entire report and introduced legislation the following year to create the Foreign
Investment Review Agency.6
As fears of American economic domination percolated in the Canadian political
psyche, conflict within the miniscule New Brunswick NDP boiled over in the fall of
1971. The New Brunswick Waffle, which was the dominant presence in two of the
NDP’s largest riding associations in the province, was confident of attracting even more
delegates into its camp when the provincial party met in convention in late September.
But even they were shocked when the New Brunswick Waffle manifesto, which
contained a stronger critique of capitalism and recommended more extensive socialist
remedies than even the original Waffle Manifesto, passed at the convention by a vote of
forty-one to forty.7 Nine labour delegates promptly exited the proceedings in disgust,
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joined shortly afterwards by more Waffle opponents, thereby thrusting the convention
into chaos and a premature adjournment. At a subsequent meeting of anti-Wafflers, Cliff
Scotton, the NDP federal secretary, admonished the trade unionists for allowing the New
Brunswick Waffle manifesto to pass. By mid-October, Waffle opponents within the New
Brunswick NDP had scheduled another convention, while the Wafflers reconvened the
earlier meeting from September and elected one of their own, Pat Callahan, as party
leader alongside a new executive. The New Brunswick NDP thus found itself with two
competing leaders and executives.8
Meanwhile, the New Brunswick Waffle was itself splitting apart. Members of the
Fredericton Young Socialists (FYS), who had founded the province’s Waffle, had not
attended the September New Brunswick NDP convention since the Toronto-based
Central Executive Council of the YS had suspended their memberships for failing to heed
the instructions of Ross Dowson, leader of the LSA, to adopt a more moderate approach
within the NDP. Fearful that a confrontation in New Brunswick could lead NDP leaders
to purge the LSA and the Waffle from the party in the rest of the country, Dowson
instructed the FYS to intervene in the New Brunswick Waffle in the hopes of avoiding a
split with the provincial NDP.9 The twists and turns of Trotskyist tactics in New
Brunswick could have proved a minor embarrassment for the Waffle had these
maneuvers not been overshadowed by a dramatic series of events much closer to
Canada’s media centre in Toronto.
In the fall of 1971, the Ontario Waffle allied with workers represented by Local
520 of the Canadian Textile and Chemical Union (CTCU) on strike at the Texpack textile
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plant in Brantford, as discussed in Chapter Five. The CTCU represented the remnants of
the Canadian Textile Council of the United Textile Workers of America (UTWA) that
had split from the parent union when the UTWA expelled the popular organizers and
leaders of the Council, Kent Rowley and Madeleine Parent, amidst accusations of
communism.10 The pair continued organizing and representing textile workers in Ontario
and Quebec through the Canadian Textile Council and Parent eventually joined Rowley
in Brantford in 1967.11 The CLC continued to perceive them as communists. Parent had
assisted the Mine, Mill and Smelter Workers Union in the battles against USWA for the
Inco and Falconbridge locals in Sudbury in 1961, 1962 and 1965, resulting in
Steelworker officials portraying her as a red witch atop a broomstick during the bitter
campaigns.12
Other unions had also seceded from their international parent unions in the 1960s,
forming independent Canadian unions as a replacement. Dissatisfaction with the
International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Workers, and the harassment
of two radical unionists from British Columbia by American border guards, led to the
formation of the Pulp, Paper and Woodworkers of Canada (PPWC) in 1963. The
Canadian Association of Industrial, Mechanical and Allied Workers (CAIMAW) formed
in 1964 at Griffin Steel in Winnipeg after seceding from the International Molders and
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Allied Workers Union.13 Barred from the CLC and recognizing an opportunity, Rowley
and Parent organized an alternative national labour federation, establishing the Council of
Canadian Unions (CCU) in July 1969.14 Along with the CTCU the CCU included the
remnants of Mine-Mill Local 598, which continued to represent workers at Falconbridge
in Sudbury, CAIMAW and the PPWC.15 The creation of a small, nationalist rival to the
CLC did not endear Rowley and Parent to the leadership of the labour movement.
Texpack was owned by the American Hospital Supply Corporation, which had
begun phasing out manufacturing at Brantford and using the plant as a warehouse for repackaging surplus U.S. army bandages labelled “Made in Canada.” The company paid
low wages to a workforce eighty percent female. The union local hoped an improved
wage and benefit package would force the company to maintain manufacturing
operations in Brantford. Strike tensions were exacerbated by the company’s hiring of
replacement workers and a court injunction restricting picket lines at the plant. The
strikers’ frustration occasionally boiled over into violent confrontations with police who
were protecting buses of scab labour entering the plant.16
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The CTCU, which contested on principle the use of court injunctions limiting
pickets as a means of easing the use of replacement workers, initially received little
support for the Texpack strike. The Brantford and District Labour Council waited two
months before endorsing the strike in August, and did so then only grudgingly, refusing
to provide financial support because the CTCU was not affiliated with the CLC.17 Worse
still, the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) conducted a CLC-endorsed raid of
the CTCU Local at Harding Carpets in Collingwood, claiming the Texpack strike was
destined to fail.18 Adding insult to injury, the TWUA crossed CTCU picket lines at
Texpack’s Rexdale plant to sign up replacement workers, and applied to the Ontario
Labour Relations Board for bargaining rights before the predictable backlash forced them
to drop the application.19 Texpack workers did receive support, however, from Wafflers
and dissident unionists at USWA Local 1005 at Stelco in Hamilton and UAW Local 439
at Brantford’s Massey-Ferguson plant. By late August the Brantford and District Labour
Council had eased its earlier reticence and helped to organize a demonstration in aid of
the striking Texpack workers. Seven hundred supporters from Brantford and Hamilton
joined the CTCU in a massive demonstration on August 25 which descended into
violence; demonstrators broke windows, threatened photographers and destroyed their
cameras, attacked a police cruiser with rocks, and broke into the plant overturning a
garbage disposal unit that caught fire. A small police contingent stood by without
intervening, less concerned apparently with protecting Texpack property than with
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avoiding a violent confrontation.20 The next day 300 demonstrators again gathered
outside Texpack, but this time were dispersed by police in riot gear, a first for
Brantford.21 One week later, 600 demonstrators marched outside Texpack but police
stayed away and the company closed the plant at the Mayor’s request.22 The following
day, Brantford police withdrew ‘special protection’ for scabs at Texpack.23
The Ontario Waffle joined the Texpack fray in early September by organizing a
conference in Brantford to highlight the strike that drew trade unionists and pledges of
support from the USWA, UAW, and CUPE. Wafflers from Hamilton, London and
Toronto joined the picket lines at Texpack resulting in several, including Mel Watkins,
Steve Penner, Robert Laxer and Daniel Drache, being arrested following a confrontation
with replacement workers and their police protectors.24 Finding it difficult to maintain its
Brantford facility using only replacement workers, the company re-opened a plant in
Rexdale. There as well, Toronto Wafflers joined CTCU members picketing the plant and
scuffled with police while attempting to prevent scabs from crossing their lines.25 The
Waffle also organized a rally at Queen’s Park, and continued to defy the court injunction
limiting picketing. The company, under pressure from government mediators, and the
union agreed to a settlement including a wage increase of seventeen cents an hour on
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October 15 which the striking workers ratified three days later.26 Its encounter with
Rowley and Parent’s CCU and the experience of the bitter Texpack strike hardened the
Waffle’s stance on the role of international unions in the Canadian labour movement.
John Lang, a researcher at York University and CCU member, recalled that the Texpack
strike “challenged the Wafflers to include the domination of Canada’s labour movement
as an important aspect of the US control of our economy.”27 In an analysis that appealed
to the Waffle, Marc Zwelling concluded in Canadian Dimension:
The Canadian Textile & Chemical Union has now given the lie to the myth that
independent Canadian unions can never win against powerful multinational
corporations… It is not the existence of international unions that gives labour its
strength – but a dedicated union leadership, a militant membership and strong
support from the rest of the labour movement.28
At the Ontario Federation of Labour (OFL) convention in November 1971, Cecil
Taylor and George Gilks, Wafflers in USWA Local 1005, submitted an emergency
resolution calling on the OFL to condemn the TWUA for its “collusion with the
company” in signing up scab workers but were ruled out of order.29 OFL president David
Archer declared “we’ll not allow anyone to attack affiliates of this group.”30 Unlike the
previous year’s Reform Caucus at the CLC convention, a newly-formed Waffle Labour
Caucus appeared at the OFL convention, leading the Globe and Mail to report that the
Waffle “is out to defeat the right-wing bureaucracy it says dominates major Canadian
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unions.”31 The Waffle Labour Caucus also sponsored a hospitality suite, distributing a
leaflet that called for “completely sovereign and independent Canadian unions.” The
program for achieving such independence outlined in the leaflet largely aped the CLC
Reform Caucus’s program for autonomy, including ensuring Canadian union officers
were elected by Canadians, union dues paid in Canada remained in Canada, and making
specific acknowledgement of Canadian autonomy in the constitutions of international
unions based in the United States.32
The Nixon Shock and Waffle involvement in the Texpack strike reverberated in
the Ontario election of October 1971 and beyond. Bill Davis, the new leader of the
Ontario Progressive Conservatives, called the election on September 13, 1971, a few
months after succeeding John Robarts as premier. Davis had quickly disposed of two
controversial issues handed him by Robarts when he cancelled construction of the
proposed Spadina Expressway through downtown Toronto, and announced full provincial
funding would not be extended to the province’s Catholic high schools. In his brief time
leading the government Davis had established the Ministry of the Environment, promised
provincial money for public housing, initiated a lawsuit against Dow Chemical for
mercury pollution, created Nordair, a provincially-owned airline to service northern
Ontario, and enacted minor economic nationalist measures such as giving preferential
treatment to Canadian-owned firms seeking government loans and grants.33 Emphasizing
their activist record in government, Davis’s leadership, and a promised three percent cut
in the provincial income tax, Ontario’s PCs combined stellar organization, effective
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fundraising and prominent advertising to give birth to the ‘Big Blue Machine’ that would
repeatedly propel the party into power over the next four elections.34
Yet Stephen Lewis and the Ontario NDP leadership were optimistic as they
embarked on the 1971 election campaign. The senior campaign team, which included
Lewis’s close friend and former Waffler Gerald Caplan, defeated leadership rival Walter
Pitman, former leader Donald MacDonald, party pollster and professor of political
science John Wilson, party secretary Gordon Brigden, and party treasurer John Brewin,
identified sixty-five ridings as the focus of the NDP’s efforts.35
All three parties responded to the Nixon Shock by featuring economic nationalist
planks in their election platforms. Davis’s accomplishments during his brief stint as
premier included halting the sale of Crown lands as well as giving preference to
Canadians when leasing these lands and to Canadian-owned firms seeking government
loans.36 Ontario Liberal Party leader Robert Nixon promised that a Liberal government
would create a Foreign Investment Review Board, possibly headed by the prominent
economic nationalist Walter Gordon.37 And Stephen Lewis began the campaign with a
promise the Ontario NDP would focus on regaining control of the provincial economy
while creating jobs, reducing the cost of living, reforming the tax system, and instituting
new environmental protections.38
Although the Waffle had enjoyed some success influencing Ontario NDP policies
at the 1970 leadership convention, including commitments to nationalize the province’s
34
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energy resource industries, an expansive housing strategy, and women’s liberation,
Stephen Lewis tempered the more radical aspects of the party’s messaging in the
following months. The party sought to moderate Lewis’s image in the lead-up to the
election campaign. In addition to speaking to business clubs, Lewis cut his hair, replaced
his corduroy suits, spoke more slowly and quietly, and sought camera angles that made
him appear more polite. It was all part of a concerted effort to portray the Ontario NDP
as “a reasonable political force,” a moderate image somewhat at odds with how the
Waffle was typically perceived.39
Wafflers secured NDP nominations in six ridings going into the provincial
election. Bruce Kidd, a former Olympian and long-distance runner, defeated Marion
Bryden, the Ontario NDP research director and NDP Now member, for the nomination in
the east Toronto riding of Beaches-Woodbine. John Brown, a social worker, had won the
riding for the NDP in the 1967 election, but opted not to seek re-election after incurring
public criticism over the controversial experimental treatment centre he ran for
emotionally-disturbed children. Among the twenty-one seats it held at the start of the
campaign, the NDP considered Beaches-Woodbine one of the most vulnerable.40 Reid
Scott, a Toronto alderman and longtime CCF/NDP stalwart, worked closely on Kidd’s
campaign, while Kidd proceeded to garner headlines for his outspoken positions on
Canadian sports.41 Within NDP riding associations Waffle support for women’s
liberation at times faced opposition. Varda Burstyn recalled the difficulty of watching
39
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“the grand old lady of Beaches-Woodbine, a stalwart Scots left winger who had never
allowed herself to be politically contained in the women’s auxiliary,” oppose the
inclusion of abortion rights in Kidd’s campaign literature for fear of alienating voters.42
Dan Heap, a self-described Anglican “worker-priest,” secured the NDP
nomination in the downtown Toronto riding of St. Andrew-St. Patrick, where he faced off
against Allan Grossman, a prominent cabinet minister in the Davis government. Heap
and his wife, Alice, who housed young anti-war, anti-poverty and Student Christian
Movement activists in their Kensington Market home, had been among the activists
opposing the proposed Spadina Expressway through downtown Toronto.43 A concerned
Grossman reminded voters that the NDP, unlike his Progressive Conservative party, had
not consistently opposed the expressway’s construction.44
Other than Bruce Kidd, the Waffle’s best opportunity to elect an MPP appeared to
be in the west Toronto riding of Dovercourt, where Steve Penner, chair of the Ontario
Waffle, had defeated Bruce Knapp, a Pollution Probe activist, in a bitter and controversial
nomination battle. A dispute over registration procedures had caused the party to
postpone the nomination meeting, and when it did occur the initial results were ruled
invalid when more ballots were cast than there were delegates registered.45 In addition to
his Waffle activities, Penner had led a protest in downtown Toronto in January 1971 as
42
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part of the National Poor People’s Conference, and planned ongoing demonstrations at a
welfare office to publicize the inadequacy of the program.46 Mel Watkins managed the
twenty-seven-year-old Penner’s campaign during which he lauded the efforts of some
two hundred youthful volunteer canvassers for revitalizing the NDP’s campaign on the
ground, but complained that the party’s central campaign committee was withholding its
support for Penner.47 Penner emphasized that working people were “extremely angry”
with job losses resulting from foreign ownership and government inattention to the issue,
and Waffler Dominic Pagnini, leader of a Toronto-area Italian labour organization,
helped the NDP campaign canvass the riding’s large immigrant population. Penner
opposed the replacement of workers’ homes with high-rise apartment and condominium
buildings that his Liberal and PC opponents endorsed wholeheartedly.48 Watkins
explained that the Waffle sought to demonstrate “that you can put forward a candidate
and a program which represent a genuine alternative, and that people will support
programs more socialist than those presented in Ontario.”49
None of the other three Wafflers were running in ridings where the NDP was
given much chance of success. Dave Neumann, a secondary school teacher, challenged
Ontario Liberal leader Robert Nixon in Brant, Jean Usher took on the Minister of Health,
Bert Lawrence, in Carleton East, and Garth Stevenson ran in Carleton, which had elected
Tories without interruption for decades.
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Stephen Lewis was not especially effective selling his party to Ontario’s
electorate during the 1971 campaign. His responses to reporters’ questions were often
long-winded and meandering.50 Although his sharp wit, remarkable memory, and
articulate speeches frequently impressed members of the Queen’s Park press gallery, the
same characteristics did not always resonate clearly with voters.51 Moreover, he found
the Waffle to be a source of continuous frustration, recalling later that “we fought the
election with and against the Waffle rather than with and against the Tories.”52 Lewis
criticized the New Brunswick Waffle and in response to a reporter’s question exclaimed
“thank God we don’t have an NDP member of the legislature in New Brunswick if that is
what the Waffles are suggesting.”53 Desmond Morton also looked askance at Wafflers’
practice of questioning Lewis on the campaign trail on such controversial issues as
nationalization and access to abortion.54 Lewis’s biographer Cameron Smith claims that
“nine times out of ten he’d be asked [by reporters] to respond to something the Waffle
had said that differed from the party position.”55 Bill Davis, not surprisingly, leapt at the
opportunity to exploit the divisions among the NDP ranks, joking that the Waffle was
causing Stephen Lewis “indigestion.”56 Bruce Kidd pointed out how Conservatives
further sowed suspicion towards the Ontario NDP by distributing leaflets detailing the
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New Brunswick NDP’s adoption of that province’s Waffle manifesto “which called for
the nationalization – without compensation – of everything in sight.”57
Confident that the PC party’s well-funded advertising campaign would translate
into more votes, Davis changed his itinerary during the final days of the campaign in
order to visit NDP-held ridings in Oshawa, Peterborough and Brantford. In response,
Lewis held a rally with 3,200 supporters at Toronto’s O’Keefe Centre at which he echoed
one of the Waffle’s core beliefs, namely that increasing foreign control of Ontario’s
economy was “the single most important issue” in the election campaign, and vowed that
an NDP government would reverse the trend and “we’ll head straight down the road to
regaining social, economic and cultural independence.”58
The results of the election, in which Davis and the Progressive Conservatives
increased their majority to seventy-eight seats with 44.5 percent of the popular vote, were
a disappointment for the NDP.

The party failed to supplant the Liberals as Official

Opposition despite the Liberals’ own lackluster performance. Although the NDP
increased slightly its percentage of the popular vote, from 25.9 percent to 27.1 percent, it
lost several close races and won only nineteen seats, two fewer than it held at
dissolution.59 The three Toronto Wafflers were among the casualties, all losing to their
Tory opponents. Toronto alderman Tom Wardle surpassed Kidd by over 2500 votes, but
Penner came tantalizingly close to winning in Dovercourt where he received just fiftyfive votes fewer than the victor George Nixon, which was an increase of some 1500 votes
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over what the NDP candidate achieved in 1967. Heap likewise increased the NDP’s
share of the popular vote in St. Andrew-St. Patrick, rising from 24.9 percent to 41.8
percent and receiving 3800 votes more than his predecessor had managed, but still lost to
Grossman.60
Wafflers Garth Stevenson and Dave Neumann nearly doubled the NDP’s vote in
Carleton and Brant, and Waffler Jean Usher increased the NDP’s vote from 1075 to 6069
in Carleton East, reflecting the “inexperienced but enthusiastic campaign workers” who
revitalized the party’s door-to-door canvassing efforts in Ottawa.61 But the Ontario
Waffle’s inability to elect one of its own would hinder the group’s capacity to influence
the party’s direction or to defend itself against critics in the months ahead. Steve Penner,
the Dovercourt NDP riding association, and the six Wafflers on the ONDP Provincial
Executive all urged the party to pursue legal action to overturn the Dovercourt results,
pointing to a number of irregularities. Although the party’s legal counsel suggested a
challenge had a strong likelihood of success, the Administration Committee and a
majority of the Executive were concerned with the potential cost and requested instead
that the caucus ask the Chief Electoral Officer to void the election. Penner and the
Waffle continued to agitate for a legal challenge with the Executive finally agreeing to go
along if the Dovercourt riding association could raise sufficient funds to pay the costs.62
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In a closed and confidential meeting of the provincial council following the
election, Lewis reviewed reasons for his party’s disappointing performance and “the large
anti-socialist vote in Ontario.” Among the multiple causes was a backlash against the
NDP for its stance on issues such as abortion and automobile insurance; a “strong antiunion, anti-labour vote;” the Conservatives’ expensive and effective advertising
campaign; an over-abundance of party policy that occasionally contradicted itself; and
distractions created by the Waffle. Conceding that “there was a good showing by
candidates who were identified as Waffle,” Lewis pointed out “there was also a good
showing taken by more moderate candidates.”63 In the discussion that followed Lewis’s
analysis, others voiced criticisms of the campaign and admitted feeling “disturbed” over
the Waffle’s role in the election.64 Privately, Lewis and several others among the Ontario
NDP leadership did not hesitate to lay blame on the Waffle.65 Morden Lazarus, for
example, attributed Mac Makarchuk’s loss in Brantford to his association with the
Waffle’s support for the controversial Texpack strike.66 Desmond Morton accused Steve
Penner of mounting a “well-publicized attack on the party’s official programme,” and
upbraided the Waffle for fighting a semi-autonomous campaign that relied in part on
drawing sympathetic party members away from nearby campaigns to work for Waffle
candidates.67 Morton sneered that “sectarian purity undoubtedly has its admirers but
among Ontario voters they are not easy to find. By making the NDP appear faction-
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ridden and far more extreme than its actual program, the Waffle hurt the party’s electoral
prospects.”68 Waffler John Smart retorted that “if I had as much responsibility for the
campaign as he and his friends in Toronto had, I would probably be looking for someone
else to blame now too.”69 An editorial in the Globe and Mail suggested Lewis had been
“hamstrung by the Waffle” and forced to spend much time and energy “to keep the split
within his own party from destroying the foothold it had going into the election.”70
The Waffle, by contrast, attributed the Ontario NDP’s disappointing performance
to the campaign team’s decision to focus on leadership rather than the socialist policies
adopted by the party convention the previous fall.71 The convention’s commitment to
nationalizing the province’s vast energy resources, for example, had been reduced to a
campaign promise to nationalize the natural gas distribution system only. Mel Watkins
argued the NDP had “effectively linked unemployment and foreign ownership” but failed
to present a convincing solution. Moreover, by highlighting too many different issues the
NDP campaign lacked focus. Most significantly, according to Watkins, the party failed
to make the “Americanization of Ontario” its campaign focus, thereby allowing “Stephen
Lewis… [to] be outflanked on the left by Robert Nixon on the issue of foreign
ownership.”72 In Bruce Kidd’s estimation, it was essential the Ontario NDP undertake
“much more educational work and extra-parliamentary organizing than ever before.”73
Anger over the Waffle’s impact on the Ontario election was still rife when the
NDP Federal Council met the following month. The New Brunswick NDP’s split into
68
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competing Waffle and anti-Waffle sections was the first item on the agenda. Twentyeight members of the New Brunswick NDP opposed to the Waffle had petitioned the
Federal Council to intervene to end the dispute, and Clifford Scotton, the party’s federal
secretary, summarized recent developments in the province. Both David and Stephen
Lewis attacked the New Brunswick Waffle, criticizing its manifesto’s radical policies and
lamenting the harmful impact negative press coverage had on the recent NDP campaign
in Ontario.74 Despite protestations by Alistair Robertson, the newly elected New
Brunswick NDP President and a Waffler, that the Federal Council lacked authority to rule
on the internal affairs of a provincial party, the councillors nevertheless voted to suspend
the New Brunswick NDP until federal party officers were satisfied it had held a
legitimate convention and repudiated the Waffle’s radicalism.75 Waffler Pat Callahan
reacted angrily to the decision, saying it was up to the people of New Brunswick “to
decide whether to accept or reject our policies, not David Lewis or the union brass of
Ontario.”76 The Federal Council’s decision evidently had a desultory effect on the New
Brunswick Waffle, and at a poorly attended meeting the following week the Trotskyist
FYS won support for a less divisive and confrontational approach within the New
Brunswick NDP in an effort to avoid expulsion. Unwilling to accept the federal NDP’s
intervention in the provincial party, the non-Trotskyist members of the New Brunswick
Waffle left the group as a result of the decision to acquiesce and at the rescheduled New
Brunswick NDP convention in late November the FYS, now all that remained of the
provincial Waffle, sought to avoid expulsion by recognizing the Federal Council’s

74

Patrick Webber, “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick’,” MA Thesis, 124.
“Group expelled by federal party, New Brunswick NDP head says,” Globe and Mail, November 13,
1971.
76
“Federal council of NDP faces N.B. challenge,” Globe and Mail, November 15, 1971.
75

288
authority and acclaiming previous leader J. Albert Richardson into the position again.77
With the New Brunswick Waffle effectively neutered, federal NDP President Donald
MacDonald, observing for the federal party, declared the convention legitimate.
Despite the rift within the New Brunswick NDP and the growing animosity
between Wafflers and the NDP in Ontario stemming from the recent provincial election
there, David Lewis presented the Federal Council with an optimistic picture of the party’s
prospects, claiming there existed “a very deep feeling of intense unity in the Party right
across the country.”78 Unity, however, was not a descriptor Wafflers and New
Democrats in Manitoba and Saskatchewan were likely to use when reflecting upon the
state of their party at that moment.
The Manitoba Waffle’s activities had peaked with its support of Laxer’s bid for
the party leadership in early 1971, but then slipped into a semi-dormant state before
restructuring itself in the summer of 1971.79 As mentioned in the more detailed local
study in Chapter Five, the group, which was largely confined to Winnipeg, published a
newsletter, supported striking construction workers, and organized for the city’s
municipal elections before turning its attention in November to the Manitoba NDP
convention where it hoped to wield greater influence than previously. The Waffle did
win the convention’s support for several of its policy resolutions, including a
commitment to nationalize the Greater Winnipeg Gas Company, and to convene a
conference to study the connection between unemployment and American economic
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policies.80 Two issues threatened to divide the convention – the question of public
financing of private and separate schools, and the liberalization of abortion laws.81 Joe
Borowski, a popular former Minister of Transportation and Public Works who had
recently been dropped from the cabinet for opposing liberalized abortion laws, was a
prominent proponent of the former and opponent of the latter.82 The Waffle, who drew
seventy-five delegates to their convention caucus meeting, opposed government support
of private schools, endorsed “greater flexibility in education curricula,” and were vocal
advocates of abortion on demand.83 Despite the internal party divide, Premier Ed
Schreyer, who was popular with delegates, successfully urged the convention to pass a
compromise resolution on public aid for private schools that allowed his cabinet
flexibility to decide the issue. Although members of a policy workshop passed a
resolution over the objections of Joe Borowski and Health Minister René Toupin that
called for abortion to be removed from the Criminal Code, the Waffle was disappointed
when the convention as a whole defeated the resolution several days later.84 Cy Gonick
estimated at least 125 of the 555 delegates attending the convention were sympathetic to
the Waffle, and Waffler Una Decter lost in her race for the party presidency to incumbent
Lawrence Bell in a 290 to 146 vote.85 Frustrated with the lack of substantial policy
debates in the Manitoba NDP, Waffler Alvin Finkel complained “many left-wing
delegates left the 1971 convention believing that the cabinet ministers had so much
manipulated the convention delegates that the big issue was how to restore democracy to
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the convention floor.”86 As its swan song the Manitoba Waffle hosted newly elected
Saskatchewan MLA John Richards at a well-attended public meeting after the
convention, but its activity subsided thereafter.87
Although the Saskatchewan Waffle had reason to be encouraged after the
successful summer election in which Richards was elected in the riding of Saskatoon
Centre, the moderate and top-down approach of the Schreyer government in Manitoba
gave them reason for pause. A month after the provincial election, the group held a
conference in Fort Qu’Appelle that, while closed to the media, attracted over two
hundred people.88 The purpose of the conference was to determine the Waffle’s role in
the new NDP government. Many options were debated: should the Waffle be the
conscience of the NDP; a “loyal internal opposition;” a traditional “left caucus;” the
voice of extra-parliamentary social movements; an “intellectual wing;” advocates of
“smallness” and local control; or left-nationalists.89 Failing to arrive at a consensus left
Wafflers to pursue these disparate roles as they preferred, and they planned an ambitious
strategy. The meeting agreed they would carefully monitor the progress of major policies
through the legislative process to ensure bureaucrats did not dilute the measures of their
leftist heft. The Wafflers also intended to promote socialism via the press, particularly
such left-wing publications as Prairie Fire and Canadian Dimension while focusing
specifically on policies for a land bank, alternative development strategies in northern
Saskatchewan, the potash industry, health care, and the environment. Finally, they
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planned to create “study-action” groups throughout the province and to engage in
unspecified local community organizing.90 At the end of the conference, the
Saskatchewan Waffle welcomed the Blakeney government’s announced cancellation of
an unfavourable contract with an American company to build a pulp mill at Meadow
Lake, a decision Liberal leader Dave Steuart blamed on the “Waffle element” in the
NDP.91 But the Wafflers were disappointed both by government’s unwillingness to
nationalize the company’s other mill in Prince Albert and by its intention to compensate
the company for expenses incurred at Meadow Lake and, claiming Saskatchewan voters
would support a legal battle to deny compensation, argued that “people are fed up with
government deals that offer crumbs to the people and huge benefits to entrepreneurs.”92
Don Mitchell urged the government to hold public hearings prior to “any further
development plans for the north, whether for pulp mills or other resources.”93 The
recently-elected John Richards warned the NDP that Waffle support remained conditional
on the party enacting its election platform recently endorsed by the province’s voters and
encouraged “farmers, labourers, people in education and the party members to remain
very active in assuring that the program is fulfilled.”94
In addition to formulating its ambitious agenda, the Saskatchewan Waffle
questioned what precisely Richards’s role should be both within the group and the party.
Some Wafflers expressed concern that Richards was being identified by the mainstream
media as their group’s sole spokesperson, a problem Richards also acknowledged while
90
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defending his right to provide a Waffle critique of the government.95 Richards sought
advice from former leader Woodrow Lloyd who warned him to be prepared for
disappointment when promoting leftist policies in government. Yet Lloyd also
encouraged Richards, explaining “there may be more support than expected in caucus.
My own guess is that there is more in the country generally than is assumed by many.”
Lloyd assured him “it seems to me that the Waffle group has a real opportunity and a
very considerable responsibility.”96
In the lead-up to the Saskatchewan NDP convention of December 1971, the
Waffle agitated for the NDP to take radical actions. The group placed advertisements in
the party newspaper and held “teach-ins” at Regina to mobilize NDP members into
pressuring the Blakeney government to support socialist measures such as eliminating the
option-to-purchase clause from the land bank policy.97 In a press release issued just prior
to the convention, the Waffle criticized the government for failing to fulfill its election
platform, and argued in favour of public ownership of resource industries as an
alternative to foreign ownership.98 Nevertheless, a majority of convention delegates
defeated two key Waffle resolutions – the nationalization of the Prince Albert pulp mill,
and elimination of the option-to-purchase clause from the proposed land bank legislation
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– and no Wafflers were elected to the party’s Provincial Council.99 The Waffle did
succeed, however, in convincing the convention to adopt both a resolution favouring
creation of a publicly-owned oil company for the province and a constitutional change
requiring constituency associations to elect at least one woman among their two delegates
to the party’s provincial council.100 Wafflers were pleased with the party’s adoption of
these policies but declared themselves “uneasy” about the election of party officials who
“are in many cases opposed to the very policies adopted by the convention.”101 John
Warnock estimated that about thirty-five per cent of the delegates supported Waffle
initiatives, but concluded “the polarization is growing within the provincial NDP… It
will be difficult for the Waffle movement to hold down those elements (mainly the older
CCFers and the youth) who want to split and form a socialist party.”102
The Waffle’s disappointments over its proposals’ generally poor reception at the
Saskatchewan NDP convention were augmented by Minister of Agriculture Jack
Messer’s plans for a Land Bank Commission presented to the Saskatchewan cabinet later
that month. Although Messer and Deputy Minister Doug McArthur advocated keeping
rents low in order to encourage leasing rather than the option-to-purchase, the Waffle
opposed the weakened land bank proposal as inadequate.103 Don Mitchell argued that
without first implementing other Waffle measures, such as regulating the farm machinery
and food-processing industries, and limiting farm size, a diminished land bank would fail
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to stem the tide of farm consolidations and rural depopulation.104 Linking the
government’s proposal to the unpopular federal Minister of Agriculture Otto Lang,
Mitchell suggested that a “land bank coupled with the assumptions of the federal task
force will ‘Lang bank’ all the way!”105
Questions about their role and future strategy also dominated discussions among
Wafflers in Ontario. The Toronto Waffle, as the largest group in the province and home
to most of the Ontario leadership including James Laxer, Krista Maeots, Mel Watkins,
Kelly Crichton, Steve Penner and Jackie Larkin, met in December 1971 to debate
strategy and determine if only NDP members should be allowed to participate in the
Waffle. A small number criticized the Waffle’s commitment to working within the NDP,
arguing the Waffle leadership was too focused on electoral activity and therefore
dismissive of extra-parliamentary activism. Having “grasped the essence of social
democracy… the fact that it is not a solution at all to class oppression, but an attempt –
always unsuccessful – to divert the crisis inherent in capitalism,” they urged the rest of
the Waffle “to become serious about starting to build an anti-imperialist movement, or, at
least… start to discuss it seriously.”106 They also contended the Waffle should remain
open to non-members of the NDP, making the confusing claim that the Waffle, having
been open to non-members in the past, was more than a “left caucus” of the NDP and
therefore accountable to its own membership.107 Not persuaded, the Toronto Waffle
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instead adopted the position of other Waffle groups that only NDP members were
allowed to vote or hold office in the Waffle. Jackie Larkin and Steve Penner questioned
how well the Waffle’s electoral activity fit with its overall political strategy. They
believed the group should remain active in the NDP in order to build a “strong mass base
of support for socialist politics” in anticipation of its eventual split from the party’s right
wing. Ongoing coordinated Waffle activity in electoral politics as well as community
and workplace organizing efforts was therefore essential.108
Waffle leaders acknowledged the veracity of some of these critiques. Mel
Watkins, Kelly Crichton and Gordon Laxer were among those who admitted “the Waffle
has tended so far to be unduly preoccupied with moving from convention to convention
and from election to election,” and believed further efforts at political organizing around
community issues was in order. They also advocated continued electoral activity, urging
Wafflers to seek NDP nominations and “special efforts be made to encourage women,
workers and new Canadians” especially.109 Krista Maeots noted that whereas the Waffle
had participated in non-electoral activities its primary focus had been “mass educational
work.” As a result “our most important failing has been in the area of advancing beyond
mass educational work to the building of a solid core of socialist activists in plants,
offices, schools and rural communities.” Encouraged by the formation of a Waffle
Labour Caucus, Maeots warned that “the labour leadership no longer sees us as a force
that will quickly die away; instead they see us beginning to carry anti-imperialist,
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socialist politics and the demand for a Canadian trade union movement into their back
yards.”110
Indeed, union leaders did grow increasingly concerned as the Waffle built a
support base within the labour movement. As James Laxer explained, “the fact that
dissident Steelworkers and Auto Workers were becoming involved with the Waffle was
highly alarming to the regional and national leadership of the USWA and the UAW…
they feared the Waffle might be gaining a foothold in their very organizations.”111 In
order to do so the Waffle allied with existing factions in some of the largest and most
powerful locals in the two biggest unions affiliated with the NDP – USWA locals 1005
(Stelco in Hamilton) and 6500 (Inco in Sudbury) and the UAW Left Caucus, which
included leaders of powerful Autoworker locals across southern Ontario – whose
membership was becoming increasingly antagonistic towards its international
leadership.112
Lingering bitterness over the USWA’s successful 1962 raid on Mine-Mill, the
Communist-linked union which had long represented Inco workers, and the USWA’s
handling of the 1966 wildcat strike at Inco, helped the Waffle attract support at USWA
Local 6500 in Sudbury.113 As well, as James Laxer recalled, “leading figures in Local
1005 at Stelco in Hamilton… gravitated to the Waffle.”114 Political conflict within the
massive USWA Local 1005 dated back to the union’s formation, but by the late 1960s a
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growing influx of young workers further altered that local’s political dynamics. After the
1966 wildcat strike at Stelco two groups of union activists gained support in opposition to
the ‘Right Wing Group’ which supported the international union and was closely aligned
with USWA staff. The longstanding ‘Left Wing Group” included older workers who had
been active in the 1950s opposing USWA raids on Communist unions but gained new
supporters in the late 1960s. The ‘Autonomy Group” formed in 1965-66 criticized
Steelworker staffers, such Stewart Cooke, the Hamilton Area Supervisor, and Larry
Sefton, Director for District Six, and pushed for the Canadian sections of the USWA to
break away from the international union. Leaders of both the ‘Left Wing Group,’ such as
Harry Greenwood, and the ‘Autonomy Group,’ such as Cec Taylor, supported the
Waffle.115 Greenwood challenged Sefton’s handpicked successor and NDP stalwart,
Lynn Williams, for election as District Director for District Six in February 1972,
promising “Canadian control through a Canadian Constitution.”116 Although Williams
won, Greenwood’s challenge was the first time the USWA District Six Director had not
been acclaimed, an indication of increasing polarization within the Steelworkers during
the early 1970s.
The other major industrial union closely linked with the NDP, the UAW, had a
Left Caucus in its Canadian section which included both Communists and left-wing
CCFers since before the Second World War until the 1950s.117 In the 1960s the Canadian
UAW became divided over the direction the continental auto industry was taking.
Beginning in 1960, a minority in the Canadian UAW opposed the formalized integration
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of the Canadian and American auto industries and advocated instead for automobiles
designed and manufactured entirely in Canada.118 Charlie Brooks, president of Local 444
(Chrysler in Windsor) from 1956 to 1977 and Abe Taylor, president of Local 222 (GM in
Oshawa) from 1963 to 1978, were among the most vocal critics of the Auto Pact, which
allowed for duty-free trade in vehicles and auto parts between Canada and the United
States while establishing minimum Canadian content safeguards.119 However, UAW
President Walter Reuther, the Canadian UAW Director George Burt, and the Canadian
Council of the UAW all supported the Auto Pact, believing a fully integrated continental
auto industry to be in their members’ best interests.120 James Laxer recalled that Waffle
support in the UAW “included left wingers and nationalists who had been opposed to the
Canada-United States Auto Pact during the 1960s.”121
Demographic changes among the UAW’s membership further enhanced the
union’s rebelliousness and support for the Waffle. The Ontario New Democratic Youth
reported that their Oshawa club consisted mainly of young workers from UAW 222 who
acted as a “left grouping with the NDP, and to some extent, within their unions.”122 As
was happening in the steel industry, auto plants experienced during the mid to late 1960s
an increase in young workers whose expectations differed from their older peers. They
insisted, for example, that working conditions as well as wage gains be up for
negotiation. When the UAW struck GM in the fall of 1970 at the outset of the ‘Big
118
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Three’ bargaining round, members in the United States returned to work before their
Canadian counterparts who remained out on strike until December in an attempt to win
additional demands that included voluntary overtime and the primacy of the French
language at GM’s plant in Ste-Thérèse, Quebec. The international union leadership,
including UAW President Leonard Woodcock, intervened to reach a settlement that
included a generous wage increase but dropped the Canadian membership’s secondary
demands, fueling opposition to the UAW leadership in Canada.123 Concessionary
agreements at UAW locals representing workers at Acme Screw and Gear and MasseyFerguson in January and February 1971 further angered leftists in the Canadian UAW
frustrated by their union’s timidity. As a result, a group of UAW radicals met in June
1971 to establish a new Left Caucus and elect a steering committee.124 With members
drawn from the old Left Caucus such as Gordie Lambert and Bill Rutherford, aligning
with younger activists such as Pat Clancy and Waffler Al Campbell, the new Left Caucus
advocated a strategy including mass demonstrations and wildcat strikes to combat work
speedups, imposed overtime, and threatened plant closures. Also highlighted was
increased activism within the NDP, and most importantly recognition of Canadian
autonomy within the UAW.125 The UAW strike at Douglas Aircraft in Malton, Ontario,
in the fall of 1971 gave the new Left Caucus further ammunition in demanding Canadian
autonomy. When the workers represented by UAW Local 1967 decided to remain on
strike after their American counterparts settled for salary increases dictated by President
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Nixon’s recently introduced wage controls, the international and Canadian UAW
leadership intervened to end the strike and force the striking members back to work.126
In response to reports that Canadian safeguards in the Auto Pact were at risk from
President Nixon’s New Economic Plan, the Left Caucus pushed for a one-day strategy
conference at the Canadian District Council meeting in September 1971, but the majority
of council delegates rejected the proposal. In contrast to the militant strategy of a oneday walkout and mass demonstration that the new Left Caucus advocated, Canadian
UAW Director Dennis McDermott initiated a letter-writing campaign aimed at MPs to
protest against revisions to the Auto Pact that might disadvantage Canadian workers.127
When the Waffle organized and co-sponsored a conference on the Auto Pact with its
UAW allies from the Windsor and District Labour Council in January 1972 – after the
Left Caucus’s proposal for a similar conference had recently been defeated by the
Canadian UAW – McDermott saw the move as an affront to internal union democracy
and the all-important principle of solidarity.128
The Waffle conference, which attracted 230 autoworkers, was addressed by
Charlie Brooks, President of the UAW Canadian District Council, Ed Baillargeon,
President of the Windsor and District Labour Council, and Ed Broadbent. Dennis
McDermott did not attend. Attracting front page coverage in the Windsor Star, the
conference called for an independent Canadian auto industry and attacked the UAW
leadership for failing to defend adequately Canadian production safeguards in the Auto
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Pact.129 The conference also called for a one-day walkout and a demonstration by
Autoworkers in Ottawa.130 Two days later the Windsor and District Labour Council
likewise endorsed a resolution calling for a one-day strike in the auto industry to oppose
the rumoured elimination of safeguards.131 As James Laxer later realized, the “highly
successful event in the heart of UAW country… the Windsor conference was the last
straw” for labour leaders.132
Dennis McDermott, at a meeting of the UAW Canadian District Council the
following weekend, assailed the Waffle at the same time he accused the new Left Caucus
of disrupting internal union democracy. He warned that the Waffle was behaving like an
independent political party and seeking to infiltrate the labour movement. “This union
has dissociated itself from the activities of the Waffle,” McDermott claimed, “and in my
view the NDP will have to do the same thing.” He labelled James Laxer “an
irresponsible academic, accountable to no one, a headline-hunter, and an ego-tripper par
excellence. His solution to every industrial problem is to first seize the plant and then
nationalize the industry.” Clearly on a roll, McDermott suggested that Waffle leaders
start their revolution in the universities where “they draw their fat salaries for lecturing a
couple of hours a week, and have all kinds of free time on their hands to meddle in other
people’s business. Meanwhile, why don’t they… for want of a better expression… get
lost.”133 The new Left Caucus’s resolutions criticizing the UAW leadership for the
timidity of the letter-writing campaign and its handling of the Douglas Aircraft strike
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were defeated decisively by the Canadian District Council.134 Watkins and Laxer
responded in a statement released the following day. Calling McDermott’s attack
“beneath contempt,” the Wafflers suggested that McDermott “is more concerned about
the heads of his union in Detroit than he is about the sellout of the auto pact
safeguards.”135 Nevertheless, they described their own relationship with the NDP as
cordial. Laxer commented that “I don’t expect any tension over the next few months.
We are all working together for the next election.”136 He could not have been more
mistaken.
The labour movement leadership monitored Waffler and leftist activity in the major
union locals, sharing their findings with senior party officials. Morden Lazarus, Public
Relations Director of the OFL, wrote to NDP federal secretary Cliff Scotton about Laxer
and Watkins and informed him that a pro-McDermott slate had ousted the “Abe Taylor
group” in UAW Local 222 in the aftermath of the Auto Pact Conference and the UAW
Canadian Council.137 The CLC maintained a confidential collection of documents and
press clippings recording Wafflers’ statements about the Canadian labour movement.138
Jean Beaudry, Executive Vice-President of the CLC, told a Saskatchewan Federation of
Labour convention that the Waffle should not try to “capture unions for their own
particular purposes or political motives.” Beaudry defended international unions and
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“served notice” that “the labour movement is well able to look after itself,” before hinting
ominously that “I don’t like to see people get their fingers burned unnecessarily.”139
Union activists and NDP members in the Hamilton-Mountain riding association,
angered by the Waffle’s role in the previous Ontario election and its unwelcome
interventions in the labour movement, passed a resolution in late November 1971 for
debate at the Ontario NDP Provincial Council in March 1972 calling for “those who
adhere to any clearly identifiable ongoing political group” to be removed from the party’s
membership rolls.140 Ian Deans, MPP for the Hamilton-area riding of Wentworth and
House leader of the Ontario NDP caucus, supported the motion, arguing the Waffle was
damaging the NDP’s ability to speak clearly for itself. Deans alleged the Waffle had
become “a political organization unto yourself,” and its presence meant “continuous
harangues and battles that go on between the two factions.”141 The Waffle’s Auto Pact
Conference in Windsor had only exacerbated frictions with its opponents. An informal
discussion in January 1972 between Stephen Lewis, Michele Landsberg, James Laxer
and Krista Maeots failed to resolve the differences between the party leadership and the
Waffle.142
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In February 1972 the Ontario Waffle held a conference at Hamilton’s McMaster
University featuring sessions on Quebec, the labour movement, the women’s liberation
movement, culture and media, and several other topics.143 The conference only fuelled
the ire of the NDP leadership. Stephen Lewis took a clear stand on the Waffle’s position
within the NDP during his speech to the Ontario NDP’s Provincial Council the following
month. Declaring that “we, as a political party, can no longer proceed in our present
state,” Lewis attacked the Waffle on four fronts – “human relationships, structure, labour
and ideology.” He criticized the Waffle for instilling “acrimony and bitterness” in the
party, for its harsh attacks on union leadership, and for publicly promoting policies
contrary to the NDP’s. Referring specifically to the recent Hamilton conference, Lewis
outlined the Waffle’s structure and fundraising efforts, arguing “it seems to me
indisputable that the Waffle has already virtually become – certainly verges on – a party
within a party.”144 Rather than following up Lewis’s speech with the scheduled debate
on the Hamilton Mountain riding association’s resolution to expel the Waffle, Ontario
NDP provincial secretary Gordon Brigden introduced a compromise resolution
acknowledging “the grave anxiety among our membership at the emergence of a distinct
group within the Party” and calling on the party executive to “prepare a statement
outlining the responsibilities and obligations of members of the party.”145 The motion
passed by a vote of 157 to 62.146 A committee was established comprised of Gordon
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Vichert, the party’s president, John Brewin, its treasurer, and Gerald Caplan, tasked with
drafting a statement to be discussed at the next provincial council. The Waffle thereby
retained its place in the Ontario NDP, at least momentarily.
The Waffle’s unique strategy of conducting parallel electoral and extraparliamentary activism was most apparent in the summer and fall of 1971. The American
turn to protectionism represented by the “Nixon Shock” and the leak of the federal
government’s Gray Report showing increasing American ownership of the Canadian
economy caught the attention of many Canadians. As a result, economic nationalism
gained political prominence in late 1971 and the Waffle sought to take advantage of the
situation. The Ontario Waffle’s support of striking workers at Brantford’s Texpack
factory served to demonstrate the dangers of foreign ownership and the limitations of
conservative international unions whose leadership was closely connected to the NDP.
Nevertheless, Wafflers continued to work within the party to organize for the adoption
and implementation of more left-wing policies. Six Wafflers won nominations and ran
for the NDP during the October 1971 election in Ontario. However, all were defeated
despite Steve Penner coming agonizingly close to victory, hindering the Waffle’s
influence within the Ontario NDP. Wafflers in Manitoba and Saskatchewan alike were
frustrated by their inability to substantially influence party conventions, let alone NDP
governments, in those two provinces and began to question the group’s role in the party
as a result. Moreover, the Waffle’s struggle with the NDP leadership was exacerbated by
conflict in New Brunswick between the Trotskyist-dominated Waffle and party
moderates, perceptions that the Waffle’s presence during the Ontario election had harmed
the party’s electoral prospects there, and the enhanced support for the Waffle amongst
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dissident caucuses within the USWA and UAW. Events in Ontario early in 1972 would
thrust all of this internal strife into public view and signal the beginning of the end for the
Waffle in the NDP.

307
Chapter Eight
“To fight for a free Canada, but without the Waffle forever an encumbrance around
my neck:” Conflict, 1972
Stephen Lewis’s speech denouncing the Waffle at the Ontario NDP’s Provincial
Council meeting at Oshawa in March 1972 reverberated throughout the NDP nationwide. The Waffle would spend much of the ensuing two years in an existential crisis,
debating its position vis-à-vis the NDP. Until the spring of 1972, its raison d'être had
been to challenge many of the NDP’s core attitudes and principles. Central to James
Laxer’s argument that the Canadian New Left should engage in electoral politics as well
as extra-parliamentary struggles was the existence of a social democratic party with a
union base and history of leftist politics.1 Although the Waffle had engaged with nonelectoral social movements, most notably within unions, its primary focus over the
previous two-and-a-half years had been to change the NDP. In the aftermath of Lewis’s
Oshawa speech, the Ontario Waffle, which the media tended to cast as representative of
the group nationally, devoted all of its energies to offsetting Lewis’s criticisms while
struggling to maintain a foothold in the Ontario NDP. In Saskatchewan and Manitoba, by
contrast, the Waffle questioned its very existence in the party. Frustrated by an inability
to influence substantially the NDP governments in those provinces, leading Wafflers
soon abandoned hope in the party’s openness to radical economic and societal changes.
Socialism, at least as the Waffle understood it, simply was not in the cards in either
Saskatchewan or Manitoba in 1972. In Manitoba, where the Waffle was weakest, its
members began drifting away from both the group and the NDP, while its sole MLA, Cy
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Gonick, grew increasingly disillusioned with electoral politics. In Saskatchewan, where
the existence of a stronger left tradition within the NDP might have been cause for
greater optimism among Wafflers, they nevertheless spent much of the next eighteen
months debating the appropriate time and tactics for departing the NDP. After losing the
fight to remain within the Ontario NDP, the Waffle there divided into those who chose to
park their loyalties with the party and the rump who preferred to eventually establish a
new political party to challenge the NDP electorally. Meanwhile, in British Columbia,
the election of an NDP government in August 1972 became final confirmation that the
west coast Waffle had been fully absorbed into the party’s mainstream. All told, by the
fall of 1972, the Waffle remained active in just two provinces, Ontario and
Saskatchewan.
In Ontario, the NDP executive established a committee consisting of Gordon
Vichert, John Brewin and Gerald Caplan to fulfill the Provincial Council’s mandate of
preparing “a statement outlining the responsibilities and obligations of members to the
Party” with the expectation that the Waffle’s involvement in particular would be
scrutinized. The executive agreed to a motion by James Laxer that the committee hold
consultation meetings with party members in Thunder Bay, Timmins, Sudbury, Ottawa,
London, and Toronto.2 Vichert, in recalling these meetings, commented on the relentless
hostility the committee encountered from Waffle supporters. Comparing Wafflers to the
Baptist fundamentalists of his youth, Vichert proclaimed “over and over again, wherever
we went, we were subjected to that kind of blood test on the part of the Waffle who set up
2
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its own strict interpretation of what the policy of the party ought to be, and then called
everyone a heathen who didn’t adhere to those policies.”3 He noted “we were not only
dealing here with an ideological movement but with a movement for the leadership of
Jim Laxer and Mel Watkins, for their own prestige and power within the party, and that
seemed to us intolerable.”4
The Vichert Committee received over one hundred submissions reflecting widely
divergent views of the Waffle’s role in the NDP. The St. George riding association
executive brief to the Vichert Committee acknowledged that the Wafflers “may have
caused some confusion in the public mind,” but argued its actions did not warrant a purge
and they would be ill-inclined to continue supporting a party that ousted the Waffle.5 The
Welland riding association, by contrast, demanded “the dismantling of the structure and
organizations of the Waffle” and advocated constitutional changes to “prevent the
continuance or new formation of any such group.”6 A group of moderates, including
John Harney, Walter Pitman, Karl Jaffary and Desmond Morton, claimed the party was
“being presented with a terrible set of alternatives and we do not want to be forced to
choose between them.” They proposed instead a compromise that would allow an
autonomous Waffle separate from the NDP, to associate with the party in a manner
similar to union affiliation.7
The Ontario Waffle’s submission to the committee recognized the intra-party
tensions, but accused Stephen Lewis of escalating them into a full-blown crisis with his
3
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speech to the ONDP Provincial Council. The Waffle contended instead that the greater
crises with which the party needed to be concerned were “the increasing contradictions
that manifest themselves in a dependent capitalist Canada,” namely the dangers to the
country’s economy posed by foreign ownership and the growing appeal of a progressive
Québécois nationalism. The Waffle brief also claimed Lewis’s criticism of the Waffle
for maintaining its own mailing list and conducting independent fundraising efforts was
just a ploy for disguising his true ideological objections to the group. The brief defended
Waffle support of unions, and proposed several changes to the party’s governance
including provision for allowing only ONDP members to sit as delegates at the party’s
councils and conventions.8
Although the Ontario Waffle’s message to the Vichert Committee was combative
in defending its right to exist within the NDP, the group was taking measures to limit its
conflicts with the party and union leadership by disassociating from more radical left
groups. Laxer explained that “behind the scenes, a few efforts were made to find
common ground between the Waffle and the party leadership. At one point, Stephen
Lewis asked me to have dinner with him, and the pleasant evening we spent discussing
the future of the party gave me a false sense of hope that compromise could be
possible.”9 Before Laxer defeated Marion Bryden for the federal NDP nomination in
East York he denied suggestions that a victory represented a test of the Waffle’s strength
in the party and instead indicated that “if Marion wins tonight, I’ll work for her, and I
think that if I win, she’ll work for me.” A reporter, obviously frustrated by the lack of a

8

A statement by the Ontario Waffle to the Ontario Executive of the New Democratic Party, personal files.
This stipulation would preclude union members or staff who were not New Democrats from sitting as
delegates at the ONDP’s councils and conventions.
9
Laxer, In Search of a New Left, 161.

311
political “bloodbath” at the nomination meeting, complained about an atmosphere
lacking energy, commenting “there were no demonstrations; there was no bar; there were
none of the visceral pleasures associated with traditional political competitiveness…
there were no fireworks.”10 Meanwhile the Ottawa Waffle, for example, had initially
partnered with the Canadian Liberation Movement (CLM) on the Committee Against the
Nixon Visit to protest the American President’s visit to Canada and speech to a joint
session of Parliament in April. But barely a week before Nixon’s arrival the Waffle
withdrew from the committee and chose to hold an educational event rather than
participate in the protest. Its erstwhile partners alleged the Ottawa group had been
threatened with expulsion from the NDP if it went ahead with the protest alongside the
radical CLM and accused Wafflers Laxer and Watkins, who refused to speak publicly
alongside Gary Perly, the CLM’s outspoken leader, of submitting to pressure from David
and Stephen Lewis.11 The same month Watkins decried the radical New Brunswick
Waffle manifesto as “a totally unacceptable thing” that “lay beyond the pale of social
democracy.”12
Internal strife within the Council of Canadian Unions (CCU) provided more fuel
to the CLM charge that the Waffle leadership was yielding to party demands. Jim Tester,
a Waffle supporter and president of the only remaining Mine Mill local (Local 598)
representing workers at Falconbridge in Sudbury, sought advice from Bill Walsh, a union
arbitrator and consultant and long-time member of the Communist Party before joining
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the NDP in 1969 and becoming active in the Ontario Waffle. At Robert Laxer’s request,
Walsh had helped to establish the Waffle Labour Caucus. Although Mine Mill had a
long relationship of mutual support with Kent Rowley and Madeleine Parent, including
hosting the CCU’s founding convention in Sudbury in July 1969, that relationship began
to unravel. Simultaneous strikes at Inco and Falconbridge in the fall of 1969 led to
cooperation between the old rivals, USWA and Mine Mill, despite Parent’s advice to the
contrary. Furthermore, Mine Mill had downplayed its CCU connection during the strike
in order to solicit support from international unions the CCU had loudly criticized
previously.13 When Rowley requested Mine Mill Local 598’s assistance in the CCU’s
attempted raids on Steel locals at Trail, Kitimat, Thompson, and Hamilton, Tester and
Walsh declined. Concerned that the CCU connection might invite another raid by the
USWA, they pushed for disaffiliation from the CCU, a move the membership supported
in April 1972.14 The CLM in turn interpreted the push for CCU disaffiliation as further
evidence of the Waffle acquiescing to the NDP and labour leadership in order to avoid a
purge. According to the CLM, Walsh, Tester and the Ontario Waffle leadership were
seeking “to prove to the NDP leaders and to the all-powerful Steelworkers, who would
just love to have the Mine-Mill membership, just how good and trustworthy the Waffle
leadership is.”15
Unlike their Ontario counterparts, the Saskatchewan Waffle determined that it
must break away from the NDP. Disappointment over the NDP government’s newlycreated land bank spurred the decision. When Jack Messer, Saskatchewan’s Minister of
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Agriculture, introduced legislation in early 1972 to create a Land Bank Commission it
faced multiple criticisms. The president of the Estevan Chamber of Commerce described
the plan as “complete folly,” Liberal leader David Steuart attacked the bill as a “land
grab” akin to farm policies behind the “Iron Curtain,” and the Saskatchewan Waffle
complained the land bank’s option-to-purchase detracted from the broader goal of
furthering public ownership.16 Doug McArthur, the Deputy Minister of Agriculture and
principal author of the legislation, sought to encourage leasing by keeping rents low.
However, his explanation “that the option to purchase not undermine the main tenure
option that the Land Bank was attempting to introduce” failed to convince the Waffle.17
The Land Bank Act passed the Saskatchewan legislature in May 1972 and the Land
Bank Commission began operations later that year.18
Consequently many of the key figures in the Saskatchewan Waffle had given up
hope by the spring of 1972 of sufficiently influencing the NDP. At a conference in
March that was closed to the press, Wafflers discussed the province’s resource policy and
economic development, focusing on oil and potash. Although they agreed to emphasize
nationalization as the preferred path towards a comprehensive socialist economic
development policy, some expressed fear that “the NDP government could conceivably
give in to pressure and act in this area – as they are now doing in the land bank – without
any socialist orientation, and indeed corrupting the idea.”19 There was general agreement
that the Waffle’s continued presence in the NDP maintained the “left legitimacy of the
16
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party,” and that a split was both an inevitable development and a positive step on the road
to socialism in Saskatchewan.20 The one remaining question that was to dominate the
Saskatchewan Waffle for the next year involved the “tactics and timing” for breaking
with the NDP. In the meantime the group resolved to remain politically active by starting
a bimonthly news magazine to report “the news omitted by the capitalist press.” The
resulting publication, Next Year Country, would occupy the attention of several leading
Wafflers for several years to come.21
Given the Manitoba Waffle’s limited strength compared to its counterparts in
Ontario and Saskatchewan, the decision by disgruntled NDP MLA Jean Allard to depart
the caucus in April 1972 due to “the growing influence of doctrinaire socialists and social
radicals” was met with incredulity by most observers.22 Caucus annoyance over Allard’s
public musings that he might contest the federal Liberal nomination in Churchill seemed
a likelier reason. Certainly neither Cy Gonick nor the social conservative NDP MLA Joe
Borowski were dismayed by Allard’s news. Gonick suggested personal conflicts rather
than ideological differences were responsible for Allard’s departure: “he was not a person
that most members of the caucus liked to deal with.”23 Although Allard had agreed with
Borowski’s opposition to the legalisation of abortion and his support for funding separate
schools, Borowski, who was no stranger to intemperate outbursts himself, described
Allard’s departure as “the best news I’ve heard” since being elected.24
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Gonick would undoubtedly have dismissed Allard’s claim that radical socialists
were influencing Manitoba’s NDP government. Although Gonick supported the
government’s land bank strategy for tackling rural depopulation, he did not hesitate to
hold the Schreyer administration to account.25 Gonick urged the government to adopt a
strategy for industrial development and address the problem of multinational corporations
shutting down plants in Manitoba by committing to nationalize any industry that
terminated operations in the province.26 He also challenged the government’s
conclusions on the potential impact of South Indian Lake flooding, leading a reporter to
note that Gonick “has been known to ask embarrassing questions of his government
colleagues.”27 Gonick was also a lonely voice for the women’s liberation movement,
calling on the provincial Human Rights Commission to take action on the “sexist nature
of readers in our elementary schools.”28 On one occasion, to highlight how women were
treated as sex objects “to sell products” he jokingly exposed the Manitoba legislature to a
fold-out photograph of a nude Burt Reynolds that appeared in Cosmopolitan magazine.29
The struggling Manitoba Waffle, concerned over developments in Ontario and
Saskatchewan and the fact that the national Steering Committee had been inactive for a
year, initiated a call for a national meeting of representatives from all provincial Waffle
groups to meet in Winnipeg at the end of April. Ontario, Saskatchewan and Manitoba
were all represented but the sole expected representative from British Columbia, Ken
Novakowski, a Waffler and federal NDP candidate, was unable to attend. Mel Watkins
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reported on the Waffle’s situation in Ontario and outlined concessions it was willing to
make to remain in the provincial NDP. These included notifying the party in advance
about the Waffle’s public activities, clarifying that any of its public statements were not
necessarily reflective of official NDP policy, and ensuring that Waffle candidates in the
upcoming federal election adhered to the party platform. Watkins did not anticipate the
ONDP Provincial Council taking action against the Waffle any time soon.30 As John
Warnock, Carol Gudmundson, and Jill Sargent explained, the Ontario steering committee
believed an attempted purge of the Waffle in that province would be hotly contested by
those riding associations opposed to the idea, making it likely that “the Lewis forces do
not want such a ‘victory’ and will therefore back down.”31 Watkins and Laxer did face
some criticism at the national Waffle meeting over the Ontario group’s brief to the
Vichert Committee and decision to pull out of the Nixon demonstration in Ottawa.32
Whereas the Ontario Waffle had outlined concessions it would make in order to
remain in the NDP, leading Wafflers from Saskatchewan and Manitoba demonstrated
they had abandoned all hope of transforming the NDP provincially. Myron Kuziak
reported that the Saskatchewan Waffle “has reached an impasse in the NDP” and now
wondered if it should plan for a split or wait for one to be initiated by party right-wingers.
Cy Gonick explained that the “personality cult” surrounding Premier Schreyer undercut
any internal opposition in the Manitoba NDP, and lamented being the only left-wing
30
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voice in the party’s caucus.33 The Winnipeg gathering debated the Ontario and
Saskatchewan Waffles’ diverging strategies, with some advocating adoption of a national
strategy. Although a national coordinator position was created to improve
communications, the provincial groups remained fully autonomous. Responding to the
earlier attacks against the Ontario Waffle, representatives at the national meeting
confirmed that the Waffle must continue to identify and act independently, refuse to
concede its right to exist as a separately structured entity within the NDP, and improve its
links with union locals while attempting to re-establish a national focus. Some
disagreements were not settled at the Winnipeg gathering. For instance, a debate that
emerged among Esther Mathews, Kelly Crichton, Mel Watkins, Joe Flexer, and Jackie
Larkin over the relative importance of cultural nationalism, foreshadowed future
divisions over nationalism and class.34
Saskatchewan Wafflers expressed frustration after the meeting with what they
perceived as the Ontario Waffle’s timidity. John Warnock, Carol Gudmundson, and Jill
Sargent complained to the Saskatchewan steering committee that the Ontario group was
“on the defensive – or so it appears, and at a time when they by rights should be on the
offensive because of the disastrous showing that the right-wing approach made in the past
Ontario election.”35 John Conway also expressed displeasure with the Ontario Waffle
leadership, explaining to Warnock he did not think it important to attend the Winnipeg
meeting since “it was called only because Laxer does not like what we are discussing out
33
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here.”36 Conway was also angry over Laxer’s appearance at a Waffle meeting in Regina,
which he interpreted as an attempt to influence the Saskatchewan Waffle’s plans for
splitting from the NDP. Laxer, Conway snapped, “is beginning to behave like a David
Lewis of the left.”37
While the Saskatchewan Wafflers urged their Ontario confreres to take the
offensive, the Vichert Committee contended the Waffle had become too offensive. In its
report the committee accused the Waffle of changing for the worse since its formation in
1969. The committee had been appalled at the Wafflers’ behaviour during its hearings at
Toronto and Ottawa, when party members with whom they disagreed were subjected to
booing, hissing, jeering, and “indifference or scorn.” Furthermore, the committee
concluded the Waffle’s continued existence as a permanent opposition “cannot fail to
confuse the public.” The report commented on the deep divisions separating the Waffle
and NDP on basic party principles, which included divisions over electoral politics,
policies, leadership, structure, and commitments to union affiliation. While recognizing
the right of members, riding associations, and affiliated organizations to express dissent
over aspects of NDP policy and leadership, the Vichert Committee believed no
compromises were possible as long as the Waffle insisted on existing as “an organized
opposition in the party.” The report deemed the Waffle “a group organized on a
continuing basis for the expressed purpose of securing fundamental changes in the
strategies, structure, leadership, policies and principles of the party,” and as such must
either dissolve or face disciplinary action.38 James Laxer remembered the report being
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“harshly critical of the Waffle, even going so far as to compare its political tone to the
stridency of former Alabama Governor and segregationist George Wallace – a metaphor
for new left Canadian nationalists that was so extreme as to ultimately undermine the
credibility of the task force.”39
Although Watkins had been sanguine about the unlikelihood of the Ontario NDP
Provincial Council attempting a purge of the Waffle, the party’s Provincial Executive did
adopt the Vichert Committee report when it met on May 6, 1972. The only opposition to
the move was expressed by the six Wafflers on the Executive. The Waffle had not taken
seriously John Harney’s proposal that it assume an affiliate status similar to a union local,
and when Desmond Morton sought to amend the Executive Committee’s report to
incorporate the possibility of affiliate status for the Waffle his motion was defeated.40
Five days after the ONDP Executive meeting Mel Watkins, Kelly Crichton, and
James Laxer met with moderate party activists, primarily from the St. David riding
association in Toronto, including former Waffler Giles Endicott and Toronto alderman
Karl Jaffary. MPPs Elie Martel (Sudbury East), Michael Cassidy (Ottawa), Janusz
Dukszta (Parkdale) and Jim Foulds (Port Arthur) also attended the meeting at Watkins’s
home. Endicott chaired and explained how St. David activists had met with Stephen
Lewis to tell him the Provincial Council in Oshawa “was a hell of a way to run the party”
and that he should “cool it.” Endicott urged the Wafflers to do the same, and clarified to
Watkins, Crichton and Laxer that “this meeting may seem like an attacking session – it
39

Laxer, In Search of a New Left, 161.
Jack Warnock, Carol Gudmundson, Jill Sargent to Saskatchewan Waffle Steering Committee, June 12,
1972, File II.16 Correspondence, 1973-1981, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina); Minutes of the
Provincial Executive, May 6, 1972, Series 13 Executive and Council Minutes, File 4 Executive and Council
Minutes 1970-72, New Democratic Party Ontario fonds, QUA. Morton describes the affiliation proposal as
an “ingenious scheme which, however, found favour with neither side,” in Morton, The New Democrats,
133.
40

320
is.”41 The moderates criticized the Waffle for making personal attacks on NDP and
labour leaders, conducting independent fundraising efforts, and for operating separate
from internal party structures. They urged Wafflers to begin making positive statements
about the NDP to demonstrate their loyalty.42 The Wafflers indicated a willingness to
compromise on some of these issues. Laxer explained they were prepared to “cool it on
personal attacks,” to work within the party structure, stop publicizing Waffle statements
as ‘NDP-Waffle’ and curb their fundraising. However Watkins, Crichton and Laxer
rejected Dukszta’s suggestion “that the Waffle should disband formally and continue to
do what it does.” Watkins indicated that the Waffle was considering Morton’s idea of
seeking affiliation status with the NDP, but it preferred the status quo and certainly had
no intention of disbanding.43
At the same time as the Waffle was facing pressure from party moderates to
change its behaviour, party officials across the country, including federal NDP leader
David Lewis, urged the Ontario section to compromise and avoid issuing the Waffle any
ultimatums. Saskatchewan MP John Skoberg opposed the “all or nothing” position taken
by the Vichert Committee since the Ontario party’s decision was certain to reverberate in
the party across the country. Rather, the matter of the Waffle and “groups… using
pressure politics to bring about democratic change within the Party” should be handled
by a federal NDP convention.44 Grant Notley, Alberta’s NDP leader, signed a petition
opposing any move by the Ontario party to oust the Waffle and as a result was
admonished by Ontario NDP secretary Brigden for interfering in the affairs of another
41
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provincial party.45 David Lewis wrote to Vichert recommending informal discussions
between the federal and Ontario NDP leaderships to address how “federal aspects of the
problem may be taken into consideration in discussions and preparations” for the ONDP
Provincial Council scheduled for June in Orillia. Although Lewis’s tone suggested
concern that a showdown with the Waffle might harm the party’s chances in the
upcoming federal election, he reassured Vichert “I do not have any hesitation about the
fact that an appropriate and decisive step has to be taken with respect to the Waffle.”46
Stephen Lewis later recalled:
There were two meetings at the Ontario Federation of Labour building which I
would sooner forget at which father and son were at bitter loggerheads… There
was one meeting attended by David, by Mahoney, by Dowling, by Larry Sefton,
by Lynn, by Don Taylor, by Montgomery, by Bud Clark, Sam Fox, David Archer,
Dennis, Vichert, and myself at which David made a strong appeal that we
shouldn’t do it, that we should lay off. I was taking an absolutely intransigent
line; so was Sefton; so was Williams. McDermott was touch and go. McDermott
wasn’t sure – he wanted to move the Waffle out but he didn’t want to offend the
old man – none of them did.47
Kenneth Bagnell reported in the Globe and Mail that David Archer, Dennis
McDermott and William Mahoney were approaching a compromise position, since they
preferred to have the Waffle remain inside the NDP rather than witness the departure of
hundreds of party activists, leaving a divided and demoralized party in their wake.48
Media reports of this development led Ontario Wafflers to believe the party and union
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leadership were debating withdrawing the Vichert Committee’s report. Although willing
to make some compromises, leading Wafflers resisted agreeing to any restrictions on
their group’s activities beyond the concessions already granted. Confident that it could
count on support from party members in the various riding associations, the Waffle
intended to force Stephen Lewis and the party leadership to drop all threats of expulsion
and postpone any decisions on the Waffle’s right to exist until the ONDP convention met
in the fall of 1972.49
In attempting to persuade party members of its right to remain within the NDP,
the Ontario Waffle emphasized the democratic necessity of allowing members to initiate
and organize internal reforms. James Laxer recalled “the Waffle fought a provincewide
campaign to salvage its legitimacy within the party.”50 Wafflers urged party members in
their riding associations to oppose the Vichert Committee’s recommendations. Several
ridings, including Ottawa South and St. David, threatened a strike by party members “on
all aspects of normal riding activities” should the Waffle be expelled from the ONDP.51
Party activists from riding associations across the country urged the ONDP leadership to
reconsider its expulsion plans.52 The riding association executive in Vancouver Point
Grey lauded the Waffle’s “positive, vital, and constructive influence,” while in Moose
Jaw North members implored the ONDP leadership and the Waffle to “resolve their
differences in the interests of the NDP as a whole.”53
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Concerned that attempts to implement the Vichert Committee’s harsh
recommendations might be rejected by moderate party activists, Vichert and Gerald
Caplan produced a compromise resolution via the Peterborough riding association similar
to the one John Harney and Desmond Morton had previously floated unsuccessfully. The
motion proposed introducing a category of associate membership “open to organizations
whose purpose is the dissemination of political ideas compatible with those of the party
and which are not organized to seek public office, providing they undertake to accept and
abide by the principles and constitution of the party.” An added proviso would forbid
associate members from using the party’s name or maintaining a separate organizational
structure within the NDP.54 The Administrative Committee of the Provincial Executive
rejected the Peterborough compromise in favour of the Vichert Committee’s original
recommendations, a decision that Terry Morley, a member of the Administrative
Committee, recalled was “strongly influenced by Lynn Williams.”55
In their discussions with the Ontario NDP leadership about the Waffle and the
Vichert Committee report, labour leaders were resolute. The Waffle’s connection to leftnationalist caucuses within the USWA and UAW in the unions’ heartland of southern
Ontario threatened labour leaders who could not help being reminded of their struggles
against Communist unionists in the recent past. Although Stephen Lewis remembered
being “persuaded that the Waffle was destroying the party,” he also recalled an “unstated
ultimatum” from the trade union movement intimating labour would rescind its financial
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support of the NDP unless the Waffle was removed.56 Lewis worried that the Vichert
Committee report was “engendering so much antagonism” within the NDP it would
produce an irrevocable rupture between party and union activists. He therefore had no
choice but to “persuade the trade unionists that alternative wording had to be found” in
order to retain the support of moderate party members, even while he personally bore the
brunt of labour’s displeasure. As Lewis explained, “Lynn Williams, who was the
bargainer for the trade union movement, was treating me like INCO and he just wasn’t
moving an inch.”57 Larry Sefton, USWA District Six Director, who was then dying of
cancer, expressed deep displeasure over Lewis’s request to compromise on the Waffle
when Sefton himself had devoted his life to building up the CCF and NDP.58 Williams
does not recall threatening to withdraw Steelworker support from the NDP, but
explained:
My sense of myself was built around indignation that the Waffle was going to
destroy my party not that I was going to destroy my party. And my whole focus
was that we had to win this argument… I can’t imagine ever threatening that we
were going to leave. Where would we go?59
As Williams described in his memoirs, Sefton was “strong and unequivocal” on the
existence of the Waffle. At a meeting between Sefton, Williams and Lewis, Sefton
“made it clear where the Steelworkers stood and that there would be no change in that
position.”60 Williams maintained that the Waffle’s presence in the NDP “would
jeopardize the union support the party enjoyed… And I’m certain that I would have
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argued that the trade union membership represented much more of a cut of what Ontario
citizens thought than did a meeting of the council of the party.”61 Moreover, as Bob
Mackenzie, another Steelworker official deeply involved with the NDP explained in a
letter to David Lewis, his support for the NDP was conditional on the Waffle’s departure.
Mackenzie warned Lewis “it is not a time for Neville Chamberlain tactics,” and predicted
“that the so-called middle of the Party would not last, or be effective, three months if the
Waffle were in control and that the Unions certainly would not stay under this kind of
situation.” Mackenzie reminded Lewis that “you and the Party still need many of us who
have become labelled the sell-outs and lunatic right wing fringe. David, that support is
no longer automatic.” Mackenzie warned that a forced compromise with the Waffle
would lead union leaders to conclude “some of us don’t belong and we have to find
another political way.”62 Not long before, David Lewis had chided the Waffle over the
inconsistency between its rhetoric and its actions represented by its failure to organize
workers. Ironically, the Waffle’s modicum of success in attracting support from workers
in international unions had now generated a backlash that threatened to whip the group
out of the NDP.
Moderates among the party leadership, including John Harney, Walter Pitman and
Ed Broadbent, desperately sought a solution to the impasse. Broadbent developed an
alternative which they believed would accomplish the goal of ridding the Ontario NDP of
the Waffle challenge while still affirming the right of dissenting caucuses to exist within
the party.63 John Brewin explained that “a form of compromise was accepted which was
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no compromise at all… There was a change in wording which meant that my father and a
whole bunch of people who fell in the centre could say that they accepted it. And yet the
trade union caucus at the council could be persuaded that the compromise didn’t water
down the fundamental recommendation at all.”64 The Riverdale riding association passed
Broadbent’s resolution three days before the Provincial Council meeting:
(1) The present structure and behavior of the Waffle cannot continue; (2) It is
contrary to the spirit and meaning of the constitution of the ONDP for any group
within the party to assume a public identity with a name distinct from that of the
party. The Waffle is such a group and has such a name; (3) Groups of members
within the party are, of course, free as they have always been, to co-operate and
caucus so long as their role remains non-public and consistent with the principles
of the NDP.65
Despite the forceful language of points one and two, Stephen Lewis had to work hard to
persuade Lynn Williams and the USWA leaders that the Riverdale resolution could
actually force the Waffle’s ouster from the Ontario NDP. The Provincial Executive
obliged by placing the Riverdale resolution first in the order of debate, ahead of
compromise resolutions from the Peterborough, Beaches-Woodbine and Carleton-East
riding associations.66 An increased number of Steelworker delegates was responsible for
a union delegation larger than usually attended Provincial Council.67 Lewis described
meeting with union delegates the night before the vote:
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The night before the council meeting, at the beer-drinking hall where the dance
was after the executive meeting, the trade union delegates were brought into the
backroom in groups of between fifteen and twenty. Pilkey was there, Lynn was
there, Bob McKenzie was there. They would talk to the delegates to explain the
change in the report and why it was acceptable to them… I was at the hall from
9:00 PM until 3:00 in the morning.68
The Waffle and party moderates alike made desperate appeals to New Democrats
ahead of the expected showdown in Orillia. Walter Pitman and John Harney wrote an
open letter to members on the eve of Provincial Council urging them to reach common
ground and proposing a resolution which would allow the delegates to choose between
two compromise proposals – one outlined rules of behaviour for internal party caucuses,
and the other created an associate membership status – rather than removing the Waffle.69
Mel Watkins also wrote to delegates prior to the meeting to explain the Waffle’s
willingness to compromise by securing approval from party bodies such as riding
associations or the OYND before undertaking any public activities and refraining from
holding press conferences to promote policies that contradicted the NDP. Watkins
addressed tensions between union leaders and the Waffle, expressed regret at the
Waffle’s contributions over the “present impasse,” and clarified that the group’s support
for Canadian autonomy in the labour movement “did not intend to split or damage any
existing labour organizations that have the support of their members.”70
Five resolutions dealing with the Waffle were presented simultaneously at the
Provincial Council, but the executive’s decision to hear first the Riverdale resolution
ensured that it shaped the debate. Confusion ensued when speakers supporting the
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Riverdale resolution, including Gordon Vichert, MPP Michael Cassidy, and MP Andrew
Brewin, described it as a compromise while Bob Mackenzie, a Steelworker official,
explicitly attacking the Waffle as “a cancer,” interpreted the Riverdale resolution as the
means to remove the group, and said “it will give us the tools to do the job.”71 Pauline
Jewett, a former Liberal and star NDP candidate federally who opposed the resolution,
argued that even compromise proposals endorsed by the Waffle were too conservative
and would damage the party’s claim that it protected internal democracy.72 The
implications of the Riverdale resolution soon became clear. Watkins pleaded with the
party to “draw back from the brink,” while Gerald Caplan mounted an “almost frenzied”
attack on the Waffle.73 Stephen Lewis’s speech proved to be the final nail in the Waffle’s
coffin. Described by Waffle sympathizer Michael Cross as “a masterful performance, an
affirmation of his socialist credentials, a persuasive argument, a threat of resignation, all
wrapped up in a rhetorical tour du force,” Lewis attacked the Waffle for existing in clear
violation of the party’s constitution.74 He declared “I, too am a socialist who wishes to
fight for a free Canada, but without the Waffle forever an encumbrance around my
neck.”75 The question was called and the Riverdale resolution passed by a vote of 217 to
88.76 In his report the following day, Lewis described his personal feelings of “immense
relief” at the weekend’s events, urged the Ontario NDP to focus on preparing for the
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upcoming federal election, and expressed his hope that Waffle supporters whose primary
allegiance was to the NDP would remain in the party.77
The determination of David and Stephen Lewis’s opposition to the Waffle
warrants added comment. Their role in opposing the Waffle earned them a special
enmity from some leftists, as Mel Watkins description of “how to identify a Waffler” in
Maclean’s attests: “You walk right up to him and whisper, ‘Stephen Lewis.’ If his eyes
go all slitty, he’s Waffle.”78 Two factors in particular likely account for the Lewises’s
determination to oppose the Waffle.
A history of conflict with Communists loomed large in the Lewis family, and in
the polarized political atmosphere of the Cold War the Waffle likely appeared like a
defeated enemy arisen from the ashes. Cameron Smith emphasizes this aspect in his
biography of the Lewis family. One of the three quotations Smith uses to open his
biography of the Lewis family is from Doris Andras, David’s sister: “we fought
communists all the time.” Smith emphasizes the importance of David’s father Maishe’s
involvement in the Jewish Labour Bund in the early 20th century and he passionately
described during his farewell speech to the 1975 NDP convention the experience of his
father being arrested and threatened with execution by the Bolsheviks in 1919 during the
Polish-Soviet War “for no other reason” than being a Menshevik.79 Furthermore,
communists in unions were, in David Lewis’s view, one of the major obstacles to union
affiliation with the CCF, and he worked tirelessly to rid the labour movement of their
77
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communist rivals.80 Their defeat and ostracization was a key factor in the establishment
of the CLC in 1956 and the NDP in 1961. Clifford Scotton explained “I think David saw
the Waffle as another manifestation of the Trots, the Commies, or whatever, so he would
go back to the old battle. David felt that you were either with us or against us.”81 The
presence of “red diaper babies” such as James Laxer and Steve Penner alongside exCommunists such as Bill Walsh and Al Campbell and Trotskyists likely sounded alarm
bells for David Lewis. The Lewises’s biographer argues “what the Waffle did was touch
a nerve still raw with memories of thirty years of bruising struggle.”82 David Lewis
recalled that the Waffle reminded him of the struggle with the Socialist Fellowship in the
BC CCF in 1950 and claimed “the consequences were not new or surprising, but they
were none the less painful.” He also suggested that Stephen, unaccustomed to “the
poisonous antagonisms of internal strife on an organized scale,” was “outraged by the
fratricidal animosities which deformed relationships and crippled the will to constructive
thought and work during the Waffle period.”83
In addition to the Lewises’s concern that the Waffle was a recurrence of past
internal struggles, it is clear that both David and Stephen Lewis also faced considerable
pressure from labour leaders to rid the party of the Waffle. David Lewis’s determination
to secure union affiliations to the CCF and the joint CLC-CCF effort to create the NDP
drew on his knowledge of the British Labour Party. He viewed the labour connection as
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essential to the NDP’s future prospects. Stephen realized the importance of union leaders
and delegates to the party’s internal power structure prior to his successful leadership run
in 1971 when labour support proved crucial to his victory. It is unlikely that either could
have imagined a NDP without its union allies.
Despite initial press reports that it was acting in defiance of the Provincial
Council, the Ontario Waffle planned a conference in Delaware, near London, in August
of 1972 to determine its options.84 But first, at a two-day meeting during July in
Gravenhurst a group of key Wafflers delivered papers and developed proposals for the
formation of a Waffle movement separate from the NDP. Among those in attendance
were Watkins, Laxer, Maeots, and John and Pat Smart, all original authors of the Waffle
Manifesto. They were joined by long-time Waffle activists Ellie Prepas, Bruce Kidd,
Paul Craven, Dave Neumann, Linda Hay, and Julia Bass.85 The outcome of the
Gravenhurst gathering was a proposal to split the Waffle from the NDP and form a
Movement for an Independent and Socialist Canada (MISC).
Two of the Waffle’s constituent groups – the Red Circle and the League for
Socialist Action (LSA) – promptly objected to the MISC proposal. The Red Circle was
the name given to a group of Wafflers that included Steve Penner and Jackie Larkin who
were greatly influenced by developments in the international Trotskyist movement and
had become increasingly critical of Laxer’s and Watkins’s leadership. Penner, Larkin,
Varda Burstyn and Joe Flexer insisted the Ontario Waffle remain within the NDP and
abide by the party’s requirements that policy differences not be aired in public, while at
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the same time continuing its efforts to shift the party towards more socialist positions.86
The LSA viewed MISC as potentially counterproductive since the existing polarization in
the NDP over the Waffle “gives our movement greater possibilities to intervene than ever
before.”87 LSA supporters predicted MISC would become a “dwindling pressure group
composed of bickering academics and professionals, without real roots in either the
economic or political movements of the workers.” They encouraged the Waffle to
imitate the LSA by becoming actively involved in the campaign for legalized, accessible
abortion and the anti-war movement.88
In the lead-up to the Delaware conference, Waffle members circulated a number
of proposals, two of which represented irreconcilable positions that ultimately polarized
the two-day conference. Advocates of splitting from the NDP and creating a Movement
for an Independent and Socialist Canada, dubbed ‘Option Three,’ included Laxer,
Maeots, Watkins, Kelly Crichton, the Smarts, Dave Neumann, George Gilks, Esther
Mathews, Corileen North and Ellie Prepas. They deemed it no longer viable to remain
part of the NDP since despite the Waffle’s best efforts the ONDP “decisively rejected the
right of a left caucus to exist inside the party” as well as “the politics of independence
and socialism.” Continuing to organize within the NDP would only lead to mass
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expulsions.89 Tellingly, the MISC paper identified “three streams of thought within the
Waffle.” The first stream, with which the authors identified, were those committed to
independence and socialism who saw the NDP as a base for the struggle. The second
stream comprised committed New Democrats who understood the Waffle as a “ginger
group” on the party’s left wing. The third stream, which the authors considered a small
minority, consisted of various “left tendencies,” such as Trotskyists, committed to
exposing the “bankruptcy of social democracy” or believing themselves a “vanguard”
within the Waffle.90 With the NDP no longer a viable base in the struggle for
independence and socialism, the question looming over the paper was whether a majority
of Wafflers would identify with the first “stream of thought” and choose to break from
the party or if the group consisted primarily of left-wing but committed New Democrats
and Trotskyists.
Despite accusations to the contrary, the Waffle was not a Trotskyist group.
Nevertheless its intention of shifting the NDP to the left was attractive to Trotskyists
schooled in the tactic of entryism and the group certainly counted Trotskyists among its
supporters from the early stages. The tactic of entryism, embraced by the LSA/YS,
entailed Trotskyist activists entering social democratic parties and social movements with
the aim of winning new adherents to revolutionary socialism.91 As discussed in Chapter
Two, Trotskyist activists made important contributions to New Left protest movements in
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the 1960s, including the anti-Vietnam War movement. The LSA’s efforts in the NDP
had been less successful. Thirty young Trotskyists were expelled from the NDP in 1963,
virtually wiping out the YS contingent in the NDY and forcing members to avoid
identifying with the LSA.92 A 1965 article in the New Democrat titled “Canada’s
Screwball left” denounced the LSA/YS and Trotskyism as “parasites on the body of other
political parties.”93 Another dozen YS members were expelled from the NDP in 1967
and the persistent expulsions led LSA leader Ross Dowson to exercise and advise caution
in LSA/YS interactions with the Waffle.94
Trotskyists were active in the Waffle almost from its inception. Regula Modlich,
for instance, attended the group’s fourth meeting in Kingston on July 26, 1969 and the
Workers Vanguard inadvertently published the Waffle Manifesto prior to its intended
public release. As discussed in previous chapters, the New Brunswick Waffle was almost
entirely the construction of the Trotskyist Fredericton YS. Furthermore, several Wafflers
adopted a Trotskyist analysis as a result of their activism in the NDP. John Warnock
complained to John Richards: “It is too bad that Thompson, Brown, Kopperud and Kouri
joined this LSA with all that fanfare… They have nothing to gain from LSA; they will be
the best people in it.”95
The LSA central office instructed members how to approach the Waffle’s internal
debates. Prior to the Ontario Waffle’s Delaware conference LSA secretary Gary Porter
informed “branch organizers, NDP coordinators and members at large” that they should
oppose the proposal to split and form the MISC. Porter explained “the situation presents
92

Isittt, Militant Minority, 176.
“Canada’s Screwball left: the Trotskyites,” New Democrat, August 1965.
94
See, for example, Webber “‘For a Socialist New Brunswick,’” M.A. Thesis, 74-5, 121-2.
95
Letter from John Warnock to John Richards, September 28, 1970, File II.3 Correspondence 1968-1971,
John Richards Papers, SAB (Saskatoon).
93

335
us with a unique opportunity to move in, rally the force in the Waffle and the party as a
whole that want to carry the fight and lay the ground work for another left formation or
‘socialist caucus’ broader than the socialist caucus” that existed from 1965-67.96
However, the LSA never achieved much influence within the Waffle. In 1972 LSA
political committee member Dick Fidler complained that “everywhere we are excluded
from Waffle executives and campaign committees.”97 James Laxer remembers the
Trotskyists as “quite a small minority” in the Waffle. He explained “there might have
been meetings where they were 20 or 25 percent. But we always knew who they were
and they never had their way in anything… one thing I would not agree with is ever using
the Trots as a way to talk about what the Waffle really stood for.”98 In fact, the Waffle
leadership’s hostility to the Trotskyists helps explain the Waffle’s reluctance to
participate in coalitions with social movements in which the LSA played a leading role.99
As Fidler explained, “the elements who constitute the Waffle leadership and determine its
policies are hostile to the mass campaigns we project… they have explicitly rejected
proposals to work in or support the anti-war coalitions and the organized movement for
abortion law repeal.”100
However, the Trotskyist influence on the Waffle was not limited to the LSA. The
appeal of an ideology providing a revolutionary Marxist framework that nevertheless
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engaged with mainstream social democratic political parties and unions and
simultaneously connected New Left activists to an international socialist movement with
a credible anti-Stalinist history proved strong. Other Wafflers, such as Steve Penner and
Jackie Larkin, adopted a Trotskyist analysis which led them to advocate a “stay and
fight” position in the summer of 1972 and form the Revolutionary Marxist Group in
1973. And, as we shall see, a York-based study group that took over the remnants of the
Ontario Waffle in December 1974 was strongly influenced by the Trotskyist analysis of
the International Socialists.
As the internal debate over the Waffle’s response to the NDP ultimatum
crystallized around the MISC plan, the Red Circlers, including Penner and Larkin,
championed a “stay and fight” proposal known as ‘Option Five.’ They criticized
attempts by the Ontario Waffle to appeal to party centrists, such as during the debates
preceding the ONDP Provincial Council in Orillia, a strategy that “retreated politically
and diluted our position.” They were convinced the Ontario Waffle continued to garner
support from rank-and-file New Democrats and urged the group to persist until at least
the next provincial convention. Furthermore, they argued that MISC as envisioned would
result in the group’s separation from workers in “politicized union locals” who remained
affiliated with the NDP.101
At Delaware, after the morning was spent debating procedural questions the
discussion revolved around Options Five and Three.102 Speaking on behalf of Option
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Five, Varda Burstyn maintained that “our defeat at Orillia was only a tactical defeat… we
reject the proposal to withdraw from the struggle.”103 Supporters of Option Three
disagreed, insisting they were not withdrawing from the struggle but merely facing
reality: the ONDP’s decision at Orillia essentially prevented the Waffle from organizing
effectively within the NDP. Laxer and Watkins, while personally committed to forming
a new movement, emphasized that MISC supporters would not need to give up their NDP
memberships and a future reconciliation might still be possible if the NDP turned
leftward. Furthermore, they explained MISC would not be a political party, although left
open the possibility it might become one in the future.104 After an afternoon of
acrimonious debate, the delegates voted 89 to 49 in favour of the Waffle leaving the NDP
to form MISC.105 The minority committed to the “stay and fight” option issued a
statement to the press indicating they would remain as a ‘Left Caucus’ within the NDP
and strive to have this role validated at the NDP Convention in December.106 On the
second day of the conference Option Three supporters reconstituted themselves as the
Ontario Waffle Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada and passed a motion
denying membership to delegates who had not voted with the majority and chose instead
to remain as a ‘Left Caucus’ in the NDP. Four Wafflers, all supporters of Option Three,
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had previously been nominated as NDP candidates in the upcoming federal election.107
All four, including Laxer and Watkins, resigned their candidacies after the conference.108
Following a ten-minute adjournment, the conference reconvened as the Organizing
Committee of MISC. Much of the ensuing discussion revolved around criteria for
membership in the new movement. Wafflers, wary of a possible takeover by other left
groups such as the Canadian Liberation Movement, the Communist Party, the Canadian
Party of Labour, and the League for Socialist Action, passed a motion stating
The Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada shall invite residents of
Ontario who share its aims and purposes to join it. Its membership shall not be
open to members of other left groups who operate closed or unacknowledged
caucuses in its midst.109
MISC’s structure closely resembled that of the Waffle prior to the split. Local groups
were established with a minimum of six members, the largest being three Toronto groups
and one in Ottawa.110 Prior to adjournment at Delaware, plans were made to hold a
founding convention in Sudbury within three months, and an Ad Hoc Secretariat
appointed until a regionally representative ProTem Committee could be established to
organize the convention.111 The new movement was born.
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Whereas in Ontario the NDP sought to rid itself of the Waffle and in
Saskatchewan the Waffle sought to rid itself of the NDP, in British Columbia Wafflers
had largely been absorbed into the party mainstream. The west coast New Democrats
were also regularly targeted with accusations of radical socialism by their wellentrenched political opponents. W.A.C. Bennett had been the Social Credit premier of
British Columbia for nearly twenty years when, in August 1972, he continued his
tradition of calling a summertime election every three years and sent British Columbians
to the polls. This time, however, the seventy-two-year-old Bennett faced a serious
challenge from a trio of younger party leaders – forty-one-year-old New Democrat Dave
Barrett, thirty-five-year-old Liberal David Anderson, and thirty-two-year-old Progressive
Conservative Derril Warren.112 Warren in particular attracted a large measure of media
attention which his party used to portray him as leader of the free enterprise party in
British Columbia and natural successor to Bennett .113 Intra-party division and its
lackluster campaign further hindered Social Credit’s hitherto tried-and-true two-part reelection strategy of championing provincial economic growth while warning voters of the
dangers of socialism.
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The labour strife that dominated British Columbia during the spring and summer
of 1972 also complicated the political scene.114 Municipal workers across the Lower
Mainland struck for seven weeks between April and June, while fallers in the logging
industry continued striking over the summer even after the rest of the IWA’s 28,000
woodworkers had ended their two-week walkout.115 Also that summer, building-trades
unions defied back-to-work legislation during a three-month-long strike that resulted in
the prosecution of union leaders and a strike by longshoremen in August that halted
shipping across the province.116 Unions, enraged by some of the most restrictive labour
legislation in the country, were committed to defeating Bennett’s government. The BC
Teachers’ Federation (BCTF) formed a Political Action Committee to coordinate
teachers’ efforts to topple Social Credit after the government introduced legislation
limiting salary and budget increases in the education sector.117 The British Columbia
Government Employees Union (BCGEU), CUPE BC, and even the traditionally
conservative Teamsters likewise campaigned to end Bennett’s long run in power.118
With the free enterprise parties divided and organized labour decidedly militant,
the NDP campaign focused on the folksy, populist appeal of its leader Dave Barrett.119
The NDP platform, “A New Deal for People,” recycled the title from the Saskatchewan
NDP’s 1971 campaign, and included planks highlighted in successful elections there and
in Manitoba, including public auto insurance, environmental protections, and higher
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royalties for resource extraction industries. A BC NDP advertisement linked its criticism
of rising unemployment to foreign ownership, explaining “raw materials from primary
resources leave our province creating thousands of jobs in foreign countries. Many of
those secondary industries could be developed right here in British Columbia.”120 The
NDP campaign focused on opposing Social Credit and avoided emphasizing the
possibility that social democrats might form the government. Barrett’s personality helped
to assuage concerns surrounding his party’s supposed inherent radicalism. He recalled
how during his first campaign, operating on a shoestring budget, “nobody saw me as a
threat. I was just a social worker, a little overweight, maybe, but quite jolly. A funny
little guy.”121 Certainly Barrett’s humour helped in deflecting Bennett’s attacks. When
the premier suggested that Marxists lurked in the NDP, Barrett joked “which one:
Groucho, Harpo or Zeppo?” And when Bennett brought up Barrett’s support for the
Waffle Manifesto, Barrett responded to a TV reporter:
When he talks about waffles, I talk about pancakes. When the premier said I was
a waffle, I said he was a pancake. He said I was a double waffle. I said he was a
stack of pancakes. Now he says there are waffles in our caucus. I say there are
pancakes in his group. It’s sheer nonsense. The premier wants to avoid the issues.
However, if he keeps this up, knowing how he feels about Quebec, I’m going to
call him a crêpe Suzette.122
Nearing the end of the campaign Bennett claimed “the socialist hordes are at the gates of
British Columbia,” and warned voters of the dangers in electing the NDP.123 But the
premier’s desperate fear-mongering was too little too late. On August 30, 1972, the
“socialist hordes” rode to victory taking thirty-eight of the Legislature’s fifty-five seats
with thirty-nine per cent of the popular vote.
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The British Columbia Waffle’s absorption into the NDP began when Barrett and
his caucus and party supporters signed the Waffle Manifesto in the summer of 1969 in
part to signify their opposition to Tom Berger’s leadership of the BC NDP.124 Barrett
subsequently admitted to signing the Manifesto as a means of stimulating debate within
the party, and Wafflers recalled his initial indecisiveness over the matter at the 1969
federal NDP convention.125 MLA Eileen Dailly recalled that the Manifesto “seemed
harmless to me” when she signed it in 1969.126 Left-wingers had maintained a substantial
and influential minority position in the BC CCF/NDP, and several served lengthy terms
in elected office.127 Even party moderates such as Grace MacInnis and Robert Strachan
had called for the nationalization of the Canadian steel industry and the BC Telephone
Company in the 1960s.128 Barrett’s triumph over Berger and his labour supporters at the
1970 BC NDP convention had coincided with the election of a left-wing slate to every
executive position, including Waffle supporters Paddy Neale, Dawn Carrell, and Harold
Winrob. Mike Lebowitz, an economist at Simon Fraser University and Waffle supporter,
had assisted in developing policies for the party in 1969.129 And the BC NDP hired Hans
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Brown, formerly Tommy Douglas’s executive assistant and a Waffle supporter, as the
party’s provincial secretary and campaign manager for the 1972 election campaign.130
The BC NDP therefore reacted less defensively to the Waffle challenge than did
its Saskatchewan and Ontario counterparts, and Wafflers there demonstrated a
willingness to work with moderates in the party. A Waffle caucus decided on the eve of
the BC NDP’s 1971 convention not to challenge Barrett for the party leadership despite
their reservations about his coolness to both unions and extra-parliamentary action.
Harold Steves, an active Waffler and NDP candidate, warned the caucus that allying with
the BCFL to challenge Barrett would only allow a more moderate party leader to emerge,
arguing “if you think Dave Barrett is right-wing just wait till you see who they put up.”131
The caucus overwhelmingly defeated the proposal to run a Waffle candidate for leader by
a show of hands, and rejected with a chorus of boos a second proposal to ally with the
BCFL in a joint slate for executive positions, but still passed a motion censuring Barrett
for his “right-wing, anti-labour” positions and his unwillingness to support the
unemployed movement.132 Nevertheless, several Wafflers endorsed by Barrett were
elected to positions on the party executive. Wafflers were pleased with policy resolutions
passed by the convention, including a recommendation that corporations developing
natural resources in the province open their books to demonstrate they were operating in
the public interest, as well as place workers’ representatives on decision-making bodies,
with nationalization the consequence of non-compliance.133 The LSA complained that
British Columbia was split into three groups but “insofar as the Waffle projects itself in
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the NDP, it is identified with the present right wing leadership of the party led by
Barrett.”134 Several signatories to the Waffle Manifesto, all Barrett allies, were appointed
to cabinet positions, although none had maintained an active connection to the Waffle
since 1969.135 Conversations with BC activists Nowakowski, Steves, and Dave York led
Caroline Brown, from the Saskatchewan group, to report that Wafflers in BC were “more
entrenched in the party” than in other provinces, but since the left had not consolidated
“under one umbrella… the Waffle hasn’t been operating as the Waffle.”136
In the immediate aftermath of the 1972 election some Wafflers were excited at the
prospect of a new provincial government. John Warnock claimed Barrett agreed with the
Waffle that “Canada should cease being just a resource base for the American industrial
empire,” and concluded the election results indicated “the people of Canada are ready for
a political party clearly committed to Canadian independence.”137 Ken Novakowski
reported to Caroline Brown that “4-5 of the elected MLAs in BC were Wafflers, and 5-6
more were Waffle sympathizers,” and informed John Richards “there is no doubt that
Barrett’s government is miles ahead of Blakeney or Schreyer.”138 According to
Novakowski, the true test of the Barrett government’s radicalism would be its willingness
to nationalize the province’s forestry industry. Yet after just three months of the Barrett
administration, BC Wafflers had grown concerned over the direction it was taking, and in
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particular its unwillingness to replace civil servants associated with the previous Social
Credit government.139 NDP MLA Harold Steves, for one, continued to associate publicly
with the Waffle while at the same time cooperating with fellow backbenchers and nonWafflers Rosemary Brown and Colin Gabelmann in opposing several government
decisions. Novakowski claimed no Wafflers attended the 1972 BC NDP convention.140
Despite the Waffle’s absence, convention delegates passed a resolution proposing
a new ministry for women’s equality. But Barrett dismissed the idea, and thereby
launched an internal party struggle over his government’s commitment to women’s
equality that led in February 1973 to the BC Status of Women Council giving the premier
the Male Chauvinist Pig Award as “most sexist politician.” Going forward, Wafflers
such as Hilda Thomas and Sharon Yandle focused on the BC NDP’s Women’s Rights
Committee (WRC), which published a newsletter, Priorities, and kept pressuring the
government to adopt feminist policies. The WRC successfully elected all nine of its
candidates to the party’s provincial executive at the 1973 BC NDP convention, and
discovered in Rosemary Brown (Vancouver-Burrard) a talented spokesperson on the
government’s backbenches.141 The conflict over the BC NDP’s approach to women’s
equality became the fight that was to consume the left and sideline the Waffle in coming
years.
The year 1972 proved to be a pivotal year for the Waffle in the NDP. The
Waffle’s ouster from the Ontario NDP proved the beginning of the end for the group.
Despite the Ontario Waffle leadership’s willingness to compromise and the desire of
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some party moderates to avoid a purge, or at least a public bloodletting, union leaders
were intractable in their determination to rid the party of its radical and noisy left wing.
The debate over how to respond to the Ontario NDP’s decision exposed pre-existing
ideological divisions and split the Ontario Waffle at its August 1972 conference.
Although a majority followed Waffle leaders Laxer and Watkins out of the NDP and into
a new Movement for an Independent and Socialist Canada, a substantial minority
determined to “stay and fight” in the party forming a Left Caucus to organize for
upcoming party meetings. Meanwhile, in British Columbia the Waffle had largely been
absorbed into the party’s mainstream when the NDP won the August 1972 provincial
election and formed a government for the first time in that province. Despite the election
of a pro-Waffle MLA and a strong left-wing tradition within the BC NDP, the Waffle did
not maintain an active presence on the west coast and left-wing criticism of the Barrett
government emerged from the women’s movement instead. Wafflers in both Manitoba
and Saskatchewan could have warned their radical counterparts in BC to be prepared for
disappointment. Frustration in both provinces over their NDP governments’ adoption of
moderate reforms in place of comprehensive socialist programs caused the Waffle in
Manitoba to dwindle and the group in Saskatchewan to debate whether it would be best
to initiate its own departure from the party or wait to be purged.
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Chapter Nine
“We are all tottering past the crucial age of thirty and into the senility of middle
age:” Leaving the NDP, 1972-73
After the Waffle’s ouster from the Ontario NDP in the summer of 1972 the group
spent much of the ensuing year-and-a-half immersed in internal debate. Without the
group’s primary purpose of transforming the NDP, Ontario Wafflers focused much of
their energy on researching and publicizing the deindustrialization of the province’s
manufacturing heartland, a situation they attributed to the high levels of American
ownership. In Saskatchewan, despite publishing a highly critical analysis of the NDP’s
first year in government, the Waffle remained divided over whether to leave the party and
advocated nationalization of the province’s oil and gas industries. The ineffectiveness of
those Ontario Wafflers who chose to “stay and fight” within the NDP by forming a Left
Caucus could only have served to dishearten the Saskatchewan Wafflers further. They
would eventually make the break in October 1973 amidst plans to form their own
socialist party the following year. By the end of 1973, in the two provinces in which the
Waffle still existed – Ontario and Saskatchewan – Wafflers had broken all ties with the
NDP.
During the summer of 1972, following the controversial battle with the Waffle in
Ontario but before the BC NDP’s surprise electoral victory, the national NDP’s prospects
in the upcoming federal election appeared dim. A party survey conducted earlier in the
year revealed that under David Lewis’s leadership there appeared to be little potential for
improvement over the NDP’s 1968 election results.1 In addition, the party was struggling
to attract media attention apart from the Waffle, leading Lewis Seale to complain “you
couldn’t turn on CBC radio without hearing about the Waffle, which had superb media
1
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access.”2 Worse still, the Quebec NDP and its president Raymond Laliberté released a
platform for the federal election entitled Il faut prendre le pouvoir partour that seemed to
confirm his party’s separatist sympathies by stating Quebeckers alone had the right to
determine their own future in Canada. David Lewis formally repudiated the Quebec
NDP platform and persuaded the provincial party to hold a special convention in
September at which it accepted the federal party’s alterations and revised the offending
passages of the platform.3
Despite these initial difficulties, Lewis hit on a winning theme early in the
campaign attacking corporations that had taken advantage of government subsidies,
grants, and tax loopholes despite making large profits. With great relish he labeled them
“corporate welfare bums.”4 The federal NDP research staff uncovered numerous
examples of prominent companies enjoying “corporate rip-offs,” enabling Lewis to
release new revelations to the press daily.5 The “corporate welfare bums” campaign drew
significant media attention and re-energized party activists who had become disheartened
by the internecine struggles of the previous three years.6
The NDP platform called for Canada to recover its economic independence and
end American plundering of its natural resources. The party opposed a continental
energy deal, but endorsed full employment, public ownership of the oil and gas
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industries, and the establishment of a prices-review board. In addition, the NDP was for
equal pay for equal work, paid maternity leave, expanded daycare, family planning and
birth-control information, a ban on all nuclear testing, and Canada’s withdrawal from
NATO and NORAD.7 During the final weeks of the campaign, with media interest in the
“corporate welfare bums” exposés dwindling, Lewis turned to other issues, such as the
NDP opposition to the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline proposed for the Northwest Territories
which he tied to the issue of foreign ownership. Lewis told audiences “we in the NDP
have been concerned about our political and economic independence for many years.”
He emphasized the party’s commitment to ending direct grants to foreign corporations
and tax concessions to resource industries and introducing a screening agency to review
and possibly disallow foreign takeovers. The NDP also promised to create a Canadian
Development Corporation to provide “major investment in industries that will create jobs
for Canadians,” and to “slow down resource development and export until the provinces
and federal government have adopted a realistic energy and resources policy… requiring
that the resources be fully processed in Canada.”8
The Waffle approached the 1972 federal election campaign with some
ambivalence. Cy Gonick dismissed Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau as a reactionary and
acknowledged that “corporate welfare bums is a good slogan, but it’s a good liberal
slogan.” He claimed the NDP would expunge the Waffle to enable David Lewis to shift
the party rightward into the centrist vacuum abandoned by the governing Liberals.9 Ken
Novakowski, who ran as the NDP candidate in Burnaby-Richmond-Delta, a riding the
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NDP held from 1962-1968, was the only self-identified Waffler to stand for election. His
campaign was co-chaired by Wafflers drawn from across the country, including Caroline
Brown in Saskatchewan, Paul Barber in Manitoba, Tom Pocklington in Alberta, and the
recently elected BC MLA Harold Steves. Novakowski’s team solicited funds from
Waffle supporters, explaining that because “Ken remains as the only ‘Waffle’ candidate
in the country, we feel it is imperative that he be elected to represent a Waffle position in
the House of Commons and in the federal caucus.”10 His campaign literature focused on
protecting the Fraser River from pollution, building public transit, preventing foreign
domination of the Canadian economy and halting the rise in food prices.11 Novakowski
lost to PC candidate John Reynolds by 1440 votes despite increasing the NDP’s raw vote
and finishing ahead of the Liberal incumbent Tom Goode.
One month after meeting at Delaware, the Ontario Waffle Movement for an
Independent and Socialist Canada made plans to stage a counter-campaign during the
federal election. Although the Ontario Waffle did not run candidates, it did draw
considerable attention via public meetings, rallies in Ottawa and Toronto, and the doorto-door distribution of its counter-campaign literature, to issues it claimed the other
political parties were ignoring. It highlighted foreign ownership and the “crucial trade
talks” involving the Auto Pact renegotiations that followed the ‘Nixon Shock’; wage and
price controls; the peacetime imposition of the War Measures Act during the 1970
October Crisis; the government’s handling of the relationship between English Canada
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and Quebec; and the status of women.12 Laxer, Watkins, and Ellie Prepas attended a
press conference that turned hostile as reporters questioned the relevance of the Waffle’s
“campaign… for no one.”13 According to a report from its Kingston group, the Waffle’s
election strategy confused voters as well.14 The Windsor Waffle supported the NDP
locally while simultaneously distributing counter-campaign literature.15 Both Laxer and
Watkins, despite their criticisms of the party, announced they would vote NDP come
election day.16 However, the Ontario Waffle made its hostility towards Stephen Lewis
clear. At a Waffle rally in Ottawa on the second anniversary of the institution of the War
Measures Act, Robin Mathews criticized the lacklustre election campaign saying “Pierre
takes his two children, Margaret and Justin, Stanfield takes whichever daughter is
available and David Lewis pays Stephen to stay at home.”17 Several hundred people
attended the rally which ended in a shouting match between Waffle supporters and
members of the Canadian Liberation Movement.18
The Saskatchewan Waffle planned its own counter-campaign, including holding
local meetings, producing a four-page tabloid emphasizing the need for public ownership
and resource development, and holding a press conference.19 The Saskatchewan
Wafflers distributed the tabloid in Regina, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw, Prince Albert, North
12
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Battleford, Swift Current and Estevan, mailed it to rural supporters, and held public
meetings in Saskatoon, Regina, Kenosee Lake, North Battleford, and Swift Current. A
rally in Moose Jaw days before the election featured speakers Carol Gudmundson and
James Laxer.20 Yet despite the Saskatchewan Waffle’s criticisms of the NDP during the
campaign, it continued to “offer voting support” to the party.21
Although David Lewis deplored the Waffle’s decision to run an anti-campaign
instead of taking a “constructive, positive position,” the election result suggested the
NDP was not significantly affected by the Ontario departure of its former left wing.
Despite drawing only a small increase in its share of the popular vote, the NDP added
nine seats to its 1968 total, electing thirty-one MPs and holding the balance of power in
the House of Commons.22 Trudeau’s Liberals only barely surpassed Stanfield’s
Progressive Conservatives, 109 to 107.23 The NDP added two seats in Toronto, two seats
in northern Ontario, and retained the seven seats it had held in Ontario at dissolution.24
The major gains came in British Columbia, where the NDP won thirty-five percent of the
popular vote and eleven of the province’s twenty-three seats, a gain of six including
Waffle Manifesto signatory Paddy Neale replacing left-winger Harold Winch in
Vancouver East.25 The results in Saskatchewan were mixed. Although the NDP retained
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four seats and added Eli Nesdoly in Meadow Lake, three incumbents were defeated.26
After the election Waffler Lloyd Robertson suggested that John Skoberg (Moose Jaw), a
Waffle sympathizer, had suffered from the party’s polarization, alleging “The right-wing
brass would not support him for his views. The left wing would not support him for he
had not joined the Waffle. He lost.”27
In the aftermath of the election, Waffler Lorne Brown’s post-election analysis
attributed the NDP’s floundering in Saskatchewan to its lack of a coherent agricultural
policy and an unenthusiastic membership divided between Blakeney and the Waffle.28
Other commentators concurred with Cy Gonick’s earlier assessment that the NDP had
moved too far right in an effort to win votes from the middle class.29 Gonick also
contended the NDP had been largely sidelined by the French Canada-versus-English
Canada debate, which “overwhelms all other issues.”30
The Waffle also criticized Saskatchewan’s NDP government for being
insufficiently socialist. Despite the government adopting another Waffle-backed policy –
a publicly-owned provincial oil company – the group expressed disappointment over the
limited progress made on this and other initiatives, further prompting its break with the
party. Approximately one hundred Saskatchewan Wafflers attended a weekend
conference at Fort San in October 1972 at which they adopted a new constitution
permitting non-New Democrats membership in the Saskatchewan Waffle for the first
26
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time, and developed an organizational structure independent of the NDP. The new
format included a president and vice-president, which Don Mitchell and Sonja Gehl were
elected to fill.31 John Richards, Joe Roberts and Rob Dumont comprised a task force on
the nationalization of the oil industry, and a second task force was formed to envision
agriculture as “part of an integrated over-all socialist development policy” which could
not be “co-opted politically and rendered meaningless by social democrats in the manner
in which the land bank concept was mutilated by the NDP government.”32
The Saskatchewan Waffle’s primary focus during the fall and winter of 1972/73
was preparing and distributing a critical evaluation of the Blakeney government’s first
year in office, titled The Blakeney Government – One Year After. The document
described the Saskatchewan NDP’s 1971 election platform as the “most radical… the
party had put forth since the 1930s,” but questioned whether the government had lived up
to its promises.33 It criticized the government for ignoring northern development, for
subsidizing private industry rather than pursuing public ownership, for continuing to seek
foreign investment despite its campaign commitment to reduce foreign ownership of the
province’s natural resources, and for relying exclusively on the civil service and a few
senior cabinet ministers instead of left-wing party activists. One Year After also
dismissed the government Land Bank as flawed for including an option-to-purchase
clause; far from being “a major experiment with a new land tenure system,” the Land
Bank would not prevent rural depopulation and preserve family farms. While the
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document urged the Blakeney government to nationalize provincial energy resources
through the Saskatchewan Power Corporation and also to nationalize the food processing
industry, it concluded that “although the Waffle should continue to work within the NDP
on issues of policy, it should spend less energy in direct confrontations with the party
establishment for control of party institutions such as provincial council and executive.
We cannot win the struggle for a socialist political party until more Saskatchewan people
want socialism.”34 The Waffle neither challenged Blakeney’s leadership nor played an
active role at the Saskatchewan NDP convention in November 1972.35
There was by no means unanimity among the Saskatchewan Waffle over the
desirability of splitting from the NDP. Some rural and union Wafflers in particular were
“less persuaded of the need or possibility of successfully leaving the NDP.”36 One
expressed concern that “the Regina leadership are working toward a clandestine, elitist
organization” that would leave the Waffle “a Trotskyist group without the NDP
connection.”37 The Waffle Steering Committee therefore postponed plans for holding
another conference until it had hired an organizer, and discouraged its members from
participating at the NDP national convention scheduled for July 1973. Don Mitchell
pressed the Steering Committee for action on the grounds that “ambiguity among Waffle
supporters about whether to leave the NDP” had to be resolved since the “present course
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is producing isolation and impotence.”38 Mitchell’s message sparked a response. The
Saskatchewan Waffle planned a conference for October 1973 in Moose Jaw to decide the
issue. In the meantime, Mitchell was to meet privately with sympathetic individuals in
the NDP to discuss a possible break from the party.39
The Saskatchewan Waffle continued advocating for a publicly-owned oil
company. Although the Blakeney government had already introduced legislation to that
effect, the Waffle feared the likelier outcome would be joint-venture partnerships with
private companies rather than a fully nationalized provincial oil industry. The Steering
Committee instructed MLA John Richards to hold a press conference during debate on
the Speech from the Throne to launch the Waffle’s campaign. To further promote its
views the Waffle distributed “SaskOil – It Can Be Done!” buttons and bumper stickers,
held a series of open meetings at Regina, Saskatoon and Swift Current, visited NDP
constituency associations and met with the Regina Labour Council and Saskatoon
Environmental Society.40 Although Liberal leader Dave Steuart attacked the crown
corporation as a ploy by the Blakeney government to appease the Waffle, the
Saskatchewan Oil and Gas Corporation established in May 1973 did not come close to
fulfilling the Waffle’s demands.41 As John Richards later explained, its “actual mandate
was to undertake a modest program of exploration.”42 As with the Land Bank, what the
Waffle perceived as the government’s half-measures in energy nationalization policy
further disillusioned its members.
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Over the winter of 1972/73, the Waffle’s remnant in Ontario pursued the different
paths chosen at the Delaware conference. Those who had supported “stay and fight”
attended the Ontario NDP’s Provincial Council at Toronto in September 1972, but had
little impact on the proceedings.43 Varda Burstyn was defeated in her bid for a seat on
the NDP Federal Council, but was elected to the ONDP Provincial Executive.44 Three
months later, just as the Ontario NDP convention was set to begin, Stephen Lewis
declared the Waffle “episode is over and done with in the life of the party” and predicted
a healthy debate on innovative policy proposals at the meeting.45 The Left Caucus
nevertheless challenged the NDP leadership at the convention, leading a Globe and Mail
reporter to describe “long delays due to procedural hassles, challenges to the chair and
demands for counted votes.”46 A Left Caucus amendment to ban parent labour
organizations from appointing delegates to NDP conventions or councils in the name of
their affiliates caused some confusion, but passed. Lewis moved the decision be
reconsidered, telling delegates “I don’t think you realize what you’ve done.” The
following day Gordon Vichert as chair retroactively ruled the Left Caucus’s amendment
out of order.47 The Left Caucus also had little success challenging the party
establishment’s slate of candidates for the Provincial Executive. Only Steve Penner was
elected as member-at-large to the twenty-six-person Executive, a significant drop from
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the five Wafflers chosen by the ONDP convention two years earlier.48 The Left Caucus
suffered a further blow when the Provincial Council passed a recommendation
immediately preceding the convention dissolving the Ontario Young New Democrats,
which had always provided a solid base of Waffle support throughout its existence.
ONDP Provincial secretary Gordon Brigden described the OYND as “an essentially
insignificant force which from time to time had representation in the councils of the party
which was far in excess of its numbers.” He accused the OYND of working against the
aims of some riding associations and questioned why the party should continue to
provide financial support to an organization “which has been of no benefit to the party
and which from time to time has proved to be largely a political embarrassment.”49
After departing the NDP, the Ontario Waffle’s primary focus was
deindustrialization. During November 1972, in preparation for its first major strategy
discussions since breaking with the NDP, members heard two alternative visions. First,
James Laxer argued the recent election of a Liberal minority government “is ideal from
the point of view of the development of the Waffle movement… NDP members of
parliament will refrain from voting no-confidence in the government and may back
Liberal measures completely inadequate to deal with Canada’s problems.”50 Laxer
identified critical issues confronting Canada – specifically, the renegotiation of the Auto
Pact and a continental energy deal – and proposed the Waffle mount “massive campaigns
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in opposition.”51 His plan centered on industry-by-industry research studies which would
enable Wafflers to connect with workers, and on an energy policy conference scheduled
for spring 1973 in Toronto. Furthermore, “in the next year and a half we should seek to
achieve sufficient size to allow us to choose whether to become a political party.”52 John
Smart, a key figure in the Ottawa Waffle, shared Laxer’s optimism. While identifying
different priorities more reflective of eastern Ontario’s circumstances, he likewise
recommended a strategy dependent on research task forces and public meetings. Smart
cautioned “[it will be] easy for us to become another mini-left group devoted exclusively
to internal discussion and to ever more refined histories and theories of socialism.”53 His
warning took two years to come to fruition but was altogether prescient.
The Waffle Council’s adoption of Laxer’s plan for a large-scale resources and
deindustrialization campaign was not without controversy. An alternative perspective
was offered by activists in the West Metro group who urged taking a strong stance in
favour of “workers’ control,” and de-emphasizing large-scale province-wide campaigns
in favour of local, grassroots-based campaigns. They maintained:
The predominantly middle class, academic background of Wafflers makes them
feel more confident about their ability to plan meetings, conferences and
educationals, write speeches, newsletters, press releases, etc., but makes them less
confident, even fearful about their ability to establish personal relationships with
the working people of Canada.54
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The Council meeting passed watered-down versions of the West Metro proposals
which had also garnered the support of the Ottawa group.55 But in the coming months
little further action was taken to incorporate themes of workers’ control and locally-based
campaigns into the Waffle’s overall strategy. Instead, divisions over developing a
strategy for the resources and deindustrialization campaign continued into the new year.
At a campaign committee meeting in February 1973, some members presented a plan
“drawn up the night before by a core of leadership people in Toronto,” for a series of
rallies and meetings to be held around the province.56 At a subsequent meeting called by
the Ottawa Waffle the differences remained unresolved. Finally, at a Waffle executive
meeting in March, the decision was made to adopt the comprehensive approach
advocated by Laxer, Watkins, and others among the Toronto-based leadership.57
Although attention was paid to eastern Ontario and measures established for local
elements within the campaign, the resources and deindustrialization campaign that
eventually materialized in November bore a close resemblance to Laxer’s original
proposal.
After several months of internal debate but otherwise little activity since its
formation, MISC initiated an ambitious twelve-part public lecture series in Toronto in
early 1973. Speakers including James Laxer, John Hutcheson, Tom Naylor, Mel
Watkins, and Robin Mathews addressed such themes as “The Evolution of Canadian
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Capitalism,” “Class and Income Distribution in Canada,” and “Canadian Resources and
Underdevelopment.”58 Some of the lectures were based on research projects the Ontario
Waffle conducted into the extent of American ownership of Canadian manufacturing and
resource industries and the loss of jobs in southwestern Ontario manufacturing centres.
The well-attended lectures were later edited by Robert Laxer and published as (Canada),
Ltd.: The Political Economy of Dependency.59 The collection focused on the Ontario
Waffle’s thesis of deindustrialization, Canada’s history of economic dependence on
foreign investment and resource extraction, and the Canadian manufacturing industry’s
reliance on American branch plants. The Ontario Waffle’s interpretation of this history
as well as recent events held that deindustrialization in Canada would follow upon
strengthened manufacturing in the United States, thereby further reducing Canada to a
mere dependent of the United States valued only for its exploitable natural resources, oil
in particular. As a result, the Wafflers concluded the Canadian working class employed
by American-owned manufacturers and resource extraction industries would be crucial to
the development of Canadian independence and socialism – which in practice primarily
meant workers represented by the USWA and UAW.60 Ottawa Wafflers explained “these
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workers in the major industries are concretely experiencing the effects of American
imperialism, through increasing plant shutdowns, lay-offs, and lack of new industrial
development.”61 In November 1973 the Ontario Waffle embarked on its resources and
deindustrialization campaign, holding public meetings in London, Kitchener-Waterloo,
Brantford, St. Catherines, and Hamilton where the oil crisis, Canada’s status as a resource
base for the United States, and the deindustrialization of southwestern Ontario were
discussed. The meetings, usually featuring Laxer and Watkins along with a local
Waffler and trade unionist, typically were attended by 100 to 150 people.62
By May 1973 when the first national Waffle meeting in over a year opened at
Regina, the group was only active in Ontario and Saskatchewan. In both provinces the
members continued to wrestle with the question of whether or not to make a final
decisive break from the NDP by challenging it electorally. In Manitoba and British
Columbia, the popularity of premiers Schreyer and Barrett stifled the Waffle’s ability to
mount a challenge from the left. Three Manitoba Wafflers, Paul Barber, Michael
Mendelson and Harvey Goldberg, explained that the group in that province “has ceased
to exist as an organized entity” although former Wafflers continued their activism “in a
variety of special interest groups,” including producing a “socialist newspaper” titled
Prairie Dog Press.63 The apparent popularity of the Manitoba NDP’s moderate course in
government, and the Waffle’s inability to influence the party’s direction there led many
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Wafflers to lose hope “of ever accomplishing anything in the NDP.”64 They revealed that
Cy Gonick had decided against running for re-election, not least because he “personally
can’t stand” participating in a government dominated by one man, Premier Ed Schreyer.65
Although no one from British Columbia attended the meeting, Caroline Brown
reported on the situation in that province based on her discussions with BC Wafflers
Harold Steves, Ken Novakowski and Dave Yorke. She described Wafflers in BC as
embedded in the NDP and explained “it is impossible to consolidate the left under one
umbrella.”66 She also conveyed that Dave Barrett “is operating on his own without
reference to the party,” and that he was a “clever operator who uses radical socialist
rhetoric at constituency meetings but pursues a conservative course in Victoria.”67 As in
Manitoba, BC Wafflers saw little possibility for an organized Waffle presence either
inside or outside the NDP. Two Alberta Wafflers reported that their provincial
organization had disbanded in August 1972 as a result of the Ontario Waffle’s decision to
leave the party, but remained as an informal left wing of the NDP.
The Ontario Waffle’s report, presented by Linda Hay, described its focus on
deindustrialization and ongoing study of plant shutdowns in Ontario since 1966, as well
as an examination of the proposed Mackenzie Valley Pipeline.68 Hay noted the political
plans of Wafflers in the Steelworkers, including Cec Taylor’s intention to run for the
presidency of USWA Local 1005 on a ‘United Steelworkers of Canada’ platform. She
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also reported that the Waffle women’s caucus met at every Waffle meeting, and had
recently supported striking stewardesses at Wardair.69
Don Mitchell conveyed that the Saskatchewan Waffle was still debating over
whether to continue working within or make a decisive break from the NDP. He credited
its SaskOil campaign with persuading the government to create a crown corporation, but
lamented that instead of nationalizing the industry “so far all they have done is establish
an exploration company.” Mitchell acknowledged that a major debate over the Waffle’s
future loomed, but felt “sentiment leans towards a split with the NDP and formation of a
new party.” He also argued that challenging the NDP electorally would be “the acid test”
of any new socialist party.70
Linda Hay reported that Ontario Wafflers remained active in the NDP, but
admitted most in the group believed a new socialist party was necessary. Consequently
they were considering running candidates in the upcoming federal election. Unlike the
Ontario and Saskatchewan contingents, Manitoba Wafflers harboured reservations about
challenging the NDP electorally. The four provincial groups’ respective attitudes toward
the upcoming federal NDP convention in Vancouver accurately reflected their opinion of
the party generally – Ontario Wafflers did not plan on attending, Manitoba and
Saskatchewan Wafflers expressed indifference, and British Columbia’s Wafflers were
very interested. Although the attendees at the Regina gathering complained about poor
communications among the provincial Waffle groups, little was done to rectify the
problem.71
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Despite their deep disappointment over the directions Manitoba’s provincial NDP
government had been taking, that province’s Wafflers predicted – accurately as it turned
out – that the Schreyer team was poised for re-election in June 1973 after a controversial
term in power. The government had, for example, faced down intense opposition from
the private insurance industry and implemented public auto insurance in 1970. It had
amalgamated Greater Winnipeg, created a community-based system of municipal
governance, and expanded public housing.72 Furthermore, it had implemented
agricultural reforms including a land-lease program targeted at younger farmers,
nationalized the troubled Churchill Forest Industries, instituted labour reforms,
established a Department of Northern Affairs, and continued its predecessor’s expansion
of Manitoba’s infrastructure.73 Through it all, Schreyer had maintained his personal
popularity as premier. The NDP campaigned largely on its record, while promising a
dental-care program for children, more money for public transit, and a publiclysubsidized prescription drug plan.74
Cy Gonick, as expected, declared he would not be seeking re-election in
Crescentwood. Gonick described his time as a MLA in the NDP government as
“interesting but frustrating.” He explained how he had been unable to advance his own
priorities, including halting the takeover by multinational corporations of Manitoba’s
economy, facilitating a major redistribution of income, creating better and cheaper
housing and recreational facilities, improving health care and education for the poor and
working class, opening community health clinics, implementing greater worker’s control
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in industry, humanizing the school system, and ensuring public ownership of resource
industries. Gonick applauded the government’s creation of public auto insurance, its
expansion of public housing and its agricultural reforms, but argued “most of the changes
we have brought about have been too mild, partial and temporary in nature to make a
dent in the gross inequalities which exist in our society.”75 Waffler Una Decter,
chairperson of the Manitoba Welfare advisory board, sought the nomination to replace
Gonick as the NDP candidate in Crescentwood, indicating she shared his objectives but
intended to pursue them “with a little more optimism than Cy.”76 However, Harvey
Patterson, president of the Winnipeg Labour Council, defeated Decter for the
nomination.77 Patterson was narrowly elected in Crescentwood after two judicial
recounts when the returning officer broke a tied vote in his favour, but the result was
declared void after an investigation into the ballot-counting process and he lost the
resulting 1975 by-election.78 Schreyer’s NDP retained office with an increased share of
the popular vote and thirty-one of the province’s fifty-seven seats.79
With the Waffle now extinct in Manitoba, its Ontario remnant struggled to remain
relevant to avoid a similar fate. Stephen Lewis described the Ontario NDP’s first
Provincial Council meeting since the December 1972 convention as “a real turning point”
and claimed “acrimony was jettisoned; the party was in good spirits; debate was
argumentative in the best sense.” Lewis proclaimed “it feels good now to be leader,” but
ironically he resurrected a major theme of the early Waffle when he argued
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The party must surely immerse itself in the enveloping spread of social activism
throughout Ontario amongst groups who fight expressways, who oppose the
deposit of garbage in our countryside, who resist indiscriminate high-rise
development, who resist strike-breaking, who fight to preserve the Escarpment or
Algonquin Park, who manage to change the boundaries of regional government.
It is no longer credible to pay homage to direct action while watching it from
afar.80
Yet the Ontario Waffle remained separate from the party, and the Left Caucus
while attracting support from outside Ontario had little impact on the NDP. The federal
NDP convention at Vancouver in July 1973 proved to be the last straw for the Left
Caucus. David Lewis drew loud applause from delegates on the first day of the
convention with his response to Left Caucus member Barry Weisleder who had criticized
the party’s support of Canadian participation in the International Commission of Control
and Supervision in Vietnam. Lewis reminded delegates the NDP caucus had opposed
“the war in Vietnam before this young man knew Vietnam existed.”81 David Lewis and
the federal caucus enjoyed widespread support throughout the convention as delegates
endorsed major planks in their strategy for minority government: a resolution calling on
Parliament to establish an effective prices review board, doubling old-age pensions to
$200 a month, and providing six percent residential mortgages.82 The Left Caucus’s
attempt to amend a comprehensive energy policy resolution by including nationalization
of all resource industries was defeated by a wide margin.83 John Richards was not
affiliated with the Ontario-based Left Caucus but he spoke in favour of its amendment,
arguing the NDP should affirm the principle of “complete public ownership of all
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resource industries.”84 Instead, delegates passed the original resolution calling for a
government-owned Canadian petroleum corporation to operate in competition with
private industry, federal aid for provincial oil and gas crown corporations, a national
energy planning board, federal and provincial energy marketing boards, postponement of
the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline, public ownership of the oil sands in Alberta and
Saskatchewan, and the recognition of aboriginal land rights.85
Mississauga taxi driver Douglas Campbell, who had unsuccessfully sought to
defeat Stephen Lewis for the leadership of the Ontario NDP in December 1972, now
challenged David Lewis to head the national party but was defeated by 719 votes to 76.86
The Left Caucus supported Varda Burstyn’s candidacy for party President, but incumbent
Donald MacDonald easily won 648 to 164.87 The Left Caucus did not contest any of the
vice-president seats, and none of its fourteen candidates were elected to the twenty open
positions on the Federal Council. Neither was the Left Caucus significant in the
convention’s decision to organize a national conference on women’s rights despite the
opposition of some of the party leadership.88 All told, the convention strongly endorsed
David Lewis’s position as leader and the federal caucus’s role in the minority
Parliament.89
Disillusioned members of the Left Caucus, including Steve Penner, Joe Flexer,
Bret Smiley and Barry Weisleder, joined a group of University of Toronto student
activists named the Old Mole in the summer of 1973 in forming a new organization, the
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Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG). Interpreting the overriding theme of Canadian left
politics over the preceding four years as “the historical isolation of North America from
the main convulsions of the world revolutionary process” and concluding “the vanguard
throughout this continent remains the prisoner of the parochialism and empiricism which
are the main ideological pillars of the North American bourgeoisie,” the RMG’s founders
looked internationally for inspiration and example.90 They found it in the Trotskyist
Fourth International which they claimed had recently transformed “from a federation of
propaganda circles to an international combat organization.”91 Thirty-one delegates
attended the RMG’s founding convention in October 1973, joined by former members of
the LSA.92 Delegates differed over whether the RMG should concentrate its activities on
infiltrating union locals, or engage with “struggles of students and teachers around the
institutional contradictions of capitalist education, mobilizations against political and
legal repression, and movements in solidarity with struggles in Quebec and
internationally (Cambodia, Chile, etc.).” Although the convention adopted the latter
position, delegates elected to the Central Committee were representative of both camps.
The RMG proclaimed itself “proud of the seriousness and political level of the intense
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debate which has just concluded” – so much so that it committed to the immediate
publication of pamphlets outlining the convention’s dueling resolutions.93
The RMG and Ontario Waffle were among the groups that actively supported
striking workers in late 1973 at the Artistic Woodwork plant in north Toronto. The
Ontario Waffle had continued to support striking workers in its ongoing effort to engage
with the working class, including taking part in the strike of primarily female employees
at Dare, Inc. in Kitchener in early 1973. The Artistic Woodwork strike attracted so many
supporters from among the broader New Left in Toronto that the numbers picketing
eventually dwarfed striking workers.94 When police determination to keep the plant open
and protect private property clashed with picketers’ will to prevent the plant from
operating, violent outbursts ensued, resulting in numerous picket line arrests, including
that of Dan Heap.95 The strike attracted significant media attention and continued into
November 1973 before pressure from media coverage, mass picketing, and provincial
and municipal governments led to a negotiated collective agreement and an end to the
strike.96 James Laxer joined the picketers in early September alongside Toronto city
councillors John Sewell and Dorothy Thomas and spoke at a strike support rally in
November.97 Historian Ian Milligan described the Artistic Woodwork strike as an
opportunity for New Leftists who had turned “towards Marxism and the working class as
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a necessary component of social change” to put their politics into practice on the picket
line.98 The strike became a personal touchstone for many New Leftists’ subsequent
activism, especially among those who went on to careers in the labour movement.99
The experience of supporting striking workers at Artistic Woodwork also proved
pivotal in the political development of a group of York University undergraduates active
in the Waffle. Influenced by left-wing and Marxist professors including James Laxer,
John Hutcheson, Virginia Hunter, and Robert Albritton, the students along with
disgruntled members of the Waffle Labour Caucus created a study group, open by
invitation only, committed to analyzing capitalism, socialism, the state, and the Waffle.
Tired of the perceived “family compact” leadership of James and Robert Laxer, the study
group declared the political atmosphere of the Ontario Waffle “tense and frustrating,” an
opinion resulting in their decision to operate “underground.”100 Abbie Bakan, one of the
group’s original members, provided an insider’s glimpse:
In this little socialist study group, comprised at its peak of about thirteen people,
there was a desperate thirst for political clarity… the study group members soon
became influenced by Lenin and considered themselves to be working under the
principles of ‘democratic centralism’… in practice, however, the main activities
of the group were simply collective discussion.101
The group’s members concluded that the Waffle was not an appropriate vehicle for
advancing their theory of a socialist revolution, and instead began identifying with a
British left tendency, the International Socialists, voraciously reading articles produced
by its leading members such as Tony Cliff. This imported analysis embraced the ideas of
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the Bolshevik Party during the early years of the Russian Revolution and rejected
Stalinism, describing the Soviet Union as “state capitalist.”102 The Artistic Woodwork
strike, in addition to influencing the ideological development of the York-based study
group, proved significant for the Ontario Wafflers whose presence on the picket line
represented their final significant non-electoral attempt at activism in coalition with other
like-minded groups.
While the Ontario Waffle attempted to re-establish itself as an activist force
outside of the NDP, the Saskatchewan Waffle determined by the fall of 1973, after
eighteen months of debate, that its moment for leaving the party had arrived.103 The
Saskatchewan Waffle issued a pamphlet in August by John Warnock entitled “A Socialist
Alternative for Canada” criticizing the NDP for failing to take “action on the question of
Canadian independence,” abandoning its roots as a “political movement” to become “just
another political machine,” and warning that the party was “tightly controlled by a small
self-perpetuating elite.”104 Warnock distinguished between the NDP’s social democracy
and the Waffle’s socialism in calling for the creation of a new socialist party. The
Saskatchewan Waffle steering committee prepared for a conference at Moose Jaw in
October when the membership would decide on the Waffle’s future.105 Prior to the
conference, members of the Saskatchewan Waffle met with Allan Blakeney at the
legislature, but the premier explained he had “nothing earthshaking to propose” and

102

Ibid.
Moose Jaw Waffle, “Towards a Socialist Party,” September 1973, File II.33 Moose Jaw Waffle, 197374, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
104
Saskatchewan Waffle, “Press Release,” August 20, 1973, File I.24 Saskatchewan Waffle, 1973, John
Warnock Papers, SAB (Saskatoon); John W. Warnock, A Socialist Alternative for Canada (Regina:
Saskatchewan Waffle Movement, 1973); “Warnock advocates new socialist party,” Saskatoon StarPhoenix, August 20, 1973.
105
Waffle Steering Committee Meeting Minutes, April 28, 1973, File II.31 Meetings, c. 1972-1983,
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
103

373
indicated he was not prepared at that time to commit to any policies that might placate the
group. Blakeney told the Wafflers there was still a place for them in the NDP, which
should act as the “great mother church” of the left. Don Mitchell reiterated Waffle
differences with the NDP, contending the government needed a working-class basis to its
policies and should focus on wealth redistribution. All agreed the split should focus on
policy differences, not personalities. John Richards asked about the possibility of a
“principled reconciliation” if the Waffle left the party, but Blakeney expressed
uncertainty and encouraged the group to “look over the NDP and see what you think”
before splitting.106
Nearly three hundred people, including two hundred Waffle members, attended
the Moose Jaw conference. A resolution to withdraw from the NDP and “work to
establish a new socialist party in Saskatchewan at a founding convention in the spring of
1974” that was amended to remove the date and add the commitment that “a major
external education and organizational program be aimed at developing a large socialist
base within the province” was carried with only a handful of delegates opposed.107
Members of other parties were to be barred from membership in the new socialist party.
The conference elected Don Mitchell as president, Sonja Gehl as associate president,
Cathie Cox as treasurer, and a ten-person steering committee.108
A panel discussion at the conference addressed the role MLA John Richards
should perform in the legislature as the Waffle’s spokesperson outside of the NDP
106

Blakeney and Waffle meeting notes, October 5, 1973, File III.27 Waffle – Manitoba, 1971-73, John
Richards Papers, SAB (Saskatoon). Wafflers Don Mitchell, Ailsa Rands, Paul Beach, John Richards, Al
Bichoff, Ron DeLatley, Glen Maguire, Sheila Kuziak and Sonja Gehl attended the meeting with Blakeney
and Alex Taylor. See also Sheila Kuziak’s recollection of the meeting in Gruending, Promises to Keep,
101.
107
Waffle Newsletter, November 1973, File II.35 Newsletters, c. 1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds,
SAB (Regina).
108
Ibid.

374
caucus. Fred Gudmundson summarized the discussion, explaining Richards “should
emphasize ideological questions concerned with articulating a socialist alternative.”109 In
early November 1973 Richards announced his departure from the NDP caucus. His
personal difficulty in deciding to leave the NDP stood in marked contrast to the
enthusiasm most of the Saskatchewan Waffle leadership felt for a definitive break from
the party and government. Richards had long struggled with the dual challenge of being
a Waffle spokesperson while remaining a member of the NDP government. He had used
his position to criticize the University of Saskatchewan’s administration, to attack high
pharmaceutical drug prices and to call for a publicly-funded plan to cover their costs, and
to express the Waffle’s demand for public ownership of the oil industry. But in such
cases he had faced questions of whether he spoke for the government or himself.110
Richards had grown increasingly frustrated with the Blakeney government’s lack
of progressive action. In May 1972 he had voted against a bill allowing the government
to extend forgivable loans to industries, a measure Richards decried as “welfare to
industry.”111 Further difficulties arose when Department of Public Health officials took
exception to an article Richards had published – albeit anonymously – in Next Year
Country.112 As for the potash industry, the issue which had drawn Richards back into
Saskatchewan politics in 1970, the government would take little action until after he had
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left the NDP.113 Shortly after the Waffle released One Year After, its critical summary of
the Blakeney government’s first year in office, Richards reported to his constituency
association that the party had accomplished little and he described the “emptiness of the
caucus debates.” However, he did point to the establishment of a Department of the
Environment, a survey of drug prices, support for community health clinics, and access to
legal abortions as positive developments.114 When he announced in July 1973 his
decision not to continue as legislative secretary to Health Minister Walter Smishek,
Richards explained to his constituency association that he could no longer remain in the
hypocritical position of criticizing the government while continuing to work within it.
The government’s resource development policies were a major source of disagreement:
“I think the government has failed to elaborate any substantial socialist strategies to deal
with corporate exploitation of our natural resources and rural decline.”115 Specifically,
Richards criticized the SaskOil program as a means for entering into joint ventures with
private oil companies rather than fulfilling the party policy of nationalizing the oil
industry, and condemned the government for failing to live up to its election
commitment to “challenge and end the control over the industry exercised by a cartel of
multinational fertilizer companies.”116
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As the Waffle moved closer to breaking with the NDP, Richards wrote a friend in
St. Louis and lamented “I have been depressed about politics for the last six months.”
Although Richards recognized that the Waffle would soon leave the NDP, he explained
I fear left schisms and it is with sadness that I see myself becoming estranged
from many good people in the New Democratic Party. However the NDP seems
totally committed to administering the status quo, and totally unwilling to bend –
even in a social democratic fashion – people on to new directions. It is quite
probable that, on its own, the Waffle will falter and die, but those of us involved
feel that we must try – we all grow old, and we lack oriental patience. We are all
tottering past the crucial age of 30 and into the senility of middle age.117
Richards’s announced departure from the NDP on the heels of the Saskatchewan
Waffle’s decision thus came as little surprise. Nevertheless he described the action as
“painful,” indicating that he still respected Blakeney, the cabinet ministers, and party
activists. Ultimately, however, Richards concluded he could no longer remain in a party
that had consistently rejected, both provincially and federally, the left-wing course
advocated by the Waffle.118
In the immediate aftermath of its decision to leave the NDP, the Saskatchewan
Waffle focused on municipal elections taking place across the province. The Moose Jaw
Waffle had been active in municipal politics since its 1970 takeover of the Civic Reform
Association from traditional New Democrats. Allied with labour, the Civic Reform
Association ran a slate of ten candidates for Moose Jaw city council in 1973 – all
unsuccessfully – although hostility from New Democrats angry over the recent split
lingered. John Conway reported that the Civic Reform Association had a base of support
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in the community numbering close to two thousand.119 In both Saskatoon and Regina,
the Waffle campaigned for candidates against NDP-backed candidates. In Saskatoon, in
conjunction with activists from the Métis Society, native women, and legal aid clinics,
the Waffle supported three candidates for council: Nora Thibodeau, Mary Arpin and
Vicki Wilson. Rose Bishop and George Smith ran in Regina, emphasizing public
housing, free public transit and attacking slum landlords.120 Although none of the above
named candidates in Saskatoon and Regina attracted more than twelve percent of the
vote, the local Waffle groups were pleased with the result of their initial foray into
electoral politics in direct competition with the NDP.
In December 1973 the Ontario Waffle met in convention to discuss becoming a
political party and fielding candidates in the federal election expected the following year.
As is discussed in the next chapter, this decision was crucial to the group’s future.
Despite falling short of a membership of one thousand that some considered as the
minimum necessary for holding a founding convention, the Ontario group pushed
forward.121 One hundred and fifty delegates attended the Toronto convention, in addition
to seventy observers and members of the press. The convention’s focus was transforming
the Ontario Waffle Movement for an Independent and Socialist Canada into a new “mass
party for Canadian independence and socialism.”122 A resolution presented jointly by the
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East Metro and Ottawa groups that stated “the objective conditions are right” became the
basis for the group’s activities over the coming months.123
The debate, for once, lacked ferocity. Most Ontario Waffle groups favoured
creating a political party and running candidates in the next federal election. Only the
Kitchener-Waterloo group was against the idea, deeming it premature, unwise, and likely
to limit further the Waffle’s ability to establish alliances and win support amongst other
activists. Claiming as evidence the Waffle’s lack of cooperation with other labour groups
in plans for a May Day celebration and a similar go-it-alone streak in demonstrations
over the military coup in Chile, the Kitchener-Waterloo naysayers warned that creating a
new party would do “serious harm” to the future of a broad movement for independence
and socialism. The majority, however, were not persuaded, and voted 115 to thirteen in
favour of a new political party.124 The convention also agreed to replace the Waffle
News, published by the Ottawa Waffle, with the journal Advance, which the York Waffle
had been publishing since August, as the movement’s primary forum for internal
discussion and debate.125
The Ontario Waffle’s decision to form a political party represented its final break
with the NDP. As Mel Watkins explained, the move was “a way of communicating to
ourselves and to the public that the Waffle is unambiguously disconnected from the
NDP.”126 The decision by the federal NDP to prop up the minority Liberal government
led Watkins to conclude “the NDP is bankrupt… no more than the left wing of the
Liberal party,” while James Laxer, appropriating Lewisian rhetoric, claimed “the NDP
123
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has become an encumbrance around the necks of the workers of Canada.”127 The Waffle
criticized in particular NDP support of Liberal energy policies, insisting that the proposed
national petroleum company would foot the bill for research and exploration while
foreign oil companies reaped the rewards. The convention voted unanimously in favour
of nationalizing without compensation all Canadian energy companies, inspired in part by
a May 1973 Gallup poll which indicated forty-eight percent of Canadians supported some
degree of nationalization of Canada’s energy resources.128 Yet the federal election the
following year would demonstrate just how misplaced was the Waffle’s optimistic view
of its prospects outside the NDP.
Late in 1973 the Waffle in Ontario and Saskatchewan lost two key figures – Mel
Watkins and John Warnock. Following the Ontario Waffle’s December 1973
convention, Watkins became adviser to the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest
Territories to assist it in preparing a submission to the Berger inquiry into the Mackenzie
Valley Pipeline.129 The media attention and respect accorded Watkins, and the public
recognition resulting from the 1968 Watkins Report, had made him one of the most
prominent Waffle spokespersons. He had been the first choice of many as the Waffle
candidate for federal NDP leader in 1971. Although he did not officially resign until
August 1974, Watkins’s absence from the Ontario Waffle was keenly felt as it entered its
next and ultimately final phase. Coincidentally, in November 1973 Saskatchewan
Waffler John Warnock announced his resignation from the editorial board of Next Year
127
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Country, a decision consistent with his determination to reduce his involvement in the
Saskatchewan Waffle. As he explained to the Next Year Country editorial board, in
addition to needing to focus on his family and research, Warnock had begun “questioning
my own political work.”130 Along with his objections to some of Next Year Country’s
editorial decisions, Warnock was frustrated over the Saskatchewan Waffle’s 1973 Moose
Jaw conference. He explained, “I am growing tired of going to endless Waffle
conferences, to discuss problems with the same hard core group. There must be more to
political activity than distributing campaign literature door to door.”131 Warnock
maintained that the Waffle would not “amount to anything until it builds a base in the
working class movement,” and indicated his plans to engage in activism with a group of
ex-Wafflers in Saskatoon “who are actually working with trade union people. For many
reasons, the waffle has not been able to do that.”132
After the Waffle lost its bid to remain within the Ontario NDP in June 1972, its
members spent much of the following year-and-a-half absorbed in discussions about their
future purpose and direction. Recognizing its failure to transform the NDP into a
socialist party focused on preserving Canadian independence, the Waffle struggled to
regroup. The Waffle’s participation in the 1972 federal election is illustrative of the
resulting confusion, for both the Ontario and Saskatchewan groups ran a countercampaign criticizing the NDP yet voted for the party anyway and individuals supported a
Waffle-identified candidate running for the NDP in BC. Provincial elections in British
Columbia in 1972 and Manitoba in 1973 demonstrated that the Waffle no longer acted as
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an organized left wing of the NDP in either province. Throughout 1972 and 1973
Wafflers debated a variety of options – remain within the NDP despite overwhelming
evidence that the party would reject Waffle policy prescriptions; break from the NDP and
act as a social movement while reluctantly supporting the party electorally; or split
definitively with the NDP and challenge it in elections. The strategic and lengthy debates
that occurred in Ontario and Saskatchewan especially over the Waffle’s future directions
both exacerbated existing ideological divisions within the two groups and created new
ones. Furthermore, these internal debates occurred amidst a rapidly evolving New Left
milieu. Ideological and organizational divisions within both the women’s and labour
movements, and an intellectual turn towards Marxism alongside a renewed emphasis on
the working class, all significantly influenced the Waffle. By the end of 1973, when the
Ontario group decided to field candidates in the upcoming federal election, the Waffle
existed only in Ontario and Saskatchewan, and in both provinces had broken definitively
with the NDP.
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Chapter Ten
“Marx out of the closet:” Outside the NDP, 1973-75
At the December 1973 Ontario Waffle conference, James Laxer reportedly
declared that the time had come to “take Marx out of the closet.”1 After splitting from
the NDP, the Waffle in Ontario and Saskatchewan adopted a Marxist analysis that
prioritized the working class – which in practice meant the unionized working class – as
the agent for socialist politics and radical change. Although this shift attracted those
academically-inclined activists interested in debating how best to apply a Marxist
analysis to Canada in the 1970s, it simultaneously alienated others not drawn to such
esoterica and thereby limited the Waffle’s ability and willingness to collaborate with
various other left-wing social movements. The Waffle’s embrace of Marxism would
have ramifications for its relationships with the women’s, labour, and farmers’
movements, as well as affecting its approach to electoral politics. As will be seen, the
failure of the Ontario Waffle’s 1974 federal election campaign to garner significant
support, and the consequent lost opportunity for communicating its ideas to a broader
public, led the Waffle to re-evaluate its strategy. The weakness of the campaign and
resulting fears over its future became touchstones for opposition to the Ontario Waffle’s
leadership. Furthermore, the emphasis on Marxism resulted in many Wafflers reevaluating their group’s commitment to Canadian nationalism, and produced contentious
ideological debates that split the Ontario and Saskatchewan Waffles into tiny sectarian
fragments. Radical student members of a study group based at York University grew
particularly vocal in their denunciation of Waffle electoral strategy and its nationalism;
their plan to take control of the Ontario Waffle came to fruition when its leadership
Abbie Bakan and Philip Murton attest that Laxer made this statement in their 2006 article “The Origins of
the International Socialists.”
1
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resigned en masse in October 1974. Although the Saskatchewan Waffle continued to
meet, publish, and debate for another ten years, by 1976 it had devolved into a small and
primarily academic discussion group resembling the Committee for a Socialist Movement
that had preceded the creation of the Waffle in that province. Meanwhile, a sizeable left
wing remained in the NDP despite the Waffle’s departure, and the party did not shift
sharply rightward in the mid-1970s.
The Waffle’s ideological shift towards rigid Marxism occurred as a result of
several factors. First and most importantly, leading Wafflers became disillusioned with
the NDP as a potential vehicle for the creation of an independent and socialist Canada.
Their experience of three years of activism within and without the party, driven by the
overriding aim of transforming the NDP into a party committed to independence and
socialism and engaged with extra-parliamentary social movements, had sapped the
enthusiasm inherent in the Waffle Manifesto. Repeated defeats in policy votes and
officer elections at party meetings, an inability to push provincial governments in
Manitoba, Saskatchewan and British Columbia sufficiently leftward, and their expulsion
in Ontario convinced the majority of Wafflers of social democracy’s limitations for
confronting capitalism in Canada. Secondly, Wafflers’ heightened emphasis on the
working class drew on their perception of workers’ increased militancy during the early
1970s, as demonstrated by the Quebec Common Front in March and April 1972 and the
labour movement’s opposition to wage controls. Thirdly, the shift was influenced by the
Ontario Waffle’s conviction that the changing economic circumstances of the 1970s,
particularly the protectionism of Nixon’s New Economic Plan and the 1973 oil crisis,
would accelerate the deindustrialization of Canada’s manufacturing heartland and return
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the country to its traditional dependence as a supplier of natural resources, oil especially,
to the United States. Finally, the Waffle’s embrace of Marxism was part of a broader
trend among the international New Left. The Canadian student movement had not been
alone in facing criticism for its lack of a rigorous analysis of society’s ills and necessary
remedies.2 The appeal of a systematic analysis purporting to demonstrate objectively
capitalism’s inevitable collapse and the means of replacing it with socialism was strong.
As a result, the 1970s witnessed a tremendous resurgence of Marxism in various guises
throughout the international New Left.
The Waffle’s focus on women’s issues underwent a transition after it departed the
NDP. In addition to their activism in local women’s liberation movements, Waffle
women had worked with other feminists within the party to urge action on a variety of
women’s issues. After their split from the party, Waffle women in Ontario and
Saskatchewan focused increasingly on the problems of working women; however, in
doing so, they limited their opportunities for connecting with a broader feminist
movement in building a socialist-feminist framework. This was partly a response to
changing circumstances within Canadian second-wave feminism. A brief lull in
organizing and activism had followed the 1970 Abortion Caravan, and when the
women’s liberation movement re-emerged a few years later it represented a broader range
of feminist issues and priorities.3 A “radical caucus” of women’s liberationists and
female unionists, including Waffle sympathizers Grace Hartman and Madeleine Parent,
had coalesced at a 1972 ‘Strategy for Change’ conference organized by the National
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Action Committee on the Status of Women (NAC). But as historians and activists Nancy
Adamson, Linda Briskin and Margaret McPhail explain:
Gradually this unity of radical women was broken. Those who would later form
the radical-feminist current turned towards the creation of social and political
alternatives to the existing society and concentrated particularly on the issue of
violence against women. Those who would form the socialist-feminist current
turned to theoretical discussion and tended to concentrate on workplace issues.4
Many women focused on organizing women’s centres and bookstores, rape-crisis centres
and battered-women hostels as well as providing counselling services and birth control
information. At the same time other women’s liberationists emphasized the plight of
working women; as the number of female unionists soared, feminists increasingly
organized within the labour movement or in independent unions.5 As the Waffle turned
toward Marxism, female Wafflers’ emphasis on working women represented the
beginnings of a socialist-feminist analysis and practice that developed fully in the late
1970s. However, given the Waffle’s limited resources, both human and financial, and its
focus on workers generally rather than women workers specifically, the women’s
question was largely subordinated to issues of class and Canadian independence.
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Waffle women worked with women’s liberation groups across Canada in the
campaign to secure the right to safe, legal and free abortions, and were among the central
figures in the Abortion Caravan. Wafflers had also worked with other feminists within
the Ontario NDP pressing the party, successfully as it turned out, to adopt policies
prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex, and introducing a
government-funded houseworker’s allowance, improved childcare facilities, changes to
divorce law, and abortion on demand.6 They failed, however, to make substantial
changes to the NDP’s structure either federally or provincially, as the party consistently
rejected proposals for mandating gender parity among party officers. Gender parity, as
well as the provision of childcare at its meetings, soon emerged as established norms in
the Ontario Waffle after MISC was formed. In Saskatchewan the Waffle accepted
structural parity in principle, but it was not always practiced until enshrined in the
group’s constitution in 1972.7
The first hint of a new direction came almost immediately after the Ontario
Waffle’s split from the NDP. Krista Maeots, in her paper “Organizing Women”
presented at the August 1972 Ontario Waffle conference at Delaware, declared abortion
campaigns would not be “the main route to building a socialist consciousness among
women,” and criticized the tendency of some “middle-class” groups to focus on personal
issues. Maeots called on the Waffle to lead the way towards a “mass-based socialist
women’s liberation movement.”8 In Ontario, however, the forum for this approach
6
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remained the Toronto Waffle Women’s Group, as it had during the NDP years. Meetings
held at members’ homes during the fall of 1972 led to a “Conference on Women
Working: At Home or At Jobs.” The broad scope can be contrasted with the group’s later
less encompassing efforts. In addition to providing a history of women in the labour
movement and a panel on organizing women, the conference featured speakers on
women on welfare and the single parent family, women and the law, and the role of
women in the media and the arts.9 For Waffle women the conference was noteworthy as
“probably the first time in the history of women’s liberation meetings [that] serious
discussion took place on the issue of women and the trade union movement.”10
A further opportunity for developing this focus on working women occurred in
December 1972 when Art Kube of the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC) suggested to
the Waffle Women’s Group that it organize female white collar workers.11 The extensive
discussions of the proposal that followed included concerns that the CLC might attempt
to tone down the Wafflers’ socialist message to its members. Ultimately, while some of
its members appear to have participated as individuals in a CLC organizing drive at the
North American Life Assurance Company, the Waffle Women’s Group did not engage in
a full-scale program organizing white-collar female workers on behalf of the CLC. The
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group did provide volunteer strike support for female flight attendants involved in a twomonth-long labour dispute at Wardair.12 In addition, it held evening educational
workshops in Toronto. But the Waffle did not highlight the Women’s Group throughout
1973. A group of West Metro Wafflers complained in a resignation letter that “the point
is not that the women’s issue is a low priority in the Waffle; rather it is no priority at
all.”13
At the December 1973 Ontario Waffle convention, the women’s plenary session
concluded “that working women are in the best position to bring about change for all
women in society.”14 Waffler Virginia Hunter’s article “Women and Socialism”
delineated the essential differences between radical and socialist feminists’ analyses of
women’s oppression. Unlike Wafflers and other socialist feminists, radical feminists
held that sex, rather than class, was the primary contradiction in society.15 While other
Waffle women agreed with her analysis, not all were convinced that the Waffle Women’s
Group strategy should preclude working with radical or liberal feminists. In fact, the
Kingston Waffle argued that Waffle women did have a role to play in the abortion
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struggle – a campaign which Wafflers had largely abandoned after concluding that
abortion-on-demand was not an issue with the potential to transform women’s
consciousness.16
In Saskatchewan the majority of Waffle women agreed that their focus should be
on the working class and the struggles of working women. The Saskatchewan Waffle
held a women’s conference at Moose Jaw in February 1974. As Martha Tracey recalled,
“by that point women who saw themselves as radical feminists weren’t there, so women
in the Waffle had made a choice, and their choice was not to see men as the enemy but to
look at more of a class analysis.”17 Conference presentations accepted the premise of
emphasizing working women, and considered the desirability of establishing a separate
women’s caucus within the larger group. Six Moose Jaw Wafflers – Carol Bruce, Joy
Elkin, Judy Hudson, Sally Mahood, Marilyn Patterson and Tracey – who self-identified
as “scientific socialists” in their paper “Towards a Strategy for Waffle Women,”
connected women’s liberation to the destruction of capitalism. They claimed “it is clear
that women have not been equal participants in the Waffle,” and argued for the creation
of an ongoing women’s caucus to educate and advocate within the Waffle. They urged
the Waffle to undertake a public campaign on the “two related issues of female
participation in the labour force and child care.”18 In contrast, Sylvia Pusch, Isabel
Andrews and Elaine Nystrom argued against forming a separate women’s caucus. They
contended that although the Moose Jaw Wafflers had adopted a Marxist framework they
16
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erred by espousing the “feminist approach, that of viewing the formation of a socialist
women’s movement in isolation from the working class as a whole.” Pusch, Andrews
and Nystrom asserted that “there cannot be a strategy for the emancipation of women
apart from a strategy for the proletariat as a whole,” and a Waffle “strategy should center
around the self-organization of women and women proletarians within the proletariat as a
whole.” Although they pushed for the Waffle to campaign for child care and abortion,
they maintained that single-issue campaigns drew the “attention of women inwards to
themselves rather than outwards to an identification with their class as a whole.”19 Sheila
Kuziak reported to the Saskatchewan Waffle Steering Committee that Waffle women had
withdrawn from the abortion campaign coordinating committee established a few weeks
before in Regina.20
The focus on working women led key Wafflers, including Pat Gallagher, Sheila
Kuziak, and Denise Kouri, to organize Saskatchewan Working Women as a coalition of
union and community-based feminists in the late 1970s and 1980s, but this activism
remained outside the parameters of the Waffle.21 Despite the Blakeney government’s
relative inattention to women’s issues during its first term, the Saskatchewan Waffle
rarely criticized the government for failing to address the major policy goals of the
women’s movement.22 As will be seen, feminists and leftists in BC by contrast routinely
criticized the NDP government there for its inaction on women’s issues, although not
under the guise of the Waffle.
19
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The Waffle’s ideological shift also affected its position vis-à-vis the labour
movement. During its NDP period the Ontario Waffle had antagonized leaders of
Canadian branches of some major international unions, the USWA and UAW in
particular, by criticizing the limited autonomy granted the Canadian sections, attacking
the union leadership’s moderation, and working with left-wing caucuses of the
international as well as independent Canadian unions, most notably affiliates of the
Council of Canadian Unions (CCU). The Ontario Waffle had lent its support to two
prominent strikes by the CTCU, the CCU affiliate led by union organizers Kent Rowley
and Madeleine Parent, at Texpack in 1971 and at Artistic Woodwork in 1973. However
Mine-Mill’s decision to withdraw from the CCU in April 1972, which two Wafflers
prompted, harmed the relationship between the Ontario Waffle and the CCU. The
Ontario Waffle’s embrace of Marxism following the split from the NDP and commitment
to the deindustrialization thesis further divided it from the independent Canadian labour
movement. In Saskatchewan, where there were no CCU locals or a manufacturing base
employing large numbers of industrial workers, the deindustrialization thesis was not
easily applicable and the ideological shift to Marxism resulted in the Waffle focusing its
energies on organized workers unfettered by the practical complications experienced by
their Ontario counterparts.
In the immediate aftermath of its departure from the NDP, the Ontario Waffle’s
uncertainty over whether it should organize within international unions or support a fullyindependent Canadian union movement contributed to a divide between the Toronto and
Ottawa Waffle groups. In a paper on “Trade Union Organizing” presented at the July
1972 Gravenhurst meeting that preceded MISC’s formation, union activist Dan Sunstrom
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recommended that the Waffle establish caucuses within international unions to advocate
for Canadian independence and socialism.23 Conversely, Robin and Esther Mathews’s
paper “On Labour and Practical Strategy,” circulated shortly after the Delaware
conference, endorsed the Waffle working towards the establishment of independent
unions.24 A letter to Canadian Dimension complained that “with the flip-flopping of the
Waffle on the question both before and after Orillia, practically the only group in Canada
to support the independent union movement has been the corporate-dominated
Committee for an Independent Canada, a paradox which lends weight to the charges of
company unionism.”25
A dispute in British Columbia throughout 1972 brought new urgency to the
debate over international versus independent unions. In Kitimat, a company town
dominated by the aluminum giant Alcan, workers at the Alcan plant broke away from the
USWA to form an independent union, the Canadian Association of Smelter and Allied
Workers (CASAW).

This ultimately successful severance from a major international

union inspired others committed to the idea of an independent Canadian union
movement. Kent Rowley and the CCU had supported the Kitimat breakaway and the
divide it engendered with USWA was among the reasons for Mine-Mill’s departure from
the organization. The Ontario Waffle Labour Committee, however, adopted a more
cautious approach. The minutes of its May 12, 1973 meeting indicate only that an
23
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“informal exchange of views took place” over the issue of breakaways and the CLC
response.26 Prior to this discussion Robert Laxer had expressed strong opposition to
breakaways, and supported working within international unions. In a February 1973
paper he argued “the attempt to find the solution to new anti-imperialist struggles by way
of short-cut organizational solutions is mechanical and uncreative.”27 Five months later
the Ontario Waffle Labour Committee had largely adopted this position. Its policy,
passed at the July 1973 council and endorsed at the December 1973 convention,
categorically stated:
While the Waffle recognizes the frustrations that lead rank-and-file members to
support local breakaways, it acknowledges that the preferable route for the
Canadian members of so-called international unions is to remain united while
they carry out the transformation of their unions into independent Canadian
unions.28
Although the complex internal politics of the Canadian labour movement clearly
influenced the Ontario Waffle’s labour policy and strategy, the position adopted at the
July council and December convention reflected the group’s emphasis on the Canadian
working class in the “key manufacturing and resource based industries of Ontario” as
critical components in the creation of an independent and socialist Canada.29 As a result
of the Waffle’s internal confusion and eventual commitment to working within
international unions, Rowley and Parent rejected the Waffle’s suggestion that it and the
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CCU establish formal ties.30 The Waffle approached other potentially sympathetic
unionists at CUPE and the Confederation of National Trade Unions in Quebec, but none
were open to a formal affiliation.31 The Waffle’s concern over deindustrialization also
precluded allying with environmentalists, according to Robert Laxer, who declared “our
allies do not include people who advocate limits to growth – for under the guise of being
concerned with the environment such a view is in fact support for de-industrialization of
Canada.”32 In addition, the Waffle Labour Committee in 1974 began publishing North
Country, a news magazine for Ontario workers. Three issues were produced before the
Waffle’s dissolution, with each edition featuring articles by Wafflers and union activists
on strikes and workers’ struggles around the province.
Despite the absence of a large industrial working class in Saskatchewan when the
Waffle there turned to Marxism between 1972 and 1974, it adopted an analysis that
placed workers at the centre of its political strategy. Pat Gallagher asserted at its August
1974 conference that the group decided it would form “an open Marxist party with a
working class base” and focus its organizing efforts on the trade union movement.33
Indeed, individual Wafflers did just that in the coming years, including Shelia Kuziak
with the Alliance of Canadian Cinema, Television and Radio Artists (ACTRA) from
1974 to 1989, Don Kossick with the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store Union in
1975, and Gallagher herself as an executive assistant with the Saskatchewan Federation
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of Labour in 1976.34 Not surprisingly, the Waffle’s Marxist analysis prioritizing the
working class hindered its existing relationship with the NFU. The Waffle and the NFU
had cooperated closely during Don Mitchell’s bid for the Saskatchewan NDP leadership
in 1970, and the Waffle had also attracted a number of NFU activists, including
president Roy Atkinson, to its cause.35 Furthermore, the Waffle had supported NFU
policies pushing NDP governments in Saskatchewan and Manitoba to adopt an
agricultural strategy for combating corporate domination of farming and food
production.36 However, as Don Kossick recalled, as the Waffle turned increasingly
towards Marxism its prevalent view became “the farmers were reactionary, that they
weren’t necessarily the group to work with in terms of progressive politics, and there was
a lot of reading and analysis of Lenin and populism and so on.”37 At the national Waffle
meeting in May 1973, Lorne Brown reported that the Saskatchewan group had grown
disappointed with the NFU. He explained how the Waffle initially perceived the NFU as
a potential ally, but now realized it had “confused the NFU’s left populism with a
socialist thrust.”38 The NFU had adopted a non-partisan approach to its advocacy, and
Brown reported that “at the moment the NFU leadership views the Waffle with
suspicion.”39 By December 1975, the Saskatchewan Waffle’s agricultural committee was

34

“Obituary,” Globe and Mail, November 5, 2016; Don Kossick interview with John Warnock, August 19,
1989, Adio Tape 1970-1989, R-11906B, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
35
National Farmers Union list, n.d., File I.9 NFU-Waffle, John Warnock Papers, SAB (Saskatoon).
Wafflers Lorne Brown, Don Mitchell, John Conway, Gerry Sperling, Doug Daniels, John Warnock and Pat
Gallagher are all listed as providing resources to NFU local area co-ordinators on the document.
36
Press Release, April 30, 1971, File III.1 Manitoba Waffle, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
37
Don Kossick interview with John Warnock, August 19, 1989, Audio Tape 1970-1989, R-11906B,
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
38
Minutes of National Waffle Meeting held at Regina, Saskatchewan, May 5-6, 1973, File III.28 National
Waffle, John Richards Papers, SAB (Saskatoon).
39
Ibid. Shortly after John Gallagher, former editor of the NFU’s newspaper the Union Farmer, became
full-time editor of Canadian Dimension, Joe Roberts complained to the Saskatchewan Waffle steering
committee that the left-wing magazine had adopted a “consistent anti-Waffle line.” Publisher Cy Gonick’s
own disillusionment with the Waffle undoubtedly contributed to Canadian Dimension’s increasingly

396
considering “how the Waffle relates to the question of agricultural production in a
manner consistent with our developing Marxist and working class analysis.” Their
analysis divided farmers into three classes – capitalist agribusinessmen, petite bourgeois
independent commodity producers, and wage earners – and encouraged Wafflers with
farmer contacts to initiate a campaign explaining workers’ ongoing opposition to the
imposition of wage controls.40 As Kossick observed, “the Waffle’s tension, or movement
towards a centralized Marxist-Leninist model in a sense blinded it from recognizing other
forms of organizational structures that could have mobilized workers or farmers in terms
of coalitions.”41
Much as the Waffle’s evolving ideology influenced its approach to the women’s,
labour, and farmers’ movements, so did its increasingly strict Marxist analysis shape
fierce internal debates over participation in the 1974 federal and 1975 Saskatchewan
elections. The Waffle played an important role in the “new nationalist” movement,
discussed in Chapter Three, that influenced the Trudeau Liberals’ adoption of several
economic nationalist measures during the 1972-74 minority government. Nevertheless,
internal criticisms of the Ontario Waffle’s strategy following its disappointing
performance in the 1974 election concentrated on the allegation that the campaign
emphasized Canadian nationalism to the exclusion of the group’s socialist message. By
contrast, the debate within the Saskatchewan Waffle over the 1975 provincial election
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there focused on the question of whether there was any strategic value to be gained from
participating in electoral politics.
Although Trudeaumania and Pierre Trudeau’s ascension to power occurred during
a period of “peak nationalism” in 1967-68, the new prime minister was in fact a
committed anti-nationalist.42 Nevertheless, under pressure from the NDP and at the
urging of the Liberal Party’s left-nationalist wing the Trudeau government embraced a
series of economic nationalist polices. Liberal left-nationalist politicians, professors and
members of the media such as Walter Gordon, Beland Honderich, Abraham Rotstein,
Eric Kierans and Peter Newman often shared platforms with leading Wafflers, accorded
the socialists media coverage alongside mainstream nationalists, and warned their fellow
Liberals that an overtly nationalist NDP, under the Waffle’s influence, would appeal to
voters concerned about high levels of foreign ownership. During his first term in office,
Trudeau took little action on foreign ownership other than to appoint an “understaffed,
low-priority task force” on foreign investment chaired by Windsor MP Herb Gray.43 As
a result of the government’s inaction, Walter Gordon warned, “the NDP is likely to steal
a good portion of the vote if the Liberals fail to bring in a strong policy to deal with
economic independence.”44 Gordon, no longer a MP, nevertheless rejected the Waffle’s
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calls for public ownership, and urged the Liberal government to adopt instead his more
moderate proposals for limiting foreign ownership.45
According to Christina Newman, Gordon and the economist Abraham Rotstein
were dismayed that the Waffle “was the only organized independentist movement in the
country.” Along with Peter Newman, editor-in-chief of the Toronto Star, they
established the Committee for an Independent Canada (CIC) in September 1970 to
“provide a focus for nationalists with ideas less radical – though no less passionately held
– than those of the Wafflers.”46 They portrayed the CIC as a mainstream, non-socialist
alternative to the Waffle’s emphasis on nationalization as the primary means for
achieving Canadian economic independence from the United States.47 The CIC included
as members such prominent public figures as the politicians Judy La Marsh and Pauline
Jewett, writers Farley Mowat, Hugh MacLennan, Pierre Berton and Al Purdy, publishers
Jack McClelland, Mel Hurtig, and Beland Honderich, journalists Claude Ryan and
Adrienne Clarkson, and academics Robin Mathews, George Grant, Kenneth McNaught,
Denis Smith, W.L. Morton and Lloyd Axworthy.48 Historian Stephen Azzi described the
CIC’s statement of purpose, in contrast to the Waffle, as “intentionally vague, in an
attempt to win as many members as possible.”49 Despite Newman’s and Gordon’s active
speaking schedules promoting the organization in the fall of 1970 and spring of 1971, and
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the CIC’s success gathering 170,000 signatures on a petition opposing foreign ownership,
it quickly declined in prominence after its initial burst of activity.50
Gordon’s close connections with the Toronto Star – he was a director and
member of its board from 1970 to 1979 – furthered the newspaper’s support of Canadian
left-nationalism in the 1960s and 1970s. Certainly the Star’s coverage of the Waffle and
the CIC enhanced the public prominence of both groups.51 In his study of the
newspaper’s support for economic nationalism, Donald MacIntosh concluded that
between Gordon and the Star “his cause was its cause.”52 The Toronto Star gave
prominent coverage to opponents of foreign ownership such as Rotstein, Watkins and
Laxer, and adopted a left-nationalist editorial position. MacIntosh argues:
The Star’s long preoccupation with foreign ownership is an excellent illustration
of an attempt by a mass circulation newspaper not only to set one aspect of the
political agenda but to change the public’s viewpoint. There can be no doubt that
the Star by the persistent prominence it gave the issue did, in effect, attempt to
structure the way in which its readers perceived foreign ownership by the events it
chose to report, its editorials and its interpretative articles... The Star, in its
campaign to change its readers’ views on foreign ownership, came very close to
suggesting that foreign ownership was responsible for most of Canada’s economic
problems.53
Peter Newman, in recalling his decision to accept the editor-in-chief position at the
Toronto Star, explained “I was after a platform where I could preach my nationalistic
convictions… what mattered to me was that the Star was the house organ of Canadian
nationalism, and as its editor, I would be in a position to advance my crusade.”54
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In addition to the Toronto Star, the Waffle received high-profile coverage in
mainstream magazines such as Maclean’s, Chatelaine, and Saturday Night.55 When
Newman left the Toronto Star to become editor of Maclean’s in 1971, he remained a
committed nationalist and ensured that like-minded voices were prominent in the
revitalized magazine.56 In explaining the nationalist inclinations of prominent Canadian
journalists such as Newman and Pierre Berton, the historian Paul Litt asserted that
“nationalism endowed their ‘beat,’ Canada, with meaning and purpose, and their voices
were influential in the national conversation.”57
Leading Wafflers’ familiarity with print, radio and television assisted their efforts
to convey a message of independence and socialism.58 Wafflers such as Laxer, Krista
Maeots, Don Mitchell, John Conway and Don Kossick had extensive experience with
university student newspapers, and several others were employed by various media
outlets in the early 1970s.59 Kelly Crichton, for example, was a reporter for both CBC
and CTV before becoming a producer at CBC Television, and Gerry Sperling was a
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freelance broadcaster with CBC-Regina. Maeots began a successful career as a CBC
Radio producer in 1971.60
In addition to the increased media attention devoted to the issue, public opinion
polls between 1970 and 1974 suggest that new nationalists, with the Waffle prominent
among them, had persuaded many Canadians that American domination of the economy
endangered their economic sovereignty and way of life. A November 1970 poll indicated
sixty-two percent of Canadians believed there was already enough US capital in Canada
(compared to twenty-five percent who said they would like more), a substantial increase
from the forty-six percent that expressed concerns over American ownership in 1964.61
A year-and-a-half later, sixty-seven percent said there was sufficient US capital in
Canada compared to twenty-two percent who desired more.62 Responses to a poll asking
if Canadian dependence on the US was a “good thing or not a good thing for Canada”
showed a similar trend: thirty-four percent viewed dependence as a good thing down
from forty-eight percent in 1963, while a majority (fifty-three percent) decried Canadian
dependence on the United States, a rise of nine percent since 1963.63 By 1974, fiftyseven percent of respondents believed the Canadian way of life was too heavily
influenced by the US, a jump of thirty percent since 1956.64
Liberal left-nationalists, apprehensive about the Waffle’s influence, NDP popular
appeal, and shifting public opinion, conspired to drive the Trudeau government in the
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direction of economic nationalism despite the prime minister’s personal reluctance.
McCall and Clarkson claim that in the aftermath of the Nixon Shock in 1971, a “crucial
point in Canadian history, Pierre Trudeau’s stubborn anti-nationalism was a serious
impediment to new planning,” but pressure from within the Liberal party as well as the
NDP during the minority parliament of 1972-74 forced his government to act.65 It
created the Foreign Investment Review Agency (FIRA) which required potential
investors to demonstrate how a foreign corporate takeover would be of significant benefit
to Canada, and the Canadian Development Corporation (CDC) to facilitate Canadian
government investment in domestic businesses. A massive increase in the price of oil
compounded by the OPEC boycott following the Yom Kippur War of October 1973 led
the Trudeau government to accept NDP demands for a national energy policy, a state oil
company, and a continued freeze in oil prices.66 However, when the government with
Progressive Conservative support also passed corporate tax cuts and introduced a budget
in early 1974 that reflected none of Lewis’s demands the NDP withdrew its support.67
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John English described the Prime Minister as having “feigned fury” at the opposition for
causing the election, but Trudeau later admitted that he, Turner and House Leader Allan
MacEachen engineered the defeat to ensure a return to the polls on the Liberals’ terms.68
The NDP’s dilemma was how to claim responsibility for the minority
government’s progressive policies while justifying its decision to force the election.
With inflation growing at an exorbitant rate, much of the campaign focused on the PC’s
endorsement of wage and price controls.69 The NDP slogan “who controls Canada?”
initially targeted corporations as the primary cause of inflation, but when that strategy
flopped the campaign shifted focus to attacking the PC’s proposed wage and price
controls, which the Liberals also opposed.70 Otherwise, the NDP election platform
highlighted the rapidly rising cost of living and the party’s promises to empower the Food
and Prices Review Board to restrain price increases, create a two-price system for crucial
commodities, and introduce a ceiling on mortgage rates. On energy policy the NDP
opposed a continental energy deal, promising instead to strive for Canadian selfsufficiency in oil production by 1980, keep oil prices low, increase research into
renewable energy sources, and delay the proposed Mackenzie Valley pipeline in order to
assess its impact on Native peoples.71
During the 1974 federal election campaign the Waffle attempted to formulate an
approach to electoral politics distinct from the NDP. In Saskatchewan, it initially
considered running a candidate against Liberal cabinet minister Otto Lang in Saskatoon-
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Humbolt, but eventually decided not to given the “low level of interest” and the group’s
predominantly provincial focus. Instead the Saskatchewan Wafflers published a
pamphlet explaining their stance on national policy issues and held rallies in Prince
Albert on natural resources, in Saskatoon on abortion and the Wheat Board, and in
Regina on inflation.72 The Ontario Waffle decision to run candidates left some of its
erstwhile supporters torn. Saskatoon Waffler Gerry Kowalenko, in Ottawa during the
campaign, explained:
I’ve decided to work for the NDP in the upcoming federal election. I could not
work for [Waffle candidate] Bela Egyed in Ottawa Centre – but I could not work
against him – so I have decided to work in my own riding… which, while
hopeless, will at least mean that I won’t have to work against the Waffle.73
James Laxer’s second book Canada’s Energy Crisis received largely favourable
reviews and generated much needed publicity for the Waffle in the lead-up to the 1974
election campaign.74 At a press conference held prior to Turner’s federal budget
unveiling in May, the Waffle announced plans to field four candidates, two of them
women, who would campaign on four main issues: foreign ownership of the economy,
and energy resources in particular; the oppression of women; the stagnation of Ontario
manufacturing; and the need for an independent Canadian union movement.75 A Globe
and Mail reporter sarcastically proclaimed that “the Waffle, the left wing that the New
Democratic Party amputated in 1972, is flapping back into electoral politics.”76 One
week later the Waffle identified its candidates, now reduced in number to three: James
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Laxer in York West, Bela Egyed in Ottawa Centre, and Mary Campbell in MiddlesexLondon-Lambton. Despite running candidates against the NDP, the Waffle demonstrated
some ambivalence in its stance toward its former party comrades.
Middlesex-London-Lambton was selected because the Waffle anticipated the
NDP would field strong or left-wing candidates in the neighbouring London ridings.77
York West was thought promising because of its high concentration of working-class
voters, and Ottawa Centre chosen because of the likelihood it would generate significant
media attention. The Ottawa Waffle believed it was accorded coverage worthy of a
“fourth major party” - including an Ottawa Citizen profile of Bela Egyed published
alongside that of the Liberal, Conservative and NDP candidates in Ottawa Centre – in
comparison to other parties such as Social Credit or the Marxist-Leninists that also had
candidates in the riding.78 Generally, however, Waffle candidates received little press
coverage, and certainly less than they did during the 1972 counter-campaign.
The Waffle conducted its campaigns similar to the NDP, distributing leaflets in
door-to-door canvasses and identifying supporters whom it subsequently encouraged to
vote on election day. With limited financial and human resources to draw upon, and
believing its best electoral prospects were disillusioned and working-class voters, the
Waffle focused on polls where the NDP had performed well in previous elections.79 Its
platform highlighted the dangers deindustrialization posed to Ontario and advocated
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extending women’s rights in the workplace, nationalizing all resource industries owned
by multinational corporations, and increasing the minimum wage and old age pensions.
The NDP for its part largely ignored the Waffle throughout the campaign. Neither its
leader David Lewis nor the NDP candidates in York West, Ottawa Centre, and
Middlesex-London-Lambton commented in the media about their rivals to the left.80
An improved Liberal campaign, the election’s twin foci on Trudeau’s leadership
and wage and price controls, and the lack of a campaign message with the resonance of
its previous “corporate welfare bums” tagline, proved the NDP’s undoing in 1974.81
Reduced to 15.4 percent of the popular vote, the party’s caucus was nearly halved. Three
Toronto seats, including David Lewis’s riding of York South, fell to the Liberals, but the
biggest losses occurred in British Columbia where the party’s popular vote dropped to
twenty-three per cent from thirty-five per cent in 1972.82 Lewis had attempted during the
campaign to distance the federal NDP from Dave Barrett’s provincial government, but
still lost nine of the eleven seats it had won in BC in 1972.83 Lewis accepted
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responsibility for the debacle and in the election aftermath announced his resignation as
party leader and retirement from political life.84
The election results were profoundly disappointing for the Ontario Waffle. In all
three ridings its candidates finished fourth behind the NDP, garnering a mere fraction of
the NDP’s vote totals.85 In the electoral post-mortem, numerous Wafflers offered
comments, criticisms, and suggestions for future activities. Doris Jantzi, an executive
member from Toronto, and Bela Egyed argued “we were wrong about the timing for the
formation of a socialist party.”86 Ellie Prepas’s assessment was even harsher. She
informed John Richards:
I think it’s fair to say that the Ontario Waffle will have great difficulty recovering
from their federal election activities. Their already diminishing credibility has all
but been wiped out here in Southern Ontario. I must say that the events of the last
couple of years have been very discouraging from the perspective of social
change in Canada, but more particularly for me, for social change in Ontario.87
The disenchantment amongst Wafflers was widespread and captured in a paper “Lessons
of the Toronto Waffle Election Campaign” written by the York Waffle’s study group.88
The document, which was sent to all Wafflers following the election, was “strategically
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signed by two members only… hoping this would minimize the defensive and repressive
response of the leadership that arose with every hint of debate.”89 It did not, and the
ensuing debate marked the beginning of the end for the Ontario Waffle.
The internal debate over the Waffle’s election strategy focused on one
fundamental issue – the York group’s belief that the Laxer campaign had emphasized
Canadian independence at the expense of socialist principles. A Laxer leaflet with the
slogan “a vote for Jim Laxer is a vote for Canadian Independence” was presented as
evidence.90 Although Laxer’s, Egyed’s and Campbell’s other campaign materials
contained the slogan “for an independent and socialist Canada,” the critics were not
placated. Their perception of the purportedly undemocratic and ad hoc manner in which
Laxer’s materials had been developed only enhanced their displeasure.91 Laxer’s
supporters lashed back at the York critique. Some thought it inappropriate that “Lessons
of the Toronto Waffle Election Campaign” was distributed via an unauthorized mailing to
all Wafflers. Others focused on its negative tone, deeming it “long, heavy, and hard to
read,” but most reacted against the charge that the Waffle leadership had “sold-out”
socialism in favour of promoting Canadian independence.92
The debate over which goal should be foremost – Canadian independence or
socialism – was hardly new to the Waffle. Some leftists praised the Waffle’s efforts to
develop a “reasoned critique of Canadian capitalism” after leaving the NDP.93 But John
Smart explained “the articulation of a class analysis in the Ontario Waffle in the winter of
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1973 (and after) interested a small number of young academic Marxists in the Waffle in a
new way… seeing Marxism coming into its own in the Waffle some people have been
misled into thinking that the Waffle was dropping independence/nationalism.”94 In
February 1974, Robert Laxer presented a paper calling on the Waffle to develop alliances
with non-socialist Canadian nationalist individuals and organizations, such as the
economist and former Liberal cabinet minister Eric Kierans, or the Committee for an
Independent Canada.95 A number of Wafflers, including those in the York study group,
criticized and rejected this analysis.96 The debate became the last straw for James Laxer
and others among the Waffle leadership.
Members of the York study group intended to dominate and transform the Waffle
by working within it. Looking back from the vantage point of 2006, Bakan explained
“the hope was to steer a course to the left, and reverse the pattern of declining morale and
loss of members that had characterized the Waffle experience since its break from the
NDP.”97 Her recollection conflicts with another document written at the time, “For
Internal Discussion Only – from AB to the comrades in Study Group (I.S., Can., Ltd.).”
The author, who almost certainly was Abbie Bakan, described the York group’s strategy:
At first, before we knew how the Waffle struggle would develop, we wanted to be
consolidated and at least 50 before we began to act and exist independently. We
saw the Waffle as an arena in which we could develop our politics and win
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aimless revolutionaries to our ideas. Then, having accomplished that, we would
split and turn to the class.98
This would be the strategy that guided the study group in the latter half of 1974 as it took
the lead in criticizing the Waffle’s apparent electoral foible of emphasizing Canadian
nationalism to the exclusion of socialist dogma. By the fall of 1974 the study group, as
‘AB’ wrote, “recognized ourselves as all that was left, saw our opposition as easily shed,
and proceeded to go for broke.”99
The nationalism debate lasted throughout the summer of 1974. By September,
James Laxer, now thoroughly exasperated, presented to the Ontario Waffle executive a
statement designed to silence his critics and develop a program of activities for the group
going forward. Accusing them of “mini-left, anti-nationalist sectarianism,” Laxer labeled
his opponents the “Americanized new left” more interested in sterile debates than “the
compelling need to give socialist leadership to the nationalist movement.”100 Laxer’s
defenders at times veered into an increasingly hostile anti-Americanism. John Smart’s
paper prepared for the October Council meeting made a point of distinguishing which
critics (and members of the York study group) were American citizens, implying this
characteristic alone was sufficient to discredit their complaints.101
The showdown occurred in October at the Waffle Council meeting in Ottawa.
Laxer’s foes had previously circulated a position paper entitled “Towards an Alternative
Strategy” in response to the Laxer statement recently adopted by the executive. Virginia
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Hunter, writing in Canadian Forum, suggested Laxer’s limited effort in organizing for
the meeting might have indicated that he had already abandoned the movement, at least
emotionally.102 Most local Waffle groups, including all three in Toronto, rejected the
executive strategy in favour of the “Towards an Alternative Strategy” document. As
Hunter recounted, “many of us knew days, even weeks, earlier that Laxer wanted nothing
less than complete submission on the part of his opponents or he would leave the
movement.”103 Similarly, the Ottawa Waffle threatened to leave the movement if the
executive report was not adopted. And so it was. The Waffle Council rejected the
executive strategy, and Laxer and his supporters promptly departed the meeting and the
movement. A month later, they officially resigned from the Waffle executive.104 In a
letter mailed to Wafflers the Laxer faction justified their decision:
It was clear… that there were people in the Waffle with fundamental
disagreements with the past policies and activities of the Waffle… in its present
state the Waffle cannot make a useful contribution to the politics of our
country…we do not intend to participate in a sterile debate within the Waffle.105
The remaining Wafflers made plans for a December convention in Toronto, at which the
York study group completed its takeover of the Waffle. A few long-time Wafflers,
including Virginia Hunter, walked out of the convention once they realized the new
group’s commitment to socialism had little to do with the Waffle’s origins.106 The
“Revolutionary Socialist Programme” produced by members of the York study group
argued that “the struggle must be devoted to mobilizing the working class as part of an
102
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anti-imperialist, socialist movement.”107 Only a tiny remnant, about twenty-five
members, was left.108 Hunter’s comment that they were soon “swept away by the kind of
love for the working class that only middle-class children can feel,” illustrated the deep
divisions separating the York study group from the former Wafflers.109
The few remaining Wafflers quickly established contacts with the International
Socialists in the United States, resolving in February 1975 that “we should put our Waffle
past behind us and move on.”110 The Waffle, they concluded, had been too much like the
NDP, too left nationalist and too focused on labour bureaucrats. Initially adopting the
name ‘Independent Socialists (Ontario)’ as “a concession to a lingering commitment to
left nationalism,” the group soon broke even this final tie to its Waffle past by renaming
itself the International Socialists and publishing a newspaper, Workers’ Action.111 The
Ontario Waffle Movement for an Independent Socialist Canada was no more. After
Laxer visited John Richards following his resignation from the group he had helped
found, Richards wrote “I am delighted that Laxer has finally seen the light about the
increasingly sectarian nature of the Ontario Waffle… it was a pleasure to see him talking
relatively rationally about the irrelevance of much of the sectarian Marxism being
propounded by the Waffle, both in Ontario and in Saskatchewan.”112
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Meanwhile in Saskatchewan, John Richards’s desire to seek re-election in
Saskatoon led to an intense debate within the provincial Waffle over the strategic and
ideological purpose of electoral participation. As the Saskatchewan Waffle, influenced
by Joe Roberts, Lorne Brown and John Conway, adopted a rigid Marxist-Leninist
analysis it questioned the strategic value of electoral participation and ultimately rejected
Richards’s coalition-based approach to campaigning. After splitting from the NDP and
waging municipal campaigns in Regina, Saskatoon, and Moose Jaw in 1973, the
Saskatchewan Waffle undertook an internal education program in early 1974 aimed at
providing “the membership with the theoretical background necessary for a debate on
party and electoral tactics prior to the founding convention of a new political
formation.”113 The internal education program received a mixed response. It was
criticized as “too heavy,” and Caroline Brown claimed the program not only failed but
also made some Wafflers feel like “they have no skills, a low level of consciousness”
which led to feelings of alienation from the organization.114 Conversely, Pat Gallagher
argued the internal education program successfully familiarized the membership with
“basic socialist concepts necessary to adopting a Marxist analysis of class and political
economy” preparatory to the group’s decision to form an explicitly Marxist party.115
John Richards’s experience as an independent MLA illustrated the conflicting
impulses of the Saskatchewan Waffle after its split from the NDP. Uncertain about
seeking re-election as an independent candidate in the next provincial election, he sought
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clarification from the Saskatoon Waffle about its future directions. The “lengthy and
intense debate” within the group during early 1974 sent Richards contradictory messages.
A straw poll revealed a majority in favour of his running again, a motion that the group
reject electoral politics “at this stage in its development” passed, and another a motion
refusing to support Richards’s candidacy was defeated. The Saskatoon group then tabled
a motion approving Richards’s re-election bid without using the Waffle label until the
provincial leadership had decided whether or not he could run as a Waffler.116 Richards
confided to a friend that although he did not expect to be re-elected he still believed
“electoral politics can be a useful way of raising issues, and I am moderately pleased at
what I’ve been able to do since 1971.” Nevertheless, he also admitted “I get fits of
depression where I think all this politics is going nowhere and I’m wasting my time.”117
By departing the provincial NDP caucus Richards became isolated in the legislature. He
was unable in April 1974, for example, to find a seconder for four of his motions,
including one calling on the provincial government to oppose the recently filed
application for construction of the Mackenzie Valley pipeline. Having previously
encountered the same problem when he sought to introduce a motion on the potash
industry, Richards’s frustration erupted into a heated exchange with Speaker Fred
Dewhurst, who admonished the Waffle MLA for being “vulgar and rude.”118 Richards
believed that NDP backbenchers who otherwise would have seconded his motions had
been pressured by their caucus not to do so, a tactic he described as a “heavy-handed
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attempt to squash the fly.”119 Ostracized by the NDP, Richards had little chance of
finding support from the Liberal opposition which he had dismissed as “incompetent.”120
Liberal MLAs complained about Richards’s attempt to question the government over its
future development plans for Saskatchewan’s woodlands after an article in Next Year
Country alleged overcutting of the province’s forests.121
Cy Gonick, who knew firsthand the challenges of being isolated in the legislature,
sympathized with Richards’s situation. He wrote to Richards:
I was sorry to see you in such rough shape. I know what it’s like because I’ve
been there myself. I don’t like what I see about the Waffle. They sound to me
like a Marxist-Leninist sect – totally out of touch with the concerns of ‘the
masses’ and increasingly incapable of communicating with them. I detect a
slavish and mechanistic application of Marxism which can only isolate them
further – and a gross intolerance of other points of view.122
Richards agreed with Gonick’s assessment of the Waffle’s increasingly “sectarian
tendencies” in Ontario and Saskatchewan, but remained hopeful for “a return to more
rational socialist politics.”123 He admitted to “operating increasingly independently of the
Waffle because it is incapable of undertaking any active outgoing politics that involve
people,” which he attributed to the Waffle’s recent ideological rigidity preventing it from
forming coalitions with extra-parliamentary social movements.124 Richards explained:
It is easy to dismiss the NDP’s issues as ‘social democratic reformism’, but they
are no more reformist than most issues posed by trade union collective
bargaining, poor people’s groups, native organizations, etc. I would argue that it
is only by posing ‘reforms’, working with groups to achieve them, that one can
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credibly pose the socialist case regarding major contradictions in capitalist
society.125
Despite Richards’s qualms about the provincial Waffle’s strategy, members of the
Saskatoon group encouraged his re-election.126 Richards, believing in the tactical value
of election campaigns for highlighting important issues, building coalitions among
progressives, and educating the public about socialist measures, agreed.127 At a meeting
chaired by former CCF cabinet minister Joe Phelps and attended by more than 100
people, Richards launched his campaign on March 29, 1974, more than a year before the
provincial election was called.128 Launching the campaign before the Waffle finalized
its stance on electoral politics generally and participation in the next provincial election
specifically sparked a reaction from the Steering Committee. Although its members
officially endorsed Richards’s candidacy, they sought a meeting with the Saskatoon local
“to resolve the dilemma” and committed to measures “to ensure this type of situation
does not arise again.”129 Even after President Don Mitchell and Associate President
Sonja Gehl met with the Saskatoon group the question of the Waffle’s position on
electoral politics remained undecided. In an “open letter” to the Saskatchewan Wafflers,
Ken Collier and Richards pleaded with them to resolve the issue immediately. They
urged their comrades to expand beyond purely abstract theoretical discussions and to
debate and resolve such practical matters as the criteria to be used when choosing
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constituencies, the degree of independence to be granted individual candidates, and
whether they must run as exclusively Waffle candidates. Collier and Richards warned,
presciently as it turned out, that “without an electoral presence, we fear the socialist ideas
of the Waffle will achieve few public outlets and the Waffle will condemn itself to being
a study group wherein committed socialists come together to debate their respective
positions.”130
At a strategy conference held at a camp on the shores of Lake Diefenbaker in
August 1974, the Waffle attempted to formulate its plans for the next provincial election.
A paper prepared by sixteen contributors questioned why the Waffle should participate in
elections. Pointing to the 1973 overthrow of Salvador Allende’s socialist government in
Chile as evidence, it contended “socialism cannot be legislated in with the use of the
ballot box.” Even as a tactic for raising consciousness or promoting specific reforms the
benefits of electoral participation were in doubt, as attested by the Saskatchewan
Waffle’s failure to advance its policy agenda despite electing one of its own as an MLA
in the governing party. Declaring contesting elections to be nothing more than “right
opportunism,” the sixteen insisted the Waffle could maintain a public presence without
electing its members to public office.131 The Moose Jaw Waffle, which included John
Conway and Don Mitchell, presented a contrasting view by arguing participation in
elections “is consistent with but not central to the development of a broader socialist
movement to ultimately gain state power.” Claiming that “the debate has centered too
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much on whether or not we run candidates and not enough on setting out a positive
overall approach to the election,” it proposed the Saskatchewan Waffle plan a provincewide campaign complete with public meetings, pamphleting, and a media strategy. The
Moose Jaw group encouraged their counterparts in Prince Albert, Regina and Saskatoon
to join them in running candidates, subject to ratification by the Steering Committee.132
Richards complained the debate over electoral participation indicated a “failure to
tolerate disagreement and exaggeration of the significance of strategic decisions.” It had
resulted in members who were at least nominally Wafflers critically labelling one another
as “social democrat,” “objectively reactionary,” “sectarian,” “opportunist,” and
“vanguardist.” Regardless, he defended his decision to seek re-election and explained the
usefulness of electoral participation. A precondition for conducting an election
campaign, Richards contended, is that it have sufficient backing from “those whose
struggles we support” in order to be seen as a “valuable common activity” and thereby
“rise above the level of sectarian irrelevance.” He emphasized the need to form
coalitions with other activists and social movements, and not to “elevate the refusal to
compromise to a moral absolute.” In Richards’s estimation the Waffle’s choice was
clear: “either we opt for a miniscule Marxist vanguard organization or a more
ideologically eclectic mass organization.”133 Unfortunately the conference failed to settle
the debate and within a month Richards stopped attending Steering Committee meetings.
By November 1974 John Conway had concluded that “clearly everyone rejects Richards’
idea of federation politics,” and one month later Richards told a friend that
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the Waffle had by this time changed its nature and become far more dogmatic in
its ideology and approach to politics. It strove to define itself as a ‘revolutionary
Marxist’ organization that spurned participation in bourgeois institutions such as
parliamentary electioneering. From being an organization somewhat eclectically
interested in a wide range of groups (labour, farm, women, native people) and
issues, it decided to concentrate on the ‘working class’. Processes of sectarianism
have splintered the Waffle both in Ontario and Saskatchewan.134
Most Saskatoon Wafflers ceased participating in the provincial group, devoting their
energies instead to supporting Richards’s “Independent Socialist” reelection campaign.135
While the Waffle in Ontario and Saskatchewan wrestled with their position on
feminism and socialism after splitting from the NDP, female party members continued to
advocate key polices of the women’s liberation movement. This internal pressure from
the women’s movement along with leftists in the BC and Ontario parties indicated the
departure of the Waffle and its offspring Left Caucus was not the death knell of left
influence on the NDP in the mid-1970s. The 1973 federal NDP convention had voted to
hold a national women’s conference the following year, a Waffle proposal that delegates
to the 1971 federal NDP convention had previously defeated. The conference was held
in Winnipeg in July 1974 following the federal election. But first, a BC NDP Women’s
Conference took place in May 1974, at which the BC NDP Women’s Rights Committee,
energized by premier Dave Barrett’s refusal to establish a provincial ministry for
women’s equality, passed a comprehensive analysis of socialism, women’s liberation and
the NDP’s policy on women’s rights.136 The BC NDP Women’s Rights Committee in
turn sent a large delegation to the national women’s conference in July, determined to
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raise support for a female leadership candidate to succeed Davis Lewis as party leader.137
Rosemary Brown, a keynote speaker at the Winnipeg conference, urged the NDP to
embrace the cause of women’s liberation, stating bluntly that “true equality of women is
the cornerstone of socialism” but male New Democrats still considered women’s
liberationists the “nut fringe” of the party. Brown warned that failing to support feminist
goals would cost the NDP dearly, for “women have decided that they are no longer going
to support any government that isn’t committed to women’s rights… But socialist women
can’t swing their votes. We must swing our party.”138 Prominent participants at the
conference, which had the added legitimacy of federal NDP sponsorship, could hardly be
associated with the party’s “fringe.” Speakers included former MP Grace MacInnis and
London Mayor Jane Bigelow. Nancy Eng, a federal NDP vice-president and chair of the
party’s Participation of Women Committee was also a leading supporter.139 One of the
event’s organizers, the ex-Waffler Hilda Thomas, described it as a “feminist-socialist
conference… although there are different views about feminism there is a general
agreement that the NDP belongs in the women’s movement.”140
While the conference attendees were by no means unanimous in their
interpretations of feminism and socialism, they did endorse a series of radical and
extensive recommendations. These included affirmative action legislation guaranteeing
women equal employment opportunites at any company or institution in receipt of public
funds, maternity leave, a homemakers’ bill of rights modeled after the Veterans’ Bill of
Rights, the extension of Canada Pension Plan benefits to women not employed outside
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the home, free 24-hour government-subsidized child care, the extension of medicare to
cover prescription drugs, more federal research into birth control and family planning
education, and the elimination of sexism from television and radio advertising and
programming as well as the school system. Delegates also demanded the NDP publish a
booklet on women’s health, and its federal caucus oppose the recent criminal conviction
of Dr. Henry Morgentaler for performing abortions and push for the decriminalization of
abortion.141
In essence, the national conference endorsed the radical BC Women’s Manifesto,
which political scientist Lisa Young described as “a blistering condemnation of the
treatment of women in Canadian society and a thinly veiled attack on the NDP provincial
government in British Columbia’s record on issues of importance to women.”142 David
Lewis objected to the attacks on the BC government and the “unnecessarily strident
language” of the BC Women’s Manifesto.143 However later that year the NDP Federal
Council, despite approving a statement which dropped the critique of the BC government
and replaced “oppression” of women with “discrimination” against women, committed
the party to supporting the relatively radical policy recommendations of free child care,
maternity leave, decriminalization of abortion, improved access to birth control, and
changes in labour and pension laws. Young contends that in so doing the federal NDP
“endorsed the key elements of the feminist policy agenda.”144 The BC NDP Women’s
Committee also convinced the conference to support a female leadership candidate for
the federal NDP. After both Grace MacInnis and Nancy Eng declined invitations to run,
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the influential Victoria Socialist NDP Women’s Caucus encouraged Rosemary Brown to
accept the challenge.145 Brown agreed, launching her campaign before any other
candidates had declared.
Although Barrett and his supporters had effectively absorbed the Waffle into the
mainstream of the BC NDP by the 1972 provincial election, this did not preclude lefist
elements within the party from criticizing his government. Barrett’s refusal to create a
ministry for women’s equality clearly rankled, and his tepid and brief endorsement of
Brown’s candidacy for the federal NDP leadership exposed further the divide between
the BC women’s movement’s most prominent spokesperson and the Premier. Waffler
Harold Steves and former BCFL political action director Colin Gabelmann also
occasionally clashed with the government in the legislature, and leftist critics were vocal
members of the BC NDP Vancouver Area Council, but none challenged Barrett’s
leadership during his first two years in office.146 Left challengers did emerge at the BC
NDP convention in Kamloops held over the Labour Day weekend in the aftermath of the
disappointing federal election results. Hans Brown, the 1972 provincial campaign
manager and Waffle supporter, used the party’s newspaper The Democrat not only to
announce his resignation as provincial secretary, but also to chastise the Barrett
government for paying insufficient attention to the party and its activists leading up to the
convention.147 When the BC NDP executive submitted a report to the convention
condemning the government for failing to fulfill its commitments to party policy, the
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media predicted a showdown.148 But successful organizing by Barrett supporters before
the convention led to delegates rejecting the executive report by a vote of 368 to 202.149
Allies of Barrett and the government repeatedly carried votes throughout the convention,
and won every spot on the provincial executive.150 Nevertheless, delegates adopted,
albeit over Barrett’s objections, the BC Women’s Manifesto drafted by the provincial
NDP women’s conference in May and supported by the national NDP women’s
conference in July. The Women’s Rights Committee was pleasantly surprised by the
outcome since, as ex-Waffler Sharon Yandle recalled, “we had come prepared to lose.”151
The convention’s support led to a thaw in the icy relations between Barrett’s
administration and the women’s movement, particularly after some activists were brought
into the government.152 Still, as Rosemary Brown recalled, many women’s groups,
believing the NDP viewed them with “hostility and distrust… decided to sit out the
[1975] election and explore options other than electoral politics in the search for equality
and justice for women” as an expression of their disenchantment with the Barrett
government.153
BC’s women’s groups were not alone on the left criticizing the NDP’s
moderation. Despite the Waffle’s ouster in 1972 and the departure of the Left Caucus the
following year, tensions between leftists and the Ontario NDP leadership remained.
Stephen Lewis was caught by surprise when twenty-eight delegates to the 1974 ONDP
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convention in Sudbury, including two members of his caucus, signed a document urging
the party to halt its “drift towards moderation” and instead move into the “vacuum on the
left” of Canadian politics. MP John Rodriguez and MPPs Jan Dukszta and Floyd
Laughren made clear this call represented neither a challenge to the party leadership nor
the Waffle reincarnated. Laughren explained “in no way should this be construed as the
son of Waffle,” while Dukszta declared “the Waffle is dead and buried.”154 Despite
Dukszta’s assurance that the appeal was not “a divisive document” but “an analysis
within the family,” Lewis responded unenthusiastically before eagerly describing a
second statement by the two MPPs as “a complete retraction.”155 The party also passed a
natural resources policy committed to public ownership that met with Lewis’s approval,
and he urged riding associations to seek out female candidates to run in the upcoming
provincial election.156 With the Waffle gone, Lewis revisited an issue from the previous
election campaign by seeking to differentiate the Ontario NDP’s image from that of the
labour movement by elaborating upon significant policy differences between the party
and unions.157 Although Lewis’s effort to place some daylight between himself and
union leaders undoubtedly appeared disingenuous to Wafflers, their absence from the
Ontario NDP in 1974 clearly did not mean the party was free of leftist critics.
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In Saskatchewan, where the Waffle had rejected John Richards re-election bid and
Wafflers in Saskatoon had decamped in order to support his independent campaign,
ideological and strategic unity continued to elude the group. Conflicts over the internal
politics of the Métis Society of Saskatchewan, the contentious departure of two separate
Trotskyist groups, the importance of nationalism, and control of the left newsmagazine
Next Year Country absorbed much of the Saskatchewan Waffle’s attention and energy
during 1974 and 1975. Little interested in the provincial election campaign that resulted
in the NDP government’s re-election, the Saskatchewan Waffle offered no support to
John Richards, its erstwhile MLA, whose re-election bid as an independent socialist
failed despite mustering a respectable fourth-place finish.
The Waffle in northern Saskatchewan included a number of community planners
hired by the newly established Department of Northern Saskatchewan (DNS).158 Waffler
Ken Collier recalled a ‘Wednesday night group’ that included Native and Métis Society
activists who met regularly to discuss Waffle position papers and the failures of the DNS.
The second issue of Next Year Country featured an article entitled “The True North: DNS
– Re-Occupying the Colony,” which criticized the minister, Ted Bowerman, and his
deputy, Wilf Churchman.159 Denunciations continued until another scathing critique in
May 1974 led to the DNS firing planners sympathetic to the Waffle.160 According to Ken
Collier, the “Wednesday night group ultimately became the organizing mechanism
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around which the support for those people who were being dismissed got picked up.”161
The Waffle also struggled to navigate the complicated politics of the Métis Society of
Saskatchewan. Métis Society leader Jim Sinclair was a persistent critic of the Blakeney
government, and Waffle leaders attending Métis Society meetings were received with
reactions ranging from “enthused to non-committed to perhaps some displeasure.”162
Further confusing matters, Sinclair clashed with former Métis Society leader Howard
Adams, an outspoken author and activist, over the latter’s claims that Sinclair was
improperly spending Society funds.163 During the dispute, which ended with Adams’s
ouster as a Métis Society director, he identified as a Waffler. Don Mitchell and Sonja
Gehl wrote to the Métis Society on behalf of the Waffle to repudiate Adams and reassure
the Society that their group had “no role to play in the internal politics of the Métis
Society.”164 Regardless, in September 1974 the Waffle Steering Committee reported on
its “deteriorating relationship” with the Métis Society.165
Divisions within the Saskatchewan Waffle became increasingly pronounced as a
handful of its members began identifying with the Trotskyist Revolutionary Marxist
Group (RMG) that emerged from out of the ashes of the Left Caucus and the LSA. They
produced an 8,500-word manuscript embracing Trotskyism, decrying the Waffle’s
nationalism, and declaring “the concept of socialism in one country (never mind one
province!) is a reactionary utopian ideal which leads to the concrete abandonment of
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proletarian internationalism.”166 Delegates at the Saskatchewan Waffle’s Annual General
Meeting in November 1974 responded by passing a constitutional amendment specifying
that members of the Waffle “shall belong to no other political party or sectarian group,”
thereby making possible the expulsion of the RMG converts.167
The Saskatchewan Waffle continued to vacillate over its plans to hold a founding
convention for a new Marxist political party in the spring of 1975. On the one hand, Pat
Gallagher, newly acclaimed as the Waffle’s co-president, argued that unresolved debates
over the purpose and structure of the party and the role nationalism would play in it were
detrimental to creating a new organization in such short order.168 On the other hand, John
Conway, who advocated a Leninist ‘vanguard party’ structure without a nationalist
emphasis, urged the Waffle to “get on with it” and hold a founding convention as soon as
possible regardless of the lack of internal agreement.169 Ultimately the Steering
Committee passed a motion presented by Ken Collier and Don Mitchell, the
Saskatchewan Waffle’s other co-president, to hold a founding convention in April 1975
ahead of achieving consensus on policy matters.170
In the lead-up to the convention, debate continued over the purpose and structure
of the party. Some leading Wafflers embraced the ideological certainty that can
accompany Marxist sectarian politics. Lorne Brown, during a debate with John Conway
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over whether nationalism was a progressive or regressive position, declared “one of the
important differences between Marxists and idealists is that the former base their political
strategy on a concrete analysis of objective conditions rather than wishful thinking, guess
work, dogmatic assumptions or moralism,”171 Larry Kowalchuk decried the “academic
intimidation, personal attacks, externalized debates, lack of attendance at meetings and
irresponsible levels of tardiness” typical of Wafflers, himself included.172 Conway
complained that the Regina Waffle had “been locked in an increasingly incapacitating
debate on the national question.”173
Debate at the April convention crystallized over two rival manifestos. The Blue
Manifesto, promoted by Conway, would have the Saskatchewan Waffle deemphasize
Canadian nationalism and form a Leninist vanguard party to pursue its revolutionary
goals. The Yellow Manifesto, supported by Lorne Brown and Joe Roberts, emphasized
Canadian nationalism as well as class conflict and rejected a Trotskyist strategy for the
Waffle.174 The convention adopted the Yellow Manifesto, and Conway claimed its
supporters had directed “vicious and slanderous charges” at the Blue caucus,
demonstrating the increased polarization within the Waffle. In the convention aftermath
Brown and Roberts, while conceding the debate was “sometimes more heated than
enlightened,” lauded the outcome as giving the Waffle a new statement of principles, a
revised constitutional structure, and a clearer direction going forward. Now the Waffle
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could focus on three fronts: agitation in the labour movement, intensive investigations
into agriculture and northern Saskatchewan, and exploring relations with socialist
formations elsewhere in Canada, all pointing to the goal of forming a Marxist party
nationally.175 Roberts, who replaced Conway as editor and primary contributor to the
Waffle Newsletter, steered the publication in a new direction. Whereas previously the
Newsletter had focused principally on internal Waffle debates over policy and tactics,
under Roberts’s editorship the Newsletter added coverage of the international Marxist
left. In the first issue he edited, for example, Roberts and Camilo (a pseudonym) wrote
critical reviews of articles by the Belgian Trotskyist Ernest Mandel and French
existential-Marxist André Gorz on workers’ control. It also included a reprinted article
by the Canadian Communist Party that critiqued the Saskatchewan Waffle’s recent
convention.176
Describing itself as a “pre-party formation,” the Saskatchewan Waffle effectively
declined to participate in the provincial election of June 1975.177 Absent the Saskatoon
Wafflers, most of whom supported John Richards’s re-election bid, the pre-party
formation consisted of two small groups in Prince Albert and Moose Jaw and a larger
group in Regina, all concerned principally with internal education and debate. Numerous
Wafflers expressed frustration at the group’s direction. In January 1975, when the
Regina Waffle did not protest the provincial government’s legislation ordering striking
members of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW) back to work,
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Conway complained “once again, events pass us by.”178 Ken Collier, in a letter
describing his impression of the April 1975 convention, commented “there were times
during the academic infighting that I turned my thoughts to earlier, real experiences in the
peace movement, in unions, in the NDP, and in jobs.”179 Recalling the Wafflers’ inability
to engage effectively in the wave of union resistance to wage controls imposed by the
federal government and supported by the Blakeney government provincially, Don
Kossick lamented “they got so caught up in the debates over the proper way of running a
Leninist structure that they missed all those mobile things that were happening all around
them.”180 In retrospect, Ron de la Hay admitted
I think the study we did was good, for those of us who were interested in that, but
to just let it dominate our activity and not achieve anything else was a mistake. It
didn’t really do much good to have all these ideologically correct people around if
nothing comes of it. There has to be the action as well as the theory.181
In the Waffle’s absence the Saskatchewan NDP’s re-election campaign was lowkey, emphasizing the accomplishments of the Blakeney government’s first term, the
Premier’s competence as an administrator, and the province’s right to control its natural
resources. The government hoped to benefit from the recent boom in prices for wheat,
oil and potash as well as anger over a recent court ruling favouring federal jurisdiction in
the inter-provincial and international trade of potash.182 The party touted among its
accomplishments the Land Bank, FarmStart loans, new community colleges, a rebate
program on land taxes and home property improvements, dental insurance for children,
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subsidized daycare, and the creation of a provincial Ombudsman and human rights
commission. During the campaign the NDP promised continued improvements to life in
rural Saskatchewan and to diversify the provincial economy through further resource
development.183 Its platform, New Deal ’75, promised “New Democrats will continue to
act to see that Saskatchewan people get the greatest possible benefit from our resources…
This may well involve new approaches to public ownership, to joint ventures between the
government and private enterprise, and to resource royalties and taxation.”184 Liberal
leader David Steuart took direct aim at the Land Bank, attacking it for artificially
inflating land prices, and accused the NDP of seeking to create a system of state
farming.185 Although Saskatchewan voters re-elected the NDP to a reduced majority
with thirty-nine MLAs, its losses included fifteen per cent of the popular vote and eight
rural seats since 1971. Historian Dennis Gruending concluded the lesson for the NDP
caucus “was that the Land Bank was unpopular.”186 The Liberals retained fifteen seats
and suffered an eleven per cent decline in their popular vote to 31.7 per cent. The PCs,
under leader Richard Collver, gained seven MLAs and 27.6 per cent of the popular vote
after being shut out of the legislature since 1967.187
Even without making the provincial election their priority, members of the
Saskatchewan Waffle participated by distributing an election supplement to Next Year
Country in Regina, Moose Jaw and Prince Albert. Despite the Waffle rejecting his
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approach to electoral politics, John Richards sought re-election as an “Independent
Socialist” candidate in the new riding of Saskatoon Centre, which contained much of his
former constituency. His campaign committee consisted almost entirely of former
Saskatoon Wafflers, including John Piper, Rob Dumont, Don Kerr, Jill Sargent and June
Bantjes.188 Although former Ontario Waffle leader James Laxer spoke at a Richards
fundraising event, no support was forthcoming from the Saskatchewan Waffle. John
Warnock recalled the Saskatoon group “felt really badly done by the Waffle because the
Waffle wouldn’t support them because they considered Richards to be a social
democrat.”189 Richards described the aims of his campaign as winning re-election and
ensuring the “survival of the creative, dynamic left tradition in Saskatchewan politics” by
raising public awareness of women’s rights, the plight of the poor, inadequate housing,
high-rise developments in Saskatoon, and “colonialism in northern Saskatchewan.”190
Richards’s election advertisements portrayed him as an independently-minded left
opposition to the NDP. One such advertisement explained “Like any large organization
the NDP makes mistakes, hides things, accumulates power. It needs all the PRODDING
and UNSETTLING it can get.”191 Another urged “At least keep Socialism in the debate
in Saskatchewan.”192 The NDP MLA Paul Mostoway, faced with the dissolution of his
riding of Hanley, ran against Richards in Saskatoon Centre. The Saskatoon Coalition for
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Life endorsed Mostoway who supported the elimination of legal abortions in
Saskatchewan.193 Richards, by contrast, made support for abortion and women’s rights a
central theme in his campaign. Mostoway narrowly won, just 359 votes ahead of the
Liberal Doug Knott. Richards finished fourth with over fifteen per cent of the vote,
behind Progressive Conservative Morris Cherneskey.194
Current and former Wafflers as well as the Métis Society supported two other
independent candidates in the 1975 election, coordinating a fundraising event with
Richards.195 Frank Tomkins ran in the northeastern riding of Cumberland, losing to the
NDP’s Norman MacAuley and finishing fourth with just over ten per cent of the vote.
Rod Bishop, who ran as a socialist candidate, lost to New Democrat Fred Thompson in
the northwestern riding of Athabasca, finishing third with twenty-one per cent of the
vote.196
The Saskatchewan Waffle assessed the election campaign and results at a
Provincial Council meeting in June 1975. Conceding that Richards’s campaign
“presented a clear picture of why voting for an independent candidate may have some
legitimacy in defending the interests of protest groups,” it attributed his lack of workingclass support to his failure to offer a class analysis or clear Marxist position.197 Lorne
Brown maintained that the NDP lost seats because farmers, workers and Native peoples
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were no longer united by a desire to defeat a right-wing Liberal government. He claimed
“there was no party presenting policies clearly in the interest of the working class” in
1975, and criticized the Saskatchewan Federation of Labour (SFL) for its moderation.198
Despite Joe Roberts’s enthusiasm for the labour movement’s militancy
demonstrated by its resistance to wage controls and his encouraging of Wafflers to
engage in the SFL campaign, internal divisions rather than organizing continued to
preoccupy the Saskatchewan Waffle for eight months after the provincial election.199
The Saskatoon Waffle had not existed since 1974 when most of its members supported
Richards’s re-election campaign and shared his bitterness over being rejected by the
Waffle leadership. Ten members of the International Socialists (IS) briefly reconstituted
the Saskatoon Waffle in 1975 before abandoning it later that year. According to
Roberts’s calculations, “now two manifestations of ideological and political error have
purged themselves from the Waffle: the right opportunism of Richards’ electoralism and
the left adventurism of the Saskatoon ten’s workerism.”200 Although Conway had been
similarly critical of “Richards’ idea of federation politics,” he and the Blue caucus
expressed dismay at the IS members’ departure.201 Conway argued that the
Saskatchewan Waffle erred by ignoring developments in Ontario over the previous two
years, specifically the creation of the RMG and IS, both Trotskyist organizations, and
urged Roberts to stop “Trot-baiting.”202 A few months later, in February 1976, Conway
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and eleven other members of the Blue caucus resigned from the Saskatchewan Waffle,
criticizing its errant positions on nationalism and workers’ control, its “tailism,” and its
new, more rigorous membership procedures.203
The divisiveness that continued to beset the remnants of the Saskatchewan Waffle
found further expression in its conflict with the editorial board of the leftist magazine,
Next Year Country. After the April 1975 convention, Lorne Brown and Joe Roberts had
expressed hope that Next Year Country could be integrated “more effectively into the
work and politics of the Waffle.”204 In late 1975, the Saskatchewan Waffle leadership in
Regina sought to exert greater control over the newsmagazine, which had operated at
arms-length from the Waffle since its inception three years earlier. Although the
magazine had been closely associated with the group, not all of its editors or editorial
board were Waffle members. John Deverell had served as co-editor since 1973, initially
with Murray Dobbin and subsequently with Martha Tracey. The editorial board along
with Deverell and Tracey were sued in late 1975 by a developer over a story John Piper
published in Next Year Country titled “Lots for Lots in Hub City” claiming to expose
“private profiteering on land development with civic government assistance,” further
undermining the editors.205 Four Wafflers, including Sheila Kuziak and Pat Gallagher,
both of whom were members of Next Year Country’s editorial board, described “illconcealed antagonisms” and Waffle criticisms of the magazine’s ideologically “flaccid
character.” Kuziak and Gallagher were in the minority at an editorial board meeting
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which rejected the Waffle’s recommendation that the board membership consist
exclusively of Wafflers.206 Martha Tracey, Don Mitchell, and editorial board member
Don Kossick described Next Year Country as a “popularly-oriented left news magazine,”
and were adamant that non-Wafflers be allowed to sit on the editorial board. As they
explained, the editors were occasionally faced with the “dilemma of publishing a news
story where no specific Waffle policy exists.” They did “not see this as a problem.”207
Joe Roberts countered that “the ability to struggle with the political question from a
Marxist standpoint is the underlying reason for a desire to reform the Board.”208
At the Saskatchewan Waffle’s Provincial Council in December 1975, the
delegates passed a Steering Committee resolution demanding tighter control over Next
Year Country by requiring the editorial board members be Wafflers, its editorial policy be
consistent with the April 1975 Manifesto, and the newsmagazine led readers “to a greater
understanding of class conflict and of imperialism in contemporary Saskatchewan and
Canadian society.”209 The Waffle Provincial Council elected a new editorial board, and
Pat Gallagher replaced Martha Tracey as editor.210 In an interview with Tracey, John
Warnock noted that the magazine’s subscribers peaked at 2500 before falling to half that
number after becoming an “arm of the Waffle.”211 Don Kossick recalled that “a group of
us were accused of muckraking journalism… we got just flayed for that.” Their
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determination to include a “very strict Marxist analysis” resulted in feeling like “you had
to finish every article with a last paragraph saying the proper Marxist response should be
the following” which “drove immense amounts of creativity away.”212 Tracey
remembered how publishing the magazine became “an end in itself,” and that “it was
really hard to tolerate the debate, the political attack, on Next Year Country.” She
became “really bitter” over the Waffle’s decision to exercise greater control.213
By 1976 the Saskatchewan Waffle had become a small, insular organization with
a strict Marxist analysis, engaging primarily in struggles with other Marxist sectarian
groups. Joe Roberts complained that the Regina Waffle’s participation in the 1976 May
Day protests had been “sabotaged effectively” by rivals such as the CP and CPC (M-L),
and later instructed Wafflers preparing for the CLC’s National Day of Protest on October
14, 1976 that they “will be expected to emphasize critiques of the state, the limits of trade
unionism in facing the crises of capitalism, and the need for a revolutionary party.”214
Assessing the group in December 1976, Roberts declared that after eight years “the
Waffle is the oldest continuous radical political organization in Canada.” He described it
as being at the second stage of development, transforming from a radical populist
reformism based primarily in the petit bourgeoisie, to a proletarian ideological line with a
working-class base. Roberts’s unfortunate choice of phrase (“let a hundred flowers
bloom”) for an article reflected the popularity of Mao amongst the international sectarian

212

Don Kossick interview with John Warnock, August 19, 1989, Audio Tape 1970-1989, R-11906B,
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).
213
Martha Tracey interview with John Warnock, September 24, 1989, Audio Tape 1970-1989, R-11903B,
Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina)
214
Joe Roberts, “Notes and Comments,” Waffle Newsletter, V. 2 N. 5, 1976, File II.35 Newsletters c. 19711979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina); Joe Roberts, “Notes and Comments,” Waffle Newsletter,
V. 2 N. 7, 1976, File II.35 Newsletters c. 1971-1979, Saskatchewan Waffle fonds, SAB (Regina).

438
Marxist left.215 In response, Don Mitchell lamented that the Waffle had deteriorated
“from a position of political relevance in the Province to one of inward study and
isolation… the leading elements in the Waffle today are substantially the same as those of
the late sixties who formed the Committee for a Socialist Movement.”216
Despite the Waffle’s departure from the NDP and its descent into conflict-ridden
study groups in Ontario and Saskatchewan, a vocal and visible left-wing minority
remained within the party in the mid-1970s. Some of the Waffle’s New Left causes and
policies, especially those advocated by the women’s movement, became largely accepted
by the NDP mainstream in the aftermath of the Waffle challenge. These developments
influenced the leadership race precipitated by David Lewis’s resignation following the
1974 federal election. The federal caucus appointed Ed Broadbent as NDP interim leader
after Tommy Douglas declined the position. However, Broadbent, frustrated by the
Federal Council’s rejection of his proposal to create a central treasury to fund an
independent federal party organization, and annoyed by efforts to recruit higher-profile
candidates such as premiers Schreyer, Blakeney and Barrett into the role, announced in
January 1975 that he would not seek the leadership.217
Rosemary Brown had already decided to vie for the job after the 1974 national
NDP women’s conference committed to endorsing a female candidate. The first Black
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woman elected to a Canadian provincial legislature, Brown would also be the first Black
woman candidate for the leadership of a major Canadian federal political party. ExWaffler Hilda Thomas was one of the leading members of Brown’s campaign committee,
and headed the group of women who designed Brown’s policy platform.218 Using the
slogan ‘Brown is Beautiful,’ Brown rallied women and leftists within the NDP to her
cause with her advocacy of socialism and feminism. Her candidacy’s momentum soon
unnerved party and union leadership alike. Brown was taken aback by the depth of
antipathy her campaign generated among some NDPers until a subsequent conversation
with David Lewis provided context: “my leadership campaign attracted the support of
party members who wanted to change the direction of the party in profound ways, party
members who were the survivors of old internal struggles waged around the Waffle and
other factions in the party, long before my arrival.”219
Although two other candidates declared – John Harney and MP Lorne Nystrom –
the popular response to Brown’s radical message drove party leaders, including Douglas,
Lewis, Schreyer, Blakeney and Barrett, to persuade Broadbent to reconsider entering the
race.220 Supported by ten of fifteen caucus colleagues, Broadbent was immediately the
front-runner. He focused on updating the NDP’s image for a new generation, explaining
“the party’s base is no longer a person who fears the Depression and unemployment… In
the advanced capitalist society, the NDP’s constituency is the man or woman who may be
well off but who is still being screwed by the system – whether it be wages versus profits,
218
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the high mortgage interest rates that keep him from getting a home or lack of job
satisfaction.”221 A fifth candidate, Toronto taxi driver Douglas Campbell, was not
considered a serious contender.
Broadbent’s victory, although widely-expected, was not a sure thing given largerthan-expected support for Brown at the convention and the unusually low number of
union delegates in attendance. Harney finished fourth with only 18.4 per cent of the vote
on the first ballot and was dropped from the slate after the second ballot. Broadbent and
Brown each drew approximately one hundred of Harney’s supporters on the third ballot,
with Nystrom picking up another seventy. Nystrom failed to generate momentum as the
anti-Broadbent candidate, and most of his supporters turned to Broadbent after he was
dropped before the fourth and final ballot.
Federal NDP Leadership Election – July 4-7, 1975 (Winnipeg)
First Ballot
Second Ballot
Third Ballot
Ed Broadbent
536 Ed Broadbent
586 Ed Broadbent
Rosemary Brown
413 Rosemary Brown
397 Rosemary Brown
Lorne Nystrom
345 Lorne Nystrom
342 Lorne Nystrom
John Paul Harney
313 John Paul Harney
299
Douglas Campbell
11
Total
1,618 Total
1,624 Total
Fourth Ballot
Ed Broadbent
Rosemary Brown
Total

694
494
413
1,601

984
658
1,642

Brown, excited by the relative success of her candidacy and the other candidates’
emphasis on socialist and feminist policies, did not hesitate to declare her second place
finish “a real victory. We’ve managed to shift the party to the left somewhat.”222
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The left wing’s continued influence was not limited to the federal NDP. Despite
the earlier animosity between Stephen Lewis and the Waffle during 1971-72, Donald
MacDonald claimed that “by the 1975 [Ontario] election, Jim Laxer was a member of an
informal advisory group throughout Stephen’s campaign.”223 Although Desmond Morton
asserted “every feature of the campaign, from Lewis’s issues of conserving farmland and
improving industrial safety to the election colours – a warm shade of brown – had been
chosen for their reassuring qualities,” moderation was hardly a factor in the Ontario
NDP’s ascension to Official Opposition in 1975.224 Much as his father had done in the
1972 federal election, Stephen Lewis discovered an issue that resonated – in this case,
rent control – and flogged it relentlessly throughout the campaign. In addition, the
party’s efforts at organizing ethnic communities paid off with the election of four Italian
NDP MPPs in 1975. Also benefitting from a much improved caucus research staff, the
Ontario NDP increased its popular vote slightly to 28.9 per cent, but doubled its
representation in the legislature to thirty-eight members.225
The provincial NDP in British Columbia had absorbed the challenge from the left
wing of the party. The Barrett NDP government introduced public auto insurance and
rent controls, created an Agricultural Land Reserve to protect farmland from
development, raised the minimum wage, banned the strap in schools, and banned mining
and logging in an expanded provincial park system. It also hiked royalties for resource
extraction industries, introduced a Human Rights Commission, and prohibited
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discrimination in housing and employment.226 But the party’s tenure in power was not
without controversy and missteps, such as Barrett’s intervention in a scandalous dispute
over egg production quotas infamously dubbed “the Chicken and Egg War.” The
premier’s relationship with union leaders, which had never been strong, was further
strained when the BCFL opposed revisions to the government’s Labour Code in 1975.
The ill will worsened when the government passed back-to-work legislation to end a
nearly three-month strike by pulp-mill workers in October 1975.227 In the meantime, the
Social Credit party under the new leadership of Bill Bennett positioned itself once again
as the province’s sole defender of free enterprise against the NDP.228 The previouslycoddled mining industry was apoplectic the Barrett government imposed new royalties
that threatened job losses as investment pulled out of the province. An unintended
consequence of the move endangered NDP fortunes in mining communities in the BC
interior.229 When Barrett called a snap election in late 1975, he “requested a mandate for
my leadership in a national fight against inflation,” and promised to extend the province’s
freeze on prices of essential commodities unless the Trudeau government took action on
prices as well as wages.230 The NDP campaign centered on Barrett’s populist defence of
his government’s policies against criticisms from corporate executives and Bill
Bennett.231 Although Social Credit was caught off guard for the election and suffered its

226

Gordon Hak, The Left in British Columbia: A History of Struggle (Vancouver: Ronsdale Press, 2013),
141-142.
227
Meggs and Mickleburgh, The Art of the Impossible, 292-302.
228
Ibid., 108-110, 272-274. W.A.C. Bennett had masterfully orchestrated his son’s ascension to the
leadership of the Social Credit party and Bill drew attention when he got himself expelled from the
legislature during the 1975 budget debate. The defections of Liberal and Conservative MLAs to Social
Credit furthered the impression of Bill Bennett as the only possible challenger to Barrett. “One of two B.C.
Tory MLAs joins Socreds,” Globe and Mail, October 26, 1974.
229
Ibid., 249-259
230
Barrett and Miller, Barrett: A Passionate Political Life, 111
231
Meggs and Mickleburgh, The Art of the Impossible, 315-320.

443
share of embarrassments during the campaign, it benefited from money, momentum, and
the collapse of support for the Liberals and Conservatives.232 Despite drawing nearly the
same popular vote as in 1972, the NDP lost twenty seats as Social Credit returned to
power with a majority government. Waffle MLA Harold Steves and Premier Dave
Barrett each lost their seats.
After departing the NDP the Waffle in 1974 and 1975 shifted sharply, and
acrimoniously, towards adopting a strict Marxist analysis that emphasized the importance
of class divisions above all else. The ideological shift was due to a number of factors,
primarily Wafflers’ disillusionment with the NDP and social democracy as a means for
bringing about radical change. Wafflers were also influenced by changing circumstances
and international developments in economics and politics, including renewed American
protectionism, the energy crisis, Canadian worker militancy, and the popularity of
varieties of Marxism (such as Maoism and Trotskyism) amongst the international New
Left. Certainly there was no agreement within the Waffle on which specific Marxist
analysis to follow. James Laxer and the Ontario Waffle leadership emphasized a
deindustrialization thesis that linked class and nationalism. In Saskatchewan, Joe
Roberts, Lorne Brown and many other Wafflers embraced a Maoist-influenced Marxism.
Numerous others in both Ontario and Saskatchewan, including the members of the RMG,
the IS and John Conway, adopted a Trotskyist analysis. The shift toward Marxism fatally
hindered the Waffle’s capacity to attract non-academic, non-Marxist supporters.
As the movement dwindled, bitter arguments over ideological divisions prevailed.
By the end of 1975, the Waffle as a national movement was dead. Three Waffle-NDP
MLAs, Cy Gonick, John Richards, and Harold Steves, no longer held their seats or
232
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identified publicly with the Waffle. The Waffle’s offspring in the sectarian Marxist left,
including the Saskatchewan Waffle, the RMG, and the IS, continued to debate and agitate
for socialist politics for many years to come. As for the NDP, by the end of 1975 it had
largely recovered from the Waffle insurgency that challenged the party leadership from
1969 to 1972. Yet despite the Waffle’s absence the NDP did not turn sharply right either
federally or provincially in the immediate aftermath. Neither was the party’s left wing
significantly weaker than during the Waffle period. Indeed, leading Wafflers such as
James Laxer once again assumed prominent roles within the party over the ensuing
decade. The Waffle, an often acrimonious expression of the New Left within Canada’s
social democratic political party might be gone, but its continuing reverberations on the
left in Canada for years to come was evidence it would not soon be forgotten.
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Conclusion
The study of the Waffle reveals a dynamic movement marked by incongruity. As
a movement active almost exclusively in the early 1970s that expressed the New Left
ideals of the “Sixties,” the history of the Waffle indicates a “Long Sixties” of political
radicalism and activism that extended until 1975. National in scope yet provincially
distinct, an expression of the Canadian New Left yet challenging to New Left ideals and
commitments, dedicated to transforming the NDP from within yet alienating party
adherents, the Waffle not surprisingly leaves a deeply contested legacy.
Noteworthy differences existed among the four largest provincial Waffle groups.
Ontario, the only province where the party acted to rid itself of the Waffle, contained the
largest provincial section of the NDP and was home to many of the Waffle’s founders
and most prominent spokespeople. As a result, the media tended to cast the Ontario
Waffle as representative of the movement nationally when in fact there was generally
little coordination among the provincial groups. Southern Ontario’s role as the country’s
industrial heartland meant the Waffle in that province focused their activism and analysis
primarily on the organized working class in urban manufacturing centres. The existence
of pro-Waffle caucuses in two major NDP-affiliated unions – the USWA and UAW –
along with the Ontario group’s flirtation with the CCU and criticism of international
union leaders ultimately caused conflict between Wafflers and pro-NDP labour leaders.
This conflict, plus the antipathy the loudly vocal and highly critical Waffle engendered
amongst an Ontario NDP leadership frustrated over its third-party status and inability to
overtake the Liberals in the 1971 election, ultimately led to the Waffle’s ouster from the
party in that province.
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The Ontario experience was not representative of the Waffle in other provinces.
In Manitoba, the Waffle already had the support of a backbench MLA in the newlyelected NDP government when it emerged on the political scene in late 1969. However,
the Manitoba NDP had won its first provincial election largely on the back of its leader
Edward Schreyer, whose personal popularity and centrist approach to governing muted
left opposition within the provincial party. The Manitoba Waffle dwindled as its
members, disillusioned with the NDP as a vehicle to achieve socialism, grew dubious
about the possibility of establishing a new party to the left of the NDP.
Although Wafflers were similarly disappointed with the NDP government in
Saskatchewan they drew different conclusions than their counterparts in Manitoba. The
Waffle leadership in Saskatchewan was drawn primarily from an intellectual cadre of
leftists strongly influenced by Marxism, including Joe Roberts, John Warnock, Lorne
Brown and John Conway, who had constituted the Committee for a Socialist Movement
that predated the Waffle. Furthermore, the CCF/NDP’s history of electoral success in
Saskatchewan and the Waffle’s albeit limited success in influencing the provincial NDP’s
1971 election platform suggested the Waffle could encounter a base of support for
socialist measures that did not exist in other provinces. When the Saskatchewan Wafflers
lost faith in the NDP government, they chose to establish a new party that better reflected
their Marxist principles.
Although British Columbia had the strongest tradition of leftism within the
CCF/NDP, the Waffle in that province was largely absorbed into the party’s mainstream.
Several factors account for this oddity. No organized group of left intellectuals
comparable to the CSM existed in BC prior to the Waffle’s formation. Also, the BC
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NDP reacted less defensively to the Waffle challenge than occurred elsewhere. Dave
Barrett’s supporters, in opposition to the labour leaders who previously dominated the
party, allied with Wafflers to take control of the BC NDP and several Wafflers were
incorporated into senior levels of the party leadership. Barrett’s personal popularity
among New Democrats, like Schreyer in Manitoba, also helped to limit the Waffle’s
appeal in the province and assimilate the group.
At first glace it might seem contradictory to characterize the Waffle as an
expression of the Canadian New Left, especially since Wafflers at times intentionally
distanced themselves from the New Left.1 Furthermore some New Left activists, such as
James Harding, directly criticized the Waffle, and Myrna Kostach recalled that “the new
left was decidedly unhappy” with the Waffle Manifesto’s “involvement in the polices and
practices of a social democratic parliamentary party” and with its “appeal, in the name of
anti-imperialism, to ‘national unity.’”2 However, by adopting a broader definition of the
New Left which includes women’s liberationists, left-wing nationalists from Quebec and
English-Canada, and young workers alongside the student and anti-war movements, the
Waffle’s position is clarified. Clearly, the Waffle brought many of the activists and ideas
comprising a broadly-defined New Left into the NDP.
The Waffle struggled at times to live up to the New Left ideals contained in its
Manifesto. Writing in 1981, Dan Heap criticized the group’s elitism, arguing that “many
Wafflers soon passed over grassroots organizing in ridings and locals as being too slow.
1
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Little sustained effort was given to mobilizing the working class and its allies in action, to
win short-term goals and prepare for larger battles. Our main focus was on convention
battles over policy statements and party office.”3 Neither did the Waffle’s practical
commitment to feminism always align with its rhetoric. Early in its existence gender
parity in the Waffle was more honoured in the breach than in the observance. Female
Saskatchewan delegates to the Waffle’s national conference in August 1970 “strongly
disapproved of the fact that two male ‘heavies’ were invited” to represent the province in
a strategy meeting of the national steering committee without consulting the
Saskatchewan delegation.4 Pat Smart described the conference while explaining the
decision to establish a Waffle women’s caucus:
My memory of it is that the men were “hogging the mics”… talking with great
relish and at interminable length about all the issues and that the women – even
the strongest and most articulate of us like Krista, Kelly Crichton, Jackie Larkin
and Caroline Brown – couldn’t get a word in edgewise. So we got together at the
end of the morning and decided to form a caucus… insisting on gender parity in
all Waffle bodies and a high profile for women’s issues in all Waffle events and
publications.5
But Smart also believed “there was a commitment by both men and women in the Waffle
to putting the idea of gender equality into action in our own lives.”6
A sense of generational conflict also pervaded the Waffle’s struggles within the
NDP. The presence of young radicals with a commitment to the principles of the New
Left but little background in the party contrasted sharply with those New Democrats and
unionists who had devoted years of dedicated and often tedious service building the
CCF/NDP into a viable political challenger for power in several provinces. Consequently
3
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some New Democrats understandably questioned the New Leftists’ commitment to the
party. For many New Democrats, advancing the cause of the left and improving the
party’s fortunes were virtually inseparable concepts. This attitude, in conjunction with
the experiencing decades of internecine struggle with Communists in the labour
movement, produced a bunker mentality that often treated nonpartisan leftists as
untrustworthy. Wafflers, “mostly young, middle class and recent converts to radicalism,”
according to Desmond Morton, “had no share in the painful struggles that kept the NDP
and the old CCF alive and growing.”7 As Giles Endicott, an early Waffler who
subsequently opposed the group explained, “I was a party hack. My whole life was
bound up in the structure of the party. I tried to persuade Laxer and Watkins that we must
not be seen to be creating a party within a party. They didn’t seem to realize the damage
they could do to the organization. But then, neither of them was a party person and they
really didn’t care about the party.”8 Such concerns were exacerbated when generational
differences devolved into personal attacks that supplanted ideological critiques. Cy
Gonick recalled that “Wafflers were also rowdy and headstrong. They could also be
arrogant towards others in the party, relentless and even abusive in their eagerness to nail
down points of order and win debates.”9 Stephen Lewis accused the Waffle of having
“nothing to do with democratic socialism and everything to do with acting out a
pathological aggressiveness.”10
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The Waffle’s legacy in Canadian political history remains contested some fifty
years after its founding in 1969. Activists and NDP members alike continue to debate
whether the Waffle, with its brand of left nationalism and embrace of New Left social
movements, exerted a positive or negative influence on the NDP and the Canadian left in
the years following its demise. In a documentary aired on the Cable Public Affairs
Channel (CPAC) in 2017, long-time left-wing and feminist activist Judy Rebick voiced
the opinion of many ex-Wafflers when she argued “by driving them out they [the NDP]
were cutting their heart out. They cut out the vibrancy and the passion in the party by
driving out the Waffle and I think it was a huge, huge error.”11 Stephen Lewis disagreed,
and directly attributed the party’s subsequent political successes to its 1972 decision to
disassociate from the Waffle:
Judy Rebick is a friend… but palpably she’s wrong, as history has proved her
wrong. It was not long after we got rid of the Waffle that we formed the Official
Opposition in Ontario for the first time in thirty or more years and I think set the
groundwork for the eventual government in Ontario in 1990. And all of the work
that is done, you know, when you form a government in British Columbia and
Saskatchewan and Manitoba and Nova Scotia, in Ontario, you’re building the
party, and ultimately you get the right leader in the right place at the right time,
like Jack Layton, and suddenly you catapult into the level of the Leader of the
Opposition federally. All of that, I think, would have been lost if we had not got
rid of the Waffle.12
This dissertation concludes by examining the contested legacy of the Waffle in six areas:
its role in the new nationalism of the 1970s; its influence on developments in both the
labour and women’s movements; its impact on the radical left and the New Canadian
Political Economy tradition, and its descendants on the left of the NDP.
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The Waffle undoubtedly contributed to the surge in left-wing Canadian
nationalism during the early 1970s. Historian Sean Mills has observed that “today,
debates rage about the role of the ‘nation’ in political struggles. Many rightly point out
the ways in which nationalism acts as a means of exclusion, both in Canada and
elsewhere. Yet, in the 1960s, nationalism was generally seen as a progressive force.”13
The Waffle’s insistence that Canadian economic independence from the United States
could not be achieved without socialism helped define Canadian nationalism as a leftwing gospel for a generation. As discussed in Chapter Ten, the attention the Waffle’s
left-wing nationalism received directly influenced the formation of the moderate CIC by
Liberal-leaning nationalists such as Walter Gordon, Peter Newman and Abraham
Rotstein. Furthermore, the CIC and left-nationalist pressure pushed a reluctant Pierre
Trudeau to implement measures to protect Canada’s economic independence, including
creating the CDC, FIRA, and Petro-Canada. Several years later, James and Robert Laxer
urged support for the Trudeau government’s National Energy Program. The Laxers
headed the Committee for the Canadianization of the Petroleum Industry (CCPI) in the
early 1980s, which counted among its supporters one-time Waffle critic and CLC
president Dennis McDermott alongside former nationalist rivals Mel Watkins, Charles
Taylor, Walter Gordon, and Mel Hurtig. One could argue that progressive nationalism
was the dominant concept and overriding issue on the Canadian left at least until the
decisive 1988 federal election, fought primarily over the issue of free trade with the
United States.
Support for the CCPI’s economic nationalism from prominent union leaders
reflected a significant development in the Canadian labour movement in the decades
13
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following the Waffle’s dissolution. As other scholars have demonstrated, the Canadian
labour movement underwent a “seismic shift from continentalism to nationalism” during
the 1970s.14 Many of the measures Wafflers demanded to protect the autonomy of
Canadian sections of international unions were eventually accepted as the labour
movement underwent a gradual process of Canadianization and, even more significantly,
union leaders adopted nationalist rhetoric in defense of Canadian workers.
Despite the Waffle’s decline, the 1974 CLC convention reflected the group’s
continuing influence. CUPE leaders, including Waffle supporters Grace Hartman, joined
with those of the BCGEU, CUPW, PSAC and CBRT to prepare a reform slate of
candidates for the CLC executive elections and produce a program emphasizing
“Canadian autonomy, industrial democracy, social unionism, effective servicing, and the
rationalization of jurisdictional structure.”15 Although the “reform movement that
wasn’t” faltered, the convention still endorsed a watered-down proposal from the CLC
executive for measures to ensure the autonomy of Canadian sections of international
unions despite vocal opposition from the building-trades unions.16 As Gil Levine argued
in retrospect, the “Canadianization issues raised by the Waffle and the Reform Caucus
have had some effect” in the Canadian labour movement.17
Certainly the Canadian labour movement’s leadership embraced nationalism in
the late 1970s and 1980s. Miriam Smith contends that the federal government’s
imposition of wage controls in 1975 in an effort to combat inflation “constituted state
interference in ‘free’ collective bargaining” which led the CLC to a “fundamental
14
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reappraisal of strategy and policy that resulted in the turn to a post-Keynesian economic
program and, eventually, to economic nationalism itself.”18 Smith believes that the shift
in strategy and program that began in 1976 culminated in the CLC’s 1982 economic
program which “stressed economic nationalism, an understanding of the distorted
character of the Canadian economy, and a preference for strong state policies.”19 Thus,
the CLC’s opposition to the Mulroney government’s proposed Free Trade Agreement
with the United States and its participation in the nationalist Pro-Canada Network was
consistent with the Congress’s opposition to continental economic integration.20 The
CLC’s embrace of nationalism thus represented a significant shift from its steadfast
opposition to the Waffle.
Stephen High maintains that Canadian unions achieved greater success in the
1980s implementing worker-friendly responses to plant shutdowns, such as advance
notice of closures and severance pay, than did their counterparts in the US, largely
because they proclaimed a nationalist ideology and sought a political solution.21 As High
explains, “despite tensions between the sometimes dogmatic left-nationalists in the NDP
and internationalist-minded trade union leaders, both groups eventually came to draw on
Robert Laxer’s concept of deindustrialization.” He further demonstrates that union
leaders “increasingly relied on nationalist oratory and the deindustrialization thesis to
legitimate their demands for increased legislative protection for Canadian workers.”22
Large Canadian sections of international unions in the years to follow also embraced
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nationalist rhetoric to justify splitting from their American comrades. In 1985, the
Canadian section of the UAW broke away to form the Canadian Auto Workers (CAW).23
Sam Gindin, a researcher for the CAW, in explaining the “pre-history” of the split wrote
that the “Waffle… could be defeated, but it could not be ignored.”24 Significantly,
former Wafflers who were subsequently active in unions and organized groups such as
Saskatchewan Working Women pushed the labour movement to embrace Canadian
nationalism, feminism and worker militancy.
The Waffle served as a touchstone for the radical left in Canada in the 1970s.25
Many former Wafflers, exasperated with the NDP’s moderation, became leading
members of Marxist organizations that proliferated in the aftermath of the Waffle’s exit
from the party. Both the Revolutionary Marxist Group (RMG) and the International
Socialists (IS) stemmed directly from the Waffle, although debates within the
international Trotskyist movement also influenced their ideological orientation. The
prominence of the Waffle meant that debates over its brand of left-nationalism and aim of
transforming the NDP dominated the Canadian left in the early 1970s. The long-standing
Trotskyist party, the LSA, whose members had been active in the Waffle, split apart over
those issues. The Revolutionary Communist Tendency broke with the LSA in 1973 and
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joined with the Old Mole and Red Circle groups to form the RMG.26 After the LSA
rejected the idea of working within the NDP and adopted a position opposing Canadian
nationalism, Ross Dowson, who had served as the party’s executive secretary from its
founding until 1972, left the organization in 1974 to form the Socialist League (known
after 1978 as the Forward Group).27 The RMG published a periodical, the Old Mole, and
ran three candidates in the 1975 provincial election in British Columbia.28 The RMG and
its “sister organization” in Quebec, the Groupe Marxiste Révolutionnaire, united with the
LSA in 1977 in establishing the Revolutionary Workers League/Ligue Ouvrière
Révolutionnaire (RWL/LOR) and began publishing Socialist Voice and Lutte Ouvrière.
Although some members of the RWL continued working with the NDP, the organization
focused on activism within industrial unions. The RWL ran a single candidate in the
1977 Manitoba election, four candidates in the 1980 federal election, and five candidates
in the 1984 federal election. Otherwise it offered critical support for the NDP in English
Canada and called for a new labour party in Quebec, where the RWL endorsed
separatism.29
The International Socialists organization that emerged from the York-based study
group within the Ontario Waffle MISC had, by early 1975, rejected any “lingering
commitment to left nationalism,” explaining in Workers’ Action that “as the crisis of
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Canadian capitalism set in the bankruptcy of the Waffle’s nationalist position became
clear.”30 In addition to emphasizing internationalist socialism, the IS rejected both the
NDP and a “parliamentary road to socialism,” instead urging its members to “lead in the
construction of a class struggle, rank and file opposition” within the union movement. IS
members were involved in the campaign to legalize abortions as part of the Ontario
Coalition for Abortion Clinics in the 1980s, and Abbie Bakan and Dave McNally
remained leading figures in the organization for many years thereafter.31
Although the clandestine nature of Trotskyist organizations makes determining
their impact difficult, both the RWL and IS, although small in number, played a notable
role on the Canadian left in the decades following the Waffle’s disintegration. For
example, Varda Burstyn, a former Waffler and member of the RMG, approached
women’s organizations about planning the first march in English Canada celebrating
International Women’s Day in 1978.32 Burstyn explained the event was successful
because “a lot of the women who were part of that original organizing committee really
wanted to have some way to act. They didn’t want to just go to the NDP, which wasn’t
feminist enough or socialist enough. They wanted to have a way to show themselves and
the world the power of socialist feminism.”33 Not all left activists remember the
Trotskyists in a positive light. Susan G. Cole recalls socialist feminists in the RMG and
LSA “saw lesbianism as bad for feminist organizing” in the late 1970s.34 Nevertheless,
Trotskyist activists were involved in the burgeoning gay rights movement of the 1970s.
30
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Members of the LSA actively participated in Toronto Gay Action, the Gay Alliance
Towards Equality (GATE) and the Coalition for Gay Rights in Ontario. An RMG Gay
Caucus joined the National Gay Rights Coalition, and RWL activists helped organize the
Stop Anita Bryant Coalition in Toronto in 1978.35 Judy Rebick notes that “these far-left
groups declined significantly as the decade progressed, with much of their female
leadership going into the women’s movement and the union movement.”36 Historian
Joan Sangster suggests that “quantifying the impact of new communism is difficult, since
this remains a largely undocumented recent history… new communist organizing has
been understudied, and I would argue underestimated, given the number of campaigns
and issues – reproductive choice, non-traditional work, organizing in the public sector,
and so on – in which these leftists were involved.”37 Future historians may well find this
to be fruitful, if fractious, territory.
Former Wafflers’ subsequent activism in the women’s movement was in keeping
with the Waffle’s history. Its advocacy within the NDP of major policies of the women’s
liberation movement had been a source of significant division among the Waffle, the
party, and labour leadership. In addition to appealing to the NDP to support abortion on
demand, improved access to child care, government-funded houseworkers’ allowances,
prohibitions on gender discrimination in employment, and amendments to the nation’s
divorce law, the Waffle also insisted, albeit unsuccessfully, that the party adopt gender
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parity for its executive and council. Varda Burstyn later criticized the NDP’s approach to
feminists and the Waffle, arguing
The NDP’s decision not to tolerate the Waffle in 1972 bears special mention for it
was a fundamental and suicidal watershed for that party. With the exclusion of its
left-wing, the NDP leadership also excluded a whole layer of women’s
liberationists who had laid the groundwork for the NDP program through a series
of convention struggles in and around the Waffle. The loss of this layer of
women and the rejection of militant feminism that this implied (with the
exception of BC) was a horrendous political error. If the NDP leadership had had
any political foresight – let alone integrity – it would have seen that feminism,
broadly speaking, was the most important political movement of the period… as it
was, the party missed the boat.38
While acknowledging that Wafflers left the party, political scientist Jill Vickers maintains
that many feminists who supported the Waffle’s positions on women remained in the
NDP after 1972.39 In 1974, shortly after the Waffle departed the NDP, the party adopted
a watered-down version of the radical BC Women’s Manifesto, thereby endorsing key
components of the feminist policy agenda.40 Furthermore, Rosemary Brown’s
surprisingly strong challenge for the federal party leadership in 1975 engaged feminists
and leftists alike. By the early 1980s, the NDP had accepted the concept of gender parity
on the party executive and council. In 1982, the ONDP adopted an affirmative-action
resolution, brought forward by its Women’s Committee, mandating gender parity in the
party’s governing bodies.41 In 1983, the federal NDP adopted a similar gender parity
program. Although feminists continued to struggle within the NDP, most notably in the
1980s with several NDP provincial governments over support for abortion clinics,
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feminist activists became instrumental in shaping party policies and structures and
feminism emerged as a key component of the NDP’s agenda in the post-Waffle period.
Beyond their influence on the NDP, the activism of feminist ex-Wafflers in
unions contributed to the labour movement’s embrace of feminism and the development
of a Canadian form of socialist-feminism. In addition to organizing small independent
feminist unions, female activists reshaped the labour movement in the 1970s and 1980s.42
Meg Luxton has demonstrated how “union-based, working-class feminism” became a
“key player” in the women’s and labour movements and the Canadian left at that time.43
The Waffle’s advocacy of government-funded wages for housework reflected the
ongoing theoretical debates amongst early Canadian women’s liberationists.44 Feminist
scholars Adamson, Briskin and McPhail explain that “the debate on wages for housework
was an important theoretical and strategic turning point for many socialist women” who
realized women’s liberation could be approached from a Marxist perspective.45 In
explaining “the emergence of different feminisms” in the 1970s, Adamson, Briskin and
McPhail point to the development of socialist-feminist theory and practice in the early
1970s.46 They describe Saskatoon Women’s Liberation as the “first self-conscious
socialist-feminist organization in Canada.”47 Canadian socialist-feminism enjoyed its
most successful period in the late 1970s and early 1980s, when feminist authors made
significant theoretical contributions and “the emerging socialist-feminist analysis
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recognized the importance of making allies within the women’s movement and with other
important social movements.”48 These developments led some to claim that the
distinguishing characteristic between the women’s liberation movement in Canada and
the United States “was and is socialism.”49 In addition to these contributions to socialistfeminist theory, Wafflers organized Saskatchewan Working Women as a coalition
between female unionists and community-based feminists in the late 1970s and 1980s.
The Waffle’s primary intellectual heritage was within the “New Canadian
Political Economy” (NCPE) school of thought that thrived in the 1970s.50 Gregory Albo
describes the NCPE as the Waffle’s “intellectual offspring.”51 Drawing on the work of
Harold Innis, the NCPE characterized Canada as a “rich dependency” with an economy
overly reliant on the export of “staple” natural resources to the United States and
disadvantaged by its weak manufacturing base. Chris Hurl and Benjamin Christensen,
two scholars who examined the history of the NCPE school, noted “it was between the
academy and a Left political milieu that the NCPE took shape.”52 They explained “the
revival of political economy through this period is often associated with efforts to
establish an ‘independent socialist’ Canada, manifested in the Waffle.”53 Specifically,
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they describe the NCPE as “linked largely to core members of the Ontario Waffle.”54
The emergence of the NCPE in the early 1970s, shepherded by Waffle activists-turnedacademics, combined the politics of left nationalism with economic and historical
analyses of Canada. As Hurl and Christensen explain, “scholars drew influence from an
earlier generation of political economy scholarship in Canada and combined it in creative
ways with Third World theories of underdevelopment, elite theory, social history, and
Marxist theories of the state.”55 Publishers such as New Hogtown Press, which was
established to publish research reports by the CUS but turned to scholarly publishing in
the mid-1970s, was joined by New Star (est. 1969), Black Rose (est. 1970), Between the
Lines (est. 1977) and Fernwood Books (est. 1978) in spreading awareness of the NCPE.56
Even as these energetic scholars established the NCPE as a legitimate academic area,
many struggled to remain “politically engaged through the late 1970s with growing
professional and family commitments.”57 In the late 1980s Mel Watkins had lamented
the ongoing division between academics in the NCPE school and the NDP:
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In 1976, people created their own political economy group within the Learned
Societies. There’s now a journal that’s been founded by this group, a very
successful journal called Studies in Political Economy. Almost everybody
involved in it has been to the left of the NDP, has not been in the NDP, and has
been more Marxist than the NDP. So the NDP doesn’t even relate to it. But I see
that partly as a phenomenon that is a result of the complete break between the
intellectual community and the NDP. And I think that is sad.”58
Indeed, the dearth of left intellectuals within Canada’s social democratic party has been
an important result of the Waffle episode.
In the immediate aftermath of the Waffle’s tumultuous four years within the NDP,
party loyalists were quick to equate criticism of either the NDP or the international union
leadership with the departed Wafflers. Terry Morley, a former ONDP executive member
pursuing graduate studies in political science, in his review of Irving Abella’s
Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour for the Canadian Journal of Political
Science criticized the book as a “Waffle-inspired tract… currently fashionable academic
nationalism which finds beauty and truth only in ultra-leftist movements.”59 Such
antagonisms could diminish somewhat with the passage of time. Political scientist Reg
Whitaker explained how “David Lewis, no friend of the Waffle, years later remarked to
me in exasperation at the party’s me-too performance over the constitutional debate in the
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early 1980s, ‘When the Waffle left the NDP, most of the brains left with them.’”60
Desmond Morton, a leading opponent of the Waffle, admitted that “what the Waffle left
behind in the NDP was a serious generation gap in the party’s intellectual wing and a
nervous awareness of the dangers of policy discussion.”61 The idea that their departure
cost the NDP dearly in intellectual and activist heft not surprisingly resonated with
former Wafflers. Mel Watkins, for one, believed the party’s efforts to dissolve the
Waffle in Ontario “turned off a generation of activists.”62 Cy Gonick concurred,
claiming “the NDP paid a high price when it expelled the Waffle. It turned off a
generation of activists and never did regain the intellectual vigour that made the NDP a
lively venue for a time.”63 Nevertheless, many Wafflers, both prominent and grassroots,
eventually drifted back to the NDP in subsequent years. James Laxer joined an informal
advisory group to the ONDP during the 1975 provincial election, and he was policy
director for Michael Cassidy’s successful left-wing bid for the ONDP leadership in
1978.64 Laxer also served briefly as the federal NDP research director, a stint which
ended in controversy in 1983.65 Former Wafflers Dan Heap and Steven Langdon both
served as NDP MPs under Ed Broadbent, and Jack Layton, who attended Waffle
meetings while a graduate student at York University, became leader of the federal NDP
in 2003. Mel Watkins, who twice ran for the NDP in the 1990s, explained “I came to the
view, particularly after [President Ronald] Reagan was elected, that it was a luxury to
imagine that you could be to the left of the NDP.”66 John Smart, who ran for the federal
60
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NDP in Ottawa Centre in 1979 and 1980 (where he was opposed by former Waffler
Robin Mathews, leader of the short-lived National Party of Canada), explained that he
continued working for the NDP despite the knowledge “that it is neither a socialist party
nor a nationalist party and that it is not likely to change in either of those directions in the
near future.”67
Observers doubtful of the NDP’s willingness to entertain serious internal policy
discussions and debate often cite the Waffle era as evidence. Wayne Roberts and George
Ehring, two leaders of the party’s left wing in the 1980s, dubbed the NDP the “No
Dissent Party,” maintaining “the Waffle incident was only the latest and most obvious
proof that Democratic isn’t the NDP’s middle name.”68 The Waffle’s tumultuous period
in the NDP has served as both inspiration and warning to left activists who have
subsequently challenged the party leadership, including various iterations of the Left
Caucus, the Coalition for an Activist Party in the ONDP in the 1980s, Svend Robinson’s
leadership bid in 1995, the New Politics Initiative in 2001, and the Leap Manifesto in
2016.69 Explaining his support for the Leap Manifesto at the 2016 NDP convention in
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Edmonton, Stephen Lewis argued:
The Leap Manifesto is a radical document; of that there’s no dispute… But that, I
would argue, shouldn’t dispatch the Manifesto to obscurity. I’m attracted to the
idea that it could become a centerpiece of constituency debate over the next
couple of years… the kind of proposition that re-energizes and re-animates,
through the lens of a determinedly left-wing analysis, a social democratic party
that’s searching for renewed vision… An intense exchange of views on all the
issues raised in the Manifesto can only be healthy. What kind of a party are we
that would run from internal controversy when we seek a re-definition of who we
are and where we’re headed?70
Many former Wafflers could only have nodded in agreement.71
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Appendix A) A snapshot of the NDP in September 1969
1968 federal election results by province;
# of MPs and % of the popular vote

most recent provincial election results;
# of MLAs (provincial party leader) and %
of popular vote (election date)

British Columbia:

8 MPs
32.6%

12 MLAs (Thomas Berger)
33.9% (August 27, 1969)

Alberta:

0 MPs
9.4%

0 MLAs (Grant Notley)
15.9% (May 23, 1967)

Saskatchewan:

6 MPs
35.7%

24 MLAs (Woodrow Lloyd)
44.35% (October 11, 1967)

Manitoba:

3 MPs
25%

28 MLAs (Edward Schreyer)
35.56% (June 25, 1969)

Ontario:

6 MPs
20.6%

20 MLAs (Donald MacDonald)
25.9% (October 17, 1967)

Quebec:

0 MPs
7.5%

0 MLAs (Robert Cliche)
- (June 5, 1966)

New Brunswick:

0 MPs
4.9%

0 MLAs (vacant)
0.1% (October 23, 1967)

Nova Scotia:

0 MPs
6.7%

0 MLAs (Jeremy Akerman)
5.2% (May 30, 1967)

Prince Edward Island:

0 MPs
3.2%

-

Newfoundland:

0 MPs
4.4%

0 MLAs (vacant)
1.8 % (September 8, 1966)
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Appendix B) The Waffle Manifesto (1969)
Our aim as democratic socialists is to build an independent socialist Canada. Our
aim as supporters of the New Democratic Party is to make it a truly socialist party.
The achievements of socialism awaits the building of a mass base of socialists in
factories and offices, on farms and campuses. The development of a socialist
consciousness, on which can be built a socialist base, must be the first priority of the New
Democratic Party.
The New Democratic Party must be seen as the parliamentary wing of a
movement dedicated to fundamental social change. It must be radicalized from within
and it must be radicalized from without.
The most urgent issue for Canadians is the very survival of Canada. Anxiety is
pervasive and the goal of greater economic independence receives widespread support.
But economic independence without socialism is a sham, and neither are meaningful
without true participatory democracy.
The major threat to Canadian survival today is American control of the Canadian
economy. The major issue of our times is not national unity but national survival, and the
fundamental threat is external, not internal.
American corporate capitalism is the dominant factor shaping Canadian society.
In Canada American economic control operates through the formidable medium of the
multinational corporation, The Canadian corporate elite has opted for a junior
partnership with these American enterprises. Canada has been reduced to a resource base
and consumer market within the American empire.
The American empire is the central reality for Canadians. It is an empire
characterized by militarism abroad and racism at home. Canadian resources and
diplomacy have been enlisted in the support of that empire. In the barbarous war in
Vietnam Canada has supported the United States through its membership on the
International Control Commission and through sales of arms and strategic resources to
the American military-industrial complex.
The American empire is held together through world-wide military alliances and
by giant corporations. Canada’s membership in the American alliance system and the
ownership of the Canadian economy by American corporations precluded Canada’s
playing an independent role in the world. These bonds must be cut if corporate
capitalism and the social priorities it creates is to be effectively challenged.
Canadian development is distorted by a corporate capitalist economy. Corporate
investment creates and fosters superfluous individual consumption at the expense of
social needs. Corporate decision-making concentrates investment in a few major urban
areas which become increasingly uninhabitable while the rest of the country sinks into
underdevelopment.
The criterion that the most profitable pursuits are the most important ones causes
the neglect of activities whose value cannot be measured by the standard of profitability.
It is not accidental that housing, education, medical care and public transportation are
inadequately provided for by the social system.
The problem of regional disparities is rooted in the profit orientation of capitalism
The social costs of stagnant areas are irrelevant to the corporations. For Canada the
problem is compounded by the reduction of Canada to the position of an economic
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colony of the United States. The foreign capitalist has even less concern for balanced
development of the country than the Canadian capitalist with roots in a particular region.
An independence movement based on substituting Canadian capitalists for
American capitalists, or on public policy to make foreign corporations behave as if they
were Canadian corporations, cannot be our final objective. There is not now an
independent Canadian capitalism and any lingering pretension on the part of Canadian
businessmen to independence lack credibility. Without a strong national capitalist class
behind them, Canadian governments, Liberal and Conservative, have functioned in the
interests of international and particularly American capitalism, and have lacked the will
to pursue even a modest strategy of economic independence.
Capitalism must be replaced by socialism, by national planning of investment and
by the public ownership of the means of production in the interests of the Canadian
people as a whole. Canadian nationalism is a relevant force on which to build to the
extent that it is anti-imperialist. On the road to socialism, such aspirations for
independence must be taken into account. For to pursue independence seriously is to
make visible the necessity of socialism in Canada.
Those who desire socialism and independence for Canada have often been baffled
and mystified by the problem of internal divisions within Canada. While the essential
fact of Canadian history in the past century is the reduction of Canada to a colony of the
United States, with a consequent increase in regional inequalities, there is no denying the
existence of two nations within Canada, each with its own language, culture and
aspiration. This reality must be incorporated into the strategy of the New Democratic
Party.
English Canada and Quebec can share common institutions to the extent that they
share common purposes. So long as Canada is governed by those who believe that
national policy should be limited to the passive function of maintaining a peaceful an
secure climate for foreign investors, there can be no meaningful unity between English
and French Canadians. So long as the federal government refuses to protect the country
from American economic and cultural domination, English Canada is bound to appear to
French Canadians simply as part of the United States. An English Canada concerned
with its own national survival would create common aspirations that would help tie the
two nations together once more.
Nor can the present treatment of the constitutional issue in isolation from
economic and social forces that transcend the two nations be anything but irrelevant. Our
present constitution was drafted a century ago by politicians committed to the values and
structure of a capitalist society. Constitutional change relevant to socialists must be
based on the needs of the people rather than the corporation and must reflect the power of
classes and groups excluded from effective decision-making by the present system.
A united Canada is of critical importance in pursuing a successful strategy against
the reality of American imperialism Quebec’s history and aspirations must be allowed
full expression and implementation in the conviction that new ties will emerge from the
common perception of “two nations, one struggle,” Socialists in English Canada must
ally themselves with socialists in Quebec in this common cause.
Central to the creation of an independent socialist Canada is the strength and
tradition of the Canadian working class and the trade union movement. The revitalization
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and extension of the labour movement would involved a fundamental democratization of
our society.
Corporate capitalism is characterized by the predominant power of the corporate
elite aided and abetted by the political elite. A central objective of Canadian socialists
must be to further the democratization process in industry. The Canadian trade union
movement throughout its history was waged a democratic battle against the so-called
rights or prerogatives of ownership and management. It has achieved the important
moral and legal victory of providing for working men an effective say in what their
wages will be. At present management’s “right” to control technological change is being
challenged. The New Democratic Party must provide leadership in the struggle to extend
workingmen’s influence into every area of industrial decision-making. Those who work
must have effective control in the determination of working conditions, and substantial
power in determining the nature of the product, prices, and so on. Democracy and
socialism require nothing less.
Trade unionists and New Democrats have led in extending the welfare state in
Canada. Much remains to be done: more and better housing, a really progressive tax
structure, a guaranteed annual income. But these are no longer enough. A socialist
society must be one in which there is democratic control of all institutions which have a
major effect on men’s lives and where there is equal opportunity for creative nonexploitative self-development. It is now time to go beyond the welfare state.
New Democrats must begin now to insist on the redistribution of power, and not
simply welfare, in a socialist direction. The struggle for worker participation in industrial
decision-making and against management “rights” is such a move toward economic and
social democracy.
By strengthening the Canadian labour movement, New Democrats will further the
pursuit of Canadian independence. So long as Canadian economic activity is dominated
by the corporate elite, and so long as workers’ rights are confined within their present
limits, corporate requirements for profit will continue to take precedence over human
needs.
By bringing men together primarily as buyers and sellers of each other, by
enshrining profitability and material gain in place of humanity and spiritual growth,
capitalism has always been inherently alienating. Today, sheer size combined with
modern technology further exaggerates man’s sense of insignificance and impotence. A
socialist transformation of society will return to man his sense of humanity, to replace his
sense of being a commodity. But a socialist democracy implies man’s control of his
immediate environment as well, and in any strategy for building socialism, community
democracy is as vital as the struggle for electoral success. To that end, socialists must
strive for democracy at those levels which most directly affect us all – in our
neighbourhoods, our schools, our places of work. Tenants’ unions, consumers’ and
producers’ co-operatives are example of areas in which socialists must lead in efforts to
involve people directly in the struggle to control their own destinies.
Socialism is a process and a programme. The process is the raising of socialist
consciousness, the building of a mass base of socialists, and a strategy to make visible the
limits of liberal capitalism.
While the programme must evolve out of the process, its leading features seem
clear. Relevant instruments for bringing the Canadian economy under Canadian
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ownership and control and for altering the priorities established by corporate capitalism
are at hand. They include extensive public control over investment and nationalization of
the commanding heights of the economy, such as the key resources industries, finance
and credit, and industries strategic to planning our economy. Within that programme,
workers’ participation in all institutions promises to release creative energies, promote
decentralization, and restore human and social priorities.
The struggle to build a democratic socialist Canada must proceed at all levels of
Canadian society. The New Democratic Party is the organization suited to bringing these
activities into a common focus. The New Democratic Party has grown out of a
movement for democratic socialism that has deep roots in Canadian history. It is the core
around which should be mobilized the social and political movement necessary for
building an independent socialist Canada. The New Democratic Party must rise to that
challenge or become irrelevant. Victory lies in joining the struggle.
In Michael S. Cross, ed. The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea (Toronto: New Hogtown
Press, 1974): 43-5.
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Appendix C) The Marshmallow Manifesto (1969)
For a United and Independent Canada
New Democratic policy seeks to make and keep Canada free to realize the full
potential and greatness of her people.
The live issue which concerns New Democrats, and Canadians generally, is to
make us free to create the future of our economy and society; to redress the inequalities
both within and between regions; to broaden and deepen the role of our people in the
decisions which affect their lives; to redesign our cities; to improve the quality of life for
all Canadians; to build a modern and efficient economy free of control of private
corporate power, whether foreign or domestic; and to play a truly independent and
meaningful role in the world.
The New Democratic Party is convinced that this cannot be achieved without the
philosophy and policies of democratic socialism. The struggle for Canada’s
independence is one with the struggle for a better society. It is a struggle for human
equality and self-fulfillment. To win this struggle, there must be Canadian control of the
economy, public control of investment and other priorities, democratic social planning to
use our resources for the enrichment of the human condition.
The urgent fact which concerns us is that our future as Canadians is now in peril.
There are too many among us whose self-interest lies in the disintegration of our country.
Our right of economic self-determination, the foundation of our future, is deeply
undermined. The control of our industry and our resources has passed to alarming degree
into foreign hands.
The erosion of our national independence has reached alarming proportions.
Effective measures to reverse the trend are necessary now before foreign control of our
economic life reaches the point of no return.
The facts of foreign control in Canada are stark and threatening. The rising rate
of take-overs, the growth of foreign ownership in many of our major industries, the
imposition of foreign laws on Canadian subsidiaries, and Canada’s increasing
dependence on American markets and practices have placed unacceptable limits on our
freedom to pursue independent policies for the welfare of the Canadian people.
In our present society, the future shape of our economy is determined mainly be
the major investment decision taken by large corporations. And for Canada this has
meant, to an important and growing extent, decision by corporations owned and
controlled by American interests. The inevitable result has been a branch-plant
manufacturing industry much less efficient that it should be, a natural resources industry
largely serving the U.S. market, inadequate industrial research and development,
restrictions on our foreign exchange policies, and investment decisions which take little
account of the priorities and needs of Canadians.
All this has happened openly. Those who hold power in Canada, the politicians
and businessmen who have run this country, have presided publicly over the devastation
of our environment, the dissolution of our national goals and the disappearance of our
autonomy. Their outworn economic philosophy led them to welcome Canadian
dependence on American corporations and to offer increasing concessions in return for
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continued good-will. Canadian business and industrial circles found in profitable to
follow this course.
While Continentalism has been the policy and practice of Liberal and
Conservative governments, in marked contrast, Canadian independence and Canada’s
survival as a free nation have been and are the determined goals of the New Democratic
Party.
Old party spokesmen are fond of decrying concern for Canadian independence as
anti-American. Nothing shows more clearly how little they understand the feelings of
Canadians. Anti-Americanism is as barren and negative a concept as is anti-French or
anti-English or anti any other country or people. Canadians have always known this.
What New Democrats seek is to make and keep Canada free to realize her full
potential and greatness. We must regain control of our national future, not because of
sentimental patriotism but because it is the only foundation on which we can build a
better society.
To achieve this end, New Democrats will use all the means available in a modern
economy: expansion of public investment and public ownership, government planning,
investment controls, a just tax system, purposeful monetary policies freed from the
restraints of a fixed exchange rate, and necessary laws to limit and regulate foreign
investment and subsidiaries in Canada.
From its inception, the New Democratic Party has proposed a massive, publiclyowned Development Corporation to give Canadians a strong new voice in the growth of
their country and to provide government with an operating instrument having a large pool
of capital for public investment in accordance with the essential social priorities. We also
propose a national commodity field throughout the world, so as to reduce Canada’s
unhealthy dependence on one unregulated market. Finally, we recognize that only our
own efforts, through a serious commitment in carefully chosen areas of science and
technology, will secure our industrial future.
Using not only one but all available means, the New Democratic Party calls on
Canadians to free their country from foreign domination of its economy, of its cultural
development and of its international policies. However, we believe that the survival of
Canada depends even more on national programmes for people – in housing, beauty and
comfort in the cities, comfort and security on the farms, income maintenance, education,
recreation and a host of other areas.
We have a noble myth in Canada of our capacity to accommodate cultural
difference. For too long, however, disparity of income and opportunity has been the
price of diversity. The result has been a persistent sectionalism, most conspicuously in
French Canada, but apparent throughout Canada – in the Atlantic Region, in Northern
Ontario and in the West. The survival of Canada depends on removing regional and all
other inequalities and building a true foundation for one united country in which the
position and responsibilities of every region and, particularly, those of Quebec, are fully
recognized within Confederation.
Millions of Canadians share our faith in Canada and our determination to
strengthen and enrich Canada’s independence and place in the world. We call on them to
join with us in the great common enterprise of saving our country. This is the challenge
of the seventies and to this challenge the New Democratic Party rededicates itself.
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Appendix D) The Ontario Waffle Manifesto (1970)
For a Socialist Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada
As democratic socialists, we seek to build a socialist Ontario in an independent socialist
Canada. As members of the New Democratic Party, we seek to make it the key
instrument of that struggle.
There is much to be done. We live today in a corporate capitalist society. Its failure are
increasingly evident. The combination of unemployment and inflation undermines the
security of working people. Labour is treated like a commodity, with giant corporations
unilaterally closing plants and replacing workers in the name of “progress”, while the
power of the state is used to repress unions. Our resources are alienated into the hands of
private capitalists, who are typically foreign, and the benefits that should accrue to local
communities are drained abroad. The land is despoiled, the air we breathe and the water
we drink is polluted. The educational system is designed to favour the privileged few
while training the many to play social roles that have been prepared for them. There is
widespread discrimination against women. The poor, the immigrant and native
minorities are systematically excluded from our economic, political and cultural
institutions and from affluence and power. Toronto, as the dominant metropolis of the
provincial economy, takes its tribute from its hinterland, and notably from resource-rich
Northern Ontario. The government is little more than a committee that administers on
behalf of the corporations.
Nor is that all, for Ontario is but a link in a long imperial chain. The Ontario economy
has been integrated into the American corporate system. Corporate capitalism within the
American empire funnels wealth to the large shareholders in the American metropolis.
Toronto corporate middlemen run the branch office for New York in appropriating much
of the profits of the Canadian economy for American owners. The system of corporate
empire results in investment being centred in a few favoured urban areas while the
hinterland us exploited for resources and allowed to sink into economic stagnation and
underdevelopment. Economic imbalance results for much of the country including large
parts of Ontario. Between 1960 and 1967, Canadian subsidiaries and affiliates (about
half of which are in Ontario) sent two billion dollars more to the United States in the
form of profits, royalties, license and management fees, than they received from parent
corporations in the form of capital imports. Ontario is now the vehicle for the
exploitation of much of the rest of Canada – we must end this domination of all
Canadians by Ontario-based corporations.
So it is that today the continuing Americanization of Ontario not only turns Ontario into a
branch plant society; it poses the chief threat to the achievement of Canadian
independence and Canadian socialism. To build a vital socialist movement in Ontario
would be to take a long step toward building an independent socialist Canada.
The means to build a socialist Ontario are at hand. The necessary powers to plan, to
bring the economy under public ownership and control, and to develop our natural
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resources for the public good already lie within the Province of Ontario. The use of these
instruments awaits the development of socialist consciousness in factories, offices,
campuses, and neighbourhoods.
*****
In fundamental opposition to our goals is the Ontario government’s present serving of
corporate interests. We must not let the continuing increase in government activity
mislead us into thinking that we are moving, albeit gradually, toward a social order in
which the people will get a larger say. Rather, the needs of an advanced technological
society are integrating the government more closely with the corporation. What is now
called “planning” by the government involves only the further buttressing of the system
of private capitalism, and reinforces the holding of power by those who already wield it.
They are satisfied to supply the support systems – hydro-electricity, highways, trained
manpower – needed for the expansion of corporate activity.
In the face of the increasing power of American multi-national corporations, the present
Ontario government not only does nothing to resist, but instead actively promotes the
foreign take-over. Ontario businessmen and the old-line parties who represent their
interests have given up any serious pretensions of an independent status for this country.
Our human and natural resources are treated as enticements to investors, mostly
American, to locate in Ontario. In recent years, the Robarts Government has subsidized
through grants and forgivable loans such giants corporations as Union Carbide, Allied
Chemical, Kraft Foods and General Foods. In this fashion, the taxes of ordinary people
are used to subsidize the corporate elite and to reduce yet further domestic control of our
economy. Rising unemployment and a full sharing of American inflation are among the
results of foreign ownership; (the present system is unable to cope with the most straight
forward demand of working people).
As democratic socialists, we must dedicate ourselves to fighting with all the means at our
disposal this sell-out and give-away of Canada’s largest province. To the present reality
of Americanization and capitalism, we must pose the alternative of independence and
socialism. In order to rid ourselves of the control of our society by American
corporations and their local allies, we must insist on nothing less than the diffusion of
power to the vast majority of citizens not now included in decision-making. The means
for the repatriation of our economy and for the winning of power for the people are
known. They include extensive public control over investment and the nationalization of
large corporations in the key sectors of the economy.
To bring presently privately-owned corporations under public ownership would be to
bring our economy directly under democratic control. To create new Crown corporations
is the most effective means to create both more jobs and more creative jobs. All public
enterprises must be run such a way as to give control in decision-making to workers and
the community.
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Socialist planning will make it possible for us both to half and reverse the
Americanization of the economy and to combat underdevelopment in disadvantaged
regions. Crown corporations should be located in such areas so as to create a balanced
variety of jobs, and to ensure that development serves the area and is not simply geared to
quick profits for a distant head office. Such Crown corporations must be administered by
people in the locals areas rather than by an impersonal bureaucracy at Queen’s Park.
*****
Our present society is characterized by gross inequality in the distribution of income and
wealth and by a monopoly of power in the hands of the few. Much remains to be done to
redistribute income through an equitable system of taxation and a humane system of
welfare. But these are no longer enough. Socialism means the gathering back of power
into this country so that it can be put in the hands of ordinary men and women. What is
required is nothing less than the building of a truly democratic society.
Across Canada we desire a new set of social and working relations in which the people
themselves actually decide local issues in the factory, office neighbourhood and school.
Socialist democracy means both the control of the immediate environment by those
affected and the control of the larger provincial and national communities by the people
as a whole. Social movements such as those of workers, farmers, students, tenants,
women, and minority groups are central to this social transformation. Socialists must
involve themselves in the organization of tenants’ unions, welfare recipients’ groups and
producers’ and consumers’ co-operatives.
The New Democratic Party must be the vitalizing centre that gives these social forces a
common perspective, a sense of solidarity and an organization for united action. Only in
this way can power be taken away from the tiny elite which now monopolizes it. Only in
this way can capitalism be replaced by socialism.
*****
The distorted priorities of the present system are nowhere more evident and more
dangerous than in the destruction of the natural and human environment of this province.
We can no longer afford to be sanguine about our “open” spaces and our “limitless”
resources, or imagine that the world’s largest lakes and rivers can be killed by pollution,
that immense timber stands can be mined out of existence, that rich resources can be
turned into slag heaps and foul air. We have seen unregulated urban sprawl eat away at
the province’s best agricultural land. The existence of tens of thousands of lakes has not
guaranteed their recreational use for the public good. The reckless exploitation of the
natural environment of this province now imperils our future for all time to come.
The impending energy resources deal between the Canadian government and the United
States gives particular urgency to the case for new resource policies. Such an agreement,
negotiated by a Liberal government in Ottawa, aided and abetted by a Conservative
government in Ontario, could result in the alienation in perpetuity of Ontarians from their
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resources. An immediate objective of New Democrats must be to stop any deal which
treats Canadian resources simply as continental resources. We must oppose such an
extension of American imperialism by all the means at our disposal – through action at
the provincial level as well as the federal, and by direct political action as well as in the
legislature.
In the cities, our human environment has suffered from the government’s primary
concern with the promotion of profit and the pursuit of growth without respect to social
costs. Poor public transportation, inadequate housing, and the lack of parks and
recreational facilities make it evident that human well-being is no the present aim of
urban design. The automobile industry in particular and its attendant jungle of
expressways has already given us unplanned urban sprawl and now threatens the
habitability of the inner city.
Only by replacing a government controlled by profit-seekers with a government
controlled by the people can we make the preservation of our natural environment and the
re-fashioning of our urban environment for human habitation attainable goals.
*****
In our present capitalist society, the people themselves are seen as a resource.
Corporations use the state to provide them with trained manpower. Immigrants are
treated as a pool of cheap labour to be exploited. Their entry into Canada is determined
more by the state of the capitalist labour market and the manpower needs of the
corporations than by human considerations. Mindless talk of cultural diversity and the
vertical mosaic obscures the reality of ghettoes and of pervasive barriers to the
achievement of equality of condition.
As the education system becomes increasingly integrated with corporate activity, people
are taught to accept their lot as producers and consumers within the American empire.
Our young people are taught to be competitive and individualist toward each other, and to
be passive and obedient toward the school system, their employers and the state.
Through their taxes, working people finance an educational system geared to maintain
corporate interest and to educate privileged income groups.
The industrial dependence on institutions of higher learning is causing both corporations
and governments to use their influence and control to make universities and colleges
better instruments for strengthening the capitalist system along continentalist lines. We
now have a branch plant system of higher education the better to service our branch plant
economy.
Canada is unique among the developed nations of the world in terms of the number of
foreigners who teach in our universities. Fewer than fifty per cent of professors teaching
in the Arts and Science faculties of many Ontario universities are Canadian citizens. The
social sciences as developed in the United States have become instruments to extend
American control by eroding our value systems and our national consciousness, and by
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creating tastes and attitudes that make us passive consumers of North American
civilization.
Democratic socialists must seek a system of education in Ontario that is critical and
Canadian and that is governed by students, teachers, and representative members of the
community.
*****
The overwhelming section of the population that works for a wage or salary must play
the key role in transforming our society. New Democrats who are trade unionists must
continue the struggle to organize the majority of the working people who remain
unorganized. All New Democrats who are trade unionists must oppose the Robarts
Government’s direct suppression of the labour movement. While corporations combine
to set prices and to exercise monopolistic control of markets, workers are prevented by
state injunctions from using their organized power.
Socialists must reject the concept that there are “management rights” in the industry
which are non-negotiable. They must be articulate and support new rights for working
people: the right to a job, and with shorter hours and higher pay; the right to benefit from
technological change without threat to income or security; and the right to control the
product of their own labour through the popular democratic management of industry.
The labour movement in Canada and in Ontario is presently fragmented among too many
unions, in part because of the present nature of international unionism. Canadian sections
of international unions must have full autonomy, and mergers must be sought between
unions in Canada.
*****
Farmers like trade unionists have long struggled to control their own environment. At
present in Ontario farmers are losing that fight. Farmers are not working for themselves
so much as for the benefit of the great food monopolies, farm implement companies and
other corporations which exploit both the farmer and the consumer. Socialists must
commit themselves to improving the standard of living and the quality of life of rural
Ontario. These objectives can be reached by ensuring that agriculture is carried on in the
interests of the farmer and the community as a whole. Industries related to farming such
as food processing and farm implement manufacturing must be brought under public or
co-operative ownership. Agricultural marketing must be rationalized and prices
maintained by means of produced controlled marketing boards.
The movement to end the exploitation of women must be vigourously supported by
socialists. The oppression of women stems from the definition of a woman as wife and
mother to the exclusion of all else. Discrimination operates against women in the
educational system and the work place. Women are discouraged from seeking higher
education and are channeled into the lowest paying and most meaningless jobs. The
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overwhelming majority of working women are unorganized and suffer discrimination not
only from management but also from their fellow male workers.
The New Democratic Party must provide its full support to the struggle for the liberation
of women and must support independent women’s organizations which are fighting
oppression.
*****
In the face of accelerating continentalism, the growth of social movements and the
increasing support for the goals of independence and socialism are reasons for hope. The
new awareness of the people regarding Americanization and the new consciousness of
the social and human costs of capitalism must be given political expression at once if we
are to halt the destruction of Canada
We must not be deterred by those who will try to dismiss us by labeling us “antiAmerican”, for those who do so profoundly misunderstand. Our complaint is not against
the American people and the progressive movements in that country, but against the
American corporate, political and cultural domination of Canada. Our colonial condition
makes necessary an anti-imperialist struggle, if we are to achieve socialism and
independence.
Finally, in our efforts to oppose the present regime at Queen’s Park, we can afford to
have the people misled by partial solutions that would result in neither independence nor
socialism. We must not settle for state capitalism or for welfare capitalism. The New
Democratic Party must dedicate itself to the building of a socialist Ontario in an
independent socialist Canada.
From For a Socialist Ontario in an Independent Socialist Canada, personal files.
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Appendix E) The Saskatchewan Waffle Manifesto (1970)
For a Socialist Saskatchewan in an Independent Socialist Canada
Introduction
Many of the richest pages of Canadian history have been written by the struggles
of the people of Saskatchewan. Whether one speaks of the struggle for political and
economic self-determination led by Louis Riel or the continuous struggles of the farmers
to obtain a secure life and a fair return on their crops, again and again the courage and
progressiveness of the people of Saskatchewan is expressed in their fight in the interests
of the majority of the people of the province – workers and farmers. Again and again
peoples’ movements in Saskatchewan have confronted the abuses, limitations and
inadequacies of capitalism – an economic system based on the exploitation of the many
by the few in the pursuit of profit and imperialism – the characteristic of capitalism in
which the people and resources of one region or nation are exploited for the benefit of
another region or nation.
In the depths of the Great Depression these same people founded the Co-operative
Commonwealth Federation (CCF). In 1933 the CCF’s first national convention adopted
a far-reaching socialist manifesto calling for the eradication of capitalism. Thus from
diverse expressions of the struggle of people against capitalism emerged a united socialist
movement.
Over the next decade the movement struggled in the interests of the working
people of the province – farmers and workers. In 1944 through political action at every
level of the community, the CCF movement swept to an overwhelming electoral victory.
The movement had become a profound part of the social fabric of the Saskatchewan
community.
But over the years the sense of being a movement was lost. The ‘prosperity’ and
political conservatism of the fifties forced the CCF to retreat from an aggressive and
courageous espousal of socialism to a more conservative reformist posture. This process
culminated in the formation of the New Democratic Party (NDP) in 1961 which
decisively set the movement on the traditional course of a parliamentary party.
Times have changed. The political mood of the people has changed. The
‘prosperity’ of the fifties and early sixties has been exposed for the hoax it was. Poverty,
unemployment and depression once more confront us. New threats face our people –
pollution, the distant but immediate threat of nuclear annihilation, permanent and hidden
poverty, urban sprawl, repression, etc. Today people are moving forward toward more
active and intense politics = the politics of survival.
Today we face new problems for which we must find new socialist solutions. The
chief source of the problems remains the same capitalism. In the thirties capitalism as a
system collapsed. Only a global war could restore it and only a continuing Cold War
could prop it up. Today we face monopoly and corporate capitalism in which the old
failings are magnified and intensified. Rampant individualism and private profiteering,
price fixing, the intervention of the state on behalf of the corporations and the elimination
of competitors are common features in our irrational economy. The goals of the system
remain the same – pursuit of profit for the few at the expense of the many. And today, in
Canada and in Saskatchewan, we face American imperialism in which the resources and
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skills of our people are not only exploited for the profit of the Canadian corporate elite
but also for their American senior partners. Thus the priorities of our economy are
doubly distorted.
In Canada this will come to mean that we will be more and more a colony of the
American economy serving the needs of that economy as a resource base and consumer
market.
In Saskatchewan, as the economic depression depends, this will come to mean
that our province will be further depopulated, the rural economy further eroded, and our
land taken over by American or Canadian corporate capitalist farms, further extending
the monopoly control of the food chains. Many of us will be reduced to the status of
seasonal employees on the land we once owned and cultivated. The cash income of the
farmers, on which so much of our city and town population depends, will leave the
province as corporate profits, throwing our cities and towns into deeper depression.
Many more of us will be driven to the urban centres to make do as best we can.
It is a question of the survival of Canada as a nation. It is a question of the
survival of Saskatchewan as a decent human community.
Mere reforms of capitalism are not enough. We must build a socialist
Saskatchewan in an independent socialist Canada. Nothing less will do.
We of the New Democratic Party must accept this challenge and must rekindle
and cherish the socialist heritage of the CCF and strive to apply it to the conditions we
face today. The NDP must become a socialist movement. It must again realize that the
building of such a movement is built primarily among the people – on farms, in factories,
offices, trade unions, universities and in the streets. We must come to realize that within
a hostile capitalist society only supreme effort and diligent work will allow the socialist
heritage we have had passed on to us, to be nurtured, and to become victorious.
Supporters of the Waffle Caucus seek the preservation and successful extension
of this socialist heritage in Saskatchewan and Canada. Aware that adequate socialist
solutions will not be found in one province but nationally, we commit ourselves to the
support of the national movement for and independent socialist Canada.
All supporters of this document are members of the NDP. We are committed to
the NDP; to work within it and so to convince it to select the road of a grassroots socialist
movement over the futile course of a traditional parliamentary party. We will publicly,
openly, and democratically organize and debate our positions among our party’s
members and supporters. We are convinced that this free and open debate will be a
turning point for the movement.
Toward a program of socialist planning
A socialist NDP will introduce comprehensive social and economic planning. A
planning agency will be created with authority to develop, with the cooperation of
constituency-level, popularly selected groups, development plans for the several regions
of Saskatchewan. Comprehensive planning must provide for all sources of government
revenue including receipts from crown corporations and other income earning public
functions, license and other fees, income from investments and various taxes and
royalties. It will be a primary objective of a socialist NDP to reduce reliance for revenues
on income and property tax and to maximize reliance on proceeds from publicly
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controlled enterprise. As more experience is gained the party must be prepared to extend
its direction over added sources of investment now considered private.
Planning for development will cover all present public services such as education,
health, welfare, power, roads, and communication. But it will also be extended to include
a broad definition of development, including but not restricted to urban development,
jobs, ecological conservation and housing.
Within this broad context, we would make the following more specific proposals
regarding the Saskatchewan economy and the development of social services and more
tangible democracy.
A) The Regional Economy
“Regional disparity” is not an historical accident. The underdevelopment of the
prairie economy is a consequence of capitalist planning. The purpose of the national
policy from 1850 to 1930 was to establish a population base in the West and to build a
network of commercial trading centers, railways and ports necessary for: (1) extraction of
primary resources and food staples; and (2) the protected marketing of British
manufactured goods. Eastern Canada acts as a funnel for wealth from the prairies which
now ends up the hands of American capitalists.
Regional development must be part of a new national policy based on socialist
planning.
Saskatchewan is a rich producer of food, and has abundant reserves in petroleum,
potash and other mineral resources. Our total economy depends on our ability to
generate and retain wealth in these key areas.
We propose an integrated program of development in the seventies which seeks to
retain in Saskatchewan the productive wealth of our key industries thereby expanding
supporting services and secondary industry. Expansion in health care, education,
recreation, electrical and telephone services only become possible when agriculture can
be made profitable for the producers and when profits from primary sources are
distributed within the region.
Capitalist planning produces the opposite results. Foreign based monopolies take
the profits from agriculture, oil, and potash but contribute little to services and secondary
industry. Even public capital goes to support private industries (such as the Prince Albert
Pulp Mill) while hospitals and schools are closed down and workers in the public sector
take relative wage cuts. Fewer teachers teach larger classes at lower real wages;
qualitative improvement in education becomes impossible. Small businessmen and
professionals within the province are forced out of business while international chain
stores expand their profit margins. As production in all sectors reaches an all time high,
urban unemployment increases, the rural area is depopulated, people of every age and
description are forced to leave the province.
A socialist NDP would adopt the following general approach to regional
development:
1) All sectors of the economy will be integrated into a planned program.
2) Productive wealth will be retained within the region necessitating ownership
in key areas of food production and resource industries
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3) Industrial planning and production must be democratically controlled by those
working within and or affected by the industry with ultimate authority in the
broader community.
4) Community control will be build into all services and social institutions such
as education, health care facilities, recreation, crown corporations etc.
More concretely still, we propose the following program for a socialist NDP in the
seventies.
I) Agriculture
Our central objectives in agricultural planning are: (1) to preserve and expand the
rural community; (2) to maintain the farm family as the basic social unity in a larger
community structure; and, (3) to establish democratic control by the farmers and workers
in the agricultural community over all facets of food production.
In order to meet these objectives, a socialist NDP will propose the following
program for agriculture for Saskatchewan and Canada:
i)
Guaranteed farm income – Farm income will be separated from produce
and livestock prices. Farmers will bargain collectively for income with
government on an industry-wide basis. Income levels will be based on
need and the productive potential of land. Farm commodities will become
a public responsibility from the time they are produced with market and
pricing policies designed to cover costs of farm income payments, costs of
services to the community, and the purchasing of farm land by the crown.
ii)
Halt corporate farming – Legislate against corporate invasion into farming
and expropriate land which is foreign or corporate owned.
iii)
Support for co-operatives and young farmers – Enact legislation on land
tenure which places maximum limits on single holdings. Begin a program
of crown land assembly by: (1) providing the crown with the initial option
to purchase retiring land at assessed value; and, (2) purchasing land from
farmers who wish to release their capital fixed in land. Such land will be
put to preferential use by licensing to young farmers or farmers desiring
co-operative or collective operations. Such land would remain under title
of the crown and would be rent free. Such a policy will sustain the rural
population at present levels and encourage repopulation by eliminating the
huge capital outlay in land required presently.
iv)
Rationalize the food industry – A socialist NDP is committed to public
ownership because capitalism has been exploiting producers and
consumers alike. In no area is this systematic exploitation more
pronounced than in the corporate food industry. The food industry
therefore will be taken into public ownership and rationalized so that food
processing and marketing (where possible) takes place in the region of
production. Phony advertising and phony competition in retail operations
will be eliminated, and the artificial profits between producer and
consumer destroyed.
II) Resource Development Policy

506
A program for resource development must reverse the trend of exploitation for
private profit and redirect proceeds to social needs and the furthering of human and
ecological values. Within provincial authority the possibility for achieving this objective
is severely limited. Any program of extractive industries must be based upon and judged
against its social and ecological consequences. Considerations of economic benefit or
loss, threats to long-term conservation, pollution, degree of community control, and the
interests of the local people must be weighed. No provincial government has yet
assessed these factors in determining its policies. A socialist NDP will make this
assessment of the potash, oil and pulp and paper industries and in assessing future
development proposals. A socialist NDP will ensure that our vast northern riches are
developed for the benefit of the people and not for foreign or domestic private profit. As
a general principle, we must seek to develop resources through public ownership so that
we have a just return of wealth, real control over industry policies, and can encourage and
develop industrial democracy.
B) Building Peoples’ Power
In order to build socialism, we must erect practical economic and social structures
that put power in the hands of the people in an ongoing fashion. If we do not do this, we
will merely substitute the authoritarian top-down state bureaucracy for the authoritarian
top-down corporation. In order to achieve a socialist democracy, a socialist NDP will
adopt the following perspectives and policies.
I) Labour policy
Throughout its history, the labouring classes of this region have suffered
exploitation in the extreme at the hands of foreign based capital. Wage slavery and poor
working conditions in the mines, mills and railways of Western Canada caused labour to
organize and take militant action. Today in the midst of yet another depression, poor
conditions and punishing attitudes prevail. Anti-labour legislation has been enacted
which denies working people their basic rights – the right to organize without fear, the
right to bargain, and the right to strike in support of their demands. A socialist NDP
government will be a partisan government in support of the worker and farmer majority
in their efforts to achieve basic rights.
A socialist NDP committed to true industrial democracy will not only recognize
these rights, but will acknowledge and support new rights for the working man: (1) the
right to benefit from technological change in industry without threat to income or
security; (2) the right to control the product of his own labour through the democratic
management of industry; and (3) the right to employment with shorter hours and higher
pay as surpluses in productive labour emerge.
A socialist NDP will protect and support the working man. Immediately this
means:
i)
The repeal of restrictive amendments to the Trade Union Act and new
legislation guaranteeing freedom to organize without employer
interference;
ii)
The repeal of Bill 2; an extension of the right to strike during the life of
the contract when new circumstances arise which are not settled by
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iii)

iv)

negotiation; and legislation enabling workers to bargain over traditional
“management rights;”
Legislation requiring notice by employers of changes in plant operations
which threaten jobs. The implementation and effects of all such changes
should be subject to negotiation including the right to re-training and/or
transfer or severance pay;
An increase of the minimum wage to $2 per hour regardless of age, sex, or
geographical location of work place.

II) The liberation of women
The oppression of women is essential to the continued smooth functioning of
capitalism. This oppression focuses on the definition of a woman as wife and mother to
the exclusion of all else.
The most graphic demonstration of oppression is the denial to women of control
of their own bodies through knowledge of, and access to, birth control techniques and
free abortions.
Work performed in the home by a woman is not regarded as socially useful labour
by society and, consequently, is viewed as secondary and supportive to work performed
in the market place where one works for wages.
The education system actively contributes to discrimination against women.
Working class women are discouraged from seeking higher education, and women who
enter university are channeled into traditional women’s occupations.
Working women find themselves performing two jobs – as housewives and as
cogs in the labour force. As workers women are discriminated against by management
and fellow workers. They are paid the lowest wages for the dirtiest, most degrading jobs.
In vast majority non-unionized, they exist as a pool of unskilled labour to be brought into
the work force, or rejected, at the whim of the employers. At the same time, they remain
an alternative source of labour to the male labour force, keeping all wages down.
The NDP shares with the union movement a complicity in active discrimination
against women in their own ranks. This must cease. If we are to work together as equals
– men and women – and socialists we must reform the party structures to eliminate
discrimination. Yet, the struggle against the oppression of women must be carried by the
women themselves organizing around their problems and demands.
A socialist NDP committed seriously to the liberation of women will: build
structural equality within the party itself; support independent women’s organizations to
fight their oppression; enact laws to provide free birth control and abortion; provide free
government supported child care; eliminate sexual discrimination in hiring, job
classifications and job training; guarantee equal pay for equal work; eliminate sexual
stereotyping in the educational system; and recognize the productive labour done in the
home with a living wage paid from the public purse.
III) Social services
Welfare in the capitalist society is nothing more than a program of expediency
designed to ease the pain of the suffering of people and the conscience of the exploiters.
It degrades human beings, and, therefore can have no place in a socialist society. Social
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services must become instruments of liberation increasing the freedom, independence,
and integrity of the people concerned.
First, good health in a socialist society is a basic right of all. In no way can it be
treated as service administered on the ability to pay. A socialist NDP will expand the
medicare system to include all forms of related health services. It will implement a social
medicare program for preventive medicine and the development of community clinics.
Second, a socialist NDP believes that all members of society have a right to
adequate, decent housing. Furthermore, they have a right to live in a community which
has been planned and organized to serve their needs rather than the profits of land
speculators, builders, and real estate parasites.
Third, a socialist NDP will ensure that basic income payments to the poor, the
unemployed, the aged and the physically handicapped will be integrated into community
development and action programs controlled and administered by the people themselves.
Social services must not mean bureaucratic invasion and control.
IV) The Indian and the Métis
Racism in Canada has created a colony within a colony. The native people of this
continent have had to face two levels of exploitation. One, at the hands of a distant
imperial power; and one, at the hands of an immediate white society which seized the
wealth of their lands and threatened the defeated victims with cultural annihilation.
Capitalism and racism combined have ensure that these people are the first victims to
suffer chronic unemployment, underemployment, and inhuman living conditions.
A socialist NDP government in Saskatchewan must help the native people of this
land achieve self-determination and self-preservation. The policy of assimilation as
advanced from Ottawa threatens to complete the process of cultural and economic
genocide. To meet this threat, Indian and Métis people must be granted the right to a
viable economic existence which will provide the real opportunity to preserve their
independent culture and history.
A socialist NDP government will bargain without prior conditions with the native
community to reach a just settlement. The rights and privileges extended in treaties made
with Indian nations will be unconditionally guaranteed at modern economic standards.
The dismantling of the expensive and rigid Indian Affairs Department is a necessary step
towards autonomy for Canada’s Indians. Real changes for Indians will only come
through their control over their own lives and resources. This is the essence of a
democratic socialist society – the development of individual and group identities within
the framework of broad regional and national purposes. The survival of the native
peoples of Canada demands a socialist society, and a socialist movement in
Saskatchewan requires the involvement and leadership of the native people.
V) Education policy
Education in a capitalist society, by using public resources to provide advantaged
education for children of middle and upper-income families, perpetuates the existing
class system. By stifling the development of social criticism it both destroys the
creativity of students and assures passive obedience to capitalist rule. Its values are the
values of capitalism: competition, obedience, passivity and individualism.
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Educated workers are essential to modern capitalism, yet education produces no
direct profits to corporations. Hence, educational spending remains a reluctant priority
and in times of economic crisis suffers particularly. At such times, quality education,
even in traditional terms, is curtailed.
The Saskatchewan educational system is stifled by central control Bureaucratic
regimentation is the most formidable barrier to creative learning. Students, teachers and
the community at large must directly become involved in educational decision making.
Schools must become resource centers for the entire community. Province-wide
curriculum planning must be balanced with more local control over teaching methods,
curriculum, and school administration.
Far from conducting dispassionate research in the interests of “pure science,” our
universities serve as handmaidens to monopoly corporations. Their research serves the
corporate interests, and thousands of their graduates are forced to leave the province in
search of employment. Yet working people, not corporations, finance in greater
proportion the cost of higher education. The university must serve the interests of the
working people.
Specifically, a socialist NDP will seek to organize and implement the following
program:
i)
Reduction of size of the central authority of the Department of Education
providing more power and finances to local community controlled bodies.
ii)
Elimination of tuition fees and provision of stipends for all students
beyond the age of family dependence; such provisions to be automatically
implemented for all post secondary students.
iii)
Enabling democratic control at all levels of education by: (1) eliminating
the business controlled Board of Governors of the university and replacing
it with a body representative of working people to work in consultation
with students and faculty in all areas of decision-making; (2) granting
autonomy to the university at Regina and any future campuses or junior
colleges; (3) establishing a student-centered teaching approach in primary
school to facilitate the development of democratic, humanistic, and
autonomous personalities; (4) entrench the right of students and faculty to
organize and to be politically active without fear of reprisal.
iv)
Compensating working people, Indian and Métis, the poor, and women for
the failure of the university in the past to respond to their interests by: (1)
providing privileged admissions’ policies for children of poor and
particularly Indian and Métis families; (2) providing stipends and free day
care for student mothers; (3) providing complete public access to all
university records pertinent to the university’s research activities and to all
negotiations between the government and the university; and within the
university, as related to fiscal matters; (4) providing research facilities and
personnel on a priority basis to working people and their organizations,
and all oppressed minorities.
Conclusion
The issues our people and our party face are issues of survival. They call for a
fundamental socialist transformation of our society. They, therefore, call for a
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fundamental re-orientation of the NDP. We must again make our party a socialist
movement – a peoples’ instrument in their struggle against capitalism, racism,
chauvinism and imperialism.
We are aware that the layers of crises which we must confront cannot fully be
dealt with by the socialist movement of one province. But we do believe that we can
again light the spark and lead the way in Saskatchewan. By building our movement here,
we build the national movement. By succeeding here, we give hope and inspiration to
our brothers and sisters across the country.
The seventies is a decade of decision for Saskatchewan and Canada. We can
choose socialism and self-determination; or we can choose the fate of a colony of the
American Empire. We must choose socialism.
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